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On 26 March 1991 the integration process for approximating the markets of the four
countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America was put into practice through the signing of the
Treaty of Asuncion by Argentina. Brazil. Paraguay and Uruguay. This has proved to be the most
prominent integrating initiative among developing countries.
Alongside contemporary discussion relating to integrating projects, intellectual property
protection has also been of great concern to developing economies. It seems that boundaries in the
modem world are no longer a geographic issue, but rather a political matter. It is of little doubt that
the development of science and technology strategies will play a determinant part for social and
economic development in the next century and beyond. Industrial property protection is necessarily
the legal instrument which provides science and technology policies with a starting point.
This research intends to discuss these issues taking into account the legal aspects of patent
protection in the context of the MERCOSUL. For this purpose the present study is divided into
seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides a historical background of the process of Latin American
integration, from LAFTA to MERCOSUL. Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the setting up
of an international patent system, discussing the establishment and evolution of the Paris
Convention and the setting up of "Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights'" under the
GATT auspices. These two chapters serve as an introductory background.
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the aspects of patent protection in the European Community.
Chapter 3 discusses the legislative and juridical developments in the implementation of the
principles of "free movement of goods'" and "protection against unfair competition" vis-a-vis the
exercise of patent rights within the Common Market. Chapter 4 reviews the attempt to unify patent
rights in the Community by using the mechanism of inter-State Convention.
Chapters 5 and 6 evaluate more substantive aspects of patent rights in the international,
supranational and national levels to draw up guidelines for the implementation of measures that
should be taken into account by the MERCOSUL. Chapter 5 discusses primarily the protection of
pharmaceutical products and processes, biotechnology and plant varieties. Chapter 6 analyses the
application of the principles of free movement of goods and competition law in the MERCOSUL.
A complementary chapter is included to review the "biodiversity-related aspects of
intellectual property rights". Chapter 7 utilises the wording of the Convention on Biological
Diversity to investigate the following issues: access to genetic resources, technology transfer,
biotechnology, and the protection of the knowledge and practices of local and indigenous
communities.
The present research concludes by suggesting strategies for the setting of goals for national
and regional science and technology as well as industrial policies for the MERCOSUL. It considers
the harmonisation of national laws and of national juridical decisions within the integrated area as a
prerequisite of implementing a common policy which will promote technological, economic and




TABLE OF CONTENTS ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS viii
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 1 - COMMERCIAL INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 9
Introduction 9
1. Historical Overview ofLatin American Integration 10
1.1. The Latin American Free Trade Association - L4FTA 14
1.2. The Latin American Integration Association - LA1A 29
1.3. From NAFTA to a Free Trade Area ofthe Americas (FTAA)? 33
2. An Overview of the Process in the MERCOSUL 44
2.1. Origins and sources 45
2.2. General structure ofthe Treaty ofAsuncion 48
2.2.1. Basic principles 51
2.2.2. Institutional matters 53
2.3. Current developments 61
2.3.1. The Ouro Preto's outcome 61
2.3.2. Towards broader international co-operation 68
Conclusion 73
CHAPTER 2 - ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
PATENT LAW 77
Introduction 11
1. Origins and Background 78
1.1. The Paris Convention 80
1.1.1. Institutional framework 83
1.1.2. The national treatment principle and the right ofpriority 86
1.2. The creation ofthe WIPO 89
1.3. Mentioning the setting up ofa patent co-operation system 95
1.4. The efforts towards a Patent Harmonization Treaty: the PUT 97
2. Patents and International Trade 100
2.1. IPRs in the GATTframework 102
2.2. IPRs during the Tokyo Round 105
2.3. IPRs in the Uruguay Round: the TRIPSAgreement 108
Conclusion 120
CHAPTER 3 - PATENT LAW AND THE EC TREATY 124
Introduction 124
1. The Free Movement ofGoods 128
1.1. The distinction between the existence and the exercise ofa patent right 129
1.2. The exhaustion ofpatent rights and the doctrine ofthe specific subject-matter 132
1.2.1. Product not patentable in a Member State and the application of the
'exhaustion' principle 137
1.2.2. Consent and compulsory licence 140
2. The Common Rules on Competition 143
2.1. Analysis ofArticle 85 143
2.1.1. Article 85 and patent licensing agreements 146
(a) Open exclusive licence and absolute territorial protection 149
(b) Tie-in and quality obligations 151
(c) Restriction on the field of use 152
(d) No-challenge clauses 153
(e) Non-competition clauses 155
(f) Grant-back clauses 156
(g) Royalties 157
iii
(h) Duration clauses 158
(i) Output restrictions 159
(J) Price restrictions 159
(k) Customer restrictions 160
(1) Export restrictions 160
(m) Most favoured licensee clause 161
(n) Assignments and sub-licences 161
(o) Restrictions on patent licence for non-Member State 162
2.1.2. Article 85 (3) - block exemptions 162
(a) Background on Regulations 2349/84 and 556/89 164
(b) The new regulation on technology transfer: Regulation 240/96 165
2.2. Patent rights andArticle 86 184
Conclusion 190
CHAPTER 4 - UNIFICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS: THE COMMUNITY
PATENT CONVENTION 196
Introduction 196
1. General Considerations 202
2. Institutional Arrangements 204
3. Patentable Subject-Matter 206
3.1. The basic requirements 206
3.2. The negative requirements 212
3.3. Selected issues 215
3.3.1. Pharmaceutical products and processes 216
3.3.2. Biotechnology 218
3.3.3. Plant varieties 226
4. Substantive Patent Law: General Clauses 230
5. Substantive Patent Law: Economic Clauses 234
5.1. Exhaustion ofpatent rights 234
5.2. Compulsory licences 236
6. The System ofJurisdiction 237
6.1. Jurisdiction under the CPC itself 238
6.2. Jurisdiction under the Protocol on Litigation 239
6.2.1. First instance 241
6.2.2. Second instance 242
6.2.3. Third instance andpreliminary ruling 244
Conclusion 244
CHAPTER 5 - SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW: PATENTABILITY 249
Introduction 249
Part 1: General and Introductory Issues 252





2. Exclusions and Exceptions 270
3. Rights Conferred by a Patent 277
3.1. Basic rights 278
3.2. The issues on compulsory licences 280
4. Term ofProtection 290
Part 2: Patentable Subject-Matter 293
1. Pharmaceutical Products and Processes 294
1.1. International legislation: the TRIPSAgreement 298
1.2. The legislation in Brazil 303
1.3. The negotiations in the MERCOSUL 308
2. Biotechnology 309
2.1. International legislation 311
2.1.1. The Budapest Treaty 312
2.1.2. The TRIPSAgreement 316
iv
2.2. The legislation in Brazil 320
2.3. The negotiations in the MERCOSUL 323
3. Plant Varieties 324
3.1. International legislation 326
3.1.1. The UPOV Convention 326
3.1.2. The TRIPSAgreement 331
3.2. The legislation in Brazil 332
3.3. The negotiations in the MERCOSUL 336
Conclusion 336
CHAPTER 6 - SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW: COMMERCIAL ISSUES 344
Introduction 344
1. Free Movement ofGoods 346
1.1. International legislation: the TRIPSAgreement 347
1.2. The legislation in Brazil 350
1.3. The negotiations in the MERCOSUL 352
2. Competition Law 355
2.1. International legislation 359
2.1.1. The Paris Convention 360
2.1.2. The TRIPSAgreement 363
2.2. The legislation in Brazil 369
2.2.1. The constitutional basis 369
2.2.2. As in industrial property laws 373
2.2.3. in competition law 376
2.3. The negotiations in the MERCOSUL 382
Conclusion 385
CHAPTER 7 - BIODIVERSITY-RELATED ASPECTS OF IPRs 389
Introduction 389
1. The Setting Up ofNew International Regulations 390
2. Access to Genetic Resources and Related Issues 396
2.1. A briefassessment ofthe application ofthe sovereign rightsprinciple 397
2.2. Mutually agreed terms and the requirement ofprior informed consent 400
2.3. Scientific research on genetic resources 404
2.3.1. The full participation of the provider 405
2.3.2. Fair and equitable share ofthe benefits 407
2.3.3. Measures to regulate biosafety 410
2.4. An overview ofthe legislative developments in Brazil 416
3. Technology Transfer and IPRs in the CBD 427
3.1. Incentive to technology transfer with appropriate IPRs 430
3.2. Biotechnology, participation in research and sharing ofbenefits 437
3.3. Traditional practices and knowledge 440
3.3.1. A sui generis system and the TRRs concept 441
3.3.2. An oven'iew ofthe legislative developments in Brazil 445
(a) Patentable subject-matter 450
(b) Non-patentable subject-matter 453
(c) Copyrights 454




APPENDIX I - Charts: Chapter 1 521
APPENDIX H - Charts: Chapter 2 524
APPENDIX III - The Interaction Between the EPC and the CPC 525
APPENDIX IV - Biotechnology Patents in Brazil 526
APPENDIX V - Legal Components of the TRRs Concept 528
APPENDIX VI - List of Officials and Professionals Who Provided Support for the
Research 531
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research, done at the Faculty of Law of the University of Edinburgh, has been
carried out with the help and assistance of several individuals and institutions.
I must thank, firstly, the "Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e
Tecnologico (CNPq)", a Brazilian public organ part of the Ministry of Science and
Technology, for awarding me a scholarship to carry out the present research. I am
also mostly grateful to the staff of CNPq who have been kindly dealing with the
various problems of a student abroad.
I am also grateful to the Chamber of Deputies which allowed me to do the
present research and continued to help me financially. It was in the Brazilian
Parliament, I must say, that I learned how to work, how to understand, and how to
believe in the future ofmy country and, above all, of Latin America.
At the Law Faculty of the Edinburgh University I would like to voice very
special thanks to Professor Hector MacQueen, my supervisor, for his continuous
assistance, his academic and personal concern for my thesis project, his support and
his encouragement throughout these years. In addition, I wish to thank Dr. Robert
Lane, my second supervisor, for introducing me to the issues on intellectual property
protection within a Common Market. At the Faculty of Law I am also indebted to
many of its staff, who helped me administratively and academically. My thanks go,
particularly, to Adnan Amkhan, Andrew Scott, Lorna Paterson, Neil Walker, Nicholas
Dyson, and the staff of the Law and Europa Libraries.
At the latest stage of my research, I have been awarded a Ph.D. fellowship at
the Institute ofAdvanced Studies of the United Nations University, in Tokyo, Japan. I
\i
am very grateful and honoured by that. This was an essential opportunity to develop
further the environmental discussion ofmy thesis and to broaden my views on science
and technology policies. At the UNU/IAS I wish to thank, in particular, Tarcisio Delia
Senta, Jyoti Parikh, Victor Kuipers and Jacob Park.
Several friends in Brazil and in Europe have been of great assistance,
forwarding me information and necessary documents when requested, giving
suggestions and helping me with infra-structure during my field research trips. Many
of them have been helping me all the way through, from the very beginning,
encouraging and supporting my project. To thank all I wish to list some. They are
Carlos Eduardo Sette Camara, Carlos Navarro Gonzalez, Clausius Gonpalves Lima,
Darrell Posey, Fernando Soares Lyra, Geraldo Torreao de Sa, Jairo Valadares, John
Touchie, Jose Robalinho, Luciano Brandao, Manuel and Thais Cesario, Mauro
Santayana, Michael Huber, Morten Plesner Smordal, Ricardo Noblat, Roberto
Battendieri, Romulo Sulz Gonsalves Junior, Syleno Ribeiro de Paiva and Victor
Allan
I would like also to express my gratitude to all those who I have interviewed,
asked for information or for any help during this period, either in Europe or in Brazil.
Without exception all of them, in different situations, helped me without hesitation
when I really needed it. They are listed below in Appendix VI.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida read carefully a substantial part of the first draft of
the thesis and supplied me with very important insight, comments and information, in
spite of his extremely busy life. I thank him most warmly for that.
I cannot forget the language assistance provided by Jill Knox. She revised the
whole text of the thesis with great care and concern. Thank you Jill.
VI1
I must also express my love and gratitude to Anne, my wife, who has
supported me all the way through with great respect towards my research, bearing
patiently my constant absence due to the amount of work that I had to complete.
Anne also helped me to organise the list of abbreviations. I would also like to thank
my brother, Eduardo, for his encouragement and belief in all my projects. Last, but
not least, I wish to thank my beloved parents, Meirione and Aluizio, for all the efforts
that they have made throughout their lives to raise their children, for their love and,
also, for their continuous support for my intellectual needs.















Associapao Brasileira de Propriedade Intelectual (Brazilian
Association of Intellectual Property)
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works
Boletim de Integra9§o Latino-Americana
Biological Diversity
United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual
Property
Proposta Brasileira de Acordo Visando a Harmonizagao de
Leis em Materia de Propriedade Industrial entre os Paises
Integrantes do Mercosul
Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the
Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent
Procedure
Convention on Biological Diversity
Council of the Common Market (MERCOSUL)
Common Market Group (MERCOSUL)
Common Market Law Review
Common Market Law Reports
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgment in






Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights
Community Patent Convention (Convention for the European
Patent for the Common Market) as amended by the
Agreement Relating to Community Patents
Community Patent Convention (Convention for the European


























Codigo de Propriedade Industrial (Brazilian Law N. 5.772, of
21 December 1971- Industrial Property Code)
Community Plant Variety Office
Regulation N. 2.100/94, of 27 July 1994 on Community plant
variety rights
Community Plant Variety Right
Document
Treaty Establishing the European Community
European Community
European Court of Justice
European Competition Law Review
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
European Court Reports
European Economic Community
European Intellectual Property Review
European Law Review
European Patent Convention (Convention on the Grant of
European Patents)
European Patent Office
European Patent Office Reports
Economic-Social and Consultative Forum (MERCOSUL)
European Union
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Free Trade Area of the Americas
















International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright
Law
International Legal Materials
Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial (National
Institute of Industrial Property)
Intellectual Property Rights
Joint Parliamentary Commission (MERCOSUL)
Journal ofWorld Trade
Journal ofWorld Trade Law
Latin American Free Trade Association
Latin American Integration Association
Living Modified Organisms
Treaty on European Union
MERCOSUL Administrative Secretariat
Common Market of the South
Ministerial Declaration
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations
Montevideo Treaty Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the







North American Free Trade Agreement
Organization ofAmerican States
Official Journal of the European Patent Office
Official Journal of the European Communities
Ouro Preto Protocol Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the









PLT I Conf. Rec.
PLT
Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property
Patent Cooperation Treaty
Prior Informed Consent
Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a
Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention as far as patents
are concerned - Volume I: First Part of the Diplomatic
Conference
Patent Law Treaty (Basic Proposal for a Treaty
Supplementing the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property as far as Patents are Concerned).
Proposed Biotechnology Directive (PBD)
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on
the Legal Protection ofBiotechnological Inventions
Protocol of Brasilia Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement ofDisputes





National Service for the Registration and Protection of Plant
Varieties
Regulation N. 1768, of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation
of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal
products
Supplementary Protection Certificate
Treaty of Asuncion Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine
Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of
Paraguay and the Eastern Republic ofUruguay
Treaty ofMontevideo 1980






Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

















United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
United Nations Environment Programme
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties
of Plants
Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations
United States of America
World Intellectual Property Organization
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization
Propuesta de Disposiciones Legales en Materia de
Invenciones y Disenos Industrials (Documento preparado
por la Oficina Internacional de la OMPI a solicitud de la
Comision de Propiedad Intelectual del MERCOSUR)
World Trade Organization
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
Yearbook ofEuropean Law
1991 UPOV Conference Records
Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the
International Convention for the Protection ofNew Varieties
ofPlants
INTRODUCTION
On 26 March 1991 the integration process for approximating the markets of the four
countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America was put into practice through the
signature of the Treaty of Asuncion by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. This
has proved to be the most prominent integrating initiative among developing
countries.
Alongside contemporary discussion about integrating projects, intellectual
property protection has also been of great concern to developing economies. The
world has grown smaller, facilitated by the development of technologies. It seems that
boundaries in the modern world are no longer a geographic issue, but rather a political
matter. It is of little doubt that development in science and technology strategies will
play a determinant part for economic development in the next century and beyond.
Intellectual property protection is necessarily the legal instrument which provides
science and technology policies with a starting point.
It is worth considering that the market and creativity are the essential tools for
development in the future. The competitiveness of nations and of industries are very
much based on the continuous capacity for innovation. New technologies, therefore,
are going to be used as a mechanism for economic development. Whether or not the
benefits are going to be shared between the rich and poor part of developing countries
is a matter for a broader political and economic analysis. The advance of technology
may, nevertheless, play a determinant role in helping to eliminate social inequalities, as
a result of economic development and of a more just social distribution of the profits
and benefits which arise from science and technology development.
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Patent protection should be analysed in the light of industrial and international
trade policies. But a modern legal framework for patent protection must also consider
the needs of industries and of society.
This research aims at analysing the present agenda of discussion in the
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUL), taking into account the setting up of
legal mechanisms for patent protection. It is therefore necessary to consider the
developments in the national, supranational and international arena for assessing
common measures which may be used by the integrating project of the MERCOSUL.
Other issues have also raised concerns related to the protection and sustainable use of
the environment and of natural resources. This research also studies the problems
arising from actions on biological diversity prospecting, and its influence on the
establishment of common legal developments in the field of patents for the
MERCOSUL and for Brazil.
This thesis is introduced by Chapters 1 and 2.
Chapter 1 serves as a historical overview of the process of commercial,
economic and political integration in Latin America. It initially describes the
experience of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), its failure, and its
replacement in 1980 by the Latin American Integration Association (LATA). It
outlines briefly the setting up of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and the initiative towards a free trade zone for the Western Hemisphere. Chapter 1
also considers the necessary background to the integration process of the
MERCOSUL, from the signature of the Treaty of Asuncion to the agreement on the
Ouro Preto Protocol. In Section 2, Chapter 1 analyses the most recent historical
origins of the Treaty of Asuncion, as well as its goals and the provisional institutional
framework therein established. Moving further, a more definite institutional
mechanism is provided by the Ouro Preto Protocol and will be described as such.
Lastly, relevant goals and initiatives towards broader economic and technical co¬
operation will be briefly considered in the context of the integration process of the
MERCOSUL.
Chapter 2 outlines the establishment of an international system for patent
protection. It begins by analysing the setting up of the Paris Convention, taking into
consideration its institutional background and the principles which have given
stronger reasons for the operation of this international arrangement. It also considers
the efforts towards a multilateral organisation to administer and support the
international harmonisation of intellectual property. Additionally, Section 1 of Chapter
2 analyses the setting up of an international system for co-operation in the field of
patent granting procedures and the attempts to create a more advanced set of rules for
harmonising patent protection on a world-wide basis.
With the intention of establishing a link between the liberalisation of
international trade and intellectual property, Section 2 takes also into account the
existing provisions of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its
relationship with intellectual property rights (IPRs). Further, it studies the attempt of
the United States of America (US), during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, to create more effective rules against the commercialisation of
counterfeit goods. Finally, Section 2 describes, in general words, the structure and
main provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement), as a result of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Uruguay Round).
There is no doubt that the European experience is of great relevance for the
MERCOSUL. Chapters 3 and 4 consider the sophisticated legal and juridical structure
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of the European Union (EU) to provide a basis for the discussion that will arise from
the integration process of the MERCOSUL.
Chapter 3 intends to provide a view of the European Community (EC)
experience on the establishment of rules and legal principles to regulate the exercise of
patent rights. This Chapter is aided by the juridical approach that the European Court
of Justice has taken towards the resolution of conflicts in relation with the exercise of
patent rights, which apparently conflicts with the establishment of an area where
goods circulate freely and where a healthy competitive market prevails. The
administrative and legislative initiatives of the Commission of the European
Communities are also considered.
Chapter 4, on the other hand, aims at analysing the attempts to establish a
common and harmonised system for the protection of patents within the European
Community. As a matter of institutional links, the practice and laws of the European
Patent Convention (EPC) will be used as a very important reference for this purpose.
Chapters 5 and 6 propose a comparative analysis between international
agreements, Brazilian nationals laws and regulations and the current stage of
negotiations in the MERCOSUL.
Chapter 5 contemplates a more detailed discussion on the issues of
patentability, considering the legal measures which must be studied when attempting
to harmonise the issues on substantive patent law in the MERCOSUL. Part 1
addresses introductory issues of patentability such as the basic requirements for patent
protection, exclusions and exceptions of patentability, rights conferred upon a patent,
compulsory licensing and the term of protection for patents. Part 2 approaches the
issues on the patentability/protectability of pharmaceutical products and processes,
biotechnology and plant varieties.
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Chapter 6 discusses two other relevant issues in relation to the exercise of
patent rights in an integrated market. Complementing the discussion carried out by
Chapter 3, this Chapter considers the principles of free movement of goods and the
maintenance of a healthy competitive market, through the enforcement of competition
regulations, as a means of assessing issues more closely related to economic
integration, patent rights and the functioning of an integrated area.
A complementary Chapter has been included to discuss modern issues on IPRs
and environmental conservation. The links between sustainable development,
environmental protection and IPRs have been formally established by the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD), as a result of the conclusion of the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The CBD has dealt with
the issues of intellectual property protection and biodiversity conservation paying
particular attention to the development of new technologies and the role of
developing countries in the context of this discussion.
Chapter 7 proposes to analyse the issues on the protection of biological
diversity in broad terms. It examines the principles established by the CBD on access
to genetic resources, intellectual property rights and transfer of technology.
Additionally, it considers the modern approach towards the traditional practices and
knowledge of local and indigenous communities as a tool for biodiversity
conservation. Indigenous and local communities have also a very detailed knowledge
about the components, properties and functions of biological diversity. National and
international laws must, as a matter of fact, determine legal instruments to be used in
this connection.
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All the issues proposed are of great complexity. Each Chapter, if not each
Section or Sub-section, may be considered as the subject of a Ph.D. thesis on its own.
The present research may thus appear superficial and descriptive in its entirety. The
analysis that follows intends to be a non-exhaustive view of most of the issues which
may be considered by the integrating process of the MERCOSUL. Other complex
issues, such as enforcement and dispute settlement procedures, have been considered
even more perfunctorily. The present research intends, nevertheless, to provide
general guidelines for future negotiations of the MERCOSUL in matters of technical
and political complexities.
Following what has been said in the foregoing paiagraph, it will be noted that
parts of the present research are very detailed in describing the European legal and
juridical experience. However, the thesis has not analysed in detail the same issues in
the context of the MERCOSUL. Nor there is an in-depth discussion of the relevance
of the particularities of the European experience for the integration process of the
MERCOSUL. This methodology is based on two reasons:
(a) Limitation of space. The thesis already exceeded 100,000 words, which is
the limit determined by Regulation 3 .2.4. (c) (The University of Edinburgh,
Postgraduate Study Programme). A detailed analysis of all the issues which
are of relevance for the integration process of the MERCOSUL would
make the present research too long. Although the thesis describes in detail
the specific provisions of European and Brazilian legal framework, this is
done only with a view to identifying general policy-making strategies which
have to be considered by the integration process of the MERCOSUL. It is
not an aim of this work to propose a model law for the protection of
patents in the MERCOSUL.
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(b) Lack of details in the negotiations of the MERCOSUL. The negotiating
documents of the MERCOSUL are vague and do not reveal the detailed
intentions of its States Parties. It is clear that the lack of technological
capabilities of the States Parties of the MERCOSUL is a very important
issue to be considered. Therefore, this thesis aims to provide the
negotiations towards a Common Market of the South with a detailed view
of the important concepts that have been developed and implemented in
Europe - the Member States of which are far more capable technologically
than the MERCOSUL - and to conclude with proposals of legislative and
institutional strategies for determining not only a harmonised way to deal
with patent protection, but also for establishing a minimum degree of
science and technology development for the region. The examination of the
details of European and Brazilian law provides an overview of the methods
currently employed in these legal systems which are faced with their own
particular problems of patent protection. This will hopefully inform the
harmonisation process of the MERCOSUL about how to deal with such
problems if and when the appropriate time comes. Presently, however, this
thesis is concerned solely with determining broad guidelines to assist the
MERCOSUL harmonisation process at its current state of development.
My presence in the United Kingdom, and later in Japan, has been of great
significance in the attainment of the proposed task. It has, nevertheless, limited the
opportunities of updating very important points. In Scotland I firstly benefited from
the intellectual and physical infra-structure of the Faculty of Law of the University of
Edinburgh, but, on the other hand, I had great difficulties to keep updating the
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developments in Brazil and in the MERCOSUL, in spite of the kind help provided by
so many individuals and institutions. The fellowship of the Institute of Advanced
Studies of the United Nations University, in Japan, has also given me essential support
to broaden my mind by providing me with close contact with the Japanese academic
community and to further the environmental-related aspects of my research. It has,
nevertheless, created difficulties to update the European part of the research. In
general, however, I must say that both the British and Japanese experiences have been
extremely advantageous.
The cross-references made throughout the present research, in relation to
other parts of the thesis, should be understood in accordance with the following
terminology:
• Chapters are named as such (Example: "Chapter 1 - Commercial
Integration in Latin America");
• Sections are represented by one number (Example: "1. Historical Overview
ofLatin American Integration"),
• Sub-sections are represented by two numbers (Example: "1.1. The Latin
American Free Trade Association - LAFTA"),
• Paragraphs are represented by three numbers (Example: "2.3.2. Towards
broader international co-operation"). When the thesis refers to paragraphs,
without initiating with a capital letter, it should be understood as paragraphs in
a grammatical sense. And
• Sub-paragraphs are represented by one letter (Example: "(a) Open
exclusive licence and absolute territorial protection").
All the translations from the Portuguese and from the Spanish languages are
my own if not otherwise stated. The law is stated as at June 1995, based on my last
field research trip to Brazil. I have, nevertheless, tried to update all the legal materials
which were available until June 1996.
CHAPTER 1
COMMERCIAL INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA
Introduction
When one thinks about commercial or economic integration, the first example which
comes to mind is the integration process which has been carried out in Western
Europe. It is true that this is the first modern integrating process which has had a
successful outcome. It is worth noting, however, that this trend has spread all over the
globe, including regions with different economic characteristics. Such initiatives may
be found in Asia, in Africa and in the Americas.1
The present study intends to examine particularly one characteristic of Latin
American integration which is currently happening in the southern cone of South
America. The subject of this research, the integrating process of the envisaged
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUL), is unavoidably related with the process
of Latin American integration as a whole and which has been happening for at least
the last fifty years.
This Chapter introduces the subject providing a historical overview on the
integration processes and trends in Latin America. Initially, it gives an outline of the
attempts of hemispheric integration. As a complementary issue, it also looks at the
process of integration in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement
'Historically speaking, it is assumed that the first customs union is the "Zollverein". which was
formed in 1834 under the leadership of Prussia and which later defined the way for the unification of
Germany. See. for this information. Mario L Blejer. Economic Integration: An Analytical
Overview, in Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) & Institute for Latin American
Integration (INTAL). Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: Economic Integration (1984
Report). Washington. DC: Inter-American Development Bank (1984). p. 5. and Jose Artur Denot
Medeiros. MERCOSUL: Ouadro Normativo e Institucional Pos-Outro Preto. [1995] 16 BILL in
http: \nw.mre.gov.hr getec webgelec bila 16 lartigos ldenoi.htm. It is possible to argue, however,
that other examples - such as the establishment of the United States of America (US) or the
10
(NAFTA) and current attempts to establish a free trade zone in the Americas with
continental dimensions.
Finally, it analyses in more detail the substantive aspects of the integration
process which is happening in the MERCOSUL. Section 2 will, then, consider the
origins of the MERCOSUL. moving further to the analysis of the basic institutional
structure set up by the Treaty of Asuncion and of a more definite institutional
framework which has been established by the Ouro Preto Protocol. It will also analyse
briefly the aspects of broadening the scope of trade between the MERCOSUL and
third countries or regions.
1. Historical Overviewof LatinAmerican Integration
Before 1938 several programmes designed to establish a Latin American customs
union or a free trade area had been initiated, but without further practical results.
Later, in 1939 negotiations between Argentina and Brazil had taken place towards
some co-operation in the area of industrial development, envisaging the setting up of a
free trade regional commitment. Then, in 1940 an agreement was drafted to create the
Inter-American Bank which, inter alia, would have the functions of controlling and
operating payment compensation transactions2. Later, in February 1941, government
representatives of the countries that have in their territories the River Plate, gathered
together under the initiative of Argentina in the city of Rivera, in Uruguay, aiming at
integration of England and Wales. Ireland and Scotland by the Acts of the Union - may also be
considered commecial. economic and political approximation.
"Eventually, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was created in 1959 with the task of
helping economic and social development in Latin America. The IDB has forty six members and
headquarters in Washington. DC. The bank's fund derives essentially from contributions from its
members: borrowing on the world's capital markets: the sale of participation in loans from the
Bank's portfolio: special funds placed under the bank's administration: and loan repayments (in
Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Latin America's Regional Integration Process, published in the
Internet: http: www.fco.gov.uk reference briefs, lalmamerica.html).
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the creation of a regional block. In November 1941 the Argentinian and the Brazilian
Ministers of Foreign Affairs signed, in Buenos Aires, an agreement in which both
countries expressed their will to create a common customs regime with the purpose of
establishing a "River Plate Customs Union"'. In addition to that, several bilateral
agreements were drawn up towards the creation of a free trade area, or the
establishment of a system of co-operation in the field of trade and payments, including
Argentina, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti.'"
None of these agreements had concrete results, however, and the promising
agreement between Argentina and Brazil, to create the "River Plate Customs Union",
was definitely forgotten as a consequence of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
when Brazil took a position in favour of the allied forces and of the United States,
while Argentina preferred to keep a neutral position This was the final element which
made the working of this agreement impossible.4
As pointed out by Urquidi5, however, the idea of a common market for Uatin
America has not been thought of in more practical terms until in its first session the
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)6 approved "... a resolution (on
June 24, 1948) which spoke of a 'Latin American Customs Union' as a possible
' See. e.g.. Paulo Roberto de Almeida. O MERCOSUL no Contexto Regional e Internacional. Sao
Paulo: EdiQoes Aduaneiras Ltda. (1993). pp 73-74: ibid.. Cronologia da Intearacao Latino-
Americana no Contexto do Sistema Economico Internacional. [1995] 16 BIL.A. in
htlp: www.mre.gov.br/geleawebgelec/bilal6/4notas lnoia.html. and Victor L. Urquidi. Free
Trade and Economic Integration in Latin Amenca: The Evolution of a Common Market Policy.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press (1968) 4 th pnnting. pp. 20-22 and
Appendix A.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida, note 3. supra, p. 74
5Supra. note 3. p. 47.
6The ECLA was founded by Resolution 106 (VI) of the Economic and Social Council of the UN
(ECOSOC). on 5 March 1948. and was renamed Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC). by Resolution 1984/67 of the ECOSOC. on 27 July 1984 (Rudiger Wolfrum
& Christiane Philipp (ed.). United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice. London: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers (1995). V. I. p. 434). To be coherent with the facts described throughout this Chapter,
only the acronym ECLA will be used. Current members of the ECLA are all North. Central and
South American and Caribbean States, as well as France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and
Spain (Ibid., pp. 444-445).
12
subject for discussion. ..." After that the ECLA has taken a more careful approach in
addressing the issues of integration per se, preferring to discuss the matter of
economic development and growth in Latin America as a whole It must not be
forgotten, nevertheless, that the theory of regional integration in Latin America has
been essentially designed by ECLA, which had considered from the very beginning
regional integration as a possible mechanism to be used for economic development7.
Further studies were carried out by ECLA from 1954 to 1959 on the setting up of
closer co-operation systems between the countries of Latin America.
It is important to note, in this regard, that the ideas put forward by ECLA at
that time received great support from two distinct but complementary facts. Firstly,
the countries of Central America, which had been negotiating bilateral free trade
agreements since 1951, asked the ECLA Secretariat to carry out further studies on a
broader integration system for those countries. As a result of these studies, between
1958 and 1961 several agreements have been adopted for the establishment of a
Central American Common Market and its institutional framework8.
Another fact that gave great support for ECLA's theories on Latin American
integration, as a mechanism for continental economic development and
industrialisation, was that Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay were already, in the
For further discussion on the establishment of a theory for economic integration in Latin America by
ECLA. see Roger D. Hansen. Central America: Regional Integration and Economic Development.
Washington. DC: National Planmng Association (1967). pp. 17-24.
sThe Multilateral Treaty of Free Trade and Central Amencan Economic Integration was signed in
Tegucigalpa. Honduras, on 10 June 1958. by Costa Rica. El Salvador. Guatemala. Honduras and
Nicaragua (published in Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies. Instruments
Relating to the Economic Integration of Latin America. New York: Oceana Publications. Inc. (1968).
pp. 3-14). The negotiations of this treaty were backed up by the technical advice of ECLA. In
addition, the Caribbean States decided also to create an integrated area when, in 1965 Antigua.
Barbados and Guy ana signed the Treaty of Dickenson Bay establishing the Caribbean Free Trade
Association (CARIFTA). Following the accessions of other Caribbean countries to the treaty and
other attempts of integration in the region, thirteen countries (Antigua. Bahamas. Barbados. Belize.
Dominica. Grenada. Guyana. Jamaica. Montserrat. St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla. St. Lucia. St. Vicent.
and Tnndad and Tobago) signed the Treaty of Chaguaramas. replacing CARIFTA with the
middle of the 1950s, negotiating multilateral mechanisms for the liberalisation of
trade In 1958, then. ECLA organised the First Consultative Meeting about
Commercial Policies in the South of the Continent, which took place in Santiago with
the participation of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. This meeting concluded
further that the four southern countries would start, at the same time as the initiative
of ECLA to set up a Latin American Common Market, the drafting of policies
towards the liberalisation of trade among them In 1959 a second meeting of that type
was held in Santiago, Chile, and a project for a free trade zone was drafted. As a
result of this second gathering, Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru decided to support and
participate in this project.9
The two initiatives discussed above had a successful conclusion in the setting
up of institutional and multilateral mechanisms for the liberalisation of trade. The first
of them. i.e. the integration process in Central America, is beyond the scope of this
research and will not be analysed further. The second will be studied in more detail in
Sub-section 1.1, infra.
As may be seen from what has been said in the foregoing paragraphs, the
integration of Latin American countries is not a new issue. Several reasons have
traditionally given rise to deeper discussion on integration issues. Probably the two
most important of them have been, firstly, the need to foster industrialisation of the
countries of the continent and secondly, another major concern of Latin American
countries, has been the successful attempt by some European countries to establish a
free trade zone as a first stage of the setting up of a fully operational Common
Market, as a result of the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. As a result of
Caribbean Community and the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM). See. e.g.. IDB & INTAL.
note 1. supra, pp. 38-47.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida, note 3. supra, pp. 63-64.
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these two major worries. Latin American countries have thought that integration
mechanisms could provide the necessary means for strengthening trade among the
possible participants, which, as a consequence, could make easier the process of
planning the industrial development of the continent and. therefore, make their
position stronger in world trade. Obviously, these are only a few of the reasons that
have been predominant in the debate on Latin American integration There are several
others which are as important as these, such as the setting up of development policies
that could help them to solve their foreign debt problems and the correction of trade
balance payment situations. They are, nevertheless, all linked together and an
economic analysis would necessarily have to take into account all of them As the
present research intends to analyse the legal aspects of commercial and economic
integration, and the current Chapter intends to work rather as a historical and
introductory overview of the process, economic issues will be avoided.
1.1. The Latin American Free Trade Association - LAFTA
After all the consultations and diplomatic negotiations which took place during the
late the 1950s, the Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin
American Free Trade Association (the Montevideo Treaty) was signed in
Montevideo, Uruguay, on 18 February I96010, by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
1 "As published, with respective Protocols, in Inter-American Institute of International Legal
Studies, note 8. supra. When the acronym LAFTA is used throughout this Chapter, or wherever, it
means the Latin American Free Trade Association. The LAFTA had its headquarters in Montevideo.
Uruguay. When the term "Area" is used in the text of the treaty it means the combined territories of
the Contracting Parties (Montevideo Treaty. Art. 1). LAFTA had a complete juridical personality,
empowered to do things such as sign contracts, acquire and dispose of the movable and immovable
property it needs for the achievement of its objectives, institute legal proceedings and hold funds in
any currency and transfer them when necessary (Montevideo Treaty . Art 46).
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Parauuav, Peru, and Uruguay." In 1966 Venezuela joined LAFTA. and in 1967
Bolivia12
Venezuela decided not to accede to the agreement in the first place, because
of the specific characteristics of its economy at that time. The government of
Venezuela has seen the accession to the Montevideo Treaty as an opportunity for
accelerating its economic development, on the one hand. On the other, it was aware
that, as a country of high costs, Venezuela would be placed in a situation of
disadvantage compared with the other signatory States. This explanation may be
found in the fact that Venezuela had high industrial wages because its essential
industrial activity was petroleum and iron ore sectors, which could pay relatively high
wages that influenced the wage levels of other sectors of its national economy1'".
Colombia, on the other hand, was granted a moratorium until 18 June 1960 to
accede to the Montevideo Treaty as a signatory State. This moratorium period was
subsequently extended, but by the time the Montevideo Treaty came into force on 1
June 1961, Bolivia had not yet adhered to the Treaty, doing so only in 196714.
It is also necessary to mention that the government of Cuba expressed its
intention to accede to the Montevideo Treaty in 1962. The Contracting Parties
therefore convened to discuss the matter It was decided that Cuba could not join the
free trade arrangement because its economic regime was absolutely incompatible with
the liberalisation process designed by the Montevideo Treaty. There were no further
details on a precise definition of the incompatibility, in so far as Cuba had agreed to
"The signatory governments deposited their instrument of ratification on 2 May 1961 and the Treaty
came into force thirty days later, by virtue of Article 57. Colombia deposited the instrument of
accession on 30 September 1961. and Ecuador on 3 November 1961 (Sidney Dell. A Latin American
Common Market?. London. New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press and the Royal Institute
of International Affairs (1966). p 36)
'"IDB & INTAL. note 1. supra, p. 43.
l3Sidney Dell, note 11. supra, p. 47-49.
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follow the liberalisation programme administered by LAFTA1". Though some authors
claim that the judgement of the Contracting Parties was merely technical or
economic16, it is possible to find a political justification for this decision. Cuba was the
only Latin American country which was clearly following a socialist economic
approach, while at that moment all Latin American countries were in the position of
becoming right-wing military regimes.
The Montevideo Treaty defined the institutional framework of the Latin
American Free Trade Association and the legal mechanisms for the establishment and
functioning of the Latin American Free Trade Area. Though this multilateral
arrangement may be seen as a result of the four southern countries of South America
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) initiative, there is no mention of that in its
text.
In its Preamble, the Montevideo Treaty lists the main objectives and goals to
be reached by the integrating process established so far. Essentially, the signatory
countries aim at eliminating barriers to intra-regional trade as a means of accelerating
the economic development process of the participating countries (thus, ensuring "... a
higher level of living for their peoples, and of strengthening national economies
with the purpose of contributing "...to the expansion of trade within Latin America
and with the rest of the world, ..." In addition to that, the Montevideo Treaty had as
its main objectives the establishment, gradually and progressively, of a Latin American
Common Market17
Victor L. Urquidi. note 3. supra, p. 73. footnote 11
"Sidney Dell, note 11. supra, pp. 46-47.
]6Ibid.
1
Montevideo Treaty . Preamble and Art 54 It is important to note, however, that while the Preamble
suggests that the participating countries should collaborate with each other for the purpose of
attaining higher degree of integration. Article 54 appears to be a more practical and institutional
mechanism for reaching the stage of a Latin American Common Market, when says: "To that end.
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The trade liberalisation programme should be made fully operational within
twelve years of the entry into force of the Montevideo Treaty18. During this time, the
participating countries agreed to eliminate, gradually, all barriers "... in respect of ...
all their reciprocal trade, such duties, charges, and restrictions as may be applied to
import of goods originating in the territory of any contracting Party"19. The
mechanisms which have been established by the Montevideo Treaty will be further
discussed after a brief look at the institutional framework designed for the operation
of the free trade area.
Before that, it is important to mention that the liberalisation of trade, as
provided by the Montevideo Treaty was based on the principle of Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment, just as provided by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), Article I. Article 18, Montevideo Treaty, had thus stated that.
Any advantage, benefit, franchise, immunity or privilege applied by a
contracting Party in respect of a product originating in or intended for
consignment to any other country shall be immediately and
unconditionally extended to the similar product originating in or
intended for consignment to the territory of the other contracting
Parties.
The principle of National Treatment should equally apply. Therefore, any
duties or charges affecting products originating in the territory of a particular country
of the Area, should enjoy treatment no less favourable than that accorded to similar
national products.20
the |Standing Executive] Committee [of LAFTA] shall undertake studies and consider projects and
plans designed to achieve this purpose, and shall endeavor to coordinate its work with that of other
international organizations".
]sIbid.. Art. 2.
]9Ibid.. Art. 3. This Article further defines the temi "duties and charges" as "... customs duties and
any other charges of equivalent effect - whether fiscal, monetary or exchange - that are levied on
imports", excluding charges in respect of services rendered.
2('lbid. Art. 21.
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The institutional framework of the Montevideo Treaty created, in a first
moment, two organs. The Conference of the Contracting Parties (the Conference) and
the Standing Executive Committee (the Committee)21 Only after almost five years
from its entry into force. Contracting Parties found out that the institutional structure
designed for the functioning of the Latin American Free Trade Area needed to be
enhanced and decided to create a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (the
Council) which should "... meet periodically to take decisions relating to the higher
political conduct of affairs of the [Latin American Free Trade] Association"22.
Then, in this first institutional period the Conference stands as the supreme
organ of LAFTA and should adopt decisions in matters which required joint actions
from the Contracting Parties, being empowered, inter alia, to take steps necessary for
the effective functioning of the Montevideo Treaty; to carry out studies on the results
of its implementation; to promote the negotiations of the National and Common
Schedules, and to deal with business of common interest for the LAFTA2T The
Conference, which would hold at least a regular session once a year24, was composed
of one representative of each Contracting Party who had one vote each25. The
decisions of the Conference would be taken only with the presence of at least two-
thirds of the Contracting Parties26 and, during the first two years of the entry into
force of the Montevideo Treaty, decisions should be adopted only when two-thirds of
:]Ibid.. Art. 33.
"Resolution 117 (V). adopted at the Fifth Regular Session of the Conference of the Contracting
Parties, on 30 December 1965.





the votes were affirmative and no negative vote was cast This quorum of decision
was also required for determining the voting system after the two-year period27.
The Committee was the permanent executive organ of the Association with
the functions of supervising the implementation of the provisions of the Montevideo
Treaty, which included, inter alia, the duty to convene the Conference; to represent
the Association in dealing with third countries and international organs; to undertake
studies, to suggest measures and to submit recommendations to the Conference; to
submit to the Conference at its annual regular session a report on its activities and on
the results of the implementation of the Montevideo Treaty, and, obviously, to
undertake any work assigned to it by the Conference28. The Committee was
composed of one representative of each Contracting Party, who had a single vote and
who was required to have an alternate representative29
It is also interesting to note that a specific provision provided for the
possibility of the Committee to request, for the organs of the Association, the
technical advice of the ECLA and of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council
of the Organization of the American States (OAS)"0. This is a possible recognition of
the technical advice that has been successfully carried out by the ECLA to lead, draft
and establish the outline of LAFTA.
The Committee had a Secretariat, headed by an Executive Secretary, and
administrative personnel. The Executive Secretary was elected by the Conference for
" Ibid.. Art. 38.
~*Ibid.. Art. 39.
~9Ibid.. Art. 40.
i0Ibid.. Art. 44. The OAS. with headquarters in Washington. DC. is the successor of several other
Pan-American organisations which were created in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
OAS was given permanent legal and institutional structure with the signature of the Charter of
Bogota, in April 1948. Eventually, the Chaner of Bogota came into force in December 1951. The
OAS has the goals of helping to guarantee peace and security in the continent: resolve political,
judicial and economic problems between its members: promote mutual understanding on
20
a three-year term and was eligible for re-election, and would be allowed to attend and
carry out the secretary duties of the plenary meetings of the Conference without the
right to vote/' Neither the Executive Secretary nor the administrative personnel of
the Secretariat were allowed to seek or to receive instruction from any government or
any national or international entity"2.
Later, on 12 December 1966, Articles 33 to 39 of the Montevideo Treaty
were amended by the Protocol Institutionalising the Council of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the LAFTAA Under this new institutional framework, the Council became
the supreme organ of LAFTA with the duty of making the decisions concerning the
conduction of its higher policy and empowered, inter alia, to enact general rules
which would permit a better achievement of the objectives of the Montevideo Treaty;
to examine the results of the tasks accomplished by LAFTA; to fix the basic rules
governing the relations of LAFTA with third countries, regional associations and
international organisations and entities; and to amend the Montevideo Treaty pursuant
to Article 60 "4 Generally speaking, the Conference and the Committee were left with
the same tasks as before, but under the supremacy of the Council. The LAFTA's
institutional framework may be visualised more clearly in Chart 1, Appendix 1, infra.
In relation to the voting system, it was determined that both the Council and
the Conference could meet and take decisions only in the presence of at least two-
development; and provide common action in the event of aggression (in Foreign & Commonwealth
Office, note 2. supra).
31 Ibid.. Art. 41.
}'Ibid.. Art. 42.
'Published in Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies, note 8. supra, pp. 318-
321.
'Montevideo Treaty, as amended by the Protocol Institutionalising the Council of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs. Art. 33. The Council, by virtue of Article 33. was composed by the Ministers of
Foreign .Affairs of the Contracting Parties, unless such a duty was nationally assigned to another
branch of the government of a Contracting Party.
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thirds of the Contracting Parties'" The Council, however, was empowered by the
amended Article 34 (g), Montevideo Treaty, to change its own system of voting and
that of the Conference.
For the liberalisation of intra-regional trade, there are two mechanisms which
were designed to be used for the negotiation of the removal of barriers among the
Contracting Parties of LAFTA. They are the National Schedules and the Common
Schedules.
In connection with the preparation of National Schedules' , Contracting
Parties were requested to grant "... to other contracting Parties reductions in duties
and charges equivalent to not less than eight (8) per cent of the weighted average
applicable to third countries" until the full elimination of customs duties or any other
charge having equivalent effect'7. These negotiations would be carried out yearly and
the mechanism for the elimination of trade restrictions would come into force until the
1 January of each following year'8.
The negotiation of the National Schedules should follow the deadlines as
described in the Protocol: firstly, before 30 June of each year, Contracting Parties
should provide the Committee with a list of products which they were applying for
concessions. Then, before 15 August of each year, Contracting Parties should provide
the Standing Executive Committee with a list of items for which they were willing to
grant concessions, but this second schedule would apply only to the subsequent years,
not to the first year of entering into force of the Montevideo Treaty, when the
3-Ibid.. Art. 37.
,6
According to Article 4 (a). Montevideo Treaty, the National Schedules consist of"... specifying the
annual reductions in duties, charges and other restrictions which each contracting Party grants to the
other contracting Parties
3 Montevideo Treaty . Art. 5.
3*Ibid.. .Art. 6.
corresponding final date should be 1 October" Further, on 1 September of each year
(with the exception of the first year, when the corresponding date should be 1
November) the Contracting Parties would initiate the negotiation of the concessions
to be accorded by each to the others as a whole These concessions would be assessed
multilaterally, but would not preclude bilateral negotiation in connection with the
interests attached to specific products40 After negotiations were concluded, the
Committee would make the necessary calculations to assess the weighted average of
duties and charges of individual concessions in force for imports from within the Area,
in relation to the weighted average of duties and charges applicable in the case of third
countries41 If such assessment concluded that the minimum commitment of eight per
cent had not been reached so far, the negotiations would continue so that the list of
reductions of duties and charges of each Contracting Party could be simultaneously
published not later than 1 November of the negotiating year, that they could come
into force from January of the following year42.
It should be noted, moreover, that for the calculation of the "weighted
averages'" Contracting Parties would consider two mechanisms: "one corresponding
to the average of the duties and charges in force for third countries; and the other to
the average of the duties and charges which shall be applicable to imports within the
Area"43.
It is also important to mention that the Montevideo Treaty established that the
application of the National Schedules mechanism should be based on the principle of
}9Ibid.. Protocol N. 1. Title III (10).
A0Ibid.. Title III (11).
A]Ibid. Title III (12).
A2Ibid. Title III (13).'
AiIbid.. Title I (2).
reciprocity44, which "... refers to the expected growth in the flow of trade between
each contracting Party and the others as a whole, in the products included in the
liberalization programme and those which may subsequently be added'"15
The Common Schedules should be understood as a list of products for which
Contracting Parties agree, collectively, to eliminate duties, charges and other
restrictions completely and that, in terms of the aggregate value of the trade among
the participating countries of the regional agreement, does not constitute less than (a)
twenty five per cent during the first three-year period; (b) fifty per cent during the
second three-year period; (c) seventy five per cent during the third three-year period,
and (d) all of such trade during the fourth three-year period46 Once products were
included in the Common Schedule the concessions granted were irrevocable47.
For the negotiation of the Common Schedule, the following deadlines should
have been taken into account: firstly, during each three-year period and not later than
31 May of the third, sixth, ninth and twelfth years from the date of entry into force of
the Montevideo Treaty, the Standing Executive Committee would supply the
Contracting Parties with statistical data relating with the value and volume of the
products traded in the Area during the preceding three-year period This data should
be eventually used for indicating the proportion of aggregate value which each
product individually represented48 In addition to that, before 30 June of the third,
sixth, and ninth years from the date of entry into force of the Montevideo Treaty, the
Contracting Parties had to exchange the lists of products whose inclusion in the




'"Protocol N. 1. Title IV. (14)
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Common Schedule thev were willing to negotiate4'' Then, the Contracting Parties
would conduct negotiations to establish, before 30 November of the third, sixth, ninth
and twelfth years, a Common Schedule including goods where the values meet the
minimum commitments referred to in Article 7 of the Montevideo Treaty.
Some escape clauses could be used in specific situations. For instance,
countries which would be in a position of disadvantage concerning the trade between
one Contracting Party and the others as a whole, in relation to the products included
in the programme for the liberalisation of trade, could request the Contracting Parties
to "... consider steps to remedy these disadvantages with a view to the adoption of
suitable, nonrestrictive measures designed to promote trade at the highest possible
levels'"50. If the circumstances referred to in Article 11 of the Montevideo Treaty
persist, at the request of the affected Contracting Party, Contracting Parties should
seek for further solutions and remedies to end such disadvantages51.
Additionally, if the importation of products included in the liberalisation
programme occurred in such quantities or conditions that they had, or were liable to
have, serious repercussions on specific productive activities of vital importance to the
national economy, Contracting Parties could, as a provisional measure, authorise the
Contracting Party in question to impose non-discriminatory restrictions upon those
imports52. The Montevideo Treaty also says that if measures have been authorised to
a Contracting Party to correct an unfavourable overall balance of payments, these
measures could have been extended, on a provisional basis, to intra-Area trade in the
products included in the liberalisation programme5. If these measures required
A9Ibid.. Title IV (15).





immediate actions from the affected Contracting Party, the latter could take the
necessary actions as provided by Articles 23 and 24. but should inform the Committee
immediately which measures have been taken'4.
The Montevideo Treaty has also adopted special provisions for the co¬
ordination of agricultural development and commodities trade policies, for the
purpose of ensuring that normal supplies to the population would be guaranteed, also
raising the standards of living of the rural population, without disorganising the
regular productive activities of each Contracting Party.55 Because of the specific
features designed to protect the agricultural activities of the Contracting Parties of the
Montevideo Treaty, GATT has requested information from Members of LAFTA in
respect of whether priority would be given to imports of agricultural products
originating in the territories of other LAFTA Members, even in the case of lower
prices from third countries. The answer was that the granting of priority to LAFTA
suppliers was dependent mainly on the competitiveness of the prices of the supplier
against the price offered by third countries. This has raised questions in relation to the
comparison with the treatment granted by the European Economic Community (EEC)
to agricultural products. Though the latter was in a rather more stable economic
situation, it did grant preferential treatment for agricultural products within the EEC.
Additionally, it was thought that agricultural products could play a very determinant
role in the context of LAFTA Members to promote the modernisation of the
agricultural economy of the region.
Another important aspect of the Montevideo Treaty was its intention to
promote industrial development, by reconciling the import and export regimes of the
>AIbid... An. 25.
'"Ibid.. Ans. 27 to 31.
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Contracting Parties and by co-ordinating the treatment accorded to capital, goods,
and services from outside the Area'6. This should have been done through the
progressive promotion of closer co-ordination of their industrial policies and through
the negotiation of mutual agreements on complementary economies by industrial
sectors57.
The situation of the less-developed economies has also been taken into
consideration, and several measures were designed to create conditions to guarantee
the growth of all economies of the Area.58 Less-developed economies were then
granted a preferential treatment in addition to that granted to all Contracting Parties.
Less-developed countries could, therefore, reduce their import duties, charges and
other restrictions at a slower pace than other Contracting Parties.
Aiming at giving other non-signatory countries of Latin America the support
to join LAFTA, Contracting Parties have decided to be reasonably flexible in relation
to future accession Thus, other Latin American States which would like to accede to
the LAFTA in the future would be required only to deposit the relevant instrument of
accession with the government of Uruguay, and the Treaty would come into force for
the acceding State thirty days after the deposit of the corresponding instrument of
accession 59
56Ibid.. Art. 15.
''Ibid.. Arts. 16 (a) and (b). respectively. The Montevideo Treaty, however, does not specify- the
scope of such mutual agreements, w hich may lead one to think that the procedures employed would
vary from case to case (Sidney Dell, note 11. supra, p. 42).
Ibid.. Art. 32. It is noteworthy that Protocol N. 5 of the Montevideo Treaty recognised the situation
of Bolivia and Paraguay , providing preferential treatment to them. Additionally, in its first session in
July 1961 the Conference of the Contracting Parties approved the extension of preferential treatment
to Ecuador, on joining LAFTA (Sidney Dell, note 11. supra, p. 42).
>9Ibid.. Art. 58. On the other hand, according to Article 64. Montevideo Treaty , a country wishing to
withdraw from the Treaty could do so informing the other Contracting Parties of its intention during
a regular session of the Conference, and should formally submit the instrument of denunciation at
the following regular session. The rights and obligations of the denouncing government in relation
with reductions in duties and charges and other restrictions, received or granted under the
liberalisation programme, would remain in force for a period of five years from the date w hich the
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The LAFTA. actually, has been an agreement full of good intentions to
promote the economic development of Latin America as a whole. Several problems
have, nevertheless, been noticed from the very beginning as contributing to the failure
of the integrating process.
Contracting Parties have, for instance, drafted provisions on the co-ordination
of external policies, but have failed to adopt rules on the harmonisation of internal
policies. It is possible to note that the LAFTA process has failed from the very
beginning and not even the short term goal of setting up a free trade area in a twelve-
year period was met.
At the beginning, the negotiations of National Schedules seemed to point to a
successful process, in so far as during the first two rounds of negotiations the
concessions were well above the eight per cent required by the Montevideo Treaty.
This has actually highlighted the fact that the easiest concessions - usually those
already part of the intra-regional trade and almost entirely based on traditional
primary products - have been included in the negotiations. During the third and fourth
round of negotiations the number of concessions was clearly reduced.
In addition, the rise of trade that followed the signature of the Montevideo
Treaty was unevenly distributed. While Argentina supplied about one-third of
LAFTA's intra-regional trade in 1961, and nearly half of it from 1961 to 1964, fifty
per cent of the concessions during the first three rounds were made only by Argentina,
Brazil and Ecuador60 The negotiations of the Common Schedules, on the other hand,
denunciation becomes formally effective. This would not apply if the denouncing government would
consent to a shorter period
"'See. e.g.. Sidney Dell, note 11. supra, pp. 70-73.
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appeared to be of no importance at all when one takes into account that "[ojnlv one
common list was approved in 1964 and never became effective"61.
After 1969, the enactment of national lists was completely forgotten and the
negotiations of LAFTA gave more emphasis to the agreements on industrial
compatibility, rather than on trade issues as such. This was actually followed by the
negotiations that had been carried out by the countries of the Andean region, which
concluded a Sub-regional agreement, signed in Bogota on 26 May 1969 (known as
the "Cartagena Agreement") by Bolivia, Colombia. Chile, Ecuador and Peru''2.
Venezuela adhered to the agreement as an original Member on 13 February 1973
Chile withdrew in 1976. In 1992, Peru suspended its participation in the tariff and
other economic mechanisms'" The legislative functions of this integrated system are
carried out by the Commission. Its decisions are applicable in the Member States
without the need of further implementation by national law64.
From 1969 to 1975, the Andean Pact actually saw a dynamic evolution of the
sub-regional process of integration and a very active legislative process on the
harmonisation of national legislation, and on the setting up of a programme on
liberalisation of trade. The ambitious aims of the Andean Pact suffered from the
economic crises that affected the whole of Latin America, and it was slowed down
mIDB & INTAL. note I. supra. p. 17.
6"Thc stagnation of the process and the sectoral contractions within LAFTA led several Contracting
Parties, in particular those of the Andean region, to be convinced that a different type of integration
project was required. This is essentially the main justification for the creation of the Andean Pact,
following a much more ambitious integrating project (LDB & LNTAL. note 1. supra, p. 20).
63S. Kendall, S. Bowne, J. Mann & S. Fidler. Andean Pact Still Split on Outside Tariff. Financial
Times. 12 May 1994. p. 6. It is worth noting that Peru did not withdraw from the agreement itself.
Peru was temporarily allowed to waive some of its obligations. It was done within the framework of
the Cartagena Agreement and with the express consent of the other Members.
MS.C. Zalzuendo. Patemes en el Grupo Andmo: Reforma de 1991.119911 39 Revista del Derecho
Industrial 457-465. at p. 459.
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after the mid 1970s0", when several integrating projects, such as the creation of a
common external tariff, were not fully implemented00.
Several economic justifications may be given for the failure of the LAFTA
process, in addition to those just mentioned It is argued that the lack of
harmonisation of economic and monetary policies, the absence of common marketing
strategies or of exploitation of common lines of credit, together with the deficiency of
a common policy for foreign investments, are all additional reasons for the failure of
LAFTA.67 It is also necessary to point out, as Paulo Roberto de Almeida08 has
properly done, that another reason, based on political adjustments, may have played a
vital role in this context. Paulo Roberto de Almeida recalls that after the second half
of the 1960s, until the beginning of the 1980s, Latin American countries were under
military dictatorships which, by their nature, expressed preferences for economic
systems which were extremely closed to international markets, with strong tendencies
to self-sufficiency and government predominance in the economy.
1.2. The Latin American Integration Association - LA!A
The first actual expression of the lack of success of the LAFTA process was briefly
described above, i.e. the creation of the Andean Pact in 1969. In addition, Contracting
Parties decided to create an agreement to replace LAFTA which did not seek to
establish a free trade area in Latin America based on strict rules and ambitious
Paulo Roberto de Almeida, note 3. supra, pp. 65-66
""Eventually, the Andean Pact's common external tariff came into force on l January 1995.
IDB & INTAL. note 1. supra, p. 19.
"Paulo Roberto de Almeida, note 3. supra, p. 65.
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deadlines, but. instead, aimed at promoting the creation of bilateral commercial
agreements that could include other countries of the continent in the long run"''
Based on the principles of pluralism '0, convergence71, flexibility72, differential
treatment7"\ and multiplicity74, three basic instruments have been created to promote
the establishment of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) . Firstly,
"regional tariff preferences"75 which are limited to reductions in the external tariff
granted reciprocally by the countries "... and which applied with reference to the tariff
level in effect vis-a-vis third countries"76. This type of mechanism does not call for the
creation of a common external tariff and is intended only to grant specific preferences
to other members of LAIA.
The second mechanism is the "regional tariff arrangements"77 in which all
Members of LAJA are to participate78, based on the same rules as the third mechanism
for trade liberalisation, "partial tariff arrangements". The latter is a mechanism which
"9The Treaty for the Creation of the Latin American Integration Association (Treaty of Montevideo
1980) was signed in Montevideo. Uruguay, on 12 August 1980. by Argentina. Bolivia. Brazil. Chile.
Colombia. Ecuador. Mexico. Paraguay. Peru. Uruguay and Venezuela, and came into force on 18
March 1981 (Avelino de Jesus. Relacoes Comerciais Internacionais: GATT. ALADI, MERCOSUL,
SGP. SGPC. NCPD. Sao Paulo: EdiQoes Aduaneiras (1992). p. 68). The Treaty of Montesideo 1980
is published in Paulo Roberto de Almeida. MERCOSUL: Legislacao e Textos Basicos. Brasilia:
Senado Federal (1992). pp. 32-54.
"Which means that it shall be based on the political will of the Members States to integrate, bey ond
the political or economical diversity that might exist between them (Treaty of Montevideo 1980. Art.
3 (a)).
'Being the progressive multilateralisation of partial tariff arrangements, through periodical
negotiations between the Members States (Treaty of Montevideo 1980. Art. 3 (b))
:
Aiming at creating the capacity to permit further agreements on partial tariff arrangements (Treaty
of Montevideo 1980. Art. 3 (c)).
3Making sure that in both the regional and partial tariff arrangements, it is recognised the economic
differences among the participating countries (Treaty of Montevideo 1980. Art. 3 (d)).
4Being the creation of possibilities in relation to forms and adjustments between the Members
States, using the existing instruments to make the regional markets more dynamic and broader
(Treaty ofMontevideo 1980. Art. 3 (e)).
5Ibid.. Art. 5.
IDB & INTAL. note 1. supra. p. 51.
Treaty ofMontewdeo 1980. Art. 6.
sIt is worth noting that by virtue of Article 18. Treaty of Montevideo 1980. Members of LAIA are
requested to approve a list of preferences for less-developed countries, to agree upon the total
elimination of customs barriers, without reciprocitv for some specific products, aiming at creating
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intends to create conditions to deepen the regional integration process, through
progressive multilateralisation7'' This mechanism shall be based on the following
rules: (a) it shall be open to accession from other Members States; (b) it must contain
clauses which lead to convergence, thus benefiting all Members States; (c) it shall
contain clauses leading to convergence, as well as preferential treatment to less
developed countries; (d) it must have a duration of at least one year; and (e) it may
contain specific norms on safeguard measures, non-tariff restrictions, and others81'
To sum up, the difference between LAFTA and LAIA. as integrating systems,
is that the latter emphasised the setting up of partial preferential agreements in a
bilateral basis - and there was no intention to establish a more formal type of regional
commercial agreements on a multilateral basis - while the former's aim was to
establish a programme of common commercial liberalisation, envisaging a customs
union type of integration and a Common Market agreement in the future. It is
important to mention, however, that the LAIA also has the main goal of a Latin
American Common Market, as part of its major objectives, but using more flexible
mechanisms than those established by LAFTA81.
The LAIA was, however, brought to life in a very difficult time. Following the
petroleum crisis, at the end of the 1970s, which considerably affected oil importing
countries such as Brazil, Latin American countries faced a large economic problem
derived from the foreign debt crisis in the early 1980s, which was made clear by the
favourable conditions for the participation of those countries in the economic development which
will be taking place.
ffreaty of Montevideo 1980. Art. 7. These arrangements can be of any type (Ibid.. .Art. 8). in so far
as they take into account further issues such as science and technological co-operation, the promotion
of tounsm and the conservation of the environment (Ibid.. Art. 14).
*nIbid.. Art. 9.
87bid. .Art. 1.
Mexican moratorium.x: The regional tariff arrangements of LAIA had, thus, no
practical results and the intra-regional trade among the members of LAIA was greatly
reduced after 1981 84
The Treaty of Montevideo of 1980 created, virtually, the same institutional
structure as LAFTA with a few terminological differences. The highest organ of the
Association is the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as in the LAFTA, and the
LAFTA's Conference of the Contracting Parties was replaced by the Conference on
Evaluation of Convergence. Finally, the Standing Executive Committee of LAFTA
was changed by a Committee of Permanent Representatives, also helped by an
administrative structure (the Secretariat) headed by a Secretary General84 In Chart 2,
Appendix I, infra, a more comprehensive view of the institutional framework of the
LAIA is presented.
The Treaty of Montevideo of 1980 did not deal in much detail with issues
about regional co-operation in the fields of industrialisation or agriculture, but
recognised and created mechanisms designed to help the less-developed countries.
Essentially, the mechanisms created are the establishment of more favourable
conditions for less-developed countries, based on the principles of non-reciprocity and
community co-operation; the setting up of preferential treatment to benefit these
countries; and the establishment of mechanisms to ensure that the preferential
treatment granted to less-developed economies could eventually come into practical
effect. To attain this goal, mechanisms for opening the markets for products from
less-developed countries have been created, as well as Special Co-operation
8"PauIo Roberto de Almeida, note 3. supra, p. 67
*3Ibid.
84Treaty ofMontevideo 1980. Art. 28.
Programmes and an Office for Economic Promotion within the Executive
Secretariat.85
It seems that LAIA has no practical importance, since it is very limited in
scope, dealing chiefly with trade arrangements and, somehow, with the settlement of
trade balances, explicitly lacking mechanisms for the co-ordination of internal and
external economic policies. The intention of LAlA's Members was actually to provide
the integration system with less strict liberalisation rules and deadlines. Following the
tragic end of the LAFTA, Contracting Parties had also thought of a more flexible
agreement which could keep the machinery of Latin American integration running,
while giving time for the future to come. LAIA was designed upon a very pragmatic
and practical basis, aiming at promoting free trade in the continent without
determining how countries should do so, and without creating deadlines which would
become difficult to meet, putting the whole process at risk. In fact, LAIA started to
gain more importance in the trade context of Latin American integration from the late
1980s to the beginning of the 1990s. An example of the partial success of LAJA, in
recent times, is that there are currently thirty two partial and other economic
agreements in place, half ofwhich have been signed in the 1990s86,
1.3. From NAFTA to a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)?
To assess the background to the setting up of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), one will have to consider firstly the geographical and economic
conditions that have, naturally, been of great importance for making the links between
Canada, Mexico and the United States of America (US). Initially, there are three
xsIbid.. Chapter III. See. for further details on the application of the goals and mechanisms to help
less-developed economies. IDB & INTAL. note 1. supra, pp. 71-72.
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events that have played a very determinant part in this context, and which should be
mentioned87.
In the first place, Mexico has been through a difficult economic and financial
crisis since the beginning of the 1980s. This led the governments of President la
Madrid and, subsequently, of President Salinas, to determine the boundaries of the
development strategies, considering structural reforms and strict fiscal adjustments
aiming at tackling the problems arising from the foreign debt crisis. These
adjustments' objectives were to review Mexican's foreign trade policy which, in the
government's view, would lead to an increase of the competitive capacity of its
industries. Following that, Mexico acceded to the GATT in 1986. Several other
actions have been taken in the field of liberalisation of trade, such as the fixing of a
twenty per cent limit for import taxes which was fully implemented by 1988. These
economic adjustments had very positive effects on the foreign practice of the country,
substituting the external trade manner of exporting primarily oil and minerals, to the
increasing exportation of other manufactured products. The liberalisation of external
trade, as a strategy designed to initiate and further sustain economic development, has
unavoidably made the economic environment of Mexico more attractive to US
commerce and investments.
Secondly, a bilateral free trade agreement was negotiated, and implemented in
January 1989 between the US and Canada with the inclusion of several mechanisms
for the liberalisation of intra-bilateral trade, comprising the liberalisation of goods,
services and investments, excluding intellectual property protection issues. The
^Organisation of American States (OAS). Toward Free Trade in the Americas. (1995). as
downloaded from hap: vrvrw. oas. org frtrade, htm.
8 Most of the information provided below about these three ev ents w hich have led to the creation of
the NAFTA has been generally extracted from Ministerio das Relayoes Exteriores (MRE) &
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integration of markets, and approximation of interests between both countries, was a
long historical process, and the setting up of a formal liberalisation programme was
merely part of the natural and geographical consequences of this process88.
The third event is the launching, in 1990, by US President George Bush, of a
programme called the "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative" which was a proposal
for a new partnership between the US and Latin America, as part of a global strategy
of the US to increase its commercial participation in the whole hemisphere. This
initiative called for the expansion of US trade with Latin America; for the increase of
the participation of the US private sector in the region; and for the negotiation of
reduction of Latin American debts owed to the US government. The Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative advocates that both Latin American countries and the US
would strengthen their position in the world market89. This is probably a major
starting point for modern discussion on a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
which will be further analysed later in this Sub-section.
Following the description of these historical facts, it is important to mention
that bilateral negotiations between the US and Mexico - later joined by Canada - were
taking place very effectively, and the consequence was an agreement on the creation
of a tripartite liberalisation programme among the North American partners.
On 12 August 1992, Canada, Mexico and the US ended the negotiations of
the North American Free Trade Agreement90 with the intention to eliminate gradually
Funda^ao Centro de Estudos de Comercio Exterior (FUNCEX/RJ). O Brasil e o NAFTA:
Impacto sobre Comercio e Investimentos. Brasilia: ABIGRAF (19931. pp. 14-25
ssMoreover. the 1965 deal on trade in auto and automotive parts between the Canada and US had not
showed much effectiveness against the outgrowing trade between the two countries.
89Foreign & Commonwealth Office, note 2. supra.
'"The negotiations towards the agreement on the NAFTA started on 12 June 1991. in Canada. The
Agreement itself was signed on 17 December 1992 (supplemented in 1993 by the negotiation of "side
agreements" in the areas of labor, the environment, and safeguards) and started to operate on 1
January 1994. According with Article 101. the NAFTA establishes a free trade area in accordance
with Article XXIV of GATT.
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the existing trade barriers to goods and services within the territories of the Parties;
to promote conditions of fair competition; to increase investment; to protect and
enforce IPRs, and to broaden the application of NAFTA through co-operation
arrangements in a trilateral, regional or multilateral basis91.
These goals will be achieved through the abolishment of restrictions on
investments and services; through the creation of rules and restrictions on the
liberalisation of some industrial sectors such as automotive, textile, energy,
petrochemical, and agriculture, through the setting up of sanitary and phytosanitary
measures; and through the regulation of telecommunications, competition and
environmental policies, and intellectual property rights.
The elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-NAFTA trade will be
done gradually in a period of fifteen years. It is important to note, however, that the
liberalisation programme of NAFTA may not be considered, in a strict sense, a free
trade area arrangement, but rather a negotiating process which will abolish trade
barriers on a limited basis, maintaining some non-tariff barriers such as domestic
subsidies and agriculture quotas92. It is even possible to assume that the NAFTA is
rather an agreement to abolish tariff restrictions to trade among the participating
countries - a type of trilateral GATT - than an agreement which establishes a free
trade zone as such.
The institutional structure of NAFTA is based on a Free Trade Commission,
composed by Ministers of the Parties or their designees, and a Secretariat. The Free
Trade Commission will have, among others, the following tasks: to supervise the
implementation and further elaboration of NAFTA; to resolve disputes on the
91NAFTA. Art. 102 (1).
9"MRE & FUNCEX/RJ. note 87. supra, p. 13.
interpretation or application ofNAFTA's provisions; and to supervise the work of the
Committees and Working Groups established by the agreement9"1.94 All the decisions
of the Free Trade Commission must be taken by consensus, unless otherwise agreed95.
The Free Trade Commission will convene at least once a year in regular session96 The
Secretariat, which will be divided into national sections97, has the duty to provide
technical and administrative assistance to the Free Trade Commission and to the
Panels, Committees and Working Groups98.
Additionally, the link between the main goals ofNAFTA, as an US strategy to
broaden the latter's commercial influence in the continent, shall be briefly described.
Between 9-11 December 1994, thirty four Heads of States of the Americas99 gathered
together in Miami to participate of the Summit of Americas (SA), and discussed
further mechanisms for hemispheric co-operation. The outcome of the SA is a
Declaration of Principles, entitled "Partnership for Development and Prosperity:
93NAFTA. Annex 2001.2 creates eight Committees - (a) trade in goods: (b) trade in worn clothing;
(c) agricultural trade; (d) sanitary and phytosanuary measures: (e) standards-related measures (which
is composed by 4 Sub-committees on land transportation standards, telecommumcations standards,
automotive standards and labelling of textile and apparel goods): (0 small business: (g) financial
services: and (h) an Advisor. Committee on Private Commercial Disputes -. and six Working
Groups - (a) rules of origin; (b) agricultural subsidies: (c) two Bilateral Working Groups (Mexico -
USA and Canada - Mexico); (d) trade and competition: and (e) temporary entry.
9AIbid. Art. 2001 (l).
95Ibid. Art. 2001 (4).
96Ibid. Art. 2001 (5).
91
Ibid. Art. 2002 (l)and (2).
911Ibid.. Art. 2002 (3).
"With the exception of Fidel Castro from Cuba who was not invited. Note that, as it has been noted
before in Sub-section 1.1 in relation to the decision against Cuba's adherence to the LAFTA. it was
showed that the decision in the context of LAFTA had a political basis rather than a technical one.
against the opinion of some authors. The justification of the host of the Summit of Americas.
President of the US. Bill Clinton, for not inviting Cuba, is that the latter was the only country of the
Americas where democracy did not prevail. For this information, see White House. Remarks bv the
President to Members of the Summit Community. Host Officials, and Officials from Florida on the
Goals of the Summit, in gopher://summit.fiu.edu/00 Updates/clinton-remarks. txt.
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Development, Free Trade and Sustainable Development in the Americas"100, and a
more detailed Plan of Action101.102
The Declaration of Principles calls for the promotion of economic progress
through the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas in which barriers to trade
and investment would be eliminated progressively. The agreed deadline for the
conclusion of the negotiations is the year 2005. Such negotiations will consider the
existing regional and sub-regional agreements to deepen and broaden the hemispheric
integration process.
In addition, the Declaration calls for further action in the field of human and
minority rights, corruption, drugs, terrorism, infra-structure, science and technology,
tourism, poverty, education, sustainable development and the protection of the
environment. The Declaration of Principles calls also for the "... participation of the
private sector, labor, political parties, academic institutions and other non¬
governmental actors and organizations in both our national and regional efforts, thus
strengthening the partnership between governments and society".
While stating that the creation of the FTAA will be in accordance with the
GATT/WTO10'1 rules and will not raise new barriers to trade, the Plan of Action is a
document considering the major steps which will be taken in four broad areas: (a)
Preserving and Strengthening the Community of Democracies of the Americas; (b)
Promoting Prosperity Through Economic Integration and Free Trade; (c) Eradicating
Poverty and Discrimination in Our Hemisphere; and (d) Guaranteeing Sustainable
Development and Conserving Our Natural Environment for Future Generations. In
1 "Published in [1994] 15 BILA 241-244.
""Published in (1994] 15 BILA 244-260.
" "Both the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action were signed virtually by all Heads of
States of the Continent with the exception of Fidel Castro.
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between, there are twenty three principles in which action shall be pursued. These
goals will be sought with the co-operation of the institutions of the regional and sub-
regional agreements and, in particular, with the technical assistance of several
international organisations such as the OAS, IDB, UN Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean. Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO), the
World Bank and other UN agencies which are active in the hemisphere. For this
purpose a schedule of negotiations was established as follows.
In January 1995 the working programme started with the creation of
schedules for the OAS Special Committee on Trade104. In June 1995, Ministers of
trade-related areas of the thirty four nations met in Denver/Colorado, the USA, to
analyse the report of the SCT and to assess areas of immediate action. As a
conclusion of this gathering, Ministers released the "Denver Declaration"105 which
agrees on an immediate programme to be prepared for the initiation of negotiations of
the FTAA, which shall be consistent with the rules of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and shall take into consideration opportunities to facilitate the integration of
less-developed economies into the process, and increase their level of development.
The Denver Declaration establishes seven Working Groups in the following
areas: Market Access106, Customs Procedures and Rules of Origin107; Investment108,
l03Plan of Action. Chapter II, 9(1). Also, countnes which are not yet Members of the GATTAVTO
are encouraged to do so.
104The OAS was in charge of the Special Committee on Trade (SCT). "... to assist in the
systematization of data in the region and to continue its work on studying economic integration
arrangements in the Hemisphere. ..." (Plan of Action. Chapter II. 9 (7)).
"5In http://americas.fiu.edu/documents/950630.htm.
Ul6The Working Group on Market Access will organise a comprehensive database on market access
barriers covering all industrial and agricultural products and make specific recommendations in this
regard (Denver Declaration. Annex, point (1)).
10'
The Working Group on Customs Procedures and Rules of Origin will compile a comprehensive
inventory of Hemisphere customs procedures, determining the feasibility of publishing a Hemisphere
Guide to Customs Procedures; develop features for a system of rules of origin; identify' areas for
technical co-operation in customs operation; and make recommendations for the negotiations on
rules of origin (Denver Declaration. Annex, point (2)).
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Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade109, Sanitary and Phitosanitary Measures110,
Subsidies, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties111; and Smaller Economies112.11, It
was also decided that next Ministerial Meeting should create working groups in the
areas of government procurement; intellectual property rights114, services, and
competition policy. These four additional working groups were eventually established
during the Second Ministerial Trade Meeting, held in Colombia on 21 March 1996115,
l0sThe Working Group on Investment will create an inventory of investment agreements and treaties
that exrst in the region, determining areas of commonality and divergence and make
recommendations (Denver Declaration. Annex, point (3)).
109 The Working Group on Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade will compile information on
the bodies that exist which are charged with conformity assessment to technical regulations in the
continent: recommend methods to promote understanding of the WTO Agreement on Standards and
Technical Barriers to Trade: and make recommendations on ways to enhance transparency (Denver
Declaration. Annex, point (4)).
1KThe Working Group on Sanitary and Phitosanitary (SPS) Measures will create an inventory of all
agreements on SPS in the continent: promote understanding of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and
Phitosanitary Measures; enhance mutual understanding of the scientific basis for SPS certification
procedures; and compile the methods used for risk assessment in the continent, with a new to work
toward common approaches (Denver Declaration. Annex, point (5)).
111 The Working Group on Subsidies. Antidumping and Countervailing Duties will identify
agricultural export subsidies and other export practices (recommending ways to address trade-
distorting export practices for agricultural products that are traded in or with the hemisphere):
promote understanding of the WTO obligations in the area of subsidies: review information on the
dumping and subsidies laws of the countries of the Americas; exchange views on the application and
operation of trade remedy laws regarding subsidies and dumping; and make recommendations
(Denver Declaration. Annex, point (6)).
112 The Working Group on Smaller Economies will identify- and assess the factors affecting the
participation of smaller economies in the FTAA identify- and examine ways to facilitate their
participation in the establishment of the free trade area: and make recommendations on measures to
be taken and issues to be considered in the negotiations of the FTAA (Denver.Declaration. Annex,
point (7)).
11'Denver Declaration, para. 5.
"following the Ministerial Meeting of June 1995. the US distributed a proposal on the terms of
reference for the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (US Government. FTAA Working
Group on Intellectual Property - Proposed Terms of Reference - 5 December 1995. in
http: americas.fiu.edu/inside/index.htmr) to be established during the Second Ministerial Meeting in
Colombia. This proposed terms of reference suggested by the US allows the Working Group to go
beyond the data-collection-onented tasks given to the other working groups, suggesting that they
should identify- ways to eliminate possible restrictions on the market access of intellectual property -
related products and services: recommend ways to promote the understanding of the WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: and identify- measures to
improve the administration of IPRs. such as the facilitation of applications and granting procedures.
115At the first meeting in Denver. Ministers accepted the invitation of the government of Colombia to
host the second meeting (Denver Declaration, para. 12). Prior to the Second Ministerial Meeting, the
private sector of the thirty four countries gathered in Cartagena de Indias. Colombia, from 18 to 21
March 1996. to discuss further its participation in the integration process. Several questions have
been taken into account, such as the opportunities for the private sector in the FTAA the effects of
national economic policy on the process of creating the FTAA and investments. Under the auspices
of four committees the "Americas Business Forum" analysed further the following issues: trading
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which also analysed the final report of the SCT and received the reports of the
working groups mentioned above116 117
The four working groups created by the Cartagena Declaration have the
following plan of action118:
(1) The Working Group on Government Procurement, which will be chaired
by a representative of the US119, has the following tasks: to collect, systemise
and create an inventory of legislation, regulations and procedures in the
national level and in the integration schemes and other existing agreements in
the hemisphere; to compile data on purchases or goods and services by central
governments, including state-owned undertakings; to identify areas of
commonality and divergence; to recommend methods to promote
understanding of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement; to
recommend methods to promote transparency; and to make recommendations.
(2) The Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, which will be chaired
by a representative of Honduras120, has the following tasks: to create an
inventory of the intellectual property agreements, treaties and arrangements,
including international agreements to which countries are parties, as well as to
compile an inventory of national intellectual property laws, regulations and
enforcement procedures, identifying, on the basis of this information, areas of
commonality and divergence; to recommend methods to promote
understanding and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement; identify possible
areas of technical assistance, including administration and enforcement of
IPRs; to analyse the implications of emerging technologies for IPRs protection
in the FTAA; and to make recommendations.
(3) The Working Group on Trade on Services, which will be chaired by a
representative of Chile121, has the following tasks: to undertake conceptual
background work on the nature of trade in services, including the relationship
with other working groups, particularly the Working Group on Investment122,
to compile a comprehensive inventory of agreements covering trade in
strategies in the FTAA: opportunities for the private sector in the development, construction and
operation of infrastructure: globalisation of production process: and human sustainable development
and environmental preservation (FTAA. The Americas Business Forum. Cartagena de Indias
Colombia. March 18-21, 1996. http://americas.fiu.edu/documents/960130.htm).
116Second Ministerial Trade Meeting. Cartagena. Colombia. 21 March 1996. Joint Declaration,
hereinafter the "Cartagena Declaration" (in http://americas.fiu.edu/documents/960321a.htm). para.
6. For the information on the establishment of the four additional working groups, see Cartagena
Declaration, para. 11.
11
Cf. notes 106 to 112. supra, for the plan of work of the working groups established in the First
Ministerial Trade Meeting.
,18The plan of action for the new four working groups is available in Annex I of the Cartagena
Declaration (in http://americasfiu.edudocumenis'960321a.htm).
U9Cartagena Declaration. Annex II.
l20lbid.
1:1 Ibid.
]"Cf. note 108. supra.
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services and determine areas of commonality and divergence; to create a
comprehensive inventory of measures affecting trade in services and identify
steps to enhance transparency and facilitate trade; to recommend methods to
promote understanding and implementation of the WTO General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS), and to make recommendations.
(4) The Working Group on Competition Policy, which will be chaired by a
representative of Peru123, has the following tasks: to promote understanding of
the objectives and operation of competition policy; to compile an inventory of
national laws and regulations, as well as competition policy agreements,
treaties and arrangements, identifying, on the basis of this information, areas of
commonality and divergence; to identify co-operation mechanisms among
governments aiming at ensuring the effective implementation of competition
policy laws; to recommend ways to assist countries to implement their
competition policy laws; to exchange views on the application and operation
of competition policy regimes and their relationship with trade; and to make
recommendations.
During the Second Ministerial Trade Meeting major points of conflict between
the US and other Latin American nations, notably Brazil, took place. Particularly, the
continuous efforts from US representatives to include in the discussion labour and
environmental regulations. Virtually all Latin American States opposed the inclusion
at this stage of a deeper discussion on regulations in these fields. Although the
position of the latter prevailed, the US managed to include in the Cartagena
Declaration a statement affirming that the Ministers recognise .. the importance of
the further observance and promotion of worker rights and the need to consider
appropriate processes in this area .. ,"124.
Another reason for conflicts, particularly between Brazil and the US, was
related to the Costa Rican candidature to host the 1997 Ministerial Trade Meeting.
Brazil had already offered to host this meeting in Denver, and it seemed that all
countries had agreed with that. Between the Denver and the Cartagena meetings,
however, Costa Rica offered its candidature which was apparently supported by US
3Cartagena Declaration. Annex II.
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representatives. At the end of the Cartagena meeting, it was finally agreed that Brazil
would host the Third Trade Ministerial Meeting and Costa Rica would host the fourth
i 125 126
one, in 1998
There are three major routes to be followed towards the establishment of the
FTAA. A possible path is through the negotiations for broadening the scope of
NAFTA with the possibility of accepting all countries. Another solution is to seek the
conclusion of arrangements between the existing sub-regional or regional
mechanisms, until the formation of a broadened network covering all the countries of
the Americas is reached. Another possibility is to negotiate a conclusive arrangement
with the participation of all countries of the Americas and covering the issues as a
whole. The latter is most unlikely. Generally speaking, the US supports the first way,
and others countries, such as Brazil, support the second route. On the one hand, the
US wishes NAFTA to lead the process of continental integration. Brazil, on the other,
wants to have the MERCOSUL playing a leading role for gathering countries together
into a broader Latin American free trade arrangement.
While it is reasonably difficult to predict what is going to come from these
negotiations, and even if they are going to have any practical success in the near
future, what is likely to happen at some point is that the negotiations will be carried
out between NAFTA and MERCOSUL, leaving other countries with no other option
than joining them.
]2AIbid.. para. 15.
1 -5Cartagena Declaration, para. 16.
"6Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva. Comercio Exterior e Foco de Tensao com os EUA Folha de Sao
Paulo. 29 March 1996.
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2. An Overviewof the Process in the MERCOSUL
In the first Section of this Chapter, a brief historical background of the integration
process of Latin America was provided. In a general sense, these historical facts are
the origins of the MERCOSUL. The political will to promote mechanisms for
commercial and economic co-operation among Latin American countries, as it has
been seen, is the basis upon which the MERCOSUL has been conceived, and these
initiatives started formally more than thirty years ago.
Economic integration is a very important issue for current Brazilian foreign
policy. It is, nevertheless, necessary to remember that not only the policy makers, but
also the Brazilian legislature have given great importance to the discussion of Latin
American integration, by the inclusion of a postulate, among Brazilian constitutional
principles, that Brazil "... shall seek the economic, political, social and cultural
integration of the people of Latin America, with a view towards forming a Latin-
American community of nations"127. Though this Brazilian constitutional principle
refers only to Latin American integration, apparently limiting the territorial application
of the concept - excluding the US and Canada - it is possible to assume that such
constitutional idea is rather a goal that Brazilian government must seek, than a
principle which limits the geographical application of the intention of the legislature.
The integration process in the MERCOSUL is undoubtedly more feasible than a Latin
American-type of process. It does not diminish, however, the intentions of setting up
a continental form of approximation on a practical basis.
Brazilian Federal Constitution, of 5 November 1988. Art. 4. Sole paragraph. Translation from
Keith S. Rosenn. Brazil - Supplement, in Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz (eel),
Constitutions of the Countries of the World. New York: Oceana Publications Inc. (1993). Release 93-
2. All the translation of the Brazilian constitutional provisions in this and the following Chapters are
taken from the reference above.
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It would appear that economic theories and doctrines have been influencing
the drawing-together of the four countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America,
which would place the present work on a second level of importance. However, this
assertion is untrue, if one takes into account the process as a whole. The rationale for
the unification of national markets among the four countries has indeed a bias to
consider the economic advantages of the process in its entirety. But, beyond economic
theories, it is necessary to recall that the process is fundamentally political, and the
necessary performance of political actions and intentions is made material by the law
and made effective by national courts. The analysis of the entire process is very
complex and all the issues involved (economic, political, legal, social, cultural, etc.)
play a determinant part in the foundation and functioning of the integrating system.
This Section shall, nevertheless, pay more careful attention to the political and legal
aspects of the MERCOSUL.
The present Section will, therefore, provide a general view of the process
which culminated with the MERCOSUL, affording a descriptive analysis of the
institutional characteristics, and of the mechanism for the operation of the common
area.
2.1. Origins and sources
Following the advice of Paulo Roberto de AJmeida, it is important to emphasise that
the first thing to be said about the MERCOSUL is that its creation is late by at least
half a century128. As has been seen in the foregoing Section, even the creation of the
LAFTA was based essentially on the initiatives of the countries of the Southern Cone,
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a fact which places them in a leading position towards the formation of a
commercially integrated area.
Recent facts, however, describe more evidence for the motivation to integrate,
particularly, the markets of Argentina and Brazil. The first action towards the
approximation of the two countries was primarily political. In 1980, Argentina and
Brazil agreed upon a co-operation programme in the field of atomic energy. Later, in
1982 Brazil expressly supported Argentina in the Falklands war. Then, the political
process of redemocratisation of both countries, which occurred almost during the
same period, naturally gave more support to further political endeavours to discuss,
on a more practical basis, the approximation of the two economies.
The initial formalisation of the economic and commercial approximation
between Argentina and Brazil occurred in 1985, with the Declaration of Iguapu. At
that time, a committee was created to study the forms and modalities of a future
economic co-operation arrangement between the two countries. The conclusions of
this committee led to the signature, on 29 July 1986, of the Agreement on Argentine-
Brazilian Integration129. This Agreement, which calls for the establishment of a
common economic space, creates the first formal instrument of the integration process
(the Programme for Economic Integration and Co-operation - PEIC) which led the
two countries to sign a total of twenty four Protocols dealing with different sectors of
the economy, like agriculture, foodstuff, financial matters, trade preferences, steel
industry and other industrialised products.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida, note 3. supra, p. 72. He obviously refers to the project of Argentina
and Brazil during the early 1940s on the negotiations of an integration scheme between the two
countries (in Section 1. note 3. supra).
'"9As published in 27ILAI901 (1988). This agreement came into force on 1 January 1987.
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This programme was followed by the signing, on 29 November 1988, of the
Treaty of Integration, Co-operation and Development130, which established a deadline
of ten years for the creation of a common economic space between Argentina and
Brazil. The mechanism utilised for the attainment of this goal was the elimination of
all tariff and non-tariff barriers, as well as the harmonisation of macro-economic
policies.
Soon after, in July 1990, both countries decided to accelerate the integrating
process and signed the Act of Buenos Aires'^1 which established a more ambitious
deadline (31 December 1994) for the creation of a Common Market between
Argentina and Brazil. Paraguay and Uruguay later joined the negotiations which
Argentina and Brazil were carrying out on a bilateral basis. The outcome of these
negotiations was the signing of the Treaty Establishing a Common Market between
the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay
and the Eastern Republic ofUruguay, on 26 March 1991lj2.133
It is also worth noting that the legal sources of the MERCOSUL are not only
the Treaty of Asuncion and its protocols, and the decisions of the organs thereby
created, but further, the complementary agreements signed in the framework of the
LAIA. By virtue of Article 8, Treaty of Asuncion, "... States Parties undertake to
abide by commitments made prior to the date of the signing of this Treaty, including
130Portuguese version published in Paulo Roberto de Almeida, note 69. supra.
131 As mentioned by Paulo Roberto de Almeida, note 3. supra, pp. 78-79.
13230 ILM 1041 (1991). Hereinafter the "Treaty of Asuncion" (Art. 23). The Treap of Asuncion
came into force on 30 November 1991.
l33The historical information provided in the preceding paragraphs was borrowed from the following
publications: Jose Angelo Estrella Faria. O MERCOSUL: Principios. Finalidade e Alcance do
Tratado de Assuncao. Brasilia: MRE/SGEE/NAT (1993). pp. 162-168: Paulo Roberto de Almeida,
note 3. supra, pp. 75-79; Gloria Worcel. El MERCOSUR en el Periodo de la Transtcion:
Funcionamento Institucional. Participacion Empresana e Impacto Sobre el Comercio. Buenos Aires:
CEPAL fECLA], Documento de Trabajo N. 44. LC/BUE/L.126. May 1992. 2-3: and Celso Luiz
Nunes Amorim. O Mercado Comum do Sul e o Contexto Hemisferico. [1991] 7 Boletim de
Diplomacia Economica 3-8. at pp. 5-7.
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agreements signed in the framework of the Latin American integration Association
(...), and to coordinate their positions in any external trade negotiations they may
undertake during the transition period". For the purpose of the application of this
provision, there are several rules which shall be followed by the States Parties of the
MERCOSUL
States Parties shall therefore avoid affecting the interests of other States
Parties or of the envisaged Common Market in agreements that they may conclude
with other countries members of the LAIA134, or in any trade negotiations they may
conduct by themselves135. They shall also consult among themselves whenever
negotiations of tariff reductions for the formation of other free trade areas take
place146, and they are obliged to extend to other States Parties of the MERCOSUL
any advantage, favour, exemption, immunity or privilege granted to a product
originating in or destined to third countries which are not members of the LAIA147.138
2.2. General structure of the Treaty ofAsuncion
The Treaty of Asuncion is a quadrilateral agreement with twenty four Articles, five
Annexes and three Declarations. The rationale of the Treaty of Asuncion is the
acceleration of the process of economic development of its participants, with social
justice; the promotion of scientific and technological development; and the
modernisation of the economies of the States Parties for the expansion of the supply
and improvement of the quality of available goods and services, with a view to
134Treaty of Asuncion. Art. 8 (b).
] 33Ibid.. Art. 8 (a).
136Ibid. Art. 8 (c).
13 Ibid.. Art. 8 (d).
138 For more detailed discussion on the instruments that were into force during the transitional
period, by virtue of Article 8 of the Treaty of Asuncion, see Jose Angeio Estrella Faria. note 133.
supra, pp 164-168.
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enhancing the living conditions of the populations of the Parties.14; All this takes into
account the necessary insertion of their economies in the international arena, in
particular considering the regionalisation trends happening all over the world, with a
view to furthering the efforts to bring about a Latin American Common Market140.
The establishment of a common market, by 31 December 1994, was designed
to be achieved taking into account the following instruments: (a) the establishment of
a system of free movement of goods, services and "factors of production"141 through,
inter alia, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on the
movement of goods, and any other equivalent measures; (b) the establishment of a
common external tariff and the adoption of a common trade policy in relation to third
parties or group of States, and the co-ordination of positions in regional and
international economic and commercial forums142, (c) the co-ordination of macro-
economic and sectoral policies between the States Parties in the areas of foreign trade,
agriculture, industry, fiscal and monetary matters, foreign exchange and capital,
services, customs, transport and communications, or any other that may be deemed
necessary; and (d) the harmonisation of legislation in the relevant areas with a view of
strengthening the integration process.143
139Treatv of Asuncion. Preamble.
14°Ibid.
141The expression "factors of production" includes two elements: capital and work force. It is also
possible to use the expression "free circulation of people", as comprising workers and undertakings,
and "free circulation of capital", referring only to material investments. As formally speaking the
Treaty of Asuncion has not the object of a full political union, consequently the "free circulation of
people" as a result of the process is related merely with its characteristics as "factors of production"
(Jose Angelo Estrella Faria. note 133. supra, p. 41).
l4"Such as the GATT/Uruguay Round, the LAIA and the negotiations towards the FTAA.
l43Treaty of Asuncion. Arts. 1 and 5. Article 5. in fact, decides upon the main instruments which
shall be used for the achievements of the objectives of an area free of restrictions, within the deadline
imposed by Article 1. such as the establishment of a liberalisation programme which includes, inter
aha. the progressive and gradual reduction of tariffs and non-tariff measures: the co-ordination of
macro-economic policies: a common external tariff: and the adoption of sectoral agreements.
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The Treaty of Asuncion recognises the economic situation of Paraguay and
Uruguay and grants them an extra period of one year. i.e. until 31 December 1995,
for the full elimination of restrictions144. In addition, the States Parties adopted
general rules of origin for the transitional period (Annex II)14 , a system for the
settlement of disputes (Annex III)146, and safeguard clauses (Annex IV).147 They also
agree upon the co-ordination of their domestic policies with a view of drafting
common rules on competition148, and they declare their will to promote closer co¬
operation with Bolivia and Chile149.
Accession to the MERCOSUL by other members of the LAIA shall be
through negotiation, and approval of the application for accession requires an
unanimous decision of the States Parties. Applications from members of other sub-
regional agreements who want to accede to the integrating process of the
MERCOSUL may be considered only five years from the entry into force of the
Treaty of Asuncion, while applications from other members of LAIA, who do not
participate in sub-regional agreements, may be considered before this date.150
A State Party who wishes to withdraw from the Treaty of Asuncion has to
inform the other States Parties of its intention and shall submit the document of
' iAIbid.. Annex I. Art. 1.
,45By Decision of Council of the Common Market MERCOSUL/CMC.DEC. N. 2/1991 (published in
[1993] Special Edition BIL4 30). the MERCOSUL establishes a more detailed set of rules for the
certification of the origin of products.
l46The Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement of Disputes (MERCOSUL/CMC/DEC. N. 1/1991. in
[1993] Special Edition BIL4 30) sets up the mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts during the
transitional period, which will be further discussed in Paragraph 2.2.2. infra.
14
Treaty of Asuncion. Art. 3.
]AgIbid.. Art. 4. Additionally. States Parties are requested to apply their domestic legislation to
restrict the importation of products, originating from third countries, whose prices are influenced by
subsidies, dumping or any other unfair practice. The negotiations towards common rules against
unfair competition is further discussed in Chapter 6. Section 2. Sub-section 2.3. infra.
1 '^Declaration Nos. 2 and 3. respectively (both published in 30 ILM 1063 (1991)).
'
^'Treaty of Asuncion Art. 20.
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denunciation within sixty days131. Once the denunciation is formalised, the rights and
obligations of the denouncing party shall cease, while those relating to the
liberalisation programme will continue for a period of two years counted from the
date of the formalisation152.
One of the main problems of the Treaty of Asuncion is that it created an
integrating process with the characteristics of a free trade zone, but did not provide
for a juridical personality under international law for this process. This was, at the
beginning, viewed as a possible threat to the process as a whole. This situation was
later re-arranged, as will be analysed below in Sub-section 2.3, Paragraph 2.3.1.
2.2.1. Basic principles
The Treaty of Asuncion is based on the principles of gradualism, flexibility and
balance153, reciprocity154 and consensus155. All these principles seem to work together
for the attainment of the main goal of establishing a common market between the
participating countries. This Paragraph will discuss briefly the application of these
principles in the context of the formation of the MERCOSUL.
The principle of gradualism implies that the process of liberalisation of trade
for the establishment of the MERCOSUL shall be done through successive stages, in
growing intensity. The example of Article 3 of Annex I, of the Treaty of Asuncion,
makes this principle clearer. This provision affirms that tariff reductions will take
place in a gradual, linear and automatic basis, benefiting the listed products classified







of tariff reduction would take place as follows: 30 June 1991 (47%), 31 December
1991 (54%), 30 June 1992 (61%); 31 December 1992 (68%), 30 June 1993 (75%);
31 December 1993 (82%); 30 June 1994 (89%); and 31 December 1994 (100%). This
principle suggests that the States Parties of the MERCOSUL intended to give time for
their economies, and for their private actors, to adjust themselves to a partial and
selective liberalisation ofmarkets.
The principle of flexibility indicates that the outline of the liberalisation
programme, its deadlines and plans, will not have a rigid character and will be flexible,
to be changed in accordance with the pace of the establishment of the Common
Market. This principle, then, gives the States Parties and the process itself the
possibility to adjust the liberalisation programme constantly, for the achievement of
the goal of creating the Common Market. As pointed out by Estrella Faria156, the lack
of definition of this principle in the text of the Treaty of Asuncion alludes to two
different types of interpretation of the application of the principle. Firstly, it is
suggested that in considering the application of the Treaty of Asuncion, the principle
of flexibility works as a guideline for the procedures that the governments of the
participating countries will take to put the liberalisation programme effectively into
practice. In this case, the principle should not any have further purpose. Secondly,
from examination of the application of this principle in the context of the Treaty of
Asuncion, the notion of flexibility constitutes one of the basic elements for the
interpretation of the provisions of the treatv This is very much a result of the general
wording of the Treaty of Asuncion, which suggests that the principles on which it will
be based are of general understanding and generally applicable in the context of
international law.
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The principle of balance may suggest that the Treaty of Asuncion should avoid
the specialisation of the sectors of the economy. It is not clear, however, how this
specialisation would take place and, further, how such specialisation would threaten
the integration process in its entirety. Again, as highlighted by Estrella Faria157, the
application of the principle of balance could take into account the negative aspect of
the balance. This means not the consideration of the balance that is supposed to be
reached by the different economic sectors during the integration process, but the
avoidance of a situation which may be unbalanced. The Treaty of Asuncion has
nevertheless provided for mechanisms to guarantee the balance of competition among
industrial sectors by the safeguard measures provided for the transitional period.
Finally, the principle of reciprocity, which indicates that the duties and
obligations of the States Parties shall follow such a principle, differs in essence from
the other set of principles listed in the Preamble of the Treaty of Asuncion. This
principle is not designed directly for the attainment of the objectives of the treaty, but
aims at regulating the formal (legal) relationship of the contracting parties within the
context of the integration process. 158
2.2.2. Institutional matters
The Treaty of Asuncion established two organs for the execution of the integration
process: the Council of the Common Market (CCM) and the Common Market Group
(CMG)159. The highest organ of the MERCOSUL is the CCM, which has the
responsibility for political leadership and for decision-making to ensure compliance
156Note 133. supra, pp. 5-6.
157 Ibid., p. 14.
i 7SFor a further analysis of the application of the principles of gradualism, flexibility, balance and
reciprocity, and its contradictions for their application during the transitional penod established by
the Treaty of Asuncion, see Jose Angelo Estrella Faria. note 133. supra. Chapter 1
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with the objectives set out by the Treaty of Asuncion"'0. The CCM is composed by
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs - who co-ordinate the meetings of the CCM161 - and
the Ministers of Economy of the States Parties, and shall meet at least once a year
with the participation of the Presidents of the participating countries162.
The CMG, which is co-ordinated by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, is the
executive organ of the MERCOSUL and is in charge of the following duties: to
monitor compliance with the treaty; to take necessary steps to enforce the decisions of
the CCM; to propose measures for applying the trade liberalisation programme, to
co-ordinate macro-economic policies; to negotiate agreements with third parties; to
draw up programmes of work to ensure progress of the process; to decide upon its
own rules of procedure; and to create any working groups it deems necessary for the
attainment of the objectives laid out by the Treaty of Asuncion, in addition to those
provided by Annex V, which will be described later in this Paragraph.163
The CMG consists of four members and four alternates for each State Party,
representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy or its
equivalent (areas of industry, foreign trade and/or economic co-ordination), and the
Central Bank. When working towards proposing measures as part of its work during
the transitional period, the CMG may call on representatives of other government
agencies or ministries, or the private sector.164 The CMG has an administrative
, :,9Treatv of Asuncion. Art. 9.
]mIbid.~Art. 10.
l6]Ibid.. Art. 12. The Presidency of the CCM shall rotate among the States Parties, in alphabetical
order, for periods of six months, and other ministers or ministerial authorities may be invited to
participate of the meetings of the CCM (Ibid.).
]62Ibid.. Art. 11.
]6iIbid. Art. 13.
] 64Ibid.. Art. 14.
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secretariat, with headquarters in Montevideo, with the functions of keeping the
CMG's documents and report on its activities165.
For the purposes of co-ordinating macro-economic and sectoral policies, the
CMG established ten working groups. Later, Resolution MERCOSUL/GMC/RES. N.
11/1991166, established the Sub-group N. 11, entitled Labour Matters. Then, by
Resolution MERCOSUL/GMC/RES. N. 11/1992167, this Sub-group was renamed to
Labour Relations, Employment and Social Security.
Sub-group 1, on Commercial Issues, has discussed, inter alia, common
regulations on competition law, including the drafting up of an Anti-dumping Code,
and common policies on safeguards measures and customs regimes. Sub-group 1 has
also identified and compared different instruments, in particular those related with
fiscal and monetary matters, and a common customs nomenclature.
Sub-group 2, on Customs Issues, has drafted a glossary for the MERCOSUL,
harmonising terms and definitions; and has discussed customs legislation for the
internal and external relationship between the States Parties of the MERCOSUL and
also with third parties. Sub-group 2 has also dealt with the comparison between the
national legislation on sanitary and phitosanitary measures, border control and
tourism
Sub-group 3, on Technical Standards, has, inter alia, analysed technical norms
relating to the transport and trade in the MERCOSUL and biosafety regulations. Sub¬
group 4, on Fiscal and Monetary Policies relating to Trade, has dealt with exchange
regimes, regulations for the operations with foreign currencies, Stock Markets
regulations, etc.
]65Ibid.. Art. 15.
166Published in [ 1993] Special Edition BIIA 100.
16 Published in 11992] 4 BIL4 25.
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Sub-groups 5 and 6, on Inland and Maritime Transport respectively, have
considered the harmonisation of norms for the transport within the MERCOSUL,
both by road or by sea or river.
Sub-group 7, on Industrial and Technological Policy, has considered, inter
alia, an approach towards a common science and technology policy, including
discussions on the harmonisation of national intellectual property laws, transfer of
technology regulations, forms to support a closer link between academia and private
sectors, and environmental protection.168
Sub-group 8, on Agricultural Policy, has carried out studies on, inter alia,
agriculture insurance, irrigation, agricultural equipment, financial mechanisms to
develop the agriculture of the four countries, storage, social programmes, training,
rural electrification, productivity and quality, and systems for the commercialisation of
agricultural products.
Sub-group 9, on Energy Policy, studied policies on all types of energy,
including electricity, coal, petrol and others, aiming to define the national mechanisms
for the promotion of institutional and organisational structure for the sector, taking
also into consideration common measures aiming at the protection of the
environment.
Sub-group 10, on Co-ordination of Macro-economic policies, considered the
aspects of the relationship between the States Parties of the MERCOSUL and the
outside world, aiming to reach a common view towards third countries. This Sub¬
group's intention was, essentially, to guarantee the necessary measures that would
support the setting up of a common external tariff. Some comparative analysis was
l58The work earned out by Sub-group 7. in particular the issues that has arisen from the Committee
on Intellectual Property , is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. infra.
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also delineated to understand some intra-trade MERCOSUL measures. It is also in
Sub-group 10 that a Committee has been established to discuss the creation of
common rules for protection against unfair competition within the integrated area169.
Sub-group 11, on Labour Relations, Employment and Social Security,
analysed, in a comparative basis, the national legal systems for regulating the
relationship between employers and employees, wages, social contributions,
employment, the free circulation of workers, training, etc. This Sub-group also
considers aspects of regulatory measures for health and safety in the context of
working conditions. Aiming to pay more attention to the views of the workers, the
most important Trade Unions were also represented in this Sub-group.
The Treaty of Asuncion, in Article 24, calls also for the establishment of a
Joint Parliamentary Commission with a view at co-ordinating the work of the
diplomatic and sectoral negotiations with their implementation into national legal
systems. The organisational structure described above is also represented in Chart 3,
Appendix I, infra
By virtue of Article 3170 and by Annex III171 of the Treaty of Asuncion, the
Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement of Disputes172 was established for regulating
the resolution of conflicts between States Parties themselves that would eventually
arise from the interpretation or application of the Treaty of Asuncion or of the
169The issues on the harmonisation of anti-competitive measures is further discussed in Chapter 6.
Section 2. Sub-section 2.3. infra.
' °Which calls for the adoption of. inter alia, a system for the settlement of disputes for the
transitional period.
' "Treaty of Asuncion. Annex III says that within 120 days from the entry into force of the Treaty of
Asuncion, a system for the settlement of disputes for the transitional period should be established
(Annex III. point 2). taking into account that until 31 December 1994 a definite system should be
established (Ibid., point 3). A definite system for the resolution of conflicts has been established and
will be further discussed in Sub-section 2.3. Paragraph 2.3.1. below.
1
"Approved by Decision of the Common Market Council MERCOSUL/CMC/DEC. N. 01/1991. note
146. supra. Hereinafter the "Protocol of Brasilia". The full text of the Protocol of Brasilia is
published in Paulo Roberto de Almeida, note 69. supra, pp. 132-140.
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agreements reached within its framework, as well as disputes related to the
interpretation or application of the decisions of the CCM and of the resolutions of the
CMG173.
The system is based on the establishment of an ad hoc Tribunal, which would
be established after the following procedure. Firstly, Parties should try to resolve their
conflicts by direct negotiations174, and should inform the CMG, through its
Administrative Secretary, about the actions that have been taken for and during the
direct negotiations175.
If such negotiations do not lead, or lead partially, to the solution of the
controversy, any of the Parties may submit it to the CMG, which will analyse the
circumstances, allowing the Parties to lay down their positions and, if necessary, the
CMG will call in a group of selected experts176.177 At the end of this stage of the
proceedings, which shall last for up to thirty days counted from the date that the
controversy was submitted to the CMG178, the CMG will formulate recommendations
to the States Parties in the dispute, aiming at its solution179.
If neither of these procedures succeed in resolving the dispute, any of the
States Parties may inform the Administrative Secretary that it intends to use
Arbitration proceedings for the settlement of the controversy180 An ad hoc Tribunal,
! 3Protocol of Brasilia. Art. 1.
]1AIbid.. Art. 2.
1 'Ibid.. Art. 3(1). Direct negotiations may not exceed fifteen days after the dispute was raised by
one of the Parties (Ibid.. Art. 3 (2)).
1 6Each State Party will designate a list of six experts, and such a list will be registered in the
Administrative Secretary (Ibid.. Art. 30 (2)).




1 S0Ibid.. Art. 7(1). After receiving such a communication the Administrative Secretary will inform at
once the other Party (ies) in the dispute and the CMG (Ibid.. Art. 7 (2)).
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composed by three arbitrators, will then be established181. Each State Party of the
dispute will designate one arbitrator and an alternate, and a third one will be chosen
by both of them, who may not be a national of one of the Parties in the dispute and
who will preside over the Tribunal'82. In the case of any dispute for choosing or
appealing against a choice of an arbitrator, the Administrative Secretary will be in
charge of designating the conflicting name18'.
Once the Arbitration Tribunal is established and operating, it will fix its own
rules of procedure and will designate where it is going to take place, in accordance
with the opinion of the Parties'84. Then, the States Parties, through their
representatives before the Tribunal185, will inform the Arbitration Tribunal about the
circumstance and will brief the Tribunal with their own justification and reasons for
the dispute186. In case the Arbitration Tribunal deems necessary the issue of
preliminary rulings, it may do so, and the States Parties shall comply with such ruling
at once or within the period specified in the ruling187.
The Tribunal shall deliberate upon a dispute within up to ninety days from the
date its President was designated and its ruling shall be adopted by majority. The
votes of the arbitrators will not be accompanied by any justification188. All decisions
™lbid.. Art. 9(1).
]S~Ibid.. Art. 9 (2). States Parties must designate a list of ten arbitrators each, which will be kept by
the Administrative Secretary and from where the arbitrators in a dispute will be chosen from (Ibid..
Art. 10). This list must be composed by legal specialists which are recognised as competent in
matters w hich may be the object of a controversy (Ibid.. Art. 13).







of an ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal are binding upon the Parties as res judicata, and
there are no grounds for an appeal189.
The Protocol of Brasilia provides, also, for a system of resolution of
controversies raised by a natural person or legal entity who is affected by a legal or
administrative measure taken by a State Party, as well as a discriminatory measure or
those which lead to a position of unfair competition, when such measures are against
the Treaty of Asuncion, its protocols or agreements signed under it. Decisions of the
CCM and Resolutions of the CMG.190
A natural person or legal entity which intends to resolve a dispute against a
State Party will communicate and provide the necessary elements of the circumstance
to the national section of the CMG191, which will either start direct contacts with the
national section of the CMG of the State Party in question192 or submit the
reclamation to the CMG19'1. After that, the CMG will carry on its work based on
essentially the same rules as applied for the conflicts between States Parties, in so far
as it finds that the reclamation is applicable, and if no final decision is reached the case
will be brought before an Arbitration Tribunal which will be constituted for the
purpose of resolving the dispute in question.
]89Ibid.. Art. 20 (l). The rulings of the Tribunal shall be executed within fifteen days from the
notification of the decision (Ibid.. Art. 20 (2)). It is also worth mentioning that States Parties
declared, through the Protocol of Brasilia, that there is no need for special agreements to recognise
the rulings of Arbitration Tribunals created under the Protocol of Brasilia (Ibid.. Art. 8).
i9"lbid.. Art. 25.
mIbid.. .Art. 26.
l9~According with Article 28. Protocol of Brasilia, if there is no agreement during these contacts
within fifteen days, the national section of the CMG of the natural person or legal entity which filed
the reclamation may bring the case directly to the CMG.
l9?Protocol of Brasilia. Art. 27.
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2.3. Current developments
As has been mentioned several times before, the Treaty of Asuncion established a
process, not a common market as such. This process, which is seen as a provisional
period of negotiations, was due to end by 31 December 1994, when the Common
Market of the South would be implemented. At this time, most of the tariff reductions
were going to take place, and, more important, a definite institutional structure was
going to be created.
For the purpose of setting up a common market by the end ofDecember 1994,
Article 18 of the Treaty of Asuncion had said that "[p]rior to the establishment of the
common market on 31 December 1994, the States Parties shall convene a special
meeting to determine the final institutional structure of the administrative organs of
the common market, as well as the specific powers of each organ and its decision¬
making procedures". In fact a customs union was implemented by 1 January 1995, but
a common market-type of integration is due to be reached only at the end of the
century.
2.3.1. The Ouro Preto's outcome
On 17 December 1994 the Presidents of the States Parties of the MERCOSUL
gathered together, by virtue of Article 18 of the Treaty of Asuncion, and decided
upon an Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure
of the MERCOSUL194, while emphasised the irreversible character of the integration
' 94Hereinafter the "Ouro Preto Protocol" (Cf. Art. 52). Published in 34ILK1 1244 (1995).
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process that would, on 1 January 1995, reach the level of a customs union195. In
addition to the Ouro Preto Protocol, several other decisions were taken in relation to
the implementation of the external common tariff - which eventually came into force
on 1 January 1995 - and concerning other sectoral mechanisms necessary for the full
operation of the integration process towards the creation of the common market.
Probably the most important achievement, at this stage, has been the agreement on a
more definite institutional framework for the customs union that started to operate
from 1 January 1995. That is why the present Paragraph will give more attention to
the setting up of this institutional structure which is also represented in Chart 4,
Appendix I, infra.
The MERCOSUL is now composed of the Council of the Common Market
(CCM), the Common Market Group (CMG), the MERCOSUL Trade Commission
(MTC), the Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC), the Economic-Social Consultative
Forum (ESCF), and the MERCOSUL Administrative Secretariat (MAS)196. Only the
CCM, the CMG and the MTC are intergovernmental organs with decision-making
197
powers
The CCM, which is the highest organ of the MERCOSUL, with responsibility
for the political leadership of the process198, consists of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs - who will co-ordinate its work199 - and the Ministers of Economy of the
195Joint Communication of the Presidents of the Countries of the MERCOSUL. of 17 December
1994. para. 12. Not published.





States Parties200 Its Presidency will be on a rotation basis, in alphabetical order, for a
period of six months201.
The CCM will meet at least once every six months, with the participation of
the Presidents of the States Parties202, and is empowered to supervise the
implementation of the Treaty of Asuncion, its protocols and agreements signed within
its context; to formulate policies and promote measures for the creation of the
common market; to assume the legal personality of the MERCOSUL203, to negotiate
and sign agreements on behalf of the MERCOSUL204, to rule on proposals from the
CMG, to arrange meetings of ministers, to establish organs when it deems
appropriate, and to modify or abolish them; to clarify the substance and scope of its
decisions; and to appoint the Director of the MAS.205 The rulings of the CCM will
take the form ofDecisions, which are binding upon the States Parties206.
The CMG, which performs the function of the executive organ of the
MERCOSUL207, consists of four members and four alternates for each country,
including representatives of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Economy
or their equivalents, and the Central Banks. The work of the CMG will be co¬




^According with Article 34 of the Ouro Preto Protocol, the MERCOSUL shall possess legal
personality under international law. Differently from the approach of the Treaty of Asuncion, which
did not provide so, the MERCOSUL, from the 1 January 1995. may sign contracts, buy and sell
personal and real property, appear in court hold funds and make transfers (Ouro Preto Protocol. Art.
35), and make headquarters agreements (Ibid.. Art. 36).
204This function may be delegated to the CMG (Ouro Preto Protocol. Art. 8 (TV), Second part).





The CMG will hold ordinary and extraordinary meetings, as often as it
considers necessary and in accordance with its rules of procedures209. When drafting
or proposing specific measures to the CCM, the CMG is allowed to call on
representatives from other organs of the government or of the institutional structure
of the MERCOSUL210.
The CMG shall have, among others, the following duties and functions: to
monitor compliance with the Treaty of Asuncion, its Protocols, and agreements
signed within its framework; to propose draft Decisions to the CCM; to take
measures to enforce the Decisions of the CCM; to draw up programmes of work
designed to ensure the achievement of the common market; to establish, modify or
abolish organs, such as working groups and special meetings; to express its views on
proposals and recommendations submitted to it by other organs of the MERCOSUL,
to negotiate agreements with third countries, when expressly delegated to do so by
the CCM, to organise the meetings of the CCM; to prepare reports and studies to the
CCM; to choose the Director of the MAS and supervise its activities; and to approve
the rules of procedure of the MTC and of the ESCF.211 The decisions of the CMG are
in the form ofResolutions and are binding upon the States Parties212.
The MTC, which is an assistant organ to the CMG213, consists of four
members and four alternates for each State Party, and is co-ordinated by the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs214. The MTC will meet at least once a month, or









empowered, inter alia, to monitor the application of the common trade policy
mechanism both within MERCOSUL and with third countries; to consider and rule
upon requests submitted by the State Parties in relation with the application of the
common external tariff and other instruments of common trade policy; to take
decisions connected with the administration and application of the common external
tariff; to report to the CMG on the development and application of the common trade
policy instruments, on the consideration of requests received and on the decisions
taken with respect to such requests; to propose to the CMG new regulation on trade
or changes to the existing legislation; to propose the revision of the tariff rates for
specific items of the common external tariff; to create technical committees,216 and to
consider complaints referred to it by the National Sections of the MTC and originated
by States Parties or individuals, whether natural or legal persons, in relation with the
dispute settlement procedures of the MERCOSUL217. The decisions of the MTC have
the form of Directives or Proposals. The Directives shall be binding upon the States
Parties218.
The JPC is the organ which represents the Parliaments of the States Parties of
the MERCOSUL219 and is composed of equal numbers of members of Parliament
representing the States Parties220, which are appointed by the respective national
Parliament221. The JPC is designed to help the acceleration of the implementation of
the common rules of the MERCOSUL in the national Parliaments, ensuring prompt








MERCOSUL. It will also assist the legal harmonisation process and, when necessary,
will be requested by the CCM to examine priority issues.222
The ESCF is the organ which represents the economic and social sectors of
the States Parties and is composed of equal numbers of representatives from each
State Party.223 Their functions are merely consultative, and are in the form of
Recommendations to the CMG224.
The MAS, with headquarters in Montevideo, provides the operational support
for the functioning of the integration process and of the customs union, being also
responsible for providing administrative services to the organs of the MERCOSUL.225
The MAS has, inter alia, the following duties: to serve as the official archive of the
documentation of the MERCOSUL; to publish and circulate the decisions adopted by
the organs of the MERCOSUL, therefore making authentic translations in Spanish
and Portuguese of all decisions adopted by the MERCOSUL; to publish the
MERCOSUL Official Journal226, to organise the meetings of the CCM, the CMG and
MTC and, as far as possible, of the other organs; to inform, on a regular basis, the
States Parties about the measures taken by each country to incorporate in its legal
framework the decisions adopted by the organs of the MERCOSUL; and to bring
together national lists of arbitrators and experts, also performing the tasks defined in





~26The MERCOSUL Official Journal shall publish the Decisions of the CCM, the Resolutions of the
CMG. the Directives of the MTC and the Dispute Settlement Arbitration Rulings, both in Spanish
and Portuguese, together with any instrument that is considered relevant either by the CCM or the
CMG (Ouro Preto Protocol, Art. 39). It is also worth noting that all decisions of the organs of the
MERCOSUL shall be taken bv consensus and in the presence of all States Parties (Ibid.. Art. 37).
221Ibid.. Art. 32.
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one of the States Parties, chosen by the CMG and appointed by the CCM, on a
rotating basis, for a term of two years. He may not be re-elected228.
In addition to the rules laid down by the Protocol of Brasilia229, the Ouro
Preto Protocol empowered the MERCOSUL Trade Commission to consider
complaints to it by the national sections of the MTC and originated by States Parties
or individuals, whether natural or legal persons, in relation with the circumstances
provided for in Article 1 or 25 of the Protocol of Brasilia.230
Further, an Annex to the Ouro Preto Protocol231 lays down the appropriate
rules for complaints initiated in the MTC. The complainant State Party will submit the
complaint to the Pro-Tempore Chairman of the MTC, who will include it in the
Agenda of the next meeting of the MTC. If there is no decision, the MTC shall pass
on the dossier to a Technical Committee.232 The latter will have thirty days to prepare
and submit a joint opinion to the MTC233.
Taking into account the conclusions of the Technical Committee234, the MTC
will rule on the complaint at its first ordinary meeting following the receipt of the
conclusions of the Technical Committee. The MTC may also convene, if it deems
appropriate, an extraordinary meeting for the purpose of ruling the complaint.235 If
such meeting does not reach a conclusion, the complaint shall be submitted to the
CMG, together with the conclusions of the Technical Committee. The CMG shall,
223Ibid.. Art. 33.
239Cf. Sub-section 2.2.Paragraph 2.2.2, supra.
30Ouro Preto Protocol. Art. 21, caput. The examination of these complaints by the national section
of the MTC does not prevent the complainant State Party from taking action under the Protocol of
Brasilia (Ibid., Art. 21 (1)).
^'Entitled "General Procedure for Complaints to the MERCOSUL Trade Commission". Hereinafter
referred to as "Annex to the Ouro Preto Protocol".
232Annex to the Ouro Preto Protocol. Art. 2.
233Ibid. Art. 3.
34Whether or not the Technical Committee has reached a joint opinion (Ibid.. Art. 3).
233Ibid.. Art. 4.
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then, give a ruling within thirty days of the receipt by the Pro-Tempore Chairman of
the proposals submitted by the MTC236.
If neither the MTC nor the CMG reach a decision about the complaint, the
complainant State may bring the case to the Arbitration procedures, as laid down by
Articles 7 to 24 of the Protocol of Brasilia. In this case the MERCOSUL
Administrative Secretariat shall be informed accordingly.237 On the other hand, if there
is a ruling, either by the MTC or by the CMG, they must set a reasonable period for
the implementation of the respective measures and, if these period expires without the
State against which the complaint is made having complied with the provisions of the
decisions, the complainant State may address directly the rules of the Protocol of
Brasilia which says that the State Party who complains may adopt compensatory
measures against the other State which does not comply with the decision.238
It is necessary to note, in addition, that the State Party in which the complaint
is filed represents the complainant when he is a natural or legal person. In addition,
the measures by any ruling has the force of res judicata without the need of further
implementation.
2.3.2. Towards broader international co-operation
The MERCOSUL, as stated by the Preamble of the Treaty of Asuncion, is an effort to
bring about Latin American integration gradually. This is, from the very beginning, the
intention of the States Parties of the MERCOSUL. To fulfil this goal the





the American continent and beyond. This last Paragraph of Chapter 1 intends to
describe briefly the steps taken towards these aims.
On 19 June 1991, the US and the States Parties of the MERCOSUL signed an
Agreement Concerning a Council on Trade and Investment239. The main goals of this
Agreement are to enhance the spirit of co-operation between the MERCOSUL and
the US240, and develop further international trade and investment relationships among
them241. This is an additional effort following the launching of the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative, aiming at making closer the relationship between the US and
South America242.
The Agreement on Trade and Investment establishes a Consultative Council
on Trade and Investment (CCTI)243, composed of the representatives of each
country244, with the duty to hold consultations on specific matters related to market
opening, trade and investment relations, and the removal of impediments to trade and
investment flows245.
An "Immediate Action Agenda", set up for initiating the work of the CCTI,
includes the following minimum list of topics on which consultation should be carried
out: co-operation in the Uruguay Round of negotiations; means to facilitate the
comprehensive reduction of barriers to trade and investment; policy considerations
concerning trade and investment, including access to technology, trade-related aspects
of IPRs, export subsidy practices in agriculture; market access for goods and services;
239Portuguese version published in Paulo Roberto de Almeida, note 130, supra. English version
published in 30 ILK! 1034 (1991). Hereinafter the "Agreement on Trade and Investment".
240Agreement on Trade and Investment, Preamble (1).
2MIbid.. Preamble, (2).
:42See. e.g., Agreement on Trade and Investment Preamble (3), (7), and (8).
243Agreement on Trade and Investment. Art. 1.
i44IbidArt. 2. Delegations of the States Parties of the MERCOSUL are represented by the




sanitary and phytosanitary requirements in agriculture; safeguard regimes; and
dumping and subsidies. This list does not preclude the suggestion by any participant
of other topics for consultation.
In addition to this initiative the States Parties of the MERCOSUL are pursuing
other co-operation programmes with Bolivia and Chile246, Japan247, within the
framework of the negotiations that has arisen from the Summit of Americas248, and
with the European Union. The latter deserves further consideration.
Following the beginning of the creation of the MERCOSUL, a technical co¬
operation arrangement between the EC and the MERCOSUL was negotiated. These
negotiations concluded with an Agreement on Inter-Institutional Co-operation signed
on 29 May 1992249. The co-operation instruments provided by this Agreement were
basically designed to provide the MERCOSUL with the necessary technical
assistance, institutional support, exchange of information, and training of personnel.
For this purpose a Joint Consultative Committee was set up. This led for a more
substantive discussion on the commercial approximation of the two areas, and to the
246Which must be seen as an original desire of the States Parties of the MERCOSUL. Cf note 149,
supra. Brazil has also signed an Agreement for Economic Co-operation with Bolivia, on 27 January
1994 (Published in [1994] 13 BILA 192-209), an Agreement for Reciprocal Protection of Investments
with Chile, on 22 March 1994 (Published in [1994] 13 BILA 210-215), and an Agreement for
Economic Co-operation with Venezuela, on 15 July 1994 (Published in [1994] 14 BILA 260-265).
With Chile, however, negotiations moved faster and during the visit of President Eduardo Frei. of
Chile, to Brazil in March 1996, it was confirmed that on 25 July 19% Chile would sign an
agreement establishing a free trade area between with the MERCOSUL. For this information see,
e.g., Chile Assina Acordo com o MERCOSUL. Folha de Sao Paulo, 23 March 19%; Chile Entra
para o MERCOSUL. Folha de Sao Paulo, 26 March 19%; and Chile Feeha Acordo com o
MERCOSUL. Jornal do Brasil, 26 March 1996. More recently. Brazilian newspapers have also
reported that Venezuela is negotiating an agreement with the MERCOSUL. to be signed by
November 1996 (See. e.g., Venezuela Ingressara no MERCOSUL. Jornal do Brasil. 21 May 1996.
and Acordo da Venezuela com o MERCOSUL Tern Apoio do Brasil. Folha de Sao Paulo. 21 Mav
1996).
See point 7 of the First Meeting of the Committee of Technical Co-operation of CMG (19-20
November 1992), [1993] 8 BILA 55-57. at p. 57.
2AgCf. Section 1, Sub-section 1.3.. supra.
249Published in Paulo Roberto de Almeida, note 69. supra.
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establishment of a programme for the setting up of a free trade zone among the two
integrated mechanisms.
On 15 December 1995, the MERCOSUL and the EU agreed upon a more
substantive set of rules for co-operation with the signature of the "Landmark Inter-
Regional Agreement for Co-operation Between the European Community and its
Member States and the Common Market of the South and its States Parties'250.
Considering commercial approximation as an instrument for economic development,
and taking into account the experience which has arisen from the Agreement on Inter-
Institutional Co-operation between the EU and the MERCOSUL, the Landmark
Agreement affirms in the Preamble that its final goal is the creation of an inter¬
regional association of political and economic character based on the political co¬
operation between the parties, and on the progressive and reciprocal liberalisation of
trade.251
Within this framework, an economic and political dialogue is established252
aiming at co-operation in the areas of norms for agriculture, foodstuff and
industries253, customs duties254, statistical data255, intellectual property256, energy257,
transport258, science and technology259, telecommunications and information
250Hereinafter the "Landmark Agreement". The text of the agreement used here is a non-published
version.
251The Landmark Agreement is based on the principle of human rights (Landmark Agreement. Art.
1) and has the subject-matter of strengthening the existing relations between the Parties as a means
of preparing the basic conditions for the creation of an Inter-regional Association {Ibid.. Art. 2).









technology260, environmental protection261, education"62, information and culture263,
and combating the problem of illegal drugs264.
Its institutional framework is based on three organs: the Co-operation
Council265, the Co-operation Committee266 and the Sub-Committee of Trade267. The
Co-operation Council, which is an organ ofMinisterial level meeting periodically268, is
composed of representatives of Members of the Council of the European Union,
Members of the European Commission, Members of the Council of the Common
Market and of the Common Market Group269. The Co-operation Council will be lead
by a President who will be the representative of the EC and of the MERCOSUL on
the basis of rotation270. The Co-operation Council is empowered to examine the
important problems of implementation of the agreement, deciding upon all bilateral
and multilateral questions of common interest271, and to propose recommendations
aiming at the final goal of an Inter-Regional Association272. The Co-operation Council
is also empowered to decide upon the creation of any other organ within the
framework of the Landmark Agreement273.
The Co-operation Committee is composed of representatives of the European







266Ibid. Art. 27 (1).
261Ibid. Art. 29 (1).
26gIbid. Art. 25 (1).
269Ibid.. Art. 26 (1).
210Ibid.. Art. 26 (3).
21^Ibid.. Art. 25 (2).




in Brussels and in one of the States Parties of the MERCOSUL275. The President of
the Co-operation Committee will be chosen on the basis of rotation between one
representative of the European Commission and one representative of the
MERCOSUL276. The Co-operation Committee is an executive organ which is
empowered to support the Co-operation Council to perform its tasks, particularly
being empowered to promote the commercial relationship between the Parties of the
Landmark Agreement; to exchange opinions about questions of common interest and
related to the liberalisation of trade and co-operation; to propose actions to the Co¬
operation Council aimed at trade liberalisation and intensification of co-operation
between the Parties; and to propose actions to the Co-operation Council aiming at the
final goal of establishing an Inter-Regional Association277.
The Sub-committee of trade is composed of representatives of the European
Union and of the MERCOSUL278 and is empowered to ensure compliance with the
objectives of the Landmark Agreement279. Once a year, the Trade Sub-committee will
present to the Co-operation Committee information about the development of its
work, as well as proposals aiming at the liberalisation of trade between the Parties280.
Conclusion
The process of commercial, economic and political integration of Latin America, as
described in this Chapter, has been essentially a learning process. Most Latin
American countries experienced the ambitious task of liberalising trade in a
continental basis - the example of the LAFTA - and learned that a detailed set of rules
215Ibid.. Art. 27 (2).
276Ibid.
277Ibid.. Art. 27 (5).
21iIbid.. Art. 29 (2).
229Ibid. Art. 29 (1).
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and strict deadlines could make the goal ofmultilateral co-operation a difficult task. It
is important to bear in mind, however, that the LAFTA, as a process, was successful
and led countries to probe integration issues in more detail. The LAFTA also led to
the creation of the LA1A which has, in its own way, supported sub-regional
agreements on the liberalisation of trade.
As a result, particularly taking as an example the US initiative to lead the
process of formation of a free trade zone with continental dimensions, a growing
interest in the region is taking place. The FTAA is feasible and seems to be a positive
enterprise towards trade liberalisation in the Western Hemisphere. It is obvious that,
considering the broad area of application of the FTAA process, conflicts of interests
occur, but they are the necessary mechanism to strengthen the process and to make it
possible.
The MERCOSUL, on the other hand, is a process which has been carried out
with great care. It is an infant process. One should not expect much from the
MERCOSUL in the short term. The transition period determined by the Treaty of
Asuncion has proved to be a correct choice. It indeed approximated the four countries
politically, economically and commercially and has raised the attention of others, from
outside the MERCOSUL. The MERCOSUL is now a reality In spite of concerns,
during this transition period, on the institutional structure and mechanisms for the
setting up of an economic integrated area, and the lack of legal personality under
international law, the MERCOSUL has grown larger and has been applied effectively.
The outcome of the Ouro Preto Protocol seems to indicate further that the
MERCOSUL is here to stay. The Ouro Preto Protocol created a more sophisticated
institutional framework as a result of the complexities surrounding the integration
280Ibid.. Art. 29 (3).
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process. This institutional framework seems to be a reasonable way to achieve the
final goal of a Common Market. It lacks, however, a more precise supranational
juridical mechanism.
It is necessary to consider that, despite its historical and cultural similarities,
national institutional structures of the countries of the MERCOSUL have their own
view of the process. The way this juridical infrastructure will be applied, therefore, is
distinct in each country. Decisions upon disputes will certainly take into account
national economic and social characteristics. A more definite institutional mechanism
to harmonise the juridical approach towards the process is necessary and this will be
emphasised further in the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4, on the European Union
experience.
It is also important to underline that the legislative process of the
MERCOSUL should consider a supranational democratic body which would have
popular representation. The MERCOSUL seems to lack, from the very beginning of
the process, a more effective participation of the societies of the countries involved in
this process. A Parliamentary-type of body is likely to bring the concerns from the
nationals of the four countries and from their private sector into the legislative
process.
The MERCOSUL should consider therefore broadening its institutional
framework to include a juridical body, with the objective of harmonising decisions
issued by national courts, and a legislative body, democratically represented, to
include the goals of all people of the countries of the MERCOSUL into the legislative
process.
The present Chapter wishes to provide the reader with an introductory
historical background of the integration process in Latin America, and does so giving
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emphasis to the project of the MERCOSUL. Note that, although this part of the thesis
has concluded that the MERCOSUL institutional framework lacks some more
effective organs, this is only a general conclusion. Further in the present research, a
discussion regarding more detailed aspects of the particularities of the negotiations
towards common rules for patent protection in the MERCOSUL will take place.
Before this happens, however, it is important to introduce generally, in Chapter 2, the
trends towards the creation of an international system for patent protection. The
discussion that follows in the next Chapter is necessary, in the context of the present
thesis, because international negotiations commits and affects both national
governments and regional arrangements.
CHAPTER 2
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW
Introduction
One of the aspects of a commercial integrated area, which has been carefully
considered by several arrangements for regional approximation, is the protection of
patents (or EPRs in general) within the geographic area in question, and the territorial
application of the rights granted by the State. The European Community has
developed a detailed juridical understanding on the subject and has been negotiating,
for a long time, a common regime for patent protection in the Common Market1. The
North American Free Trade Agreement has established an extensive set of rules for
intellectual property harmonisation among the three participants2. The MERCOSUL
has also created a Committee on Intellectual Property, under the auspices of Sub¬
group 7, on industrial and technological policy, aiming at creating common rules for
patent protection3.
Although a more detailed analysis of patent protection within the
MERCOSUL and in the EC will be further discussed throughout the present research,
it is necessary to describe, in general words, the attempts to harmonise patent
protection on a world-wide basis.
That is why the present Chapter discusses the development of an international
system for patent protection, considering last century's agreement on an international
convention for the protection of industrial property rights; the creation of an
organisation with the tasks of administering the arrangements in the field of IPRs, as
'See. eg., Chapters 3 and 4, infra.
2NAFTA Chapter 17.
'Chapters 1. supra, and 5. infra.
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well as promoting international harmonisation of IPRs; the creation of an international
system for co-operation in the field of patent granting procedures; and current
developments of international patent negotiations within the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO).
Section 2 considers the development of the links between IPRs and
international trade, which has reached its highest stage of multilateral understanding
with the signature of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) as a result of the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations under GATT. Section 2 considers the
existing provisions within the original text ofGATT; the US attempt to include in the
GATT framework common rules for trade in counterfeit goods; and the TRIPS
Agreement, which is considered the most advanced and ambitious international
attempt to harmonise IPRs.
The analysis that follows should be understood rather as a preliminary
approach to this research as a whole, by providing the readers with the necessary
background. Unavoidably, what is happening in the international arena affects both
national governments and regional arrangements, making this Chapter necessary as an
introduction.
1. Origins and Background
The origins of the word "invention" date back to twenty eight centuries ago, when,
during the Roman empire, the meaning of the woro was chiefly related to the final
product, excluding the notion of an inventive idea for the solution of a technical
problem. There is no record that leads one to think that at that time the result of the
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inventive activity was protected in some way. According to the historians, the
protection of an invention took place, firstly, during the Middle Ages, in 1236, when
the Municipal Authority of Bordeaux granted a privilege of fifteen years to
"Bonafusus de Sancta Columbia e Companhia", for the process of textile
manufacturing and painting. The privileges granted at that time were primarily based
on the personal will of the monarch and there was no technical assessment of the
degree of inventive activity or industrial application of the invention. Generally, the
monarch granted privileges to favour specific sectors of national industries.4
The first time that an industrial property privilege appeared to be granted
under a more technical approach was in the Venetian Republic, when in 1416
Francesco Petri was granted a monopoly for the construction of twenty four mills that
could work without the use of water. There is no information to assess the term of
protection granted for this specific creation, but the monopoly was apparently given
for a specified period of time; others were prohibited from copying or manufacturing
it; and the rights were automatically transmitted to the heirs of the right holder.
Apparently, some of the legal requirements and the scope of the rights, as granted at
that time, were very similar to the requirements and rights as granted today. Further,
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries patent privileges were widely used by
some European states.
The first patent law enacted for the purpose of regulating patent protection as
such was the British Statute of Monopolies of 16235. This legislation was very
Douglas Gabriel Domingues. Direito Industrial - Patentes. Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora
Forense (1980). pp. 1-4.
^ 1623 21 Ja. 1. c.3.The Statutes at Large. From the First Year of King James the First to the Tenth
Year of the Reign of King William the Third. Volume the Third. London: Printed for Mark Basket
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detailed in essence and eventually influenced the form of the US Patent Act, approved
by the US Parliament on 10 April 1790. The latter, for instance, required the patent
applicant to affirm that he was the actual inventor. Some degree of disclosure was
also required for the purpose of filing a patent application, and the privilege was
granted for a period of fourteen years.
1.1. The Paris Convention
During last century, the growing industrial capacity and production of the world has
determined the expansion of international commerce, aided by the growth in the
economies of England and Wales, Ireland and Scotland which was a result of the
'Industrial Revolution". This fact, and also the expansion of international commerce
made easier by developments in transport and communication, led national legislatures
to realise that one of the very specific characteristics of intellectual property was its
ability to transcend national boundaries. National laws started, then, to provide for
more specific conditions of industrial property protection considering, in addition, the
special case of foreign patent applicants, with provisions on a "national treatment-
type" of approach. Even so, a holder of an intellectual property right was dependent
mainly on reciprocity between the laws of his own country, and those of the country
in which he desired to obtain protection. This proved to be an unsatisfactory position,
because of the many fundamental differences between the laws of different countries.
At the international level, further attempts took place aiming at a solution to
the problem by including in treaties of "friendship, trade and navigation" clauses
Printer to the King's Molt Excellent Majesty, and by the Assigns of Robert Basket; And by Henry
Woodfall and William Strahan. Law Printers to the King's Most Excellent Majesty.
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relating to the protection of industrial property6. The contrast between the different
national systems of industrial property protection confirmed that the establishment of
common principles, and a minimum level of standardisation of industrial property
legislation, was unequivocally necessary for further co-operation in this field, in so far
as the clauses included in such treaties did not work at all as a solution to the specific
circumstances of a foreign applicant.
In 1873, on the initiative of the Austrian-Hungarian government, the first
international gathering to study modern industrial property issues took place in
Vienna. Though this first congress did not reach any successful conclusion, in 1878,
during the Universal Exposition, a second version of this gathering (known as the
Trocadero Congress) took place in Paris to discuss in more detail some forms of co¬
operation mechanisms for a multilateral arrangement in the field of industrial property.
Therewith, a Permanent Committee was created and empowered to draft a proposed
text for an agreement, following the recommendations that were placed by the
participants of the Trocadero Congress. In 1880 the participants of the congress met
again in Paris to consider the proposed text of the Permanent Committee, which had
been previously distributed to the interested countries. It was further decided to adopt
a proposed agreement which was, once again, submitted to the governments of the
participating countries.7
On 6 March 1883 a Diplomatic Conference was convened and adopted, on 20
March 1883, the text of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial
6Jo5o da Gama Cerqueira. Tratado da Propriedade Industrial. V. II. Tomo II. Parte III, Rio de
Janeiro: Rcwsta Forense (1956). p. 408.
Ibid., pp. 409-410.
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Property (the Paris Convention)8 which established a " .. Union for the protection of
industrial property"9. The necessity to adapt the text of the Paris Convention to the
development of new technologies and needs of modern society has required the
original text of the Paris Convention to be revised and amended six times: at Brussels,
on 14 December 1900; at Washington, on 2 June 1911; at The Hague, on 6
November 1925, at London, on 2 June 1934; at Lisbon, on 31 October 1958, at
Stockholm, on 14 July 1967; and as amended on 2 October 197910.
Considering industrial property in a broad sense, the Paris Convention protects
patents (including patents of importation, patents of improvement, patents and
certificates of addition)11, utility models, industrial designs, trade-marks, service
marks, trade names, indications of source or appellation of origin, and the repression
of unfair competition12. Industrial property protection shall apply additionally to the
sThe signatory States were Belgium. Brazil, France. Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands. Portugal. San
Salvador, Serbia. Spain, and Switzerland. As at 1 January 1996. the Paris Convention had 136
Contracting Parties. Some had signed and ratified all the revisions, up to the 1967 Stockholm
revision, while others are Parties of past revisions only. See, e.g., WIPO Doc. N. 423 (E) (1 January
1996) States Party to the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) and/or Other Treaties Administered bv WIPO and/or to the International Convention for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) - Governing Bodies of WIPO. of the Unions
Administered bv WIPO and their (Permanent) Committees, and of the Rome Convention. Status on
Januan 1. 19%.
9Paris Convention. Art. 1 (1). In 1883 the agreement on the Paris Convention created a Union which
was to be administered by an International Bureau (the Paris Union). Then, in 1883, another
International Bureau was created to administer the Berne Union, established by the Beme
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (the Berne Convention). The two
International Bureau were united, institutionally and administratively, in 1893, being named, in
French, Bureaux Intemationaux Reunis pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle (translated
into English as the United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property ) which led
to the famous acronym BIRPI. This was later replaced by another International Bureau administered
by WIPO. as it will be seen in Sub-section 1.2, supra.
1CBIRPI. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property . Geneva: BIRPI (1968). When
the present research refers to the Paris Convention it means the text of the latest revision at
Stockholm in 1967.
"Paris Convention. Art. 1 (4).
]2Jbid. Art. 1 (2).
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fields of commerce and industry, to agricultural and extractive industries, and to all
manufactures or natural products13 .
The main aspiration of the Paris Convention is to set two general and essential
principles related to the international character of industrial property rights, as above
described. These two principles, which will be observed in more detail below in
Paragraph 1.1.2, are the greatest achievement of the Paris Convention.
1.1.1. Institutional framework
The administrative functions of the Paris Convention are performed by the
International Bureau14 which has the following functions: to act as the secretariat of
the various organs of the Paris Union15; to assemble and publish, through a monthly
periodical16, information concerning the protection of industrial property17; and to
conduct studies, or provide services, aiming at facilitating the protection of industrial
property18. The chief executive of the Paris Union is the Director General of WIPO
who will represent the Union internally and externally19.
"Ibid.Art. 1 (3).
"ibid.. Art. 15 (1) (a). Further details on the nature of the International Bureau of Intellectual
Property (BIRPI). replaced by the International Bureau of the WIPO in 1967. will be provided below,
in Sub-section 1.2. As the text of the Paris Convention which is used as a reference here is the one
revised at Stockholm in 1967, this Chapter will refer alwavs to the International Bureau ofWIPO.
"ibid.. Art. 15 (1) (b).
"ibid.. Art. 15 (3).
1 Ibid.. Art. 15 (2). This provision also establishes that Members of the Union are requested to
communicate promptly all new laws and official texts, as well as any information or publication
which may be useful for the International Bureau of the WIPO. concerning the protection of
industrial property. All information kept by the International Bureau of the WIPO. shall, on request,
be provided to any country Member of the Union.
"Ibid.. Art. 15 (5).
"ibid.. Art. 15 (1) (c).
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The Paris Union has an Assembly consisting of the countries of the Union
which are bound by Articles 13 to 17 of the Paris Convention20. The government of
each country will be represented by one delegate, who may be assisted by alternate
delegates, advisors and experts21. Each country member of the Paris Union shall have
only one vote22. The Assembly is empowered to deal with all matters relating to the
maintenance and the development of the Union; to give directions for the preparation
for conferences of revisions; to review and approve reports and activities of the
Director General of WIPO and of the Executive Committee; to elect members of the
Executive Committee of the Assembly; to establish committees of experts and
working groups; and to determine which countries or international organisations may
attend the meetings of the Assembly as observers23.
The quorum for decisions shall be of at least one half of the countries members
of the Assembly24. The Assembly may, nevertheless, make decisions with the presence
of one-third or more countries members, in so far as these decisions do not relate to
the Assembly's own procedures. In this case, the International Bureau of the WIPO
shall communicate the decisions taken under this condition to the countries members
of the Assembly which were not represented at the meeting, asking them to express,
in writing, their vote or abstention within a period of three months from the date of
communication. The decisions in question will take effect only provided that the
number of countries which expressed their votes in writing reaches the minimum
70Ibid.. Art. 13 (1) (a).
21 Ibid.. Art. 13 (1) (b).
22Ibid.. Art. 13 (4) (a).
23Ibid.. Art. 13 (2) (a). By virtue of Article 15 (6). Paris Convention, the Director General of the
WIPO and any staff member designated by him may participate, without the right to vote, in all
meetings of the Assembly, of the Executive Committee, and of any other committee of experts or
working group
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quorum of one-half of the members of the Assembly.25 With the exceptions of
decisions regarding amendments to Articles 13 to 17, which require three quarters of
the votes cast26, the decisions of the Assembly may be taken with a minimum of two-
thirds of the votes cast27. Abstentions will not be considered as votes28.
The Assembly shall meet at least once in every third calendar year upon
convocation by the Director General of WIPO29, and may be requested to meet in
extraordinary sessions upon convocation from the Director General or at the request
of one quarter of the countries who are members of the Assembly50.
The Assembly of the Paris Union has an Executive Committee, composed of
elected countries members of the Assembly31, as of one-fourth of the member
countries of the Assembly32. One representative of each country member of the
Executive Committee shall be appointed by the government in question and shall be
represented by only one delegate, who may be assisted by alternate delegates,
advisors, and experts33. Members may be re-elected , but only to a maximum of two-
thirds of such members'4. Meetings of the Executive Committee shall take place once
2AIbid.. Art. 13 (4) (b).
25Ibid., Art. 13 (4) (c).
26Ibid.. Art. 17 (2). Articles 13 and 17 (2) of the Paris Convention, however, require a minimum of
four-fifths of the votes cast to be amended (Ibid.). Amendments may be initiated by any country-
member of the Paris Union, the Executive Committee, or by the Director General of WIPO.
Proposals of amendments shall, nevertheless, be communicated to the member countries by the
Director General of WIPO at least six months before being considered bv the Assemblv (Ibid.. Art.
17(1)).
21Ibid.. Art. 13 (4) (e).
^Ibid, Art. 13 (4) (e).
29Ibid., Art. 13 (7) (a).
i0Ibid., Art. 13 (7) (b).
31 Ibid.. Art. 14 (2) (a). Members of the Executive Committee are elected by the Assembly (Art. 13 (2)
(a) (iv)), who shall consider the equitable geographical distribution of the members of the Executive
Committee (Ibid.. Art. 14 (3)).
32Ibid. Art. 14 (3).
31Ibid.. Art. 14 (2) (b).
34Ibid.. Art. 14 (5) (b). Rules governing election of members of the Committee and possible re¬
election shall be established by the Assembly (Ibid.. Art. 14 (5) (c)).
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a year, in ordinary session by convocation of the Director General of the WIPO"5,
and, in extraordinary session, either upon convocation of the Director General of the
WIPO or at request of its chairman or of one quarter of its members76.
The Executive Committee has the following functions: to prepare the draft
agenda of the Assembly; to submit proposals to the Assembly in which regards to the
draft programme, triennial budget and periodical reports of the Director General of
WIPO, to approve the specific yearly budgets and programmes prepared by the
Director General; and to take all necessary steps to ensure the execution of the
programme of the Union.17
1.1.2. The national treatment principle and the hght of phohty
As has been mentioned before, the Paris Convention relies on two basic principles
which are the pillars of the international patent system. Both principles were
introduced by the Paris Convention and became quite well known during negotiations
of other multilateral arrangements in the field of IPRs.
The Paris Convention has, therefore, instituted that "[n]ationals of any country
of the Union shall, ..., enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages
that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; ...", and
that, as a consequence, .. they [foreign applicants] shall have the same protection as
the latter [the national applicant], and the same legal remedy against any infringement
of their rights ,.."38.
35Ibid.. Art. 14 (7) (a).
36Ibid.. Art. 14 (7) (b).
3 Ibid.. Art. 14 (6) (a). See. also. Chart 1. Appendix II, infra, for a more detailed view about the
institutional structure of the Paris Union.
38Ibid.. Art. 2 (1).
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This principle is a very forthright rule that leaves little space for further
interpretation which could run against the main goals of the Paris system. In addition
to that, Article 3 of the Paris Convention affirms also that nationals of countries which
are not members of the Union shall benefit from the application of the "national
treatment" principle, if they are domiciled or have real and effective industrial or
commercial establishment in the territory of one of the countries members.
In accordance with the studies carried out by Gama Cerqueira39, the operation
of the national treatment principle provides for two methods of application. Firstly,
the principle of assimilation which includes the acquisition of industrial property
rights; the duration and scope of these rights, as well as the obligations imposed for its
permanence as a legal right; the legal measures for the protection of the rights; and the
civil and penal sanctions available in national laws against the infringement of
intellectual property rights.
Secondly, Gama Cerqueira refers to the "unionist treatment" of the principle
which includes the object of the following Articles of the Paris Convention: 4 (right of
priority), 4bis (independence of patents), 5 (working requirements of the patent and
compulsory license), 5bis (grace period), 6 (conditions of registration ofmarks), 6bis
(well-known marks), 6ter (State emblems, official hallmarks and emblems of
intergovernmental organisations), 7 (nature of goods to which a trademark is applied),
8 (trade names), 10 (false indications) and 10£/s (unfair competition).
In accordance with the thoughts of Gama Cerqueira, the '^unionist treatment"
forms the basis of the application of the right ofpriority principle. Taking into account
that the novelty of an invention is a condition sine qua non for the granting of a patent
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privilege, the fact that an invention has been disclosed as a consequence of the filing
of a patent application in another country could lead to the understanding that the
invention is already part of the prior art, thus not patentable. The discussions that led
to the signature of the Paris Convention had a major concern with this field and a
solution was necessary to be found. One possible solution was the creation of a
simultaneous filing system, which would be done, firstly, before national patent offices
and, then, in the consulates of the other countries in which the inventor desired to
obtain protection. This solution was, for obvious reasons, considered difficult in
40
practice.
The discussions that followed led to the development of the right of priority
principle, which is, in a strict sense, an exception to the novelty requirement. This
principle primarily rules that once the inventor has filed a patent application in his
country - or in any other country of the Union - he is given an extra period of twelve
months41 to apply for patent protection in other countries of the Union, without his
invention being considered as part of the prior art, and, thereupon, not patentable.
An inventor who wishes to enjoy the benefit of the right of priority shall be
required to make a declaration indicating the date of the first filing and the country in
which the application was filed42. The countries of the Union may require further
formalities. The inventor, for instance, may be requested to produce a copy of the
application previously filed. The copy of the application, certified as correct by the
authority which received it, shall not require any authentication. Contracting Parties
39Note 6. supra, p. 421.
4'Joao da Gama Cerqueira. note 6, supra, p. 423.
41Pans Convention. Art. 4 (C) (1).
A~Ibid.. Art. 4 (D) (1). This information will be mentioned in the national publication issued by the
competent authority (Ibid. Art. 4 (D) (2)).
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may require, however, the application to be accompanied by a certificate from the
same authority showing the date of filing, and by a translation43. If necessary, for the
purpose of fulfilling the requirements of the law, members may require, thereafter,
further proof of a previous application44.
Members of the Union may not refuse a priority, or a patent application on the
ground that the applicant claims multiple priorities, even if those originate in different
countries. Neither may a member of the Paris Union refuse a priority on the ground
that an application claiming one or more priorities contains one or more elements
which were not described in a previous application45. If the examination finds that an
application for a patent contains more than one invention, the applicant is allowed to
divide the application into several applications, and claim priority from the date of the
initial application for each46.
1.2. The creation of the WlPO
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is the successor of the
BERPI47. As the growing necessity for a more effective institutional mechanism to
administer the Paris and Berne Unions, and their special agreements, became manifest,
members of both Unions started to carry out modifications to their institutional
structures as soon as 1948, when the Brussels Revision Conference of the Berne
Union created a Permanent Committee of the Berne Union48.
43Ibid.. Art. 4 (D) (3).
"Ibid., Art. 4 (D) (5).
4SIbid. Art. 4 (F).
46Ibid, Art. 4 (G) (1).
41
Cf. note 9. supra.
^Arpad Bogsch. Brief History of the First 25 Years of the World Intellectual Property Organization.
Geneva: WIPO (19921, p. 9.
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Then, according to Arpad Bogsch, the idea for the setting up of a more
centralised institutional framework to administer the Paris and Berne Conventions,
and its special agreements, was developed and translated into practical proposals in
1962. From 1963 up to 1967 the idea was further elaborated and it was included in
the negotiations of the 1967 Stockholm Conference.49
The Conference of the Parties gathered in Stockholm to negotiate two major
changes in the framework of Paris and Berne Unions, as well as on the five special
agreements under the Paris Union50. The first point of discussion was the
implementation of a structural and administrative reform of the Unions; the second,
some modification in the substantive provisions of Paris and Berne Conventions. With
the participation of seventy three States and thirty six organisations, the Stockholm
Conference lasted for more than a month, from 11 June to 14 July 1967, and
concluded successfully the revision of seven multilateral treaties and the establishment
of a new one: the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization51.52
The WIPO was established to promote the protection of intellectual property
throughout the world with a view to enhance co-operation among States, and to
49Ibid., pp. 9-10.
50The agreements are: the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks,
concluded in 1891; the Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of
Source on Goods, also concluded in 1891; the Hague Agreement Concerning the International
Deposit of Industrial Designs, concluded in 1925; the Nice Agreement Concerning the International
Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, concluded in
1957; and the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International
Registration, concluded in 1958.
5 Hereinafter the "WIPO Convention". The WIPO Convention came into effect on 26 April 1970.
Eventually, the WIPO. whose headquarters are in Geneva (WIPO Convention. Art. 10 (1)), became a
Specialised Agency of the United Nations on 17 December 1974. The WIPO Convention is published
in 6ILKI782 (1967). '
5:Arpad Bogsch. note 48. supra, p. 11.
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ensure administrative co-operation among the Unions.53 This was to be done through
the following actions: to promote the development of measures to facilitate the
efficient protection of intellectual property and to ensure the harmonisation of national
laws in this area; to perform administrative tasks for the Paris, Berne and Special
Unions; to encourage the conclusion of other international agreements in the field of
intellectual property, to offer services of technical co-operation to States which would
eventually require legal assistance; to gather together and disseminate information
about IPRs; and to provide services facilitating the international protection of IPRs,
and, where appropriate, provide for registration services and the publication of data
concerning those registrations54.
The institutional framework of the WIPO, which was probably the main goal
of the Stockholm Conference, consists of a General Assembly55, the Conference of the
Parties, and the Coordination Committee.
The General Assembly consists of the State Parties of the WIPO Convention
which are also members of the Unions56, represented by one delegate, who may be
assisted by alternate delegates, advisors, and experts57. The functions of the General
Assembly are to appoint the Director General of WIPO, upon nomination by the
Coordination Committee58; to review and approve reports of the Director General, as
well as measures proposed by the latter, and the activities of the Coordination
53WIPO Convention. Art. 3.
54Ibid.. Art. 4.
55It is worth noting that each of the Unions (Paris. Berne. Madrid. Hague. Nice and Lisbon) has an
Assembly, but not a General Assembly that is part only of the institutional framework of the WIPO.
Cf. Appendix II, Chart 1, infra.
56WIPO Convention. Art. 6(1) (a).
5 Ibid.. Art. 6 (1) (b). By virtue ofArticle 6 (3) (a), each State shall have only one vote in the General
Assembly.
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Committee; to adopt the triennial budget and financial regulations; and to determine
which States not Members of the W1PO, or inter-governmental organisations, may be
admitted as observers in its meetings. The General Assembly shall meet once in every
third calendar year in ordinary session, upon convocation by the Director General59,
and in extraordinary session upon convocation by the Director General, at the request
of the Coordination Committee or at the request of one quarter of the States members
of the General Assembly60. With regard to the quorum for convening the General
Assembly and the quorum for talcing decisions, there are applied the same rules as
those described for the Paris Convention, in Sub-section 1.1, supra.
The Conference consists of the States Parties of the WIPO Convention
whether or not they are members of the Unions61. The functions of the Conference are
the following: to discuss matters in the field of intellectual property and to adopt
recommendations to such matters; to adopt the triennial budget and to establish the
triennial programme of legal-technical assistance; to adopt amendments to the WIPO
Convention; and to determine which States not members of the WTPO, and which
inter-governmental and international non-governmental organisations, may be
admitted as observers to its meetings62. The Conference shall meet in ordinary session,
upon convocation by the Director General, during the same period and at the same
place as the General Assembly63, and in extraordinary session, upon convocation by
the Director General, at the request of the majority of the Member States of the
58WIPO Convention. Art. 8 (3) (v). The Director General shall be appointed for a term of at least six
years and he may be re-appointed {Ibid., Art. 9 (3)).
59Ibid., Art. 6 (4) (a).
MIbid.. Art. 6 (4) (b).
6]Ibid.. Art. 7(1).
62Ibid. Art. 7 (2).
aIbid. Art. 7 (4) (a).
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WIPO Convention64. Again, the same rules for quorum and decision-making, as those
provided by the Paris Convention, in Sub-section 1.1, supra, apply to the Conference.
The Coordination Committee of WIPO is composed of the States Parties of
the WIPO Convention who are members of the Executive Committee of the Paris or
Berne Unions, being a number of more than one quarter of the number of the
countries members of the Assembly which elected it. The Executive Committees of
the Unions will then indicate which members will be designated to participate in the
Coordination Committee65. The latter has the following functions: to give advice to
the organs of the Unions, the General Assembly, the Conference, and the Director
General, on all administrative, financial and other matters; to prepare the draft agenda
of the General Assembly, and the draft agenda and draft programme of the
Conference; to establish annual budgets and programmes, on the basis of the triennial
budget of expenses of the Unions and of the Conference; to nominate the Director
General for appointment; and to appoint the Acting Director General, in case the post
becomes vacant between two sessions of the General Assembly66.
The Co-ordination Committee meets once a year in ordinary session, upon
convocation by the Director General of the WTPO - generally at the headquarters of
the WIPO67 - and, in extraordinary session, either upon convocation by the Director
General, upon the own initiative of the Co-ordination Committee, or at the request of
its Chairman or one quarter of its members68.
64Ibid., Art. 7 (4) (b).
65Ibid.. Art. 8 (1) (a).
"ibid.. Art. 8 (3).
61Ibid., Art. 8 (4) (a).
68Ibid. Art. 8 (4) (b).
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The secretariat services offered by the WIPO will be carried out through the
International Bureau of Intellectual Property (the International Bureau)69. The latter is
headed by the Director General of WIPO, assisted by two or more Deputy
Directors70. The Director General is also the chief executive of the WIPO,
empowered to represent the organisation, and to report to the General Assembly as to
the internal and external affairs of the WIPO.71 The Director General shall also
prepare the draft programmes, budgets72 and periodical reports on activities which
will be distributed to the governments, the competent organs of the Unions and the
organs of the WIPO73 .74
Membership to the WIPO is opened to any State which is a member of the
Unions administered by WTPO, to any member of the United Nations, or its
Specialised Agencies; to members of the International Atomic Energy Agency; to any
party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice; or to any other State which
is invited by the General Assembly to become Party to the WIPO Convention.75
Countries wishing to adhere to the WIPO Convention must sign it, ratify it, and
deposit the instrument of ratification with the Director General ofWIPO75.
69Ibid., Art. 9 (1).
70Ibid.. Art. 9 (2).
71 Ibid.. Art. 9 (4).
"When drafting up the budget the Director General shall take into account two separate budgets: (a)
the budget of expenses to the Unions, which includes provision for expenses of interest to the several
Unions; and (b) the budget of the Conference, which includes provision for the expenses related with
holding sessions of the Conference and for the cost of the legal-technical assistance programme
(WIPO Convention. Art. 11).
3WIPO Convention. Art. 9 (5).
""For a better view on the institutional structure of the WIPO and its relationship with the other
Unions, see Chart 1. Appendix II, infra.
'Ibid.. Art. 5. As at 1 January 1996, the WIPO had 157 States Parties (WIPO Doc. N. 423 (E), note
8. supra).
6Ibid.. Art. 14. By virtue of Article 16 ofWIPO Convention reservations are not allowed.
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1.3. Mentioning the setting up of a patent co-operation system
From 1967 up to 1970 sixteen preparatory meetings, organised by the International
Bureau, took place in order to draft an international agreement to harmonise and
facilitate the procedures to file a patent application, in a single form, which would be
valid in several countries. On 19 June 1970, the Diplomatic Conference convened to
decide upon an international system for patent filing procedures concluded its work,
adopting the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and its Regulations77.
The PCT system makes the filing of a patent application in many countries
easier by providing mechanisms in which a patent applicant would file a single
application78, designating the Contracting State or States of the PCT79 in which he
desires to obtain protection80. National patent offices will operate as "receiving
offices", checking and processing the application81. One copy of the application is
kept by the receiving office (home copy), another copy will be transmitted to the
International Bureau (record copy)82, and a further one will be sent to the
The ratification process of the PCT was very slow for several reasons. In particular, because of the
resistance of many patent agents fearing that their services would become needless as a result of the
PCT system. Another reason was that some Western European countries intended to have the PCT in
operation only after the European Patent Convention would be fully established and operating. The
PCT came into force, finally, on 1 June 1978 (Arpad Bogsch. note 48, supra, p. 24). The text of the
PCT. with Regulations, is published in 9ILM 978 (1970).
8Called "international application" if filed under the PCT system (PCT, Art. 2 (vii)). It is
noteworthy that under Rule 13.1, Regulations of the PCT, an international application "... shall
relate to one invention only or to a group of inventions so linked as to form a single general inventive
concept ('requirement of unity of invention')".
9On 1 January 19%, the PCT had eighty three Contracting Parties (WIPO Doc. N. 423 (E), note 8,
supra).
*°PCT, Art. 4 (ii).
*]Ibid., Art. 10.
S2The record copy is the one which will be considered the true copy of the international application
(PCT. Art. 12 (2)). If the International Bureau does not receive such a copy within a specified period
of time, the international application will be considered withdrawn (Ibid., Art. 12 (3)).
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International Searching Authority83.84 The International Searching Authority will then
carry out the international search and endeavor to discover as much as the "relevant
prior art"85 as its facilities permit, on the basis of the claims, with due regard to the
description and the drawings (if any)86. After that, the International Searching
Authority will establish an international search report87, which shall be transmitted to
the International Bureau and to the applicant88.
The PCT system offers another mechanism to the applicant, in which he may
submit his international application to an international preliminary examination89,
indicating the Contracting State or States in which he intends to use the results of his
international preliminary examination90. The main purpose of an international
preliminary examination - which will be carried out by an International Preliminary
83Being appointed by the Assembly of the PCT Union (PCT, Art. 16 (3)(a)), for a fixed term (Ibid..
Art. 16 (3)(d)), the International Searching Authority may be either a national office or an inter¬
governmental organisation with the task of. inter alia, writing up of documentary search reports on
prior art with respect to inventions (Ibid.. Art. 16 (1)). According with Rule 36. of the PCT
Regulations, there are three minimum requirements to become an International Search Authority: the
national office or inter-governmental organisation must have at least 100 full-time employees with
sufficient technical qualifications to carry out searches: the office or organisation must possess at
least the minimum documentation which will enable them to assess the relevant prior art: and the
office or organisation must have staff who are capable of searching the required technical fields and
who have the language facilities to understand at least those languages in which the minimum
documentation is written or translated.
84PCT, Art. 12 (1).
85Rule 33.1 (a), Regulations of the PCT, determines that the "'relevant prior art' shall consist of
everything which has been made available to the public anywhere in the world by means of written
disclosure (...) and which is capable of being of assistance in determining that the claimed invention
is or is not new and that it does or does not involve an inventive step (...), provided that the making
available to the public occurred prior to the international filing date". If the "... wntten disclosure
refers to an oral disclosure, use. exhibition, or other means, whereby the contents of the written
disclosure were made available to the public. ..." before the filing of the international application,
the report on the international search must mention such fact and the date when it occurred (Rule
33.1. (b), Regulations of the PCT).
86PCT. Art. 15.
91Ibid. Art. 18 (1).
™Ibid, Art. 18 (2).
89Adhering States to the PCT are not obliged to accede to the international preliminary examination
system, being, thus, not bound bv the provisions of Chapter II of the PCT (PCT. Art. 64).
90PCT. Art. 31.
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Examining Authority91 - is to formulate a preliminary and non-binding opinion on the
satisfaction of the basic criteria of novelty, inventiveness and industrial application92.
The outcome of this preliminary search is an International Preliminary Examination
Report which states whether the claim appears to satisfy the criteria of novelty,
inventive step and industrial application. This report shall not contain any statement as
regards the patentability or non-patentability of the invention.93
To sum up, the PCT system provides eligible applicants94 with at least three
advantages. First, and probably the main one, is the timing advantage it gives as to the
payment of fees, and incurring of translation costs. Second, a patent applicant may
apply for a patent in several countries using a single procedure. Third, the patent
applicant has the possibility of having a technical assessment on the patentability or
non-patentability of his invention, before he starts to incur higher costs for applying
for patent protection. This undoubtedly makes patent filing procedures much simpler,
and, above all, less costly.
1.4. The efforts towards a Patent Harmonization Treaty: the PLT
Since 1983, preparatory work led by the WIPO has approached the creation of a
'Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention as far as Patents are Concerned", the
Patent Law Treaty (PLT). This treaty was initially called the "Treaty on the
Harmonisation of Patent Law" The preparatory work, initially designed to introduce
91Rule 63 sets up the minimum requirements to be an International Preliminary Searching Authority,
which are literally the same of those of the International Searching Authorny, as provided in note 83.
supra.
^PCT. Art. 33.
93Ibid.. Art. 35 (2).
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an international novelty grace period from the priority date95, has dealt also with the
issues on disclosures and descriptions, claims, unity of invention, priority, rights
conferred by a patent and obligations of the right holder, conditions of patentability,
prior art effects, term of patent protection, enforcement of patent rights, and reversal
of the burden of proof96.
The most important, and probably most controversial, point of discussion
during the first diplomatic conference has been the establishment of a grace period
system. Also, the discussions on the exclusion of the first-to-invent principle - against
the inclusion of the widely recognised first-to-file principle - from the PLT system
raised concerns from the delegation of the US. The latter regards the first-to-invent
system as a more efficient and fair system for patent applicants, in so far as the
inventor may publish, use and test his creation commercially before having to bear the
high costs of patent filing procedures and the maintenance of a patent right. After
testing his creation, the inventor could decide whether his invention is worth patenting
or not, without having any risk with regard to the non-patentability of his invention on
grounds of lack of novelty.
Other discussions have occurred in different areas of substantive patent law,
such as the basic criteria for patentability, term of protection and enforcement issues.
The First Part of the Diplomatic Conference, held in 1991, could not, however,
94Those w ho are nationals of a Contracting State, or a legal entity of a Contracting State, or those
which are nationals or residents of a country member of the Paris Union, allowed by the Assembly to
file international applications under the PCT system (PCT. Art. 9).
^Heinz Bardehle. WTPO Patent Harmonization: a Time for Compromise. [1991] 5 World
Intellectual Property Report 95-99. at p. 95.
96As in the draft treaty presented to the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference that took place at
The Hague, from 3 to 21 June 1991 and published in WIPO Records of the Diplomatic Conference
for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention as far as Patents are Concerned -
Volume I: First Pari of the Diplomatic Conference. The Hague. 1991. Geneva: WIPO (1991).
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conclude its work because of two basic reasons. Firstly, the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations of the GATT had not, at that time, been completed,
and delegations feared that some duplication of work could occur. Secondly, the US
had repeatedly affirmed that consultations with the interested circles in their country
had not been conclusive and that they needed some more time97.
Subsequently, from 8 to 12 May 1995, a Consultative Meeting for the
Preparation of the Second Part of the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of
the Patent Law Treaty, was due to take place98.
Although the PLT appears to be a duplication of the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement, in my opinion this assertion is based on a superficial examination of the
circumstances as a whole. The negotiations towards the PLT occur under the auspices
of the WIPO, which is the appropriate forum for international intellectual property
discussion. A future Patent Law Treaty has the opportunity to play a determinant part
in fulfilling the gaps left by the TRIPS Agreement, such as the environmental-related
aspects of patent rights; biotechnology; harmonised rules for patent granting
procedures; the recognition of the existing technological gaps between developing and
developed world; and, obviously, a grace period system with international application.
The PLT must be seen rather as a development of the international patent system that
has started more than one-hundred years ago than as a duplication of the outcome of
the negotiations taken under the GATT auspices. Even if it does not reach a
successful end, the history of negotiations will probably be a very useful source for
substantive patent laws and practices.
9
Arpad Bogsch. note 48. supra, p. 37.
98This information was extracted from [1995] 2 EIPR D-56.
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2. Patents and International Trade
Before getting on to the issues on intellectual property and international trade, it is
necessary to provide a brief historical view of the setting up of the world trade
system. The origins of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) date
back to 24 March 1948, when fifty two states signed, in Cuba, the Havana Charter,
aiming at setting up rules to regulate and encourage the liberalisation of international
trade, and wishing to create an International Trade Organisation (ITO). Ironically
enough, the initiative to establish such an organisation was taken by the US and the
most important reason for the ITO's failure was that the US Congress did not
approve the so-called "ITO Charter"99. The GATT is itself an international agreement
that, because of the historical events which occurred during the attempt at establishing
the ITO, has the status of an international binding agreement, and the functions of a
multilateral trade organisation.100
"Some argue that, because of the reluctance of the US Congress to ratify the Hav ana Charter, the
latter was never submitted by the US government to Congress. See, e.g., Rudiger Wolfrum &
Christiane Philipp (ed.), United Nations: Law. Policies and Practice. London: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers (1995), V. I, p. 532. It appears that this information is not accurate, because in Public
Papers of the President of the United States. Harry S. Truman - January 1 to December 31, 1949.
Washington. DC: United States Government Printing Office (1964), pp. 233-235, it is published the
"Special Message to the Congress Transmitting the Charter for the International Trade
Organization", of 28 April 1949. At the end of the messsage, page 235. a note says that "Congress
did not authorize the United States to accept membership in the International Trade Organization".
No mention is made of the fact that President Truman withdrew the Havana Charter on grounds of
Congress' reluctance to approve it. Apparently, what happened is that the US Congress did not
accept membership in the ITO, and. following this event President Truman decided not to resubmit
the Havana Charter to the Congress. See. for instance. GATT. Analytical Index: Guide to GATT
Law and Practice. Geneva: GATT (1994), 6th ed. p. 6. note 7.
l00See, also. John H. Jackson. The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International
Economic Relations. Massachusetts: The MIT Press (1989).
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Since its troublesome birth in 1948, the world trade system has operated under
the GATT 1947 framework on a provisional basis'01, and has been revised by several
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations'02. The last round of negotiations, the
Uruguay Round, was conceived in order to approach several issues that were not
included in the GATT, such as services, intellectual property and investments, as well
as a new and definite institutional structure for the operation of the overall system and
a more efficient dispute settlement machinery. These new issues, together with the
need (mostly the needs of developed nations) to reframe the world system of trade
regulation, led to a set of very complex diplomatic and political negotiations, making
the Uruguay Round objectives, as described in the Ministerial Declaration on the
Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations'03, an amazingly difficult task.
On 15 April 1994, 124 States signed, in Marrakesh, the Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the 'Tinal
Act")104, under the auspices of GATT. The Final Act incorporates an Agreement
101As the GATT did not come into force, because of the failure to put the Havana Charter into efFect.
the GATT has been applied provisionally, since 1948. under the provisions of the Protocol of
Provisional Application (PPA), by Australia, Belgium. Canada. France. Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the US. Governments that acceded to the GATT after 1948
did so on the terms and provisions of their protocols of accession. See. for more detailed
information, and for an analysis of the text of the PPA GATT, note 99, supra, pp. 993-1006. It is
also worth mentioning that the envisaged ITO would be part of the UN system through a specialised
agency agreement with the UN Economic and Social Council, under Article 63 of the United Nations
Charter. As the ITO was never established, the GATT "... is treated as a specialized agency on a de
facto basis", though the GATT has never established any formal relationship with the United
Nations (Ibid., p. 1041).
l02Seven rounds of negotiations preceded the Uruguay Round, as follows: Geneva (1947), Annecv
(1949); Torquay (1950); Geneva (1956); Dillon (1961); Kennedy (1962 to 1967); and Tokyo (1973
to 1979). The first five rounds addressed essentially tariff-reduction matters. Then, the Kennedy
Round was designed to look more seriously at the non-tariff barriers issues, but was concluded with
little success. Lastly, the Tokyo Round was the major round of negotiations which attained further
the objectives of reducing non-tariff barriers to trade (John H. Jackson, Reestructuring the GATT
System. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs (1990), p. 36).
103Published in 25 ILM 1623 (1986). Hereinafter the "Ministerial Declaration".
: '"^Published thoroughly in GATT. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: The Legal Texts. Geneva: GATT Secretariat (1994).
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Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO)105, which creates the institutional
framework of the successor of GATT, the WTO. It has also several agreements, in
various areas, attached to it. Among others, there is the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (Annex IB), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (Annex 1C)106, and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Annex 2). A more comprehensive view of the
institutional framework of the WTO is provided below in Appendix II, Chart 2.
2.1. IPRs in the GATT framework
Since its beginning, the GATT system has dealt marginally with the issues on IPRs,
though it has accepted that IPRs may become barriers to international trade, and
should be regulated somehow. In accordance with the GATT Secretariat107, there are
two types of provisions that are relevant in the analysis of these issues, and some
further provisions in other instruments negotiated under the GATT auspices.
Firstly, the GATT lays down general rules or procedures capable of bearing
upon some aspects of IPRs related to international trade, although they do not
address the issues of EPRs directly. They are, inter alia, Article I (2) and (4), on the
application of the Most-Favoured-Nation clause; Article III (4), on the application of
the National Treatment principle; Article XI (1), on the general elimination of
quantitative restrictions; and Article XHI, on non-discriminatory application of
quantitative restrictions. As emphasised by the GATT Secretariat,
105Hereinafter the "WTO Agreement"'. The WTO Agreement came into force on 1 January 1995 with
seventy six members (WTO Focus. N. 1, January/February 1995, p. 5). As at 1 July 1995. the WTO
Agreement had already 100 members (WTO Focus. N. 3, Mav/June 1995, p. 5).
10^he "TRIPS Agreement".
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The General Agreement contains basic rules and principles on
governmental measures affecting the importation and exportation of
goods as well as on certain internal governmental measures affecting
trade. These rules and principles apply to all such measures
irrespective of the policy area in which they are taken. They, thus, also
apply to such measures when taken in connection with intellectual
property rights.108
Still, according to the analysis of the GATT Secretariat, there are some
provisions in agreements negotiated under the auspices of GATT which should be
understood as referring to trade-related aspects of IPRs. These instruments are the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VII of the GATT, and the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in
Textiles.109
As this research deals essentially with international trade and patent
protection, a more limited approach to the subject shall be taken. The present Sub¬
section will consider in more detail only the provisions suggested by the GATT
Secretariat as referring specifically to IPRs. They are Articles IX, XII (3)(c)(iii),
XVIII (10), and XX (d).
Article IX, entitled "Marks of Origin", refers essentially to marking
requirements and the marking of imported products and trade names, making sure
that they are not used in a way which could obstruct the liberalisation of international
trade or that they could be used as discriminatory measures between Contracting
Parties. These marking requirements are present in paragraphs 1 to 5 of Article IX,
10 GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/6 (22 May 1987) GATT Provisions Bearing on Trade-




and paragraph 6, which is mainly concerned with the protection of geographical
indications related with marking requirements.
Articles XII (3)(c)(iii) and XVIII (10), on the other hand, refers to certain
conditions in which Contracting Parties are allowed to use import restrictions to
safeguard their balance of payments. Both provisions, however, "... prohibit these
restrictions from being applied so as to prevent compliance with patent, trademark,
copyright or similar procedures"110.
Article XX (d) is a general exception to governmental measures, such as those
related to IPRs, that are allowed to secure compliance with the laws of IPRs. Article
XX (d), thus, reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction to international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption
or enforcement by any contracting party ofmeasures:
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent with the provision of this Agreement,
including those relating ..., the protection of patents, trademarks and
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices.
A GATT Panel has discussed the subject under Article XX (d) when relating
to patent infringement and noted the following:
The Panel noted that the GATT recognized, by the very existence of
Article XX (d), the need to provide that certain measures taken by a
contracting party to secure compliance with its national laws or
regulations which otherwise would not be in conformity with the
GATT obligations of that contracting party would, through the
application of this provision under the conditions stipulated therein, be
U0Ibid.. p. 5. para. 15.
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in conformity with the GATT provided that national laws or
regulations concerned were not inconsistent with the General
Agreement. In this connection the Panel noted in particular that the
protection of patents was one of the few areas of national laws and
regulations expressly mentioned in Article XX (d).UI
2.2. IPRs during the Tokyo Round
More effective concerns in relation to IPRs and international trade took place during
the late 1970s, when the International Anti-counterfeiting Coalition was created, with
the participation of 100 multinational corporations, "... to lobby national governments
to strengthen protection against counterfeit trademarked goods"112. Eventually, this
Coalition continued to raise efforts towards more substantive discussion on all forms
of intellectual property protection, which led to the inclusion of the theme in the
Uruguay Round of negotiations113. This Sub-section was therefore included in this
Chapter as a necessary background to the negotiations which led to the TRIPS
Agreement.
The US government had considered the effects of the growing market for
counterfeiting trade-marked goods, and raised this point in the GATT framework for
the first time in June 1978, in the Tokyo Round Sub-group on Customs Matters114.
Draft rules on anti-counterfeiting were then prepared by the US and other delegations,
and a proposal for an agreement in this area was circulated in December 1978 among
11'Document L/5333, adopted on 26 May 1983, 30S. pp. 124-125. para. 53, apud GATT. note 99,
supra, p. 538.
n:Julie Chasen Ross & Jessica A. Wassennan. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, in Terence P. Stewart (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-
1992). Deventer/The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers (1993). p. 15. note 83.
n 3Ibid.
1,4GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/4 (6 May 1987) Work Undertaken in GATT Concerning
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods. Note
bv the Secretariat p. 2. para. 3.
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the Contracting Parties of the GATT115. From October to November 1979 other draft
texts of an agreement were circulated among the Contracting Parties ofGATT, but at
the conclusion of the Tokyo Round an agreement was not reached116.
The US government, with the support of Canada, the European Communities
and Japan, continued efforts to include the matter in the GATT framework. As a
consequence a Ministerial Declaration of the GATT Contracting Parties, of 29
November 1982, decided that the Council of Representatives of GATT should
examine the "appropriateness of joint action" within the GATT, and, if such was
found necessary, the Director General of the GATT Secretariat would be requested to
hold consultations with the Director General of WIPO aiming at clarifying the legal
and institutional aspects related with trade in counterfeit goods117.
After consultative meetings between the GATT and the WIPO Secretariats
took place, a report was issued and a Group of Experts on Trade in Counterfeit
Goods was formed. This matter was gaining more importance and becoming part of a
major concern in the GATT framework. More substantive actions were decided, then,
in the Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este, when the Uruguay Round was
launched in 1986118.
The latest version of the "Agreement on Measures to Discourage the




UHCf note 103. supra. The negotiating objectives for the discussion of Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights. Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, as described in the Ministerial
Declaration of 20 September 1986 will be referred to. in more detail, in Sub-section 2.3, infra.
11'Hereinafter the "Agreement on Counterfeit Goods". As reissued to participants of the Negotiating
Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Including Trade in Counterfeit
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international trade in counterfeit goods, through co-operation among participating
countries, was designed to create measures to protect the rights of trade-mark
owners120, laying down minimum requirements to discourage international trade in
counterfeit goods121.
Parties would be required, therefore, to provide trade-mark owners with
administrative and/or judicial mechanisms to initiate procedures to protect their rights,
before goods were released from the jurisdiction of customs authorities122. The trade¬
mark owner initiating administrative or judicial procedures should be required to
produce "... satisfactory evidence that counterfeit goods are in the process of being,
or are likely to be imported"123. National authorities would, consequently, take the
necessary steps to retain jurisdiction over the importation of counterfeit goods, once
satisfied with the evidence provided by the trade-mark owner124. A national treatment-
type of rule would also apply in so far as "[t]he criteria by which the authorities
determine whether imported goods are counterfeit shall be no less favourable than the
criteria used to determine whether domestically produced goods are counterfeit"125.
Developing countries would be given an extra period of up to two years from
the date of entry into force of the Agreement on Counterfeit Goods to apply its
provisions. They would also be able to receive, upon request and on mutually agreed
Goods, of the Uruguay Round, in GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/9 (25 June 1987) Draft
Agreement to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods.
120Agreement on Counterfeit Goods. Preamble and Art. 1.
™Ibid.. Art. 1.3.
l22Jbid. Art. 2.1.
]23Ibid.. Art. 2.2. In accordance with a note to Article 2.2.. which would be part of the Agreement on
Counterfeit Goods, by virtue of Article 6, "[t]he phrase 'or likely to be imported' is intended to
provide a means whereby the owners of the trademark rights may initiate procedures, where the
country of importation so provides, in cases were alleged counterfeit goods have not yet come within




terms, advice and assistance from developed countries, in relation with, inter aha,
training of personnel, assistance in preparing implementation measures, and advice on
the control and identification of imported counterfeit goods.126
The Agreement on Counterfeit Goods would be serviced by the GATT
Secretariat127, and a Committee on Measures to Discourage the Importation of
Counterfeit Goods would be created to administer the provisions of the agreement
and to afford Parties with the opportunity to consult on any matters relating to the
operation of the Agreement or the furtherance of its objectives. Such a Committee
would consist of representatives of each of the Parties, and would be required to meet
at least once a year128.
2.3. IPRs in the Uruguay Round: the TRIPS Agreement
Strictly speaking, the work for the setting up of an institutional and legal framework
for an agreement, under the GATT auspices, concerned with trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights, started with the unsuccessful negotiations of the
Agreement on Counterfeit Goods. A more practical approach associated with
intellectual property issues in GATT, nevertheless, took place in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, on 20 September 1986, when Ministers adopted the Ministerial Declaration
on the Uruguay Round1 , establishing the objectives of the negotiations to address
TRIPS matters, as follows:
]26Ibid. Art. 8.
121Ibid.. Art. 9.9.
l28Ibid.. Art. 7. In addition to that. Article 7 affirms that dispute settlement procedures would be
subject to Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT and the Understanding on Notification.
Consultation. Dispute Settlement and Surveillance.
]29Cf note 103, supra.
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In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and
adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall
aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules
and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of
principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in
counterfeit goods, taking into account work already undertaken in the
GATT.
These negotiations shall be without prejudice to other
complementary initiatives that may be taken in the World Intellectual
Property Organization and elsewhere to deal with these matters.
It is possible to highlight, at least, three major points of interest expressed by
the Ministerial Declaration. Firstly, it is acknowledged that non-uniform protection of
EPRs on a world-wide basis may become a barrier to trade, and that GATT should
clarify its own provisions and elaborate common rules and principles accordingly.
Secondly, the Ministerial Declaration recognised the work already carried out in the
field of counterfeit goods, including this subject also in the framework of the future
negotiations of TRIPS. Finally, it expressed a respect towards the work of other
international organisations, in particular those of the WIPO. These are the basic rules
which should have been followed by the negotiating group on TRIPS. It is argued by
some developing countries, however, that TRIPS negotiating group went far beyond
its mandate, discussing substantive intellectual property principles, and imposing
minimum standards which do not take into consideration the technological gap
between North and South130.
130See. generally, GATT Doc. N. MTN.TNC/MIN (90)/ST/46 (4 December 1990) India - Statement
by Dr. Subramanian Swanv, Union Minister of Commerce, Law and Justice: GATT Doc. N.
MTN.GNG/NG11AV/30 (31 October 1988) Submission from Brazil; and GATT Doc. N.
MTN.GNG/NG11AV/61 (22 January 1990) Communication from Chile.
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The negotiations on the TRIPS Agreement started in February 1987, when
Ministers agreed on procedures for the negotiations in this field, and were carried out
until 1992 when a final draft Agreement on TRIPS was issued. The TRIPS
Agreement, reached at the Ministerial Meeting in Marrakesh in April 1994, contains
seventy three Articles and is divided into seven parts. It contains provisions on
substantive intellectual property laws, including copyright and related rights, trade¬
marks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs of
integrated circuits, trade secrets and the control of anti-competitive practices applied
to contractual licences. It also lists minimum requirements for the enforcement of
IPRs, deals with rules relating to the acquisition and maintenance of IPRs, sets up a
dispute settlement mechanism, and recognises the situation of developing countries,
"transforming economies" and less-developed countries. The operation of the TRIPS
Agreement is designed primarily "... to promote effective and adequate protection of
intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade"131.
The TRIPS Agreement will be administered by the Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the "Council for TRIPS"), established under
the institutional framework of the WTO.132 The Council for TRIPS will have the
assignment of monitoring "... the operation of this [TRIPS] Agreement and, in
particular, Members' compliance with their obligations hereunder, ..." and the task of
131 TRIPS Agreement. Preamble.
13:WTO Agreement. Art. IV (5).
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providing assistance requested by the Members relating to trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights and dispute settlement procedures133.
Two substantive GATT principles apply to the TRIPS Agreement. The
"national treatment" principle implies that "[e]ach Member shall accord to the
nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its
own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property"1 4. The main
point here is that, within the GATT framework, this principle applies originally to
goods, while within the TRIPS Agreement, the national treatment principle applies
equally to right holders135. The establishment within the WTO framework of the
operation of this principle will be certainly developed by the practice of the
Agreement itself, made available by dispute settlement decisions, and enhanced by the
application of this principle in other intellectual property conventions administered or
not by the WIPO.
"Most-favoured-nation" treatment recognises that "[w]ith regard to the
protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members"136. The major
problem that emerged during the negotiations was that the application of this principle
has never been included into other international intellectual property arrangements,
133TRIPS Agreement. Art. 68. This provision calls, also, for the establishment of co-operation
arrangements with the WIPO. For a general view of the institutional mechanisms created by the
Final Act see Chart 2. Appendix II, infra.
134TRIPS Agreement. Art. 3(1).
135See. e.g., GATT Doc. of 26 January 1990, Checklist of Issues. Prepared by the Secretariat, p. 4,
para. 6.
136TRIPS Agreement. Art. 4.
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and, in addition, although part of the GATT framework, the "most-favoured-nation"
clause has been applied primarily to goods, not to right holders137.
It is also important to note that the TRIPS Agreement proposes the
establishment of minimum standards which should be adopted by national law.
However, there is no restriction on adopting higher standards of IPRS than those
proposed by the TRIPS Agreement, in so far as such protection does not run against
its provisions. Members have, in addition, the discretion to include the minimum
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement in their national laws and practices by the
method that they deem appropriate and necessary138. Furthermore, the TRIPS
Agreement will have binding force once ratified by Members, but will be enforced
under the new international trade system only after an additional period of time
granted solely to less developed countries139.
137Note 135. supra, p. 6, para. 17.
138TRIPS Agreement. Art. 1(1).
Xi9Ibid.. Art. 65. Generally, Members will be obliged to apply the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement
within one year from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement (Ibid., Art. 65 (1)).
However, developing countries and "transforming economies" have been granted an extra period of
four years (Ibid., Arts. 65 (2) and (3), respectively). In addition, the extra period for "least-
developed" countries is ten years (Ibid., Art. 66). The application of this provision has caused,
particularly in Brazil, a major discussion within the Brazilian Association of Intellectual Property
(ABPI). Industrial property agents started to debate the subject because of the publication of
Brazilian Decree N. 1.355, of 30 December 1994. in the Official Journal of Brazil on 31 December
1994, which is the legal instrument ratifying the Final Act. In Article 2, Decree N. 1.355/94 says that
its provisions will enter into force on the date of publication. As a matter of interpretation, within the
ABPI two school of thoughts were formed. One group believed that the fact that the Decree does not
make any reservation to the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement does not preclude the
application of the extra period of time granted to Brazil, as a developing country. They argue that
this is a programmatic provision that in its essence, has included all countries within the category of
developing economies. Another group argued that once a Decree is published, the international
agreement becomes part of the national legal framework, without the need of further implementation,
and all provisions to the contrary will be automatically revoked. This, they say, is a common
understanding of national implementation of international rules. The ABPI has finally decided that
the second view is one which should prevail and that the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are
already part of the Brazilian legal framework, revoking all the provisions of national intellectual
property laws. This discussion, however, has not been brought before a national court yet and the
matter is. in a practical sense, still unresolved. See. for further information in this regard. Antonella
Carminati. A Aplicacao do TRIPS na Ordem Juridica Interna. [1995] 17 Revista da ABPI 13-17.
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The protection of "copyrights" under the TRIPS Agreement shall comply with
Articles 1 to 21, and the Appendix of the Berne Convention. A substantial exception
is made by the Agreement. Under the continental-European law understanding of
copyrights, there are two subjects of protection. First there are "economic rights",
which entitle the author to authorise reproduction, translation, or adaptation of his
work, as well as its public performance; second, there are "moral rights" which entitle
the author to claim authorship of his work and prevent actions prejudicial to his
honour or reputation. "Moral rights" are retained by the author even after he has
transferred his economic rights. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the TRIPS Agreement
excludes the application of moral rights, when it says that Members shall not have
rights under the TRIPS Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under Article
6bis ofBerne Convention140.
Copyright protection, under the TRIPS Agreement, shall extend to all forms
of original expression, regardless of the condition in which the work is created,
expressed, or embodied, or the method by which it is communicated or utilised.
However, ideas, procedures, methods of operation, or mathematical concepts are
excluded from protection141. Under the wording of the TRIPS Agreement, Members
shall protect, as a minimum, all types of traditional copyrights, as well as computer
programs and data compilation142, rental rights143, and rights of performers, producers
of phonograms and broadcasting144.
140Article 6bis (1) of Berne Convention reads as follows: "Independently of the author's economic
rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of. or other
derogatory action in relation to. the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation''.
141 TRIPS Agreement. Art. 9 (2).
U2lbid.. Art. 10.
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The term of protection shall be for at least fifty years from the end of the
calendar year of authorised publication, or fifty years from the end of the calendar
year of the making of the work145. Copyright protection is based on the creation of a
work, and shall subsist whether or not the work is published, communicated, or
disseminated in any way. The mere fact that the work exists makes it capable of legal
protection.
The TRIPS Agreement expressly accepts as the subject-matter of a "trade¬
mark", "[a]ny sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing goods or
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, .. ,"146.
A remarkable point, which was made in the trademark provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement, is that Members are allowed to require that the signs will be
visually perceptible. This reference, in the last sentence of Article 15 (1), TRIPS
Agreement, seems to make reference to the fact that the smell, tastes and sounds may
not be protected under trade-mark concepts147.
The term of protection shall be for no less than seven years. The trade-mark
shall be renewable indefinitely, and the renewal shall be also for a term of no less than
seven years148. In this regard, Members are allowed to require the use of a trademark




146Ibid., Art. 15 (1). These combinations, as provided, include personal names, letters, numerals,
figurative elements and combinations of colours.
'^During a personal interview with one of the delegates negotiating the Uruguay Round particularly
the TRIPS Agreement, it was said that some industries, e.g. perfume manufacturers, lobbied to
include the smell as a sign capable of trade-mark protection. The last sentence of Article 15 (1),
seems to make a direct reference to this fact.
I48TRIPS Agreement Art. 18.
149Ibid.. Art. 15 (3). Members may not. however, require actual use as a condition for filing an
application for registration.
115
so, they are not allowed to cancel the registration before at least three consecutive
years of non-use150. Licensing and assignment of a trade-mark is permitted, but trade¬
marks are not subject to compulsory licences151.
The inclusion of the provisions aimed at the protection of "geographical
indications" was essentially a proposal of the European Communities152, supported by
several other countries153. In the light of the TRIPS Agreement, Members are required
to protect "... indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a
Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or
other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin"154.
Members shall, therefore, refuse or invalidate the registration of a trade-mark, ex
officio, if the latter contains or consists of a geographical indication with respect to
goods not originating in the territory indicated155.
Special mention is made in Article 23, TRIPS Agreement, of additional
protection of geographical indications for wines and spirits156. For the purpose of
facilitating the protection of geographical indications of wine, for instance, there will
be established, in the Council for TRIPS, a multilateral system of notification and
registration of geographical indications for wines157.
150Ibid. An. 19 (1).
]5]Ibid. Art. 21.
15:See. e.g., GAIT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/7 (29 May 1987) Submissions from Participants on
Trade Problems Encountered in Connection with Intellectual Property Rights, p. 2. para. 3.
153See. generally, GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG1 lAV/32/Rev.2 (2 February 1990) Synoptic Table
Setting Out Existing International Standards and Proposed Standards and Principles, Prepared bv the
Secretariat, Revision, at pp. 68-69, for the suggestions of Australia. Switzerland. Hong Kong, Peru.
Canada. New Zealand and Republic of Korea.
154TRIPS Agreement Art. 22 (1).
lisIbid. Art. 22 (3).
l56Ibid.. Art. 23 (1).
151Ibid.. Art. 23 (4).
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It is also noteworthy that the Council for TRIPS was given the task of keeping
under review the application of the provisions on geographical indications, in which
the first review will take place within two years after the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement158. There is no such term of protection for geographical indications.
During the TRIPS negotiations, the legal protection of "industrial designs"
faced a conceptual problem. International law does not provide a common definition
of industrial designs and of the protectable subject-matter159. The Paris Convention,
for instance, gives no solution to this problem. In the absence of such a conceptual
approach, the principles of the EC seem to have prevailed.
Designs will, then, be protected in so far as they fulfill the requirements of
novelty or originality. The design capable of protection has, thus, to differ from
known designs or combinations of known designs160. TRIPS negotiators have
decided, additionally, that industrial design rights may be kept to minimum standards,
and Members may, therefore, provide that such protection will not extend to designs
dictated essentially by technical or functional considerations161. The term of protection
shall be for at least ten years162.
In relation to "patent rights", there are several conceptual and substantive
clarifications to make. The brief description of the other elements of the TRIPS
Agreement, which takes place at the present Sub-section, is obviously too limited.
Because the main concern of this research is the protection of patents, the issues on
substantive patent law will be further considered, below, in Chapter 5.
]5*Ibid. Art. 24 (2).
159See. e.g.. Checklist of Issues, note 135. supra, pp. 18-19. para. 67.
l60Ibid. Art. 25 (1).
]6]Ibid.. Art. 25 (1). Last sentence.
]62Ibid.. Art. 26 (3)
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The protection of "layout-designs of integrated circuits" shall comply,
generally, with the provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits163. Under the wording of the TRIPS Agreement, innocent
purchasers of infringing products are not considered infringers, though they will have
to pay the respective royalties after the notice of infringement164. Compulsory licences
apply for layout-designs, as for patents165.
In general terms, the term of protection is not more than fifteen years after the
creation of the layout-design166. In countries where registration is required as a
condition for the protection, the term shall be at least ten years, counted from the date
of filing the application for registration, or from the first commercial use of the layout-
design167. Moreover, in countries where registration is not required, the term of
protection shall be for at least ten years from the first commercial use of the layout-
design168.
In addition to the provisions on traditional IPRs, the TRIPS Agreement
governs the protection of "undisclosed information or trade secrets". Despite juridical
and doctrinal doubts whether trade secrets are intangible property or "subjective
rights" and, therefore, whether they are protectable under the current system of
intellectual property laws169, Article 39 (2), TRIPS Agreement, rules that Members of
the WTO Agreement shall give the possibility to anyone (either natural or legal
i63Ibid.. Art. 35. Signed on 26 May 1989. Published in 28 ILU 1477 (1989).
[bAIbid. Art. 37(1).
]65Ibid. Art. 37(2).
l66Ibid. Art. 38 (3).
]61Ibid.. Art. 38 (1).
i6gIbid. Art. 38 (2).
169See. e.g., Stanislaw J. Soltvsinski. Are Trade Secrets Property''. [1986] 17 IIC 331-356. and
Sheldon Burshtein. Confidential Information is not Property in Canada. [1988] 11 Industrial
Property 55-58.
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persons) "... of preventing information lawfully within their control from being
disclosed to, acquired by, or used by other without their [owners] consent in a manner
contrary to honest commercial practices ,.."170. The conditions to be fulfilled, that
protection may be granted, are the following: (a) the existence of an information
which is secret; (b) the information has commercial value because it is secret and; (c)
all reasonable steps have been taken to keep the information secret. In the absence of
any provision regulating the term of protection of undisclosed information, it is
possible to affirm that the TRIPS Agreement grants protection for valuable
undisclosed information for an unlimited duration, if the conditions above listed are
met.
The provisions on the protection of undisclosed information deal also with
another form of trade secret protection. When Members require, as a condition for the
approving of the marketing of pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products, the
submission of undisclosed information, test or other data, such information shall be
protected against unfair commercial use and against disclosure, except where
necessary to protect the public171.
In relation to protection against "unfair competition", there was general
agreement among industrialised nations that some degree of control over licensing,
where the licensing agreement has anti-competitive effects - thus having adverse effect
on trade and impeding the transfer and dissemination of technology172 - should exist in
1 °The TRIPS Agreement defines, in a footnote to Article 39 (2), that '"a manner contran to honest
commercial practices" shall mean at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence
and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties
who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the
acquisition".
i 'TRIPS Agreement. Art. 39 (3).
r2lb id.. Art. 40 (1).
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the TRIPS Agreement. Members are, therefore, allowed (but there is no obligation to
do so) to "... adopt, ..., appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices,
which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing
challenges to validity and coercive package licensing"173. Further discussion of the
TRIPS Agreement's approach towards competition law principles takes place in
Chapter 6, Section 2, Sub-section 2.1, Paragraph 2.1.2, mfra.
The need of stronger rules, in a multilateral level, for the "enforcement of
EPRs" was one of the major arguments for the inclusion of the issues on IPRs in the
context of the Uruguay Round. The US, for instance, has claimed that the
international agreements administered by the WIPO did not provide for appropriate
rules for the enforcement of EPRs174.
Accordingly, the TRIPS Agreement requests that Members should establish
national rules to ensure the enforcement of IPRs, in a fair and equitable way175, .. so
as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property
rights covered by this [TRIPS] Agreement"176. Therefore, decisions on the merits of
a case should be preferably in writing and reasoned, and made available to the parties
of the proceeding without undue delay177. Parties should also be given the opportunity
of judicial review of final administrative decisions178. In fact, the TRIPS Agreement
goes beyond these basic rules, providing that Members shall provide intellectual
property owners with several legal mechanisms, such as due process, evidence, fair
mIbid.. Art. 40 (2).
1 4See. e.g., GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/2 (3 April 1987) Statement bv the United States at
Meeting of 25 March 1987.
psTRIPS Agreement. Art. 41 (2).
]16Ibid. Art. 41 (1).
177Ibid. Art. 41 (3).
riIbid. Art. 41 (4).
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hearing and motivation of decisions, appeals, delays, provisional measures and
preliminary injunctions, ex officio actions by border authorities, and damages and
criminal sanctions related to trademark and copyright infringements.179
As it is generally known, the WTO Agreement improved the dispute
settlement mechanisms for the resolution of disputes among countries. This has been
one of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round which improved the procedural
rules of the system providing for a binding-type of rulings regarding the resolution of
conflicts180. The system of the WTO will apply equally to disputes within the
framework of the TRIPS Agreement181.
Conclusion
This Chapter has attempted to provide a general background on the establishment of
multilateral agreements in the field of patent protection. As has been seen, the
development of an international patent system is part of a historical process which
considered the various stages of technology and human knowledge.
This complex set of rules must be taken into account within the context of the
negotiations of the MERCOSUL. The international commitments of each State Party
of the MERCOSUL has to be part of the negotiating process. Of course diplomatic
and technical negotiations are considering a common regime for patent protection for
the MERCOSUL which is compatible with the international commitments of the
States Parties. But, as has been briefly described above, this group of rules and
|79See. generally. TRIPS Agreement. Part III.
:S"For further analysis of the issues on dispute settlement as an outcome of the Uruguay Round, see
e.g.. Lei Wang. Some Observations on the Dispute Settlement System in the World Trade
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international norms are complex and sometimes confusing. Within this complexity, the
MERCOSUL has to find out how to address issues on transfer of technology,
proprietorship of technology and knowledge, in ways which recognise the
technological needs of the region.
There are two institutional approaches, at international level, that are of
relevance in this context. The MERCOSUL, firstly, has to act jointly in the
international debate as a means of defending its own interests as a common integrated
area and also as individual countries. States Parties must consider the development of
the negotiations both within WIPO and within WTO, to take account of certain
circumstances that are particularly connected with the unfair technological gap
between developed and developing world.
The MERCOSUL, as such, has a political strength in the international debate
which is to be considered as a means of attaining the goals of multilateralism in the
international patent discussion. If one takes the example of the negotiations during the
Uruguay Round, it is clear that although developing countries sometimes acted
together, they were unable to include most of their propositions into the TRIPS
Agreement. The outcome of the latter was clearly a position in favour of the
developed world as proprietors of technology. But, at the end of the day, developing
countries were granted at least an extra period of time to implement these provisions,
which is a recognition of their lack of technological competitiveness.
The second approach, that should be taken by the MERCOSUL, derives from
the recognition that international negotiations in the field of patent protection are
Organization. [1995] 29 JUT 173-178. and Gary Horlick. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms - Will
the United States Plav bv the Rules?. [1995] 29 JWT 163-172.
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moving towards a stricter and more detailed legal framework which embraces several
aspects of the protection of technology. If regional arrangements in developing
countries, such as the MERCOSUL, do not include patent protection as part of their
common science and technology strategy, they will have to face a situation in which
they become even weaker players, merely buying technology. They have to include, in
their common legal framework for patent protection, mechanisms which grant them
some degree of flexibility against the commercial and technological power of the
industries of the developed world, such as regulations on prices, anti-competitive
practices and abuse of dominant position. A country and, in this case, an integrated
area have to control the participation in the market of both their own industries and
undertakings as well as their foreign counterparts.
A common mechanism for the protection of patents in the MERCOSUL must
indeed consider transfer of technology as part of a policy which aims at technological
development in the region. This is to be achieved by common actions in this field and
co-ordinated establishment of national policies in science and technology. If States
Parties of the MERCOSUL are primarily buyers of modern technology, they must
invest highly in developing their own technology, at least based on the existing
technology that they are buying. It does not seem that the international debate in this
field will consider further the weak position of developing countries. It is neither clear
whether international negotiations will consider further mechanisms for technology
transfer under most favoured treatment to the developing world. It appears that the
international discussion will rather approach the subject in a way to provide
181TRIPS Agreement. Art. 64.
123
multinational undertakings with stronger position in the international and highly
competitive market of technology.
A common legal framework for the protection of patents in the MERCOSUL
will have to examine, additionally, the commercial issues related to the
implementation and functioning of an integrated area. This will be further studied
below in Chapter 3, as a means of providing an example of an integrating process
such as the European one. Additionally, some deeper discussion is necessary in the
field of unification of institutional mechanisms and substantive patent laws within an
integrated arrangement. This will be examined in more detail in Chapter 4, also taking
into consideration the European experience.
CHAPTER 3
PATENT LAW AND THE EC TREATY
Introduction
The MERCOSUL, as has been seen above in Chapter 1, Section 2, is an infant
integrating experience. The example of the European Community (EC) may be of
relevance to the MERCOSUL in several respects, particularly when one considers the
protection of patents, the exercise of the rights conferred upon a patent and the
effects that this exercise may have in an integrated area. The legislative and juridical
experiences of the EC have been developed for more than three decades and
undoubtedly throws light on prospects for the MERCOSUL. It is necessary to
mention, however, that both integrating projects have distinct goals and
characteristics and the experience of the EC cannot be just copied to the
MERCOSUL. The analysis that follows is an attempt to provide the Southern Cone
project with some of the legal and juridical problems that may arise in different forms
in the MERCOSUL.
This Chapter considers the effects of EC law on patent rights. The protection
of these rights by national law will be dealt in the light of the Community context to
the extent which EC law affects the traditional exercise of national patent rights. It is
thus necessary to analyse the basic rules protecting the free movement of goods1 and
the legal framework aiming to establish a system of competition within the Common
Market which is not distorted2. Although it seems that both group of rules are
'EC Treaty, Arts. 30 to 36.
'Ibid, Arts. 85 and 86. As secondary sources, this Chapter utilises Regulation N. 17/62 (OJ. Special
Edition. 21/2/62. 87). implementing the above mentioned provisions (hereinafter the "Regulation
1T) and Regulation 240/96 of 31 January 1996 (OJ 1996 L31/2). on the application of Article 85(3)
of the Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer agreements (hereinafter the "Regulation
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distinct, since each operates in its own particular way, and both are part of the
objectives of the Treaty Establishing the European Community3 listed in Article 3,
conflicts emerge from the application of these rules. It is important to understand the
relationship between the rules relating to the free movement of goods and the rules
relating to competition within the Community in order to clear up the discussion that
follows in this Chapter.
While Articles 30 to 36 are addressed to the Member States, and all its
governmental bodies in all levels, to ensure no restriction on the free flow of products
within the territory of the Common Market, Articles 85 and 86 are directly addressed
to undertakings and, to operate, it requires an agreement, decision by undertakings or
concerted practices between at least two undertakings, or the existence of a dominant
position "... within the Common Market or in substantial part of it"4, which affects,
or may affect, trade between Member States of the EC. If two undertakings breach
the rules of competition, they may incur fines and penalties from the European
240/96). The present analysis provides also an outline of Regulation N. 2349/84 (OJ 1984 L219/15,
corrigendum OJ 1985 LI 13/34), on block exemptions for patent licensing agreements (hereinafter
the "Regulation 2349/84"), and of Regulation N. 556/89 (OJ 1989 L61/1), on block exemptions for
know-how licensing agreements (hereinafter the "Regulation 556/89"). The last two Regulations as
amended by Regulation N. 151/93 (OJ 1993 L21/8).
3Published in Nigel Foster (ed.), Blackstone's EC Legislation. London: Blackstone Press Limited
(1995), 6th ed.. As amended by the Treaty Amending Certain Financial Provisions, the Single
European Act the Merger Treaty, the Greenland Treaty, the Acts of Accession and the Treaty on
European Union (Maastricht Treaty). Hereinafter referred to as either the "Treaty" or the "EC
Treaty". As a matter of clarification, it is important to note that "[t]he Treaty on European Union
created the 'European Union", which consists essentially of the three so-called pillars: the central
pillar is the existing communities [the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic
Energy Community, and the former European Economic Community which is now called, as
amended by the Maastricht Treaty, the European Community] and their law (...). The two other
pillars comprise provisions on common foreign and security policy and provisions on co-operation in
the fields of justice and home affairs"' (David A.O. Edward & Robert C. Lane, European
Community Law: An Introduction. Edinburgh: Butterworths & Law Society of Scotland (1995), 2nd
ed., p. 12. para. 37).
4EC Treaty. Art. 86.
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Commission (the "Commission"). On the other hand, in the case of breaching Articles
30 no such sanction is available to a government.
Below, it will be seen that several cases involving the disputes of intellectual
property rights, however, are dealt with under the free movement of goods and
competition provisions.5 Goyder, analysing the relationship between both groups of
provisions of the Treaty, states that:
The European Court of Justice might well seek, as a matter of policy,
to limit the application of Article 30 to situations other than those
when the Commission itself had, after protracted consultation and
negotiations, established a model for patent licensing arrangements
within the Community which it followed would not in its view restrain
competition within the terms of Article 85.6
Afterwards, the author sums up the question concluding that "[t]he Court
would be likely to seek a solution which harmonized the approach of the two Articles
[Articles 30 and 85 of the Treaty] rather than emphasized the differences between
them"7.
As will be seen in detail below, principles such as the doctrine establishing the
distinction between the existence and the exercise of intellectual property rights have
been developed in the context of one of the provisions of the Treaty (either Articles
30 to 36 or 85 and 86), but apply to the others. The link between both groups of
provisions is quite clear as far as an agreement between undertakings or an abuse of a
'See. as an example, cases listed in notes 12 and 13. infra.
D.G. Goyder. EC Competition Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1993) 2nd ed.. pp. 337-338.
1lbid.. p. 338.
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dominant position, which affect trade between Member States, may, as a
• 8
consequence, restrict the free flow of goods within the Commumty.
Note, finally, that the following methodology was used in Sub-section 2.1.
(Analysis of Article 85). This Sub-section firstly provides a general overview of the
application of Article 85, EC Treaty. Then, the most important - and/or the most
complex - clauses in patent licensing agreements are described in some detail
Following that, Paragraph 2.1.2. provides a general view of the legal mechanisms
available in the EU to regulate patent and know-how licensing agreements.
It may seem, for the reader, that there is an overlap between Paragraph 2.1.1.
and Paragraph 2.1.2., below. While the former suggests to include in the discussion
some of the the clauses commonly present in patent or know-how licensing
agreements, the latter describes, Article by Article, the contents ofRegulation 240/96.
This Regulation focuses, indeed, on block exemptions for patent and know
licensing agreements, and determines which clauses are - and are not - to be deemed
as within the wording of Article 85 (3), EC Treaty. Regulation 240/96 focuses also on
other procedural matters for the appropriate application of Article 85 (3), which
should be generally described.
Paragraph 2.1.2. provides, only, a general overview of past Regulations on
block exemptions for patent (Regulation 2349/84) and know-how (Regulation
556/89) licensing agreements, briefly listing the provisions of Regulation 240/96.
Paragraph 2.1.1., on the other hand, discusses in more detail particular clauses which
should be analysed with further care by the integrating process of the MERCOSUL.
8See. e.g.. Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak v. Commission [1990] ECR 11-309. [1991] 4 CMLR 334, and
Derrick Wyatt & Allan Dashwood, European Community Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.
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1. The Free Movementof Goods
The provisions of the Treaty related to the free movement of goods are Articles 3
(a)9, 9 and, as "substantive provisions", Articles 30 to 37 The present discussion will
be based on the aspects of Article 30, which states the prohibitions, and Article 36
which states the exceptions of the prohibitions established by Article 30. The main
purpose of the Treaty is to create an integrated economic system similar to national
systems. Hereupon, an exclusive monopoly granted by the State within its territorial
jurisdiction to an individual, as the case of a patent, appears to be incompatible with
the provisions of the Treaty creating an area where goods shall circulate freely.
The European Court of Justice (the "Court"), analysing the characteristics of
patent protection, declared that the holder of a patent has the right to exploit the
invention for the purpose of making and selling the patented product and hence the
right to prevent an infringement by a third party that is manufacturing and/or selling
the patented product without the owner's consent. The connection between the
exercise of these rights and the application of the common principles of Community
law had to be developed further to reach a balance between national and Community
interests.
(1987) 2nd ed.. pip. 613-615, for the relationship between Articles 85 and 86 and the relationship
between both Articles and Article 30 of the EC Treaty.
'Article 3 (a) states that, for the purposes of establishing a Common Market, the activities of the
Community shall include "the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and
quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all measures having equivalent
effect". As emphasised by Diana Guy & Guy Leigh. The EEC and Intellectual Property. London:
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd (1981). p. 5. "... the link between this and intellectual property is to be found
in the innocuous phrase 'all measures having equivalent effect"'. For further discussion in this
regard see. also. R. Barents. New Developments in Measures Having Equivalent Effect. [1981] 18
CKfL Rev. 271-308
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1.1. The distinction between the existence and the exercise of a patent
right
National rules governing intellectual property rights within the Community are, on the
one hand, protected by Article 22210 and by Article 36 of the Treaty. On the other,
Article 30, aiming to ensure the free circulation of goods throughout the Community,
determines that "[quantitative restriction on imports and 'all measures having
equivalent effect' shall, be prohibited between Member States"11. It is clear that
there is conflict between the existence of EPRs, protected by the Treaty and granted
by national legislation, and the effects of the exercise of these rights on the rules
ensuring the circulation, without restrictions, of goods within the territory of the
Community. In several judgments the court has held that the exercise of a national
intellectual property right in a way that prevents the free circulation of goods
constitutes a "measure having equivalent effect" to a quantitative restriction and,
under Article 30 of the Treaty, it is prohibited.
The European Court of Justice developed the distinction between the
existence of IPRs and its exercise, seeking to set out a balance between the
requirements of Community and national laws. It seems that the Court gave priority
to the needs of the Community when it stressed that the existence of national rights is
not affected either by Articles 30 to 34 or by Articles 85 and 86, but its exercise in
some ways may contravene the rules of the Treaty.
10Article 222 establishes the following: "The Treaty' shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member
States governing the system of property ownership".
11
Cf. note 9. supra. Emphasis added.
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Although the distinction was first developed in cases under the application of
Article 85 (l)12, and related to trade-marks, later the principle was reaffirmed in cases
dealing with Articles 30 to 3613. Henceforth, despite some criticisms, the distinction
became clearer in the sense that "... it is only the 'existence' of the right which is
safeguarded by Article 36 [and Article 222] and that the 'exercise' of the right is
subject to limitations arising from the rules of the Treaty"14. Indeed, the limitations
arise from the rules provided by the Treaty but are enforced by the Commission and
by national courts, and imposed by the interpretation of these rules by the European
Court of Justice.
The development of the distinction, on the points which have been discussed
above, leaves patent rights granted by national legislation intact, because the existence
of these rights cannot be incompatible with Articles 30 to 34. The conflict emerges
solely when these rights are exercised. Hereupon the Court limits its practice.
The Treaty left discretion to protect IPRs with the Member States, but
controls its exercise to the extent to the limits of the common rules of the Community.
"In practical terms, this implies,..., that each Member State is free to define what
constitutes the novelty for a patent, but once it has granted the right it cannot allow its
12See Joined Cases 56 & 58/64 Consten & Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 299, [1966] CMLR
418, when the Court firstly developed the distinction. See. also. Case 40/70 Sirena v. Eda [1971]
ECR 69. [1971] CMLR 260.
13See Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro [1971] ECR 487, [1971] CMLR 631. In relation
with patents, however, the Court firstly affirmed the distinction in Case 24/67 Parke, Davis & Co. v.
Centra/arm [1968] ECR 55. [1968] CMLR 47 and. later, analysing disputes under the provisions
regulating the free movement of goods, the Court reaffirmed the distinction in Joined Cases 15 &
16/74 Centra/arm v. Sterling Drug [1974] ECR-II 1147. [1974] 2 CMLR 480.
1 Vivien Rose (ed.), Bellamy & Child Common Market Law of Competition. London: Sweet &
Maxwell Ltd. (1993) 4th ed.. p. 491.
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holder to act in ways incompatible with the objectives of the Treaty concerning the
free movement of goods and competition1'15.
By conclusion, one can see that the balance reached by such a doctrine is of
great importance to set up the private interests of the patentee and the public interest
of free trade within the Community. The patent holder draws advantage from the
monopoly granted to him, but this monopoly cannot be exercised freely, it has to be
limited to fit in with the Community interest.
A not unimportant procedural point to refer is that the conflict between the
existence and the exercise of IPRs has been seen quite commonly, and has been
resolved by different levels of discussion: administrative and judicial. As an example,
when a company lodges a complaint with the Commission that firms from another
Member State are unfairly invoking their national patent law to prevent the
importation of goods from a different Member State, the conflict may be solved by
administrative methods with the intervention of the Commission. Nevertheless, it is
more common that these conflicts are discussed on the level of the national courts as
well as on the level of the European Court of Justice. This point will be discussed in
more details in the next Section which analyses the rules of the Treaty which regulate
competition law.
A final point, which must be mentioned, is that the development of this
doctrine is considered by many as a paradox of the essence of an intellectual property
right. The existence of IPRs is intrinsically related with their exercise. If no rights to
exercise a patent exist, no reason would be found to have a patent right. This,
15G. Friden. Recent Developments in EEC Intellectual Property Law: the Distinction Between
Existence and Exercise Revisited. [1989] 26 CARL Rev. 193-218. p. 194.
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although confusing for many, is an approach that ma- be the outcome of further
developments of the doctrine of "existence against exercise"1 . It is important to say,
however, that the Court has probably developed such a doctrine as a compromise
given the existence of non-uniform systems of laws for the protection of intellectual
property within the EC. If one considers, as in the case of patents, that a "Convention
for the European Patent for the Common Market"17 has not come into force yet,
maybe this was not the best way for the Court to reach a balance between different
systems of laws and the EC system, but since the establishment *he doctrine of
"existence against exercise" it has proved that it was not entirely useless or lacking
practicability.
1.2. The exhaustion ofpatent rights and the doctrine of the specific
subject-matter
The distinction between the existence of national patent rights and their exercise was
defined above in the light of the provisions of the Treaty and through its interpretation
by the Court. Once the holder of a patent manufactures and markets his product, he is
exercising the right granted by the State upon his invention. Then, limitations on this
exercise arise.
l6From more recent decisions of the Court it appears that such a doctrine is become of marginal
importance within the context of the application of EPRs in the Common Market. See. e.g. Guy
Tritton. Articles 30 to 36 and Intellectual Property: Is the Jurisprudence of the ECJ Now of an Ideal
Standard?. [1994] 10 EIPR 422-428. p. 423. and Clifford G. Miller. Magill: Time to Abandon the
'Specific Subject Matter' Concept. [1994] 10 EIPR 415-421. p. 419.
1 Known as the Community Patent Convention (CPC). See Chapter 4. infra, for further discussion on
the aspects of the implementation of a common patent system for the common market through the
establishment of a multilateral agreement between Member States of the EC.
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The doctrine of exhaustion of intellectual property rights establisnes that the
patentee has the monopoly of the invention.18 The patent holder, in this case, has the
sole right to produce and market his invention. Nevertheless, once the patented
product is lawfully marketed within the territory of the Community it must be able to
circulate freely thereafter. Indeed, what the Court understands is that when the patent
holder, for the first time, markets the patented product in the Community his rights
are "exhausted", in the sense that "[w]hen the patentee sells a patented article he is
presumed to transfer the right of free disposition of that article"19 and, as a
consequence, he cannot block the importation of this product within the Community,
although, during a limited period of time, only he, or someone with his consent, has
the right to manufacture the patented product. In Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug,
Advocate-General Trabucchi stated that:
... the patentee still retains the exclusive right to manufacture the
product concerned in the country which granted the patent and to be
the first to market this product. It is true that the meaning of property
rights is defined by national law which creates and enforces them. But
the law in force in the individual Member State cannot ignore the
existence of the Community system and all this means.20
The development of this doctrine in the Community context is essential to
guarantee the evolution of the creation of the Common Market, as the free movement
of goods is one of the most important objectives to be achieved during this process.
Otherwise, if the holder of a patent is able to prevent the circulation of his product
within the Community he would jeopardise the application of the principles and the
18An obvious conflict emerges, as discussed in the beginning of this Chapter, when one system
confers legal monopolies while another system intends to ensure free circulation of goods.
19David Gladwell. The Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights. [1986] 12 E1PR 366-370, p. 366.
"^Case 16/74 [1974] ECR-I1, note 13. supra. p. 1176.
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achievement of the objectives established by the Treaty. The market in the Community
has to be unitary, representing one single system
The concept of the doctrine of exhaustion of rights however has to be
analysed together with the development of the Court's concept on "specific subject-
matter" of an intellectual property right. In Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro the
Court held that, although the Treaty establishes prohibitions and restrictions on the
matter of free movement of goods, "Article 36 only admits derogation from the
freedom to the extent to which they are justified for the purpose of safeguarding
rights which constitute the specific subject-matter of such property"21. In this case the
Court first developed such a doctrine. Although the case was concerned with "sound
recording" copyrights, the principle applies equally to patent, copyright and trade¬
mark rights.
Later, in the above-mentioned case Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug , under the
view that patent rights are exhausted in Community law when the specific purpose of
the right has been secured by a patent holder, the Court defined, for the first time, the
"specific subject-matter" of a patent right:
In relation to patents, the specific subject-matter of the industrial
property is the guarantee that the patentee, to reward the creative
effort of the inventor, has the exclusive right to use an invention with a
view to manufacturing industrial products and "putting them into
circulation for the first time", either directly or by the grant of licences
to third parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements.23
"'Case 78/70 [1971] ECR. note 13. supra, p. 500. para. 11.
"Case 16/74. note 13. supra.
3Ibid., p 1162. para. 9. Emphasis added. However, a more specific definition of the specific subject-
matter of a patent right is not clear yet. See, for general criticisms on this subject. P.A. Stone. Some
Thoughts on the Windsurfing Judgment. [1986] 8 E1PR 242-248.
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In the same case the Court stressed the risk for the Common Market if
limitations would not be imposed, when held that "if a patentee could prevent the
import of protected products marketed by him or with his consent in another Member
State, he would be able to 'partition ofF national markets and thereby restrict trade
between Member States"24.
The link between both concepts is of great importance. Basically, the patent
holder has the exclusive right to manufacture, and has the exclusive right to market
the patented product for the first time25. However, after marketing the product for the
first time, by himself or by someone with his consent, "the previous marketing
'exhausts' the ability of the owner of the right to prevent the subsequent free
circulation of the products concerned throughout the Community"26.
The patent holder enjoys the primary benefit of the right upon the patent,
which means that only he, or a third party with his consent, will be able to
manufacture and/or put the product on the market for the first time. If someone else,
without the patentee's consent, does it, he will be infringing the patent holder's right
and, consequently, the patentee will be able to oppose infringements. In that case the
right is not exhausted because the specific subject-matter of that specific right has not
been secured.
The Commission expressed its opinion in a White Paper entitled "Completing
the Internal Market"27, affirming that, following the rulings of the Court, "... the
principle that goods lawfully manufactured and marketed in one Member State must
2"lbid., Case 16/74 [1974] ECR-II, note 13, supra, p. 1163. para. 12. Emphasis added.
""The definition of the "specific subject-matter" of patent rights.
_6Vivien Rose, note 14. supra, p. 492. The definition of the principle of "exhaustion of rights".
•^Commission of the European Communities. Completing the Internal Market - White Paper from
the Commission to the European Council (Milan. 28-29 June 1985). COM (85) 310 final.
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be allowed free entry into other Member State", and that it would use all the powers
conferred on it by the Treaty to ensure the principle for the completion of the
Common Market in 199228.
A remarkable point relating to the application of the principle of exhaustion of
IPRs is when a product originates in a third country which is not a Member State of
the EC. In cases brought before English and German courts29, related to "sound
recordings" copyrights and trade-marks, respectively, it was held that the principle
applies only to the free movement of goods between Member States, excluding third
countries even if there is an agreement between the Community and the third country.
As a general understanding, both decisions may also apply to patent rights.
The analysis of both doctrines discussed above, although not sufficient, is
important to clarify the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty ensuring the free
circulation of goods within the Community and to understand the development of the
principles of the Treaty by the European Court of Justice. Nevertheless, two other
questions were faced by the Court: (a) when a product is not patentable in one
Member State of the Community, but marketed in this Member State and imported to
another Member State where it is under patent protection, if the principle of
exhaustion of rights applies; and (b) the question of application of the principle in the
case of the grant of a compulsory licence. These two aspects will be analysed below.
^Ibid. p. 22.
~9The Who Group v. Stage One Records [1980] 2 CMLR 249 (CD) and Deutsche Grammophon v.
Firma Pop [1982] 1 CMLR 137 (BGH).
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1.2.1. Product not patentable in a Member b^ate and the application of the
'exhaustion' principle
As has been seen above, the Court drew a distinction between the existence and the
exercise of intellectual property rights and held that when these rights are exercised
within the Community, for the first time, by the owner of the right, directly or
indirectly, they are exhausted and the product is allowed to circulate freely in the
territory of the Common Market.
The Court, however, faced a question on the application of the doctrine of
exhaustion of intellectual property rights in the context of a Member State which does
not provide patent protection for a specific product. The point is essentially whether
or not the holder of such right can prevent the importation of the patented product to
another Member State where the product is patented and has been put into the market
by the patent holder, or with his consent.
In a case referring to a pharmaceutical product, patented and marketed in the
Netherlands by Merck & Co., and later marketed by a subsidiary of it in Italy, where
such protection was not available, and, afterwards, imported back to the Netherlands
by Stephar, the Court examined the question whether the rights on that product were
exhausted or not, considering that the product was lawfully marketed in Italy.30
A prior analysis of the provisions of the Treaty leads to the concept that the
national right granted by a Member State is exhausted when the product has been
lawfully marketed for the first time by the proprietor of the right, or with his consent,
on the market of another Member State. In Merck & Co. v. Stephar and Exler the
30Case 187/80 Merck & Co. v. Stephar and Exler [1981] ECR 2063. [1981] 3 CMLR 463.
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product was marketed in Italy by a subsidiary of the proprietor of the patent with his
consent.
Merck argued that the principle of exhaustion of rights is based on the premise
that the proprietor of the patent should enjoy the monopoly granted by national law.
This right, then, is designed to provide the inventor with the exclusive right to market
the product in question for the first time and, consequently, to be recompensed for the
creative effort and costs involved in the research. Otherwise, if a competitor, without
any further costs, is allowed to produce and market the same product - obviously with
a lower price - there would be no guarantee of recompense for creative effort and
therefore no existed right protected31.
On the other hand, according to Advocate-General Reischl's opinion, there
would be no reason to talk about the exhaustion of a right within the Community "...
if Merck was relying on its Netherlands patent in order to try to prohibit the
reimportation of a product which its subsidiary had manufactured and exported to
Italy"32.
The Court, in its judgement, emphasised that "... it must be stated in
accordance with the definition of the specific purpose of the patent,..., the substance
of a patent right lies essentially in according the inventor an exclusive right of first
placing the product on the market"33. The proprietor of the patent is free to decide
under what conditions he will market the product, taking also into consideration the
possibility of marketing his product in a Member State which does not provide patent
protection for such product. If he decides to do so, "... he must accept the
3]lbid. [1981] ECR. pp. 2070-2071.
32Ibid., at p. 2095.
139
consequences [and risks] of his choice as regards the free movement of the product
within the Common Market ,.."34 as a fundamental principle involving the economic
circumstances that he is considering.
In conclusion, replying to the question raised by the Dutch court, the
European Court of Justice held that:
... the rules contained in the EEC Treaty concerning the free
movement of goods, must be interpreted as preventing the
proprietor of a patent for a medical preparation who sells the
preparation in one Member State where patent protection exists, and
then market it himself in another Member State where there is no such
protection, from availing himself the right conferred by the legislation
of the first Member State to prevent the marketing in that State of the
said preparation imported from the other Member State.'5
To sum up, in accordance with the above-mentioned judgment, the doctrine of
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights was held to apply even if the product
concerned was imported from a Member State which does not offer patent protection
for such product, provided that the proprietor himself, or someone on his behalf,
marketed the product. Otherwise, the Court emphasised, the patent holder would be
able to partition off national markets, acting against the objectives and principles of
the Treaty.'6
33Ibid., at p. 2081. para. 9.
iAIbid.. at p. 2082. para. 11.
35Ibid.. para. 14.
36Ibid.. para. 13. See. additionally, ruling of the Court relating to the same discussion in Case 119/75
Terrapin v. Terranova [1976] ECR 1039. [1976] 2 CMLR 482 (trade-mark and commercial name).
It is. also, worth noting that in case Merck & Co. Inc and others v. Primecrown Ltd and others
[1995] Fleet Street Reports 909, a British patent court has raised questions related with the
application of such a principle developed by the Court in Merck & Co. v. Stephar and Exler Justice
Jacob raises a question, pursuant to Article 177 of the EC Treaty, asking whether the Court should
change the rule established by the Court in Merck & Co. v. Stephar and Exler by "... reverting the
notion of exhaustion of rights at least in the case where patent protection is not available" (Ibid.,
909-910). Justice Jacob seems to be in favour of an over-ruling of the application of this principle
and the Court might consider further developments of this doctrine.
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1.2.2. Consent and compulsory licence
The question presented here is whether the owner of a parallel patent has the right to
prevent the importation into the Member States where he has the patent of a product
manufactured under a compulsory licence issued in respect to his patent in another
Member State.
The question was brought to the Court for the first time in Pharmon v.
Hoechst'1 In this case a compulsory licence of a drug known as "ffusemide" had been
granted to the manufacturer in the UK, DDSA. Pharmon purchased a consignment
from the licensee to sell on the Dutch market. The holder of the patent in the
Netherlands, Germany and United Kingdom, Hoechst, brought proceedings against
the importation of the drug by Pharmon to the Dutch market and obtained an
injunction against Pharmon, confirming that Hoechst had an exclusive licence to
exploit the product in the Netherlands. Afterwards Pharmon brought an action before
the Dutch "District Court" and a subsequent appeal to the "Regional Court of
Appeal". The latter then requested the European Court of Justice, pursuant to Article
177 of the Treaty, to make a preliminary ruling on questions based on the application
of the -nnciples established by the Court concerning the free movement of goods
within the Community.
The questions raised were essentially related to the application of the principle
of exhaustion of intellectual property rights upon the grant of a compulsory licence.
Pharmon, referring to the Court's decision in Merck & Co. v. Stephar and Exler™,
3 Case 19/84 [1985] ECR2281. [1985] 3 CMLR 775.
3sNote 30. supra.
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argued that the patent holder is free to decide whether to market his product and has
to accept the consequences which come from his decision. Thereupon, he must
consider the possibility that the national law provides for the grant of a compulsory
licence to third parties. Advocate-General Mancini, however, did not accept the view
of the plaintiff and concluded that there was no consent in the grant of a compulsory
licence, but rather there was a decision, based on the national interest and taken by the
State, imposed on the holder of the patent'9. Understanding that there was a lack of
consent by the patent holder, and emphasising the dangers of such an argument to the
integration process of the EC, Mancini concluded that "...is so provided that the
holder of the patent has not expressly or implicitly manifested, ..., his consent to the
exploitation by third parties of the right which he holds"40. Therefore, the patent
holder has the right to prevent the importation of the patented product.
A remarkable point, which arises from this case, is that a compulsory licence is
an isolated action of the State to provide goods to its market, as e.g. foodstuffs and
medicines, available at the lowest price on grounds of national policies. If it was
possible to allow the holder of a compulsory licence to export those goods to another
Member State, the establishment of the patent system in the Community would be
threatened. Gormley, commenting on this case, stated that "[a] compulsory licence to
exploit a patented product or process in one Member State is not a carte blanche to
ignore patents in other Member States" and, "... to give 'extra-territorial' effect to
patent licences would encourage freeloading by the industry of certain Member States
39Note 37. supra. [1985] ECR. at p. 2287.
*°Ibid. at p. 2290.
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on the backs of the inventiveness of others"41. The CPC, although not yet in force,
excludes expressly the application of the principle of exhaustion of patent rights under
the grant of a compulsory licence42.
The Court, analysing the question raised by the Dutch Court, stated that no
such "consent" exists in a case of the granting of a compulsory licence.
In the first place, it is contended that the nature of a
compulsory licence is different to that of a licence freely granted
because, ..., there are no real negotiations between the compulsory
licence and the patentee, ..., and the relationship which in normal
circumstances exists between a patentee and a contractual licensee is
lacking.
Secondly, it is argued that the objectives of a compulsory
licence and a licence freely granted are different. Whilst a licence freely
granted is a means of exploitation which goes to the specific subject-
matter of the patent right as defined by the Court, a compulsory
licence, on the other hand, is essentially intended to meet the special
needs of a Member State.
Thirdly, all the abovementioned observations emphasise in
particular the "lack of direct or indirect consent" on the part of the
patent proprietor in the case of compulsory licences.43
The Court finally held, in accordance with the opinion of Advocate-General
Mancini, that when a compulsory licence is granted the principle of exhaustion of
rights does not apply, because the specific subject-matter was not secured and hence
the proprietor of the patent right may prevent the importation of his product.44
41 Laurence Gormley, Recent Cases on Article 30-36 EEC. [1985] 10 EL Rev. 431-457. at 449.
42CPC. Art. 81 (3).
4JNote 39, supra, at p. 2296. paras. 18. 19 and 20, respectively. Emphasis added.
44See. also. Case 434/85 Allen and Hanburys v. Generics [1988] ECR 1245. [1988] 1 CMLR 701,
and Commission's comment on the Court's ruling of Case 19/84 Pharmon v. Hoechst. note 37,
supra, in Commission of the European Communities. Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy.
Brussels & Luxembourg (1986). pp. 111-112. The case mentioned above in note 36. Merck & Co.
Inc and others v. Primecrown Ltd and others, may also lead the European Court of Justice to review
the application of this pnnciple established in Pharmon v. Hoechst. Justice Jacob explicitly affirms
that: "The result of all this, says the plaintiffs, is that either the rule in Merck v. Stephar should be
changed altogether or qualified. It could be changed, for instance, by reverting back to the notion of
exhaustion at least in the case where protection could not be obtained in a particular Member State.
Or it could be qualified so that where there is a genuine ethical obligation or a genuine legal
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2. The Common Rules on Competition
The main provisions of the Treaty regarding "the institution of a system ensuring that
competition in the common market is not distorted"45 are Articles 85 to 94 The rules
on "dumping"46 and "aids granted by States''47 are outside the scope of this work.
This section will study only the rules contained in Articles 85 and 86.
To ensure the principle established by Article 3 (g), Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty prohibit certain types of business practice. These prohibitions have "direct
effect"48 and will be imposed by both the national courts and the Commission. The
holder of a patent right is not by that fact alone infringing the rules of the Treaty He
may only be capable of infringing Articles 85 and 86 when these rights are exercised ,40
2.1. Analysis of Article 85
The structure of Article 85 of the Treaty is based on three paragraphs. Paragraph 1
prohibits "all agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
obligation upon a party to sell his product in a particular Member State where he has no patent, the
goods so sold should not be regarded as put on the market with his consent. The analog) is with
goods sold under compulsory licence, which are not so regarded, even though the patentee does
receive a royalty . . . ." (Merck & Co. Inc and others v. Primecrmvn Ltd and others. 11995 ] Fleet
Street Reports, p 914).
"5EC Treaty. Art. 3 (0
A6Ibid. Art. 91.
A'lbid.. Arts. 92 to 94.
,xThe doctrine of "direct effect" of Community law was first developed by the European Court of
Justice in Case 26/62 Van (lend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tarief Commissie \ 1963] ECR 1. 11963] 1
CMLR 105. when the Court understood that, under certain specific conditions. Community law is
capable of establishing rights and obligations w hich can be enforceable before national courts. See.
also. Case 127/73 Belgische Radio en Televisie v. Sabam 11974] ECR 313. ] 1974] 2 CMLR 238 and
Case 148/78 Publico Ministero v. Ratti 11979] ECR 1629. ] 1980] 1 CMLR 96.
J1JSee. in this Chapter. Section 1. Sub-section 1.1. supra, for further discussion on the development of
the distinction between the existence and the exercise of intellectual property rights.
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States".3" For the purpose of this prohibition the agreements or restrictive practices
shall have "... as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market". Further, Article 85 (1) lists examples of
such practices as. inter alia, price fixing, limitation of production and sharing markets.
To infringe Article 85 (1), an agreement has to fulfil all the following
requirements. There must be an agreement, decision or concerted practice between at
least two undertakings, and this must affect trade between at least two Member
States. Also, it has to have the object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting
competition within the Common Market. If one of these requirements is lacking, there
is no breach of Article 85 (l)51. This Article applies to undertakings in the public and
private sphere. The meaning of an agreement, under the wording of Article 85, is to
be defined in a very wide way, including either written or oral agreements52.
Furthermore, any agreement or business practice has to be judged in the
context of the relevant market. The Commission expressed its view regarding this
subject with the publication in 1986 of the "Notice on Agreements of Minor
Importance"53 The relevant market may be understood as (i) the "relevant product or
service market" which "... includes any products or services which are identical or
NJThe concept of the word "undertaking " for the meaning of the provisions of the Treaty covers, as
stated by David A.O. Edward & Robert C. Lane, note 3. supra, p. 105. para. 226. "... every type of
entity. regardless of its legal status, from a single individual to a multinational corporation, provided
he or it has legal capacity and is engaged in economic activity of some sort"".
"In addition, the Court has ruled in several cases that may not be against the prohibition of Article
85 (1) of the EC Treaty "... where it constitutes no real threat to competition or to the functioning of
the common market and where its anticompetitive effects are a necessary incident of the proper
functioning of an agreement which is not. in essence, anticompetitive" (David A.O. Edward &
Robert C. Lane, note 3. supra, pp. 107-108. para. 232). This is the so-called "rule of reason "
concept which has been reaffirmed by the Court in sev eral decisions, such as in Case 56/65 Societe
Technique v. Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235. [19661 CMLR 357.
""The Commission elaborated the concept of an "agreement", for the purposes of Article 85. EC
Treaty , quite broadly . See. e.g. Re the Franco-Japanese Ballbearings Agreement OJ 1974 L343/19.
[1975] 1 CMLR D8
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equivalent to those [products or services] in question"04, being "interchangeable"" and
"substitutable"; and (ii) the "relevant geographic market" which "... is defined by
reference to a geographic territory throughout which the product or service in
question moves freely"35.
Article 85 (2) establishes that all decisions or agreements that fall under the
prohibition of paragraph 1 "shall be automatically void". It is possible for an
agreement to be declared only partially void by the Commission If the clauses of the
agreement which are infringing Article 85 (1) do not affect the agreement as a whole,
the Commission will declare void only the clauses in question.
Finally, paragraph 3 of the Article 85 of the Treaty establishes the possibility
for an agreement to be "exempted" if it contributes to improve "... the production or
distribution of goods ..." or to promote "... technical and economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits, ...". To obtain the exemption
an agreement or decision must satisfy all the criteria mentioned above and must not
"impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives"56, and must not "afford such undertakings the
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question"'37. The decision about exempting a restrictive agreement will be taken by the
Commission38.
An agreement for the licensing of a patented product, that it can be
manufactured and/or sold, may, in some circumstances, infringe the Community rules
53OJ 1986 C231/2.
David A.O. Edward & Robert C. Lane. note 3. supra, p. 106. para. 231.
-■Ibid.
'"EC Treats . Art. 85 (3) (a).
-'ibid. Art. 85 (3) (b).
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on competition. However, it is possible to apply for the granting of an exemption
pursuant Article 85 (3) of the Treaty, Regulation 17 and Regulation 240/96. Also, if
one or more clauses of the agreement infringes Article 85 (1) it may be declared void
by the Commission.
2.1.1. Article 85 and patent licensing agreements
As has been seen above, only the existence of an intellectual property right is
protected by the Treaty. Its exercise may infringe the provisions on the free movement
of goods and competition Concerning patent protection, the most important
discussions have been on licensing agreements. The Commission itself, on 24
December 1962, published a "Notice on Patent Licensing Agreements" (the
"Christmas Message")59 expressing its views and clarifying the interpretation of the
application of Article 85 in this field At this time, the Commission took an
opportunity to affirm that most of the clauses of a patent licensing agreement would
not infringe Article 85 (1), since the restrictions imposed on a licensee represented a
natural position of the licensor emanating from the latter's monopoly However, this
view could not be maintained. A few years later the Court of Justice, in a case related
to trade-mark rights50, explicitly understood that the exercise of an intellectual
property right will in some ways infringe the Community rules on competition,
A patent licensing agreement6' is essentially the granting, by the holder of an
intellectual property right, of permission for a third party to exploit the right against
^Regulation 17. Arts. 4 to 9.
9OJ. Special Edition. 1962 C139/2922. This notice was later withdrawn (OJ 1984 C220/14).
^'Joined Cases 56 & 58/64 Consten & Grundig v. Commission, note 12. supra.
bl
Regulation 240/96. in the Preamble. Recital (5). provides the following definition of patent and
know-how licensing agreements: "Patent or know-how licensing agreements are agreements w hereby
147
the respective payment of royalties. This exploitation may be for manufacturing,
selling, or both. The European Court of Justice recognised that the exploitation of a
patent through licences constitutes the specific subject-matter of the right However,
questions related to the applicability of Article 85 (1) of the Treaty arise if there are
included in the licensing agreement terms that go beyond the meaning of the specific
subject-matter of the intellectual property right, or where the exercise of such a right
has the means, the object or the consequence of a restrictive agreement62 This
problem emerges when one party of the agreement, either the licensor or the licensee,
imposes restrictions on the activity of the other party. Some of these restrictions are
understood as being within the specific subject-matter of the patent right, and,
thereby, not breaching the rules of the Treaty. However, some of them will infringe
Article 85 (1). Therefore, two specific issues must be analysed on a patent licensing
agreement: first, whether the licence is caught by Article 85 (1) of the Treaty and, if
caught, whether or not the agreement will be qualified for individual or block
exemption under Article 85 (3).
In addition, an agreement will not infringe Article 85 (1) - even if it has the
object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition - when it is considered of
minor importance. The "de minimis" doctrine emerges from the Commission's Notice
on Agreement of Minor Importance6'" and is seen as a weak position. Whish,
commenting on the problems which arises from the application of this doctrine,
stated:
one undertaking which holds a patent or know-how ( the licensor ) permits another undertaking
('the licensee ) to exploit the patent thereby licensed, or communicates the know-how to it. in
particular for the purposes of manufacture, use or putting on the market ".
6"See, e.g.. Case 40/70 Sirena v. Eda. note 12. supra.
6,Nole 53. supra.
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Article 85 (1) will not apply where an agreement is one of minor
importance. The problem with the "de minimis"' doctrine in patent
licence is that a successful exploitation of the patent is likely to
increase the parties" turnover and market share and take them above
the relevant thresholds This would presumably mean that the
agreement outgrows the "de minimis"' rule and comes within Article 85
(1). Article 85 (1) will not apply to an agreement which is incapable of
affecting inter-state trade. Assuming that these requirements are
satisfied, various terms in the licence may be considered to infringe
Article 85 (l).64
The Commission, using the power conferred by the Treaty, and by Regulation
17, analyses the patent licensing agreement and the provisions that it contains. The
undertaking, or the parties involved in an agreement, shall notify the Commission or
apply for an individual or block exemption pursuant Article 85 (3) and Regulation
240/96 In case the Commission is not favourable to the agreement the undertaking
can appeal from the decision of the Commission to the Court of First Instance65 which
is entitled to review the Commission's decision.
The Commission analyses an agreement case by case. The Regulation 240/96
lists provisions that may be exempted and provisions which fall within Article 85 (1).
However, this Regulation does not exhaust all the circumstances of patent licensing
agreements. An analysis of each provision may be necessary. Provisions such as
vertical price fixing66 will come within Article 85 (1). Other provisions, such as
"'Richard Whish, Competition Law. London: Butterworth and Co. (Publishers) Ltd. (1989) 2nd ed..
pp. 660-661
"David A.O. Edward & Robert C. Lane, supra, note 3. at p. 29. para. 84. provides the following
explanation of the establishment of the Court of First Instance: "In order to ease the workload of the
Court of Justice the Single European Act amended the founding treaties so as to empower the
Council, upon a request from the Court of Justice, to attach' to it a court with first instance
jurisdiction in certain forms of action" (EC Treaty. .Art. 168a). The Court of First Instance shall "...
hear and determine at first instance certain classes of actions or proceeding ..." but "... shall not
be competent to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 177"
(Ibid.. Art. 168a (1)).
'"Regulation 240/96. Art. 3 (1).
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obligations of secrecy''7, to prevent infringements of the patent6* and most-favoured
licensee clauses60, will all be capable of exemptions. Below, the most important
clauses of patent licensing agreements are analysed.
(a) Open exclusive licence and absolute territorial protection
Patent licensing agreements usually include provisions imposing an obligation upon
the licensor not to grant licences to other undertakings in the licensed territory or not
to exploit the patent himself in the licensed territory. This has been a controversial
field of discussion since the very beginning of the establishment of the rules of the
Community. When the Commission published the "Christmas Message"70 its view was
very liberal Throughout the development of this discussion the Commission took a
more restricted approach when in certain decisions taken in 197271 the Commission
looked at exclusive licences as falling within the prohibitions of Article 85 (1). Later,
72
the Commission developed this point in several other decisions .
A distinction, however, was elaborated by the European Court of Justice
concerning exclusive agreements. Under an "open exclusive licence" - i.e. a licence
that does not grant absolute territorial protection - the licensor agrees not to grant a
licence to other undertakings and not to manufacture or market the protected product
himself within the licensed territory The market, however, in the licensed territory
6"Ibid.. Art. 2 (1) (1).
6SIbid. .Art. 2 (1) (6).
69Ibid. Art. 2 (I) (10).
"Note 59. supra.
Burroughs/Delplanque OJ 1972 LI3/50. [1974] CMLR D67 and Davidson Rubber OJ 1972
L143/31, 11974] CMLR D52.
"See. e.g.. Commission's decisions on the following patent agreements: AOlP/Beyrard OJ 1976
L6/8. [1976] 1 CMLR D14; KabelmetaUlMchaire OJ 1975 L222/34. [1975] 2 CMLR D40:
Bronbemaling/Heidemaatschapij OJ 1975 L249/27. [1975] 2 CMLR D67: Video Cassette
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remains open to parallel importers, even to other licensees of the same product in
other territories of the Community. The Court, in the so-called Maize seeds case
held that such an arrangement will not fall within Article 85 (1). In this case the Court
accepted the view that the grant of an "open exclusive licence'' is capable of
promoting technical progress74. From the decision taken in the Maize seeds case a
question which arises is if the interpretation applies equally to other form of
intellectual property rights, including patents. According to Bellamy and Child "... it
seems that the reasoning in Nungesser is fully applicable to other intellectual property
rights, particularly patents"75.
What emerges from this case is that the Treaty does not allow the licensee to
impose "absolute territorial protection", but some limited type of exclusivity is
allowed on grounds of technological progress. The Court held, then, that "absolute
territorial protection granted to a licensee in order to enable parallel imports to be
controlled and prevented results in the artificial maintenance of separate national
markets, contrary to the Treaty"76.77
Recorders OJ 1978 L47/42. [1978] 2 CMLR 160; Vaessen Morris OJ 1979 L19/32. [1979] 1 CMLR
511.
Case 258/78 A'ungesser v. Commission [ 1982] ECR 2015. [1983] 1 CMLR 278.
''Ibid. |1982] ECR at p. 2069, para. 55.
'Vivien Rose, note 14. supra, at p. 548.
_6Note 74. supra, at p. 2070. para. 61.
See. for a more detailed discussion on this subject. Vivien Rose, note 14. supra, pp. 545-549;
Dieter Hoffmann & Orlagh O'Farrel The 'Open Exclusive Licence' - Scope and Consequences.
11984] 4 EIPR 104-110; and Korah's criticism to the latter's position in [1984] 6 EIPR 206. For
more recent decisions, see Tetra Pak I (BTG Licence) OJ 1988 L272/77. appeal case before the
Court of First Instance Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak v. Commission note 8. supra: Rich Products/jus-rol
OJ 1988 L69/21. [1988] 4 CMLR 527. and; Delta ChemiedDDI) OJ 1988 L309/34. (1989] 4 CMLR
535. See. also. Regulation 240/96. Art. 1 (1) (1). (2). (3). (4) and (6).
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(b) Tie-in and quality obligations
A tie-in obligation is imposed upon the licensee (s) and is a clause in an agreement
requiring the latter to buy a second product, as a complementary material, or services
from the licensor only or from an undertaking designated by the licensor. Under
Regulation 240/96 this clause will not infringe Article 85 (1) "... in so far as these
quality specifications are necessary for: (a) a technically proper exploitation of the
licensed technology, or (b) ensuring that the product of the licensee conforms to the
minimum quality specifications that are applicable to the licensor and other licensees;
and to allow the licensor to carry out related checks"78. A controversial discussion has
taken place in relation to this clause as far as a tie-in obligation is mentioned in Article
85 (1) (e) of the Treaty among the list of clauses that restrict competition within the
Community.
The first time that the Commission rejected a tie-in clause was in its decision
in Vaessett/Morris \ The purpose of a tie-in obligation is to "secure the fullest
technical and economic exploitation of the licensed invention"80. Under Regulation
2349/84 it was explicit that if there was an obligation with the purpose of imposing on
the licensee trade for complementary products or services that are not directly related
with the patented product or process, it would fall within the prohibition of Article 85
^Regulation 240/96. An. 2(1) (5).
'Note 72. supra. The Commission has. nevertheless, accepted a tie-in clause in decision Re
Campari OJ 1978 L70/69. [ 19781 2 CMLR 397. on grounds of the protection of a trade secret. For a
critical view on the Commission's decision in Vaessen/Morris see L. Zanon. Ties in Patent
Licensing Agreements. 11980] 5 EL Rev. 391-399
s"Noel Byrne. Patent Tie-in Arrangements and Article 83. |1980] EIPR 141-148. p. 146.
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(l)81. Although Regulation 240/96 does not include such a prohibition it seems that
this would be decided on a case-bv-case basis by the Commission.
It is also worth noting that under Regulation 2349/84. an obligation on the
licensee to manufacture the licensed product to a minimum standard of quality would
not breach Article 85 (1), by virtue of Article 2 (9), if it was necessary for a "...
technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed product".
Regulation 240/96 recognised a relationship between tie-in and quality
obligations and merged both provisions of Regulation 2349/84 into one single
provision of Regulation 240/96, by accepting that both clauses in a licensing
agreement are connected by the need of a technically satisfactory exploitation of the
technology, ensuring that the product of the licensee conforms to minimum quality
specifications.
Finally, it is also necessary to mention that if the licensor imposes on the
licensee a "quality" and a "tie-in" obligation which are not necessary for a technically
satisfactory exploitation of the licensed technology, but notifies the Commission and
the latter does not oppose such exemption in a period of four months, such a clause
will not be deemed as falling within Article 85 (1) of the Treaty.82
(c) Restriction on the field of use
A field of use clause intends to restrict the licensed invention to be exploited in one or
more ways. Generally this clause does not fall within Article 85 (l)8^ of the Treaty if
the results of an agreement are not aimed to restrict competition between the licensees
Nl
Regulation 2349/84. Art. 3 (9).
8~Regulation 240/96. Arts. 4(1) and 4 (2) (a).
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or between the parties of the agreement in question. "... since the licensor is entitled
to transfer the technology only for a limited purpose"84.85
In the case of Windsurfing International v. Commission86, for example, the
Court, following the Commission's arguments, condemned a provision in the
agreement imposing upon the licensee the use of a windsurfer rig87 only in certain
types of boats. The Court held that the licensor, in this case, had interest essentially
"... in ensuring that there was sufficient product differentiation between its licensees'
sailboards to cover the widest possible spectrum of market demand"88 and, therefore,
its object was the distortion of competition within the Community. The Court,
however, may accept the field of use restriction "... only if related to different
products belonging to different markets"89.
(d) No-challenge clauses
A no-challenge clause is an obligation on the licensee not to challenge the validity of
the patent right of the licensed product. This clause can be seen in two ways: as a part
of the licence agreement or as a part of a settlement of patent disputes. In the first
case the justification is that the transfer of information involved in a licence permits
"ibid.. Art. 2 (1) (8).
"ibid.. Recital (22).
"See Commission of the European Communities. Fourth Report on Competition Policy. Brussels.
Luxembourg (1975). p. 22. for Commission's view.
""Case 193/83 [1986| ECR611. [19861 CMLR 489.
x
Ibid.. for the definition of a "rig". [1986] ECR 611. at p. 645. para. 2.
"ibid.. at p. 656. para. 49.
"ibid., at p. 654. para. 42.
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the licensee to acquire knowledge and consequently challenge it. In the second case,
however, it is justified on grounds of public policy . '0
Such a clause, the Court held, in accordance with other decisions of the
Commission'1, does not come within the specific subject-matter of a patent.9"
Consequently, a no-challenge clause was normally caught by the prohibition of Article
85 (1).9? In Raymontl/Nagoya*, the Commission took the view that such a no-
challenge clause was a restriction on the licensee's freedom of action which,
accordingly to the Court's view in the above-mentioned Windsurfing International
case, does not constitute the specific object of a patent right.
Later, nevertheless, in conflict with the Commission's argument, the Court
held in Bayer v. Sulhofer9i that a no-challenge clause, when part of a settlement
agreement, was not capable of exemption under Article 85 (3). The Court here
appears to have .. stepped back from the Windsurfing case. As a result, every no-
challenge clause must be individually considered in its context and the public interest
test is ignored"96, in accordance with the obligations laid down by Regulation
2349/84.
Regulation 240/96, on the other hand, did not exclude the possibility of a no-
challenge clause to be exempted under the block exemptions mechanism. In this case,
'"See Commission's argument in Case 65/86 Bayer v. Sulhofer 11988) ECR 5249. [1990] 4 CMLR
182. at 11988) ECR pp. 5257-5258. See. also, a more detailed discussion in John Ferry. Patents
Agreements: No-challenge Clauses. [ 1989] 4 EIPR 138-139.
"The first occasion that the Commission held that a no-challenge clause falls within Article 85 (1)
was in Burroughs/Geha OJ 1972 L13/53. [1972] 4 CMLR D72 The Commission's approach was
quite strict and in agreements such as Davidson Rubber, note 71. supra, and Kahelmetal/I.uchaire.
note 72. supra, it compelled removal of the clauses.
"See Case 193/83. note 86. supra.
"Regulation 2349/84. Arts. 2 (1) (8) and 3(1).
94OJ 1972 L143/39. [1972] CMLR D45.
"Case 65/86. note 90. supra.
"
John Ferry , note 90. supra, p. 139.
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however, a different legal situation was described. Article 2 (1) (15) of the Regulation
240/96 states that it is generally no restriction to competition, and thus not falling
within the prohibition of Article 85 (1) of the Treaty, "a reservation by the licensor of
the right to terminate the agreement if the licensee . challenges the validity of
licensed patents within the common market belonging to the licensor or undertakings
connected with hint"'9 .
(e) Non-competition clauses
A provision in a patent licensing agreement with the obligation on the licensee not to
manufacture, use or sell competing products normally falls within Article 85 (l).98 The
Commission itself expressed its view when it said:
Non-competition prohibitions can have the effect of not only
strengthening a monopoly position of a patentee, but also of
weakening competition between manufacturers of substitute products.
A licensee might no longer have worthwhile prospects in carrying out
independent development. Accordingly, the Commission regards non¬
competition provisions as covered by Article 85 (1). Possibilities of
exemption under Article 85 (3) could only arise in special situation,
particularly cases relating to specialization agreements."
As it can be understood from the above-mentioned points, an obligation on the
licensee not to work on the development of new products that would compete with
the licensed product also falls within Article 85 (1), EC Treaty.100 However, in a later
J
See. also. Regulation 240/96. Art. 4 (2) (b).
°8See. e.g. Commission's decision in Maize seeds OJ 1978 L286. 119781 3 CMLR 434. and
Windsurfing International v. Commission, note 86 . supra. See. also. Regulation 240/96. Art. 3 (2).
"Commission of the European Communities, note 85. supra, p. 23.
u"lbid. See. also. AOIP/Beyrard OJ 1976 L6/8. [1976] 1 CMLRD14 at D24.
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decision. Delta Chemie/DDD' \ it was held that an obligation imposed on the
licensee not to manufacture, use or sell competing products without the licensor's
consent was not contravening Article 85(1).
The licensor is nevertheless authorised by Regulation 240/96, Article 2(1)
(18), to make a reservation in the agreement of the right to terminate the exclusivity
granted to the licensee if the latter enters into competition within the Common Market
with the licensor or with undertakings connected with him, and to require the licensee
to prove that the licensed know-how is not being used for the production of products
and the provision of services other than those licensed. This provision seems to be
necessary to guarantee the application of the provisions listed in Article 1 (1) of the
Regulation 240/96.
(f) Grant-back clauses
The so called "grant-back" clauses are related to an obligation on the licensee or the
licensor to inform the other party about any improvements on the licensed product
and to "grant-back" a licence in respect to any invention which comes from the
improvements in question. Under Article 2 (1) (4) of Regulation 240/96 there is no
restriction of competition, provided that the licensor is put under a corresponding
obligation, and the licences to be granted by either party are non exclusive "... so that
the licensee is free to use his own improvements or to license them to third parties, in
so far as it does not involve disclosure of the know-how communicated by the
licensor that is still secret, and that the licensor undertakes to grant an exclusive or
"Note 77. supra. Although this case is related with know-how and trade-mark licensing, it seems to
apply also to pure patent and mixed licensing agreements.
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non-exclusive licence of his own improvements to the licensee"10' However, this
clause will fall within Article 85 (1) if one of the parties is required to assign the
property of the inventions exclusively to the other"13.104
(g) Royalties
The obligation on the licensee to pay royalties to the licensor is clearly within the
specific subject-matter of the patent right, in so far as it signifies the recompense for
the creative effort of the inventor and the right to exploit commercially the patented
product However, some obligations concerning the payment of royalties will fall
within the prohibition of Article 85 (1).
In the context of clauses concerning the payment of royalties, two specific
situations should be analysed The first is when there is an obligation for the payment
of minimum royalties. Unde' Regulation 240/96105 this provision is not a restrictive
clause because it ensures the adequate exploitation of the product in question.
The second case is related to an obligation on the licensee to pay royalties
after the expiry of a patent or after the expiry of the licensing agreement. An
obligation on the licensee to continue paying royalties after the expiry of the patent
will generally fall within Article 85 (l)106. However, if the payment of the royalty is
related to a know-how that is still being used by the licensee and has been made
""Regulation 240/96. Art. 2 (1) (4). See also Derrick Wyatt & Alan Dashwood. The Substantive
Law of the EEC. London: Sweet & Maxwell (1987) 2nd cd.. at p. 508. and Commission's decision in
Davidson Rubber agreement, note 71. supra.
'"3Ibid.. .Art 3 (6). See. also. Raymond/Nagoya. note 94. supra, and Kabelmetal/Luchaire. note 72.
supra. The same prohibition applies to the obligation on the licensee to grant to the licensor joint
ownership of the invention (Nodet/Lamazou. in Commission of the European Communities. Tenth
Report on Competition Policy. Brussels. Luxembourg (1981). p. 88. para. 127).
"4See. also. Regulation 240/96. Recital (20).
"^Regulation 240/96. Art. 2(1) (9).
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publicly by the licensee himself, an exemption may be granted"17 Regulation 240/96
also accepts, in Article 2 (1) (7) (b), that the licensee continues to pay the royalties to




Article 3 (7) of the Regulation 240/96 prohibits an obligation imposed upon the
licensor, through a separate agreement or through a clause in the licensing agreement,
extending the duration of the agreement by the inclusion of any new improvements.
Such prohibition is concerned with the exploitation of the licensed technology in the
territory exploited by other licensees or by the licensor himself, including the
imposition of limits for parallel importation, and shall not exceed five years, in case of
pure patent licensing agreements, and ten years, in case of either pure know-how
licensing agreements or mixed patent and know-how licensing agreements.110
*'AOlP/Beyrard note 100. supra.
'" See Regulation 240/96. Art. 2 (1) (7) (a). Note, in addition, that such an exemption is without
prejudice to the payment of additional damages in the event of the know-how being made publicly by
the licensee or as a consequence of his action.
Kl8See. also. Regulation 240/96. Recital (211 which affirms that "... the parties must be free, in order
to facilitate payment, to spread the royalty payment for the use of the licensed technology over a
period extending beyond the duration of the licensed patents, in particular by setting lower royalty
rates".
'"'When Regulation 2349/84 was in effect, an additional situation was predicted where exemption
could not be granted. This was an obligation on the licensee to pay royalties on products not entirely
or partially patented. It was understood that this had the object of discouraging the licensee to supply
different products separately (Regulation 2349/84. Art. 3 (4)).
"°Cf Regulation 240/96. Art. 1(2). (3) and (4). Article 1 of the Regulation 240/96 will be further
described in Paragraph 2.1.2. Sub-paragraph (b). infra.
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Exemption may be granted only by individual decision for longer periods of
territorial protection, particularly to protect "... expensive and risky investment or
where the parties were not competitors at the date of the grant of the licence"111
(i) Output restrictions
Restrictions imposed on the licensee regarding the quantity of products manufactured
shall be analysed under two views. Firstly, a provision which establishes an obligation
of producing a minimum quantity of the licensed product will not fall within Article 85
(l)112. Such a provision is considered necessary to ensure the adequate exploitation of
the product in question11. In contrast, a clause imposing on the licensee the obligation
to produce a maximum quantity of the licensed product will fall within Article 85 (1).
The Commission's view is that such provision makes the licensee weaker as a
competitor and. if imposed on a number of licensees, it may have a similar effect to an
export ban114
(j) Price restrictions
Restrictions on prices are prohibited by Article 3(1) of Regulation 240/96. Thus, an
obligation on the licensee or the licensor "... in the determination of prices,
components of prices or discounts for the licensed product" fall within Article 85
(l).115
"Regulation 240/96. Recital (14).
u2Ibid. Art. 2 (1) (9).
"JSee. e.g.. Burroughs/Delplanque. note 71. supra.
Commission of the European Communities. Ninth Report on Competition Policy. Brussels.
Luxembourg (1980). p. 22.
" 'See. also. Regulation 240/96. Recital (24).
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(k) Customer restrictions
An obligation on the licensee or on the licensor as to the customers he may serve, or
restrictions on the form the licensed product will be distributed, or ".. with the aim of
sharing customers, using certain types of packaging for the products""6 falls within
Article 85 (1) and is not capable of exemption. In contrast, an obligation on the
licensee to supply only a limited quantity of the licensed product to a particular
customer, where the licence was granted so that the customer might have a second
source of supply inside the licensed territory will not fall within the prohibition of
Article 85 (1) of the Treaty"7.118
(I) Export restrictions
An export restriction imposed on the licensee clearly infringes Article 85 (1). It has
already been seen that any restriction to the free movement of goods within the
Community is contrary to Articles 30 to 36 of the Treaty. The Commission expressed
its view affirming that export bans within the Community . are contrarv to the very
idea of a single market and are as a matter of principle caught by Article 85 (1)" and,
further, it affirmed that it may accept some exceptions "... under certain tightly
defined conditions, notably in favour of small and medium-sized businesses"119.
11 "Regulation 240/96. Art. 3 (4). See. also. Recital (17).
11 Ibid.. .Art. 2 (1) (13). This applies also to the licensee where the latter is the customer ""... and the
licence was granted in order to provide a second source of supply provides that the customer is
himself to manufacture the licensed products or to have them manufactured by a subcontractor"
(Ibid.).
,l8See. also. Regulation 240/96. Recital (23).
'Commission of the European Communities, note 114. supra, p 22 Note, however, that the
licensor may make a reservation in connection with his right "... to exercise the rights conferred by a
patent to oppose the exploitation of the technology by the licensee outside the licensed territory"
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(m) Most favoured licensee clause
An obligation imposed on the licensor to grant to the licensee more favourable terms
than to other licensees is capable of exemption under Regulation 240/96.'20 In
Kabelmetal/Luchaireu\ however, the Commission found that a clause in most
favourable terms was restricting competition within the Community
(n) Assignments and sub-licences
Restrictions on the licensee not to assign or grant sub-licences does not fall within the
prohibitions of Article 85 (l)122. However, "the exercise of the right deriving
therefrom may be limited by the rules of the Treaty"123, depending on "the turnover
attained by the assignee in respect of products made using the know-how or the
patents, the quantity of such products manufactured or the number of operations
carried out employing the know-how of the patents". This applies when the risk
associated with exploitation remains with the assignor124.
(Regulation 240/96. Art. 2 (1) (14)). and may also impose an obligation on the licensee not to use or
manufacture the licensed product, or use the licensed process, in territory of the licensor or in
territories in the Common Market which are licensed to other licensees (Ibid.. Art. 1(1) (3) and (4).
and Recital (11)).
'"^Regulation 240/96. Art. 2 (1) (10).
'"'Note 72. supra.
""Regulation 240/96. Art. 2(1) (2).
'""Vivien Rose, note 14. supra, at p. 559.
^Regulation 240/96. Art. 6 (2) and Recital (9).
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(o) Restrictions on patent licence for non-Member State
The Commission faced the problem for the first time in an agreement between
Raymond, a German company, and Nagoya, a Japanese company 125 In this
agreement, Raymond granted a licence to Nagoya in respect of a plastic product used
in the construction of cars. The licence contained a limitation on exports to the
Community. The Commission understood that such a product could be obtained in the
Community without difficulty by the licensor and by other companies and,
consequently, such an agreement was not infringing the rules of the Treaty. It is also
noteworthy that Regulation 240/96 applies equally to agreements involving non-
Member States, particularly when such licensing agreements "... have effects within
the common market which may fall within the scope of Article 85 (1), ,.."126.
2.1.2. Article 85 (3) - block exemptions
The Commission is empowered by Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to grant individual and
"block exemptions" to individual and categories of agreements, respectively. Under
Regulation 17. Article 24, the Commission was given legislative powers and functions
to implement provisions regarding procedural matters. Under Regulation 19/65127 the
Council of the European Communities authorised the Commission to enact
Regulations providing group exemptions for categories of agreements between two
~~
Raymond/Nagoya. note 94. supra.
1:6See Recital (7) of the Regulation 240/96 See. also. BBC/Bromt Boveri OJ 1988 L301/68. 11988]
4 CMLR 427. where the Commission held that an exclusive licence granted to a Japanese company
was infringing .Article 85 (1) of the Treaty, because the exports to the Community would be affected
with such agreement.
1: OJ. Special Edition. 1965-1966. 35. 1965. 533.
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undertakings covering, inter aha, patent licences and "... a method of manufacture or
knowledge relating to the use or to the application of industrial processes"1 8.
When the Commission grants an individual exemption it takes into account, as
seen above, whether the agreement in question "... contributes to improving the
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress,
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit"129, and whether the
agreement does not impose restrictions on the undertaking concerned "... which are
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives"120 and whether the agreement
does not "afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question"1"1' The Commission, when it
enacts a Regulation on group exemptions, takes into account all the requirements
above-mentioned
In order to improve the legal mechanisms of the Community, group
exemptions must have a time limit. Through the experience obtained during the life of
a Regulation, changes can be proposed or the original text can be maintained. Both
Regulation 2349/84, concerning the application of Article 85 (3) for patent licensing
agreements, and Regulation 556/89, concerning the application of Article 85 (3) for
know-how licensing agreements, were considered to apply for a period of ten years.1,2
1 "^Regulation 19/65. Art. 1(1) (b).
i"9EC Treaty. An. 85 (3).
]XIbid. Art. 85 (3) (a).
mIbid.. Art. 85 (3) (b).
'"Regulation 19/65. Art. 2 (1). note 127. supra, states that such Regulations "shall be made for a
specified period". Art. 14. Regulation 2349/84. establishes that it will enter into force from 1 January
1985 and will apply until 31 December 1994. Art. 12. Regulation 556/89. establishes that it will
enter into force from 1 April 1989 and will apply until 31 December 1999.
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Regulation 240/96, which replaces both Regulations 2349/84 and 556/89 entered into
force on 1 April 1996 and applies until 31 March 2006'"
(a) Background on Regulations 2349/84 and 556/89
The Commission, on 23 July 1984, published Regulation 2349/84 on the application
of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of patent licensing agreements.1'4
This Regulation applied equally to patent agreements and agreements combining the
licensing of patent and the communication of know-how. However, the latter did not
apply if the know-how in the agreement was the dominant element of it. If it was so,
exemption would be granted under Regulation 556/89. Moreover, this Regulation did
not apply to agreements between members of a patent pool, agreements in connection
with a joint venture, reciprocal licences - unless the agreement did not involve any
territorial restriction within the Common Market - and plant breeders' rights1'5.
On 4 March 1989 the Commission published the Regulation 556/89 on the
application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of "know-how"1'6
licensing agreements137. This Regulation applied to know-how agreements and mixed
agreements combining the licensing of know-how and the acquisition or use of other
"Regulation 240/96. Art. 13.
I3'lt must be noted that the Commission took nineteen years to enact this Regulation, since it has
been empowered to do so by Regulation 19/65. note 127. supra.
"Regulation 2349/84. Art. 5 and Recital (8). A remarkable point is related to the exclusion of plant
breeders' rights from the scope of this Regulation. In Nungesser v. Commission, note 73. supra, the
Court seemed to have understood that plant breeders' rights were in similar position to patents for
competition purposes.
136For the purpose of this Regulation "know-how" was defined as "... a body of technical information
that is secret, substantial and identified in any appropriate form" (Regulation 556/89. Art. 1 (7) (1)).
13 The Commission was very much criticised when enacted Regulation 2349/84 for not including the
possibility for exemption for pure know-how. Thereafter, the Commission had been seeking actively
for opinions of businessmen towards the adoption of Regulation 556/89. For a discussion on the
Commission action's towards a Regulation concerning block exemptions for know-how licensing
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industrial property rights, if the know-how in the agreement was the dominant part of
it. Regulation 556/89 did not apply to agreement between members of a patent or a
know-how pool, agreements in connections with a joint venture, reciprocal
agreements, and agreements relating to the licensing of other industrial property
rights, excluding patents, or the licensing of software, if the patent rights or the
software were not of assistance in achieving the object of the licensed technology1,8.
The structure of Regulation 556/89 was very similar to that of Regulation
2349/84. It is also important to recall that both Regulations 2349/84 and 556/89
applied only to agreements between two undertakings1,9
(b) The new regulation on technology transfer: Regulation 240/96140
Due to the expiration of Regulation 2349/84 on 31 December 1994141, the
Commission started to circulate draft versions of a regulation on certain categories of
technology transfer agreements, aiming at replacing and updating Regulation 2349/84
and regulating block exemptions also for know-how licensing agreements142
With a view to allowing further discussion of the complex issues approached
by the draft regulation on technology transfer agreements, the validation of
Regulation 2349/84 was extended until 31 December 199514\ A preliminary draft
agreements, see Valentine Korah. European Commission's Tentative Views on Know-How
Licensing. 119861 12 EIPR 79-86.
' ^Regulation 556/89. Art. 5.
'Regulation 19/65. Art. 1(1). Regulation 2349/84. Art. 1(1). and Regulation 556/89. .Art. 1 (1). In
a case involving more than two undertakings the possibility still remains under Regulation 17. where
it is possible to apply for an individual exemption
M"A11 the provisions mentioned in this Sub-paragraph are related with Regulation 240/96 if no other
reference is given.
]v'Cf. note 132. supra.
'""Regulation 556/89. on block exemptions for now-how licensing agreements, was due to expire
only on 31 December 1999 (Cf note 132. supra).
mOJ 1995 L214/6.
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Commission Regulation (EC) of 30 September 1994 on the application of Article 85
(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer agreements was
published144 and further discussion took place. Eventually, the Commission published
on 9 February 1996 the "Commission Regulation (EC) N. 240/96 of 31 January 1996
on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of technology
transfer agreements"145.
Regulation 240/96 combines into a single set of rules, block exemptions for
"pure" patent146, "pure" know-how147 and "mixed"148 licensing agreements.149 In
general. Regulation 240/96 remains with the same structure as that of Regulations
2349/84 and 556/89, changing, however, substantive concepts related with the
application of block exemptions for technology licensing.
Probably the first major change which must be considered more carefully is
that Regulation 240/96 put under a single procedure the regulatory measures for
block exemptions of pure patents, pure know-how and mixed technology licensing.
Under the division provided by Regulations 2349/84 and 556/89 one could choose
which Regulation would bring the benefits of block exemptions. So, by virtue of
Regulation 240/96, Regulation 556/89 is revoked and replaced by the former.
Businessmen who thought that they had norms for know-how licensing valid until the
"OJ 1994 C178/3 (corrigendum OJ 1994 C187/16).
]A'Cf. note 2. supra.
lJ6This applies to Member State's own patents. Community Patents (patents granted under the
Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, discussed in Chapter 4. infra) and
European Patents (patents granted under the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, discussed
in Chapter 4. infra).
l4 Such as descriptions of manufacturing processes, recipes, formulae, designs or drawings .
^Combined patent and knots-how licensing agreements.
U9Recital (4).
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end of 1999150, will face different legal circumstances brought to life by Regulation
240/96 and which will be further discussed below This leads to legal uncertainty and
more costs for business151
The basic structure of Regulation 240/96 is a Preamble with twenty seven
Recitals and a framework of thirteen Articles. The provisions of the "white list'1 of
Regulations 2349/84 and 556/89 remain (Article 2), with some extended clauses
which will be deemed not restrictive to competition. The "black list" (Article 3) has
been shortened on the ground that a "market share"152 test will apply for assessing
licensing behaviour within the Common Market. The provisions of Regulation 240/96
will be discussed in more detail below.
Article 1 exempts several clauses relating to exclusivity and territorial
protection which fall within Article 85 (1), applying to exclusive and non-exclusive
licences. Article 1 (1) lists the obligations in pure patent, pure know-how or mixed
licensing agreements, including agreements containing "ancillary provisions"153,
' 50Note 132. supra.
1 "Obviously, the provisions of agreements exempted under Regulations 2349/84 and 556/89. and
which keeps satisfying the conditions there established, will be valid, by virtue of Article 11 (3).
Regulation 240/96. for agreements in force on 31 March 1996. It is possible to assume, as a matter of
interpretation, that agreements under Regulation 556/89 and in force on 31 March 1996. will be
valid until 31 December 1999. Those agreements in force on 31 March 1996 and related with patent
block exemption will be valid until the date of expiration of the agreement in question or of the
patent.
"The "licensee s market share" is defined by Regulation 240/96 as "... the proportion which the
licensed products and other goods or services provided by the licensee, which arc considered by users
to be interchangeable or substitutable for the licensed products in view of their characteristics, pnee
and intended use. represent the entire market for the licensed products and all other interchangeable
or substitutable goods and semces in the common market or in substantial part of it" (Art. 10 (9)).
'"Article 10 (15) defines "ancillary provisions" as "... provisions relating to the exploitation of
intellectual property rights other than patents, w hich contain no obligations restrictive of competition
other than those also attached to the licensed know-how or patents and exempted under this
Regulation".
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between only two undertakings'54, which do not fall within the prohibition of Article
85 (1) of the Treaty.
Regarding the protection of the licensee. Article 1 (1) (1) exempts restrictions
imposed on the licensor not to license other undertakings to exploit the licensed
technology155 within the territory where the licensee is authorised to exploit it.
Moreover, the licensee may impose a restriction on the licensor, under Article 1(1)
(2), not to exploit the licensed invention in the licensed territory himself. The term
"licensed territory" must be understood as covering all the Common Market or only
part of it .156
Regarding restrictions imposed on the licensee to protect the licensor. Article
1 (1) (3) exempts an obligation prohibiting the licensee to exploit the licensed
technology "... in the territory of the licensor within the common market"157 This
"reserved territory" must be understood in a very broad way and it includes the areas
where the licensor is exploiting the licensed technology himself, as well as the areas
where the licensor has not yet granted a licence or has not yet been exploiting the
invention himself. The licensor is also authorised, by Article 1 (1) (7), to impose on
the licensee an obligation to use "... only the licensor's trademark or get up to
]-ACf note 139. supra.
155C/ Recital (10).
"6Where the agreement is a pure patent licensing agreement, these obligations are exempted only for
as long as the licensed product is protected by parallel patents in the territories of the licensee (Art. 1
(2)). Where the agreement is a pure know-how licensing agreement exemption may be granted for a
period not exceeding ten years counted from the date when the licensed product was put in the
market by one of the licensees (Art. 1 (3). First sentence). Where the agreement is a mixed licensing
agreement, these obligations are exempted for as long as the licensed product is protected in the
Member State in question by such patents if the duration of such protection exceeds the periods
specified in Article 1 (3) (Art. 1 (4)).
15 The information provided above, in note 156. applies equally to this obligation.
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distinguish the licensed product during the term of the agreement"158 The licensee is
nevertheless authorised to identify himself as the manufacturer of the licensed
product'5'' Such an obligation is limited by Article 3 (4), which prevents the
application of the exemption on the restrictions as to the customers the licensee may
serve by A. using certain types of packaging for the products".
Moreover, the licensor may impose an obligation on the licensee, by virtue of
Article 1 (1) (8) .. to limit his production of the licensed product to the quantities he
requires in manufacturing his own products and to sell the licensed product only" as
part of a replacement part of his own products or in connection with the sale of the
licensee's products160. Such quantities must be freely determined by the licensee
himself
In relation to the protection of the other licensees. Regulation 240/96 provides
exemption to obligations imposed on the licensee in three different aspects. Article 1
(1) (4) exempts an obligation on the licensee not to manufacture or use the licensed
product or process, in the territories within the Common Market which is licensed to
other licensees161 This particular situation received particular support from Recital
(11) which affirmed that "[t]he exemption of export bans on the licensor and on the
licensee does not prejudice any development in the case law of the C ourt of Justice in
relation to such agreements, .... This is also the case, ... regarding the prohibition on
'An Burroughs/Delplanque. note 71. supra, the Commission ruled that the use of the licensor's
trade-mark in the licensed invention is necessary to enable the licensor to control the quality and
quantity of the products covered by the agreement.
'"Where the agreement is a pure patent licensing agreement, these obligations are exempted only for
as long as the licensed product is protected by parallel patents in the territories of the licensee (Art. 1
(2)). Where the agreement is a pure know-how agreement, these obligation are exempted during the
lifetime of the agreement as long as the know-how remains secret and substantial (Art. 1 (3). Third
sentence)
"The information provided above, in note 159. applies equally to this obligation
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the licensee from selling the licensed product in territories granted to other licensees
(passive competition)"
Article 1 (1) (5) accepts an obligation on the licensee not to pursue activities
to put the licensed product on the market licensed to other licensees. ".. in particular
not to engage in advertising specifically aimed at those territories or to establish any
branch or maintain any distribution depot there"162. The protection from "active
sales", however, faces some difficulties regarding the decision whether advertising is
aimed at other licensees" territory or not, in so far as television advertising can be
easily caught by consumers in other territories within the Common Market and many
newspapers are distributed internationally16'. It is clear, however, that any other
export policy, as having agents or sales man or branch, to commercialise the licensed
technology in the territory or other licensees is prohibited
Under Article 1 (1) (6) an exemption may be granted in relation with an
obligation on the licensee .. not to put the licensed product on the market in the
territories licensed to other licensees within the common market in response to
unsolicited orders". This obligation is exempted "... for a period not exceeding five
years ..." from the date the product was first put on the market by one of the
licensees, as far as this product is protected by parallel patents. In relation to the
protection of "passive sales" "... from other licensees, the incentive must be the
possibility of earning for five years more than a competitive profit if the investment in
tooling up and developing a market is successful"164.165
"'The information provided above, in note 156. applies equally to this obligation.
]62Ib,d
"Valentine Korab : atent Licensing and EEC Competition Law - Regulation 2349/84. Oxford:
ESC Publishing Limned (1985). p. 40.
]6AIbid.. p. 42.
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The obligations listed in Article 1(1) also apply when parties choose to use
these obligations with a more limited scope than is permitted therein166 In addition,
where the agreement is a pure know-how licensing agreement, the exemptions listed
in Article 1(1) will apply only if the parties have identified the initial know-how and
any subsequent improvements to it, only for as long as the know-how remains secret
and substantial167
Article 2(1) (the "white list") lists obligations which normally do not infringe
Article 85 (1) of the Treaty, but if they did eventually fall within such prohibitions,
because of particular economic or legal circumstances, they would be exempted under
.Article 2 (2). The list provided by Article 2 (1) is not exhaustive168 and the obligations
will also apply where an agreement contains clauses of that type but with a more
limited scope than is permitted by Article 2 (I)169.
Article 2 (1) (1) exempts an obligation on the licensee not to divulge the
know-how communicated by the licensor, even after the licensing agreement has
expired, as a means of guaranteeing the continuous secrecy of the know-how170. It
may be suggested, however, that such an obligation will apply only so long as the
know-how in question remains secret171
l65Note. in addition, that under Regulation 2349/84 such possibility was withdrawn by Article 3 (10)
if the licensee was required, for a penod of five years, not to put on the market the licensed product
in the territories licensed to other licensees within the Common Market.
166Art. 1 (5).
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.Art. 2 (1) (1). This obligations applies even after the agreement has expired as a means of
guaranteeing the secrecy of the know-how.
1
See Kabelmetal/Luchaire. note 72. supra.
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Article 2 (1) (2) exempts an obligation on the licensee not to assign or sub¬
licence the licensed technology172 Otherwise, the licensor would be restricted in his
right of protecting the confidentiality of his secret information Article 2 (1) (3)
exempts an obligation on the licensee not to exploit the licensed know-how after the
expiration of the agreement in so far and as long as the know-how remains secret and
the patent right is still in force. Such restriction is seen necessary, as far as it
guarantees to the licensor the possibility of granting a licence to another undertaking
or to exploit the protected technology himself after the termination of the agreement
Article 2 (1) (4) exempts an obligation imposed on the licensee to grant to the
licensor a non-exclusive licence to exploit the improvements to or new applications of
the licensed technology. Although the licensee has the right to assign or licence the
improvement over the technology of the licensor, the former may not disclose the
know-how communicated by the licensor which gave rise to such improvements. Such
obligation will be exempted if the licensor undertakes to grant an exclusive or non-
• ] 7^
exclusive licence of his own improvements to the licensee.
Article 2 (1) (5) includes an obligation which will be exempted if two
conditions are met The obligation is that the licensee shall observe minimum quality
specifications for the licensed product or to procure goods or services either from the
licensor himself or from some other undertaking designated by the licensor. The
conditions to be met are that this is necessary for a technically satisfactory
exploitation of the licensed technology and for ensuring that the product of the
licensee conforms to the minimum quality specifications that are applicable to the
1 :Cf Paragraph 2.1.1. Sub-paragraph (n). supra.
' 'Ibid.. Sub-paragraph (f). supra.
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licensor and other licensees. This obligation is understood as necessary also to allow
the licensor to carry out related checks with the production and use of the licensed
technology. 174
Article 2 (1) (6) exempts obligations on the licensee to inform the licensor of
misappropriation of the know-how or of infringements of the licensed patent or to
take or to assist the licensor in taking legal actions against such misappropriation or
infringement
Article 2 (1) (7) permits an obligation on the licensee to continue paying
royalties until the end of the agreement even if the know-how becomes publicly
available other than by action of the licensor, allowing also an obligation on the
licensee to continue paying royalties after the expiration of the agreement, in order to
facilitate payments.175
Article 2 (1) (8) establishes that restriction on the licensee exploiting the
licensed technology to one or more technical fields of application covered by the
licensed technology or one or more product markets shall be exempted.176
Article 2 (1) (9) exempts an obligation on the licensee to pay a minimum
royalty or to produce a minimum quantity of the licensed product or to carry out a
minimum number of operations to exploit the licensed technology. In this case, the
licensor may reduce the risk relating to the investment in the creative process at the
same time that the licensee shall participate of this risk although the latter has not
contributed to the development of the technology .177
4Ibid.. Sub-paragraph (b). supra.
1 5 Ibid.. Sub-paragraph (g). supra. See. also. Recital (21).
! ('Ibid.. Sub-paragraph (c).
! Ibid.. Sub-paragraph (g).
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Article 2 (1) (10) exempts an obligation imposed on the licensor to grant to
the licensee more favourable terms than the licensor may grant to another undertaking
after the agreement is entered into 178
Article 2 (!) (11) exempts an obligation on the licensee to indicate the
patentee's name or that of the licensed product when marketing it. Article 2 (1) (12)
exempts an obligation on the licensee not to use the licensor's technology to construct
facilities to third parties. This exemption does not include a limitation to the right of
the licensee to increase the capacity of his own facilities or to set up additional
facilities for his own use. Article 2 (1) (13) exempts an obligation on the licensee to
supply only a limited quantity of the licensed product to a particular customer, as a
means of guaranteeing that the customer has a second source of supply inside the
licensed territory This provision applies equally when the customer is the licensee179.
The licensor may also impose an obligation on the licensee to use his best endeavours
to manufacture and market the licensed product180.
Article 2(1) also lists the following reservations made by the licensor that is
exempted by Regulation 240/96: (a) a reservation of the right to exercise his rights to
oppose the exploitation of the technology by the licensee outside the licensed
territory181, (b) a reservation of the right to terminate the agreement if the licensee
contests the secret or substantial nature of the licensed know-how or challenges the
validity of the licensed patent182, (c) a reservation of the right to terminate the
' sIbid.. Sub-paragraph (m).
1 9Ibid.. Sub-paragraph (i).
ls:'Art. 2 (1) (17).
181 Art. 2 (1) (14).
""Art. 2 (1) (15). Cf Paragraph 2.1.1. Sub-paragrap!
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agreement if the licensee claims that the patent is no longer necessary1', and (d) a
reservation of the right to terminate the exclusivity of a licence and to stop licensing
improvements to him when the licensee enters into competition within the Common
Market with the licensor or with undertakings connected with him. The licensor may
also request the licensee to prove that he is not using the licensed technology for
purposes beyond those established by the licensing agreement184
Article 3 (the "black list") lists the obligations which are condemned by
Regulation 240/96 and, hence, prevents the application of the exempting provisions of
the Regulation.185 The obligations prohibited by Article 3 work mainly as a limitation
of the restrictions permitted by Articles 1 and 2.
Article 3(1) prohibits an obligation on the licensee or the licensor relating to
the determination of prices, components of prices or discounts for the licensed
products186 Article 3 (2) prohibits one party imposing on the other a restriction on
competing with the former, or with other undertakings connected with the other party
within the Common Market, in respect of research and development, manufacture,
use or sales, other than as provided by Articles 2 (1) (17) and (18)187. Nevertheless,
an obligation which is imposed on the other party to use its best endeavours to exploit
the licensed products are outside the scope of Article 3 (2).
Article 3 (3) covers two situations which shall be prohibited The first is when
"one or both of the parties are required without any objectively justified reason" to
183Art. 2 (1) (16).
184Art. 2 (1) (18). Cf Paragraph 2.1.1. Sub-paragraph (e).
8"Recital (19) affirms, however, that "]s]uch restrictions may be declared exempted only by an
individual decision, taking into account the market position of the undertakings concerned and the
degree of concentration on the relevant market"".
'*6Cf Paragraph 2.1.1. Sub-paragraph (j).
18 Ibid.. Sub-paragraph (e).
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refuse to supply users or resellers in the same territory as the licensed one. who would
market such products in other territories within the Common Market188. Such a
provision is understood as preventing competition and working as a type of export
ban The second type of restriction provided by Article 3 (3) is when one or both of
the parties are required, without justified reason,
to make it difficult for users or resellers to obtain the products from
other resellers within the common market, and in particular to exercise
intellectual property rights or take measures so as to prevent users or
resellers from obtaining outside, or from putting on the market in the
licensed territory products which have been lawfully put on the market
within the common market by the licensor or with his consent.189
This second prohibition is possible basically by the exercise of intellectual or
commercial property rights. Other measures relating to this obligation may include
restrictions on other licensees or their customers. Furthermore, both situations are
condemned also if one or both of the parties do so "as a result of a concerted practice
between them".
Article 3 (4) prohibits parties which are already competing manufacturers
before the licensing agreement and within the same technical field and within the same
product, to impose restrictions on the other party as to the customers he may serve.
This applies particularly to prohibitions such as supplying certain classes of user,
employing certain methods of distribution, or aiming at sharing customers by using
certain types of packaging for the products. This is without prejudice to Articles 1(1)
(7) and 2(1) (13).
,S!iArt. 3 (3) (a).
3 (3) (b).
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Article 3 (5) prohibits a restriction on either parties to the quantity of the
licensed products one party may manufacture or sell or the number of operations
exploiting the licensed technology he may carry out. This is without prejudice to
Articles 1(8) and 2 (1) (13).
Article 3 (6) prohibits an obligation on the licensee to assign to the licensor
the whole or part of improvements or new applications of the licensed technology190
Finally, .Article 3 (7) prohibits an obligation imposed on the licensee to extend the
duration of the agreement of any new improvements, for a period of over those
determined by Article 1 (2), (3) and (4).
A licensing agreement which does not fall within Regulation 240/96 may apply
for an individual exemption under Regulation 17. Nevertheless, to accelerate the
process of granting exemptions for agreements which do not qualify for block
exemption under Regulation 240/96, Article 4 provides an "opposition procedure"
with the aim of facilitating the whole process.191 Then, agreements which do not
qualify for block exemptions may be notified192 to the Commission192 The automatic
l9"C/i Paragraph 2.1.1. Sub-paragraph (f).
"'.Although Recital (25) of Regulation 2349/84 argued in favour of the "opposition procedure", by
affirming that such a procedure is important to "allow the Commission to ensure effective
supervision as well as simplifying the administrative control of the agreement", this procedure has
not shown effective practicability . See. generally. Valentine Korah. note 163. supra. Chapter 7. and
Vivien Rose, note 14. supra, p. 571 See. also. Commission of the European Communities.
Twentieth Report on Competition Policy . Brussels (1991). p. 46. where the Commission enunciates
that in 1990 no notification requesting opposition procedure provide by Regulations 2349/84 and
556/89 was received See. likewise. Commission of the European Communities. Twenty First
Report on Competition Policy . Brussels & Luxembourg (1992). pp. 134-135. where the Commission
assumes that in 1991 it received eight applications for the opposition procedure, under both
Regulations 2349/84 and 556/89. and none of them could applv for such procedure.
""Notification shall be done under Regulation N. 3385/94 (OJ 1994 L377/28).
'93All information acquired by the Commission in relation with "opposition procedures" shall be
used only for the purpose of Regulation 240/96 and may not be disclosed by the Commission, by the
authorities of the Member States, their officials and other servants. Only information of general
character or surveys' which do not contain information relating to particular undertakings or
association of undertakings, may be published by the Commission or Member States (Art. 9).
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exemption will be obtained if, during a period of four months194, the Commission does
not oppose exemption. The Commission, though not obliged to oppose exemption,
must do so if it receives a request from a Member State, within two months from the
transmission to the latter of the notification195 196
The opposition procedure may be withdrawn at any time by the Commission
However, if the opposition was raised by request of a Member State, and the Member
State in question maintains the opposition, it may be withdrawn only after
consultation of the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant
Position.197
Articles 4 (7) and (8) establish from which date the exemption shall apply in
the case of the agreement which has fulfilled all the conditions, and in the case where
the agreement was amended in order to fulfil such conditions. In the first case the
exemption shall apply from the date of notification and, in the second, from the date
that the amendments took effect.
Article 4 (9) provides that if the Commission's opposition is not withdrawn,
the effects of such notifications will be governed by Regulation 17. Oddly enough,
because the Commission has the right to withdraw the opposition at any time, there is
not a clear line determining when such procedure shall begin.
l94Counted from the date on which notification takes effect (Art. 4 (4)).
195Art. 4 (5).
196The opposition procedure shall apply, particularly, where the "the licensee is obliged at the time
the agreement is entered into to accept quality specifications or further licences or to procure goods
or services which are not necessary for a technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed
technology" (Art. 4 (2) (a)) and where "the licensee is prohibited from contesting the secrecy or the
substantiality of the licensed know -how or from challenging the validity of patents licensed within
the common market belonging to the licensor or undertakings connected with him" (Art. 4 (2) (b)).
191Art. 4 (6).
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Article 5 establishes that Regulation 240/96 does not apply in relation to five
specific matters. The reason why these five types of agreements were included in
Article 5 is justified by Recital (8) on grounds that "[sjuch agreements pose different
problems which cannot at present be dealt with in a single regulation". The first case
which is excluded is when the agreement is between members of a patent or know-
how pool which relates to the pooled technologies198. A patent pool cannot always be
separated from the understanding of a joint venture what could lead the Commission
to assess licensing agreements taking into consideration different Community
requirements. Regulation 240/96 will nevertheless apply to licensing agreements
provided the parties are not subject to any territorial constraint within the Common
Market with regard to the manufacture, use or putting on the market of the licensed
product or to the use of the licensed pooled technologies199.
The second situation is when a licensing agreement is settled between
competitors who hold interest in a joint venture or between one of these competitors
and the joint venture200. This provision applies only if the agreement is directly related
with the activities of the joint venture in question and the members of the joint venture
are actual competitors. Notice, additionally, that if the product, related to the
agreement, represents, "in case of a licence limited production, not more than 20%,
and in case of a licence covering production and distribution, not more than 10%, of
the market for the licensed products and all interchangeable or substitutable goods
and services", Regulation 240/96 applies to such agreements201. Further, Regulation
240/96 continues to apply where for two consecutive financial years the market shares
198Art. 5 (1) (1).
'"Art. 5 (2) (2).
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are not exceeded by more than one-tenth. When the limit is exceeded. Regulation
240/96 continues to apply .. for a period of six months from the end of the year in
which the limit is exceeded"202 The Commission's approach in this regard, which was
included as part of Regulations 2349/84 and 556/89 by amending Regulation N.
151/93203, seems to represent a cornerstone economic point of view concerning the
effects of the product in question in the competition within the Common Market and
part of the introduction of the "market share" concept included in the assessment of
exemptions by Regulation 240/96, which will be analysed further below.
The third aspect which does not benefit from Regulation 240/96 is related to
agreements between one party which grants a licence to another party and that other
party, although through "separate agreements or through connected undertakings",
grants to the first party a patent, trade-mark or know-how licence204. In this case
parties have to be competitors in relation with the products covered by the licensing
agreement. Moreover, Article 5 (2) (2) includes the view that Regulation 240/96 shall
apply to reciprocal licences if no territorial restriction is provided by the agreement in
question "within the common market with regard to the manufacture, use or putting
on the market of the licensed product or to the use of the licensed or pooled
technologies".
The fourth aspect which will not benefit from the application of block
exemption under Regulation 240/96 is licensing agreements containing provisions
Art. 5 (1) (2).
201 Art. 5 (2) (1).
202Art. 5 (3).
"^^Note 2. supra.
204Art. 5 (1) (3).
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relating to IPRs other than patents which are not ancillary205. In addition, agreements
entered into solely for the purpose of sale will not benefit from the application of
Regulation 240/96206. It is also worth mentioning that, following Court decisions and
other criticisms towards the non-applicability of Regulation 2349/84 to licensing
agreements in respect of plant breeders' rights, Regulation 240/96 has not excluded
licensing agreement on plant breeders' rights from the application of the block
exemption rules207.
Article 6 determines that Regulation 240/96 shall apply also to: agreements
where the licensor is not the holder of the know-how or the patentee, but is
authorised by the holder of the patent to grant a licence208, assignments of know-how,
patents or both where the risk associated with exploitation remains with the
assignor209; and licensing agreements in which the rights or obligations of the licensor
or the licensee are assumed by undertakings connected with them210.
In Article 7, Regulation 240/96 establishes the "market share" concept. It
must be understood as a reaffirmation of the Commission's power to withdraw the
benefit of Regulation 240/96 where it finds in a particular case that an agreement
exempted by Regulation 240/96 has certain effects that are incompatible with the
conditions laid down by Article 85 (3) of the Treaty. Article 7, for this purpose,
provides in particular the following situation:
^Art. 5 (1) (4)._06Art. 5 (1) (5). Recital (8) supports such exclusion by affirming that "... this Regulation should
apply only where the licensee huiiself manufactures the licensed product or has them manufactured
for his account, or were the licensed product is a service, provides the service himself or has the
service provided for his account irrespective of whether or not the licensee is also entitled to use
confidential information provided by the licensor for the promotion and sale of the licensed product".




[where] the effect of the agreement is to prevent the licensed products
from being exposed to effective competition in the licensed territory
from identical goods or services or from goods or services considered
by users as interchangeable or substitutable in view of their
characteristics, price and intended use, which may "in particular occur
where the licensee's market share exceeds 40%",211
A broader approach to technology transfer and dissemination was included in
the first draft of Regulation 240/96212 and suffered several criticisms from
businessmen and scholars213. The draft Regulation proposed, in Article 1 (5), that the
exempted obligation on the licensor not to licence other undertakings to exploit the
licensed technology in the licensed territory214 would apply only provided:
- that the products manufactured by the licensee which are capable of
being improved or replaced by the contract products and other goods
manufactured by him which are considered by users to be equivalent in
view of their characteristics, price and intended use account for more
than 40% of the entire market in those products in the common market
or a substantial part of it, and
- that the licensee is not operating on an oligopolistic market; for the
purposes of this regulation the market is to be considered as an
oligopolistic one if on the relevant product and geographic market
three undertakings or less hold together a market share of more than
50%, or if five undertakings or less hold together a market share of
more than two thirds and provided that the licensee is one of the
undertakings which make up this group of companies and that it holds
a market ofmore than 10%.
This approach seems to be hardly acceptable to business in so far as block
exemptions would be necessarily more difficult to obtain in a continuous basis. The
210Art. 6 (3).
211Art. 7(1). Emphasis added. See also. Recital (26).
2X2Cf note 144, supra.
~'3See, e.g., Robin Whaite. The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption. [1994] 7 EIPR 259-
262. and Valentine Korah. The Preliminary Draft of a New EC Group Exemption for Technology
Licensing, 119941 7 EJPR 263-286.
214Art. 1 (1) (1).
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licensee would have to bear with constant tests on its market share, in so far as once
the technology is widely disseminated and known by the market and the consumers,
the "oligopolistic position" would be reached easily. In addition to that, it seems that
such a market share concept would create more problems than solve them, because of
the difficulty to provide an accurate technical economic analysis of the position of the
licensees and licensors in a substantial part of the entire Common Market215. The
Commission appears to have taken into account these criticisms and the possible
effects of a stricter "market share" concept and excluded this provision from
Regulation 240/96.
Article 7 (2) finally affirms that the Commission may withdraw exemptions
already granted when the licensee refuses to meet unsolicited orders from users or
resellers in the territory of other licensees, without prejudice to Article 1 (1) (6).
Under Article 7 (3), either parties of a licensing agreements are also prohibited to
refuse to meet orders from users or resellers in their respective territories who would
market the products in other territories of the Common Market, or to make it difficult
for users or resellers to obtain the products from other resellers within the Common
Market, and in particular when they exercise IPRs or take measures so as to prevent
users or resellers from obtaining the products outside the licensed territory, aiming at
restricting the free flow of goods within the Community.
Article 8 affirms that the following shall be deemed to be patents: patent
applications; utility models; applications for registration or utility models;
topographies of semiconductor products; certificats d'utilite and certificats
d 'addition under French law, supplementary protection certificates for medicinal
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products216 or other products for which such supplementary protection certificates
may be obtained, and plant breeders'rights217.
Article 10 provides an exhaustive list of definitions for terms used in
Regulation 240/96. Article 11 revokes Regulation 556/89 from 1 April 1996 and gives
effect to Regulation 2349/84 until 31 March 1996. Article 12 affirms that the
Commission shall take regular assessments of the application of the provisions of
Regulation 240/96, particularly in relation with the opposition procedure laid down by
Article 4, and determines that the Commission shall draw up a report on the operation
of Regulation 240/96 before the end of the fourth year following the entry into force
of the Regulation and, on that basis, decide whether or not an adaptation of the
Regulation is necessary. Article 13 determines that Regulation 240/96 enters into
force on 1 April 1996 and shall last until 31 March 2006.
2.2. Patent rights andArticle 86
Article 86 of the Treaty is, together with Article 85, the effective implementation of
the general objective established by Article 3 (g), aiming to ensure a system of
competition within the Common Market which will not be distorted. The purpose of
Article 86 is to control the abusive exercise of an undertaking (or of more than one
undertaking) which holds a dominant position within the Common Market. Article 86,
caput, determines:
"15See Valentine Korah and Robin Whaite. note 213, supra, for this opinion
21^or further discussion relating to supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products, see
Chapter 4. Section 3, Sub-section 3.3. Paragraph 3.3.1. infra.
2]1Cf note 135. supra.
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Any abuse of one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States.
Further, Article 86 lists examples of practices which shall constitute an abuse
of a dominant position such as the imposition of unfair prices or unfair trading
conditions218, the limitation of production, market or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers219, the imposition of different conditions upon equivalent
transactions placing the other party with competitive disadvantages220, and the
imposition to other parties of conditions or supplementary obligations which have no
connection with the subject of the contract221.
Article 86 thus involves three essential elements. For the application of this
Article there must be a dominant position by an undertaking, or a group of
undertakings, in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it. The exercise of this
dominant position has to constitute an abuse and its consequence shall be the effect on
trade between Member States. What should be made clear, however, is that Article 86
does not prohibit the dominant position, but only the abusive exercise of such
position.
Dominance may exist in two ways:
Dominance can exist both in the supply and in the purchase of goods
or services. In order to determine whether an undertaking occupies a
dominant position it is necessary first to identify the relevant market -
ie the relevant product or service market and the relevant geographic
market. Application of Article 86 requires dominance within the
common market "or a substantial part of it". A "substantial part" of the
-18EC Treaty Art. 86 (a).
2X9Ibid.. Art. 86 (b).
220Ibid.. Art. 86 (c).
~]Ibid.. Art. 86 (d).
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common market may be the territory of a single member state or even
part of a member state. Having identified the relevant markets, it must
then be shown that an undertaking (or group of undertakings) is
dominant in those markets. A very high market share - more than 85
per cent - is determinative of itself of a dominant position; a market
share of 50 per cent constitutes a dominant position except in
exceptional circumstances. Whether dominance can exist with a lower
market share depends upon the restrictive market shares of the
undertaking and its competitors, their respective technical, financial or
other resources (such as intellectual property rights) and the
undertaking's conduct in the market.222
To define the existence of the dominant position in the Common Market or in
a substantial part of it, a definition of the market in question must be considered in the
first place - the relevant product market - followed by the anai> sis of the position of
the undertaking with a high share of activity in such market, and the possibility of
actual or potential competitors to threaten the position of the dominant
undertaking.223
The second element for the application of Article 86 is whether or not the
undertaking which holds a dominant position in the Common Market, or in a
substantial part of it, acts in such a way that constitutes an abuse of its position.
Article 86 lists examples of conduct of undertakings which may be considered an
abusive practice.
The effect on trade between Member States shall be understood in the same
way as the wording of Article 85. The activity of an undertaking, if not affecting trade
David A.O. Edward & Robert C. Lane, note 3, supra, pp. 109-110, para. 234. The Court
accepted a very high market share with the power to impede effective competition as an evidence of a
dominant position. See. e.g., Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1
CMLR 429 and Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461. [1979] 3 CMLR
211.
223Vivien Rose, note 14. supra, p. 593.
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between at least two Member States, but providing for the possibility of doing so, is
already condemned by Article 86.
The prohibition established by this Article may be applied to the activities of
private and public undertakings. It is noteworthy that a .. dominant position may be
acquired over time by economic performance by private undertakings or it may be
conferred by statute upon a 'public undertaking' or upon undertakings to which
Member States grant special or exclusive rights"224.
The main difference between Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, though both
Articles' goal is to ensure the principle established by Article 3 (g) of the Treaty, is
that under Article 85 there is a possibility of exemption of an agreement. No such
possibility is available for an undertaking which falls within the prohibition established
by Article 86. In Tetra Pak v. Commission225 the Court of First Instance drew
principles concerning the relationship between both provisions and emphasised the
distinctions between them.
When one considers that patent rights grant a monopoly through national rules
to the patentee, it is important to bear in mind that this is not enough by itself to
establish a dominant position, nor may the exercise of such right constitute an abusive
exercise of a dominant position. The Court, for the first time, analysed the application
of Article 86 concerning the exercise of patent rights in Parke, Davis & Co. v.
Centrafarm'26 In this case, the rights of a holder of two Netherlands patents for
biological and chemical manufacture of an antibiotic, Parke, Davis & Co., had been
infringed by the marketing of such product in the Dutch market by Probel, a Belgian
n*Ibid.. p. 404.
::5Casc T-51/89. note 8. supra.
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company, and by Interpharm and Centrafarm, both Dutch companies. The importation
of the product from various countries ofEurope was not done with the consent of the
patentee, nor with the permission of the licensee in the Dutch market. A preliminary
ruling, under Article 177 of the Treaty, requested the Court to decide how far a high
price charged for a product in the Dutch market, directly or indirectly, constitutes a
breach of the rules of the Treaty, if a parallel importation of the product, done by
Centrafarm from Italy where such protection was not available, could supply the
market with lower prices for the same product.
Advocate-General Roemer, analysing the questions raised by the Dutch Court,
emphasised that the existence of a patent right, by itself, is not enough to fulfil the
requirement of Article 86 since it is not, as such, a proof of a dominant position and,
further, stated that .. not all the actions of the person who enjoys a monopoly are
illegal, but only those which have been carried out with the help of a dominant
position"227. In this case, Roemer understood that the difference of price was
essentially based on the very heavy costs involved on the research of such product. He
considered that to pay such costs and to be recompensed for the creative effort, by
profiting on the marketing of the patented product, falls within the specific subject-
matter of a patent. Furthermore, he understood that in a country where no protection
is available, an undertaking may, based on published specifications, exploit an
invention without incurring further costs, being able, hence, to offer the product in
another Member State at lower prices.
The Court, following Advocate-General Roemer, held:
~6Case 24/67. note 13. supra.
-Ibid.. [1968] ECR. p. 79.
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since the existence of patent rights is at present a matter solely of
national law, the use made of them can only come within the ambit of
Community law where such use contributes to a dominant position, the
abuse ofwhich may affect trade between Member States.
Although the sale price of the protected product may be
regarded as a factor to be taken into account in determining the
possible existence of an abuse, a higher price for the patented product
as compared with the unpatented product does not necessarily
constitute an abuse.228
To establish the position of a patent holder as a dominant one, all the
requirements of Article 86 must be taken into account. A dominant position is,
nevertheless, an economic concept which is unlikely to be analysed under an abstract
view. A more technical assessment is necessary to find out whether or not an
undertaking is in a dominant position. In a later case, Hoffman-La Roche v.
Commission229, the Court, according with the Commission's view, said that a
relevant consideration to make the position of dominance clearer was that the
undertaking in question possessed technological advantage amongst other
competitors. In this case, Hoffman-La Roche clearly had financial and technological
resources to develop products or technical services with an advantage over its
competitors.230
Other situations concerning the exercise of intellectual property rights may be
understood as an infringement of Article 86. In another case, Eurofix-Bauco v.
Hilti23 , the Commission held that it was an abuse of a dominant position to demand
^Ibid.. at p. 72.
229Case 85/76. note 222, supra.
30See. for a more recent decision. Tetra Pak v. Commission, note 8. supra, where the Court of First
Instance held that with the acquisition of another company, obtaining the exclusivity of a patent
licence for a sterilisation process for milk packing, Tetra Pak would strengthen its dominant position
in the market.
31OJ 1988 L65/19. [1989] 4 CMLR 677.
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high royalty payments and, for this reason, to delay the time when a licence of right
would be available.
In relation to patent rights it is easier to envisage an evidence of a dominant
position. However, it is important to emphasise that the mere existence of such right
cannot be mixed up with the concept of dominance. Moreover, the prohibition
established by Article 86 applies only if the patent right establishes a dominant
position for its holder and the patent holder exercises his rights in a way which is
considered abusive, thus affecting trade between Member States and acting against
the principles established by the Treaty.
From the many cases decided by the Court, it seems that the holder of a patent
right, when in a dominant position, is required to grant licences to anyone capable of
paying a reasonable royalty232. The patentee, in a dominant position, is also required
to supply the protected product to third parties without imposing unfair conditions.
Moreover, it is clear that if the patentee in a dominant position exercises his rights in
ways which may affect trade between Member States, as described by paragraphs (a)
to (d) of Article 86, he will be abusing his position and thus acting against the
prohibition of Article 86.
Conclusion
There are several considerations provided by the present Chapter which are of
relevance to the MERCOSUL. The first, and most obvious one, is that the control of
J2In a more recent case related with the exercise of copyright (Joined Cases C-242 P and C-242/91 P
RTE and ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR-I 743, known as the "Magill Case"), the Court held that
the refusal to grant a licence for television programme listings for weekly publication, against the
payment of reasonable royalties, may breach Article 86 of the Treaty . Although this case is related
with copyright licensing, such judgment seems to confirm that undertakings in a position of
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the exercise of patent rights within an integrated area is of paramount complexity and
importance. What can be learned from the experience in the EU is that a well defined
supranational institutional framework has played a determinant role in the setting up
of rules and principles for the establishment and functioning of the integrated area. As
has been noted in Chapter 1, Section 2, supra, the institutional framework established
by the Ouro Preto Protocol does not provide for organs with supranationa. powers to
decide upon disputes, which would eventually harmonise the juridical interpretation of
the common legal measures of the MERCOSUL, and enforce common regulations.
Additionally, it is possible to oversee a clear inter-action between the
application of the free movement of goods principle with the establishment of a
common area where a healthy competitive market shall prevail. This is emphasised by
the conflict between the laws of the MERCOSUL and those of the States Parties.
Neither the Treaty of Asuncion nor the Ouro Preto Protocol provide a more detailed
legal framework on the application of the principle of free movement of goods and the
understanding on common rules for competition. This may be viewed as both an
advantage and as a problem. Firstly, it is advantageous because it leaves much room
for further definition of such complex issues during the negotiations that have been
carried out to implement the concepts of the Treaty of Asuncion. Secondly, it poses
problems for the establishment and functioning of the integrated area in so far as there
is no constitutional basis to guide the implementation of the common legal measures
that will be applied for in practical situations. These two characteristics are to be
dominance must grant intellectual property licences to all other undertakings which are willing to
pay reasonable royalties
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taken into account when drawing up common measures to regulate commercial
practices within the common territory of the MERCOSUL.
The main goal of the MERCOSUL, as that of the EC, is to create an
integrated economic and commercial system similar to national systems. This raises
questions related to the implementation of the common rules to be applied in the
territory of the MERCOSUL as well as the application of national rules related to
anti-competitive practices. It is initially necessary to note that the dimension of the
application of the free movement of goods principle between two or more countries
makes the legal analysis of the matter even more complex. This Chapter has shown
several circumstances that are of concern for integrating projects. In this regard, a
possible doubt is how a temporary monopoly sponsored by national law (as the case
of patents) will be dealt with in the context of the integrated area of the MERCOSUL.
Patented products, know-how and technology are allowed to circulate without any
barriers in the territory of the MERCOSUL and, as has been seen throughout the
present analysis, the exercise of patent rights may, in some circumstances, impose
unlawful barriers on the free flow of patented goods. How will lawful and unlawful
practices be defined in the context of the MERCOSUL? Of course common
regulatory mechanisms are necessary for defining and limiting commercial practices of
patent holders and licensees and an effective harmonisation process ought to take
place. The legislative outcome of the MERCOSUL process has to be constructed in
detail to equip the integrated area with a common set of norms which would be valid
throughout its territory, offering business legal certainty, as a result of clearer rules,
and limits for commercial practices. These rules must foresee situations which run
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against competition law and also situations which are to be decided in a case-by-case
b&sis
Secondly, it may be possible to derive from the European experience that anti¬
competitive practices directly affect trade between members of integrating projects
which, as a consequence, restrict the free circulation of goods in that particular
common area. This relationship between free movement of goods and an undistorted
competitive market becomes even more complex when no guidance is provided by the
constitutional principles of the Treaty of Asuncion. It is more difficult to envisage a
practical solution to this problem if, in the case of disputes, no institutional mechanism
is provided for harmonising the understanding of national courts.
It is also possible to draw a parallel with the situation in the EC. As
emphasised by both the EC Treaty and the Treaty of Asuncion, measures having
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions is prohibited and that is the particular
situation of IPRs. At this stage of discussion, a balance between national and common
interest, as well as between private and public (liberalisation of trade) interest, has to
be established. National courts will play a determinant part in this direction but will
have no guidelines to act in harmony with national courts of other States Parties of
the MERCOSUL. The conflict between the existence of national patent rights and the
inherent exercise of these rights within an integrated territory has to be limited to fit
into the interest of free trade and an undistorted competitive environment.
I am not suggesting that the experience of the European Community, as
described in the present Chapter, must be used as a definite model for the integration
project of the MERCOSUL. This is so for many reasons, not least of which is because
the characteristics of the States Parties of the MERCOSUL and its undertakings,
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differ in substance from those of the European Community. I propose to give the
details of the European experience as a means to facilitate the preparedness of the
integration process of the MERCOSUL to suggest possible future problems and
scenarios. However, the present analysis intends to establish only general conclusions
of more immediate utility for the MERCOSUL. The analysis of these measures in the
MERCOSUL will be further discussed in Chapter 6, below.
At this point, I should like to suggest that there are strong reasons to lead me
to think that the institutional framework established by the EC Treaty is relatively
exhaustive and provides more solutions for the harmonisation of national legal and
juridical concepts than the institutional framework provided by the Treaty of
Asuncion and the Ouro Preto Protocol. Within the EC, the Commission and the Court
have played crucial roles for the setting up and operation of the integrated area.
In the case of harmonisation or unification of national laws there are already
legislative functions assigned to different organs of the MERCOSUL. These organs
have, since the signature of the Treaty of Asuncion, worked in harmony and provided
the process itself with a variety of necessary common regulations. The legislative
functions performed by the MERCOSUL are indeed working, though there is no
democratic representative body. Nevertheless, in the case of patent rights, the
legislative outcome has not been that effective, lacking precise definitions on
substantive patent law, competition law and regulatory measures on the free
movement of goods. These regulations are extremely necessary to aid national
administrative and juridical organs to decide upon particular circumstances while
considering in practice the integration process of the MERCOSUL. The
harmonisation of national laws regulating patent rights must also consider the needs
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and the stage of technological development of the industries of the region, as well as
the necessary strategies to encourage foreign investment in the MERCOSUL.
Therefore, the setting up of common regulations in the field of patent rights must be
in conformity with a common science and technology policy for the region, as well as
a joint industrial policy, as a means of determining the boundaries of the application of
the common rules for the MERCOSUL.
Following the discussion which took place in the present Chapter, it is worthy
noting that there are two other issues, related to attempts to establish a harmonised
patent system in a regional basis, which are relevant to the present research. The first
is the setting up of the European Patent Convention (EPC) which has been applied
since the mid-1970s. The EPC has proved to be an effective system, although its
application is not directly related with a harmonised approach towards patent
protection in a Common Market. The other, the Community Patent Convention
(CPC) which attempted to create a very detail system ofjurisdiction inter-related with
the EPC patent granting system, has not come in force so far.
This complementary discussion takes place in Chapter 4, belpw, aiming to
provide the negotiating process of the MERCOSUL with a detailed view of a possible
solution towards the harmonisation of substantive patent laws, and the creation of a
system which would unify administrative and juridical patent decisions, possibly
through the mechanism of inter-state conventions.
CHAPTER 4
UNIFICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS:
THE COMMUNITY PATENT CONVENTION
Introduction
Chapter 3, above, provided information about several legislative, administrative and
juridical actions taken by the EC and concludes with some general guidelines for the
integration project of the MERCOSUL. As described in Chapter 3, the EC has carried
out in this researcher's opinion, a rather efficient legislative and juridical way to harmonise
regulations on patent issues in the Common Market, as a means of defining the limits of
patentees' practices ensuring that the integration process as a whole would be established
and operate successfully. Chapter 3 emphasised that the Commission and the Council have
played a crucial role in setting up common rules for the European integration process.
The EC has, in addition, attempted to unify substantive patent law and the
economic effects of the exercise of patents within the Common Market, through the
mechanism of inter-State Convention. This attempt has suffered many draw backs and
does not seem feasible within the European context, as will be further discussed in this
Chapter. As the practice described in Chapter 3 has been relatively successful for the
setting up of the integrated system, it is also necessary to describe the other side of the
story which is highlighted by the difficulties ofunifying national patent principles through a
single multilateral instrument. This experience is also of relevance for the integration
process of the MERCOSUL in so far as the latter is considering the harmonisation of IPRs
through multilateral mechanisms and giving little, if any, emphasis to common regulatory
measures to regulate the exercise of patent rights.
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This Chapter considers the harmonisation process of patent law in the European
Community. The establishment of a common system of jurisdiction, enforcement and
standards of substantive law for patent protection is seen as a cornerstone not only of the
issues on the establishment of a Common Market, but further as a key point of the
functioning of the integrated system that is now the European Community. The EC Treaty
expressly lists the "approximation of laws" as one of the main objectives to be reached by
the Member States "... to the extent required for the proper functioning of the common
market"1.
In the case of patent protection, the harmonisation process itself is drawn by the
EC Treaty, inter alia, for the purposes of ensuring the application of the principle of free
circulation ofgoods and the establishment of a system in which competition would not be
distorted2, making national laws similar in order to have uniform protection and
enforcement of inventions at national and Community levels. Although some of the
problems arising from the exercise of patent rights within the Community have been
harmonised by case law3, the problem was not fully exhausted by the various questions
brought before the European Court of Justice. The Court itself has pointed out that the
problems of intellectual property rights within the Community are essentially based on the
'EC Treaty, Art. 3 (h). The term "approximation", as used in this paragraph, is employed by the
Treaty with a variety of terms. It is used, for example, "approximation" also in Articles 27, 45. 100
and 117; "co-ordination" in Articles 54. 56, 57 and 70; "harmonisation" in Articles 99. 112 and 117;
"making equivalent" in Article 54; or "the adoption of common rules" in Article 75. It does not
seem, however, that there is a great difference among all these terms employed by the EC Treaty.
Some authors nevertheless understand that the term "approximation" represents "... a more intensive
process of integration than harmonisation" (D. Lasok & J.W. Bridge, Law and Institutions of the
European Communities. London & Edinburgh: Butterworths & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. (1991), 5th ed.,
p. 534). Despite that these terms, when used in this Chapter, should be understood as equivalents.
"See. generally, Chapter 3. supra, for a more detailed analysis of the conflicts between patent rights
and the objectives established bv the EC Treaty.
}lbid
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differences among national systems of law and suggests that a solution would come up
when those systems were unified.4
Article 100 of the Treaty sets out the legal instruments which will be used by the
Community in order to remove the differences among national laws which "... directly
affect the establishment or functioning of the common market". For this purpose, the
Council is empowered to issue directives or make regulations for the approximation of the
national provisions of the Member States5. It is argued that, by its nature, directives are a
more appropriate instrument for the harmonisation process established by Article 100, in
so far as it leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and method of
implementation of Community rules. They do not intend to replace national laws. On the
other hand, because of their general application, and the fact that they are binding in their
entirety - being directly applicable in all Member States - regulations are not seen as the
best instrument for harmonisation purposes, but rather for the purposes of unification of
laws.6
4See. e.g.. Case 24/67 Parke, Davis & Co. v. Centra/arm [1968] ECR 55. p. 71, and the opinion of
the Advocate-General Trabucchi in Joined Cases 15 & 16/74 Centra/arm v. Sterling Drug [1974]
ECR-II 1147. p. 1176.
sThe Council was initially empowered by the EC Treaty to adopt harmonisation measures by-
unanimity. As a result of the inclusion of Articles 100a and 100b by the Single European Act (Arts.
18 and 19. respectively), the Council was empowered, with some exceptions, to do it by qualified
majority. Currently, after the amendments included by the Maastricht Treaty, the Council is required
to act unanimously on a proposal of the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee. Note that, as a result of the entering into force of the
Maastricht Treaty, the Council now may legislate only together with the European Parliament. The
latter was given great power of decision and veto against the Council's decisions and legislative
initiatives, enhancing its participation in the legislative process of the Community. See. e.g., EC
Treaty. Arts. 189 to 191.
6See. generally, A.J. Easson. EEC Directives for the Harmonisation of Laws: Problems of Validity,
Implementation and legal Effects [1981] 1 YEL 1-44, pp. 2-3, and Alan Dashwood, The
Harmomsation Process, in Carol C. Twitchett (ed). Harmonisation in the EEC. London: The
MacMillan Press Ltd (1981). A detailed discussion on this matter is outside the scope of this
Chapter. For a more specific analysis on the harmonisation of national laws within the EC, see the
two references quoted above and George Close. Harmonisation of Laws: Use or Abuse of the Powers
under the EEC Treaty?. [1978] 3 EL Rev. 461-481; Julian Curral. Some Aspects of the Relation
Between Articles 30-36 and Article 100 of the EEC Treaty, with a Closer Look at Optional
Harmomsation. [1984] 4 YEL, 169-206: Jacques Pelkmans. The New Approach to Technical
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Traditionally, in international law, the most common instrument for the
harmonisation is the "inter-State Convention". The EC Treaty itself, in Article 220,
contemplates the conclusion of conventions for specific matters. In the case of the
harmonisation of patent law, the Council of Europe envisaged, as early as 1949, that the
Convention was the best instrument for the unification of the national patent laws of the
Member States.7 Later, in 1959, a working group was established for the creation of a
uniform system of patent protection for the EC aimed to prevent patents being used as
trade barriers within the Common Market8. The working group started to work on the
preparation of this Convention in 1961 and drafted a proposal that was published in 1962.
Because of political problems related to the adherence of the United Kingdom to the EEC
this Convention did not come into force at that time.9 However, the substantive provisions
Harmonization and Standardization. [1987] 25 Journal of Common Market Studies 249-269; T.W.
Vogelaar. The Approximation of the Laws of Member States under the Treaty of Rome. [1975] 12
CML Rev. 211-230; and Daniel Vignes. The Harmonisation of National Legislation and the EEC.
[1990] 15 EL Rev. 358-374.
As a first attempt at harmonising patent law in Europe, a "European Convention Relating to the
Formalities Required for Patent Applications" was signed in Paris in 1953, which eventually came
into force on 1 June 1955 ((1980) 19 Industrial Property 21). At that time, the purpose was not to
establish a European Patent Office as such, but to "... entrust the existing national examining Patent
Offices with the granting of European patents with effect for the combined territories of all
participating States. These national Patent Offices would then simply apply their own national
provisions" (M. van Empel. The Granting of European Patents. Levden. The Netherlands: A.W.
Sijthoff International Publishing Company B.V. (1975), p. 11).
8This programme provided, more extensively, for the preparation of drafts for the unification of the
legislation on patents, trade-marks and designs.
9 The "Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for
Inventions", done at Strasbourg on 27 November 1963 ((1964) 3 Industrial Property 13) eventually
came into force on 1 August 1980. with the ratification or accession of France. Germany. Ireland.
Liechtenstein. Luxembourg. Sweden. Switzerland and the United Kingdom ((1981) 20 Industrial
Property, 25). See. also, for this information. Gerald Paterson. The European Patent Svstem: The
Law and Practice of the European Patent Convention Oxford: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. (1992), p. 16.
and Giinter Gall. Legislative and Judicial Power in Europe - How far is Harmonisation of Patent
Law and Practice Possible and Desirable? [1988] 5 EIPR 138-142. p. 141. For further analysis of this
Convention, known as the "Strasbourg Convention", see. e.g., G. Oudemans. The Draft European
Patent Convention. A Commentary with English and French Texts. London. Stevens and Sons
Limited (1963); Franz Froschmaier. Some Aspects of the Draft Convention Relating to a European
Patent Law. [1963] 12 International and Comparative Lav,' Quarterly 886-897; and W.L. Haardt.
Infringement Procedure According to the Draft Convention Relating to a European Patent Law.
[1963-1964] 1 CML Rev. 202-209.
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of this Convention were later incorporated into other developments of the European
patent system.10
Then, in December 1968 the French Government stated its position towards the
conclusion of an agreement on the setting up of a European patent system. This agreement
should provide a centralised system involving non-EEC States known for their industrial
and technical capacity, such as the United Kingdom, and the establishment of a unified
patent system for the Common Market. At the beginning of 1969 the EEC Council
approved a proposal for an inter-governmental conference on this issue, which had its first
meeting in May 196911. The main reasons for the establishment of such a system were
both political - i.e., the creation of a common patent system for the EEC in order to
eliminate distortions of competition which would result on the promotion of the free
movement of goods - and practical - i.e., the creation of a centralised system which would
rationalise the granting of patents in Europe, avoiding duplication of search and
examination of patent applications, bringing the costs of patents down12.
The results of the process came up in 1973, with the signature of the Convention
on the Grant of European Patents (the European Patent Convention)13, followed by the
signature of the Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market (the
Gerald Paterson. note 9. supra, pp. 16-17. Mainly the provisions on patentable subject-matter
were very much incorporated by the European Patent Convention, note 13. infra.
11M. van EmpeL European Patent Conventions: the First Convention in the Semi-Finals. [1972] 9
CMLRev. 456-465, p. 15.
~J.B. van Bethem. The European Patent System, Today and in the Future. [1984] 7 EIPR 182-188.
p. 185.
13Signed on 5 October 1973 and amended by Decision of the Administrative Council of the European
Patent Organisation of 21 December 1978 (OJ EPO 1979. 3) (hereinafter the "EPC"). As printed in
Gerald Paterson. note 9, supra, Appendix 1. For an analysis of the negotiations and draft proposals
of the EPC. see. generally. M. van Empel. European Patent Conventions. [1972] 9 CML Rev. 13-34;
M. van Empel. note 11. supra, and; R. Bowen & A. Parry. European Patent Convention: The First
Convention. [1974] 11 CML Re\>. 105-113.
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Community Patent Convention)' After the signature of the Community Patent
Convention in 1975, two conferences took place in Luxembourg on the CPC: (a) in 1985
when a first round of amendments to the Convention was provisionally established15, and
(b) in 1989 when the Agreement Relating to Community Patents was signed16. Another
Conference, called by the "Protocol on a possible modification of the conditions of entry
into force of the Agreement relating to Community patents"17, took place in Lisbon, on 4
and 5 May 1992. This Conference was empowered to amend, unanimously, the number of
States which must have ratified the Agreement in order for it to enter into force18, without
the ratification by Denmark and Ireland, leaving Spain and Portugal with the option of not
applying the CPC until 1996. This Conference failed to find a way of bringing the
Convention into force without the ratification by, at that time, the twelve Member States
ofthe Community19.
uSigned in 1975 and printed in OJ 1976 L17 (hereinafter "CPC 1975"). Also there was the signature
of the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1970. under the auspices of the WIPO. The PCT. although not
negotiated in the context of the EPC and CPC. is closely related with both Conventions. For further
reference to the PCT. see Chapter 2. Section 1. Sub-section 1.3. supra.
1 Council of the European Communities. Texts Established bv the Luxembourg Conference on the
Community Patent 1985 (1986).
16Agreement Relating to Community Patents - Done at Luxembourg on 15 December 1989. printed
in OJ 1989 L401 (hereinafter the "Agreement")- Article 1 of the Agreement states that the
Community Patent Convention signed in 1975, as amended by the Agreement (hereinafter the
"CPC"), the Protocol on the Settlement of Litigation concerning the Infringement and Validity of
Community Patents (hereinafter the "Protocol"), the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the
Common Appeal Court, and the Protocol on the Statute of the Common Appeal Court shall form an
integral part of the Agreement.
17OJ 1989 L401/51.
]*Ibid., Art. 1.
19See. for more detailed information on the outcome of this Conference, the "Report from the
President of the Lisbon Conference on the Community Patent to the EC Council". 7373/92. EN.
Although constitutional problems in Ireland and Denmark prevented the Convention from coming
into effect, according to the Danish delegation, during this Conference, the procedure for ratification
of the Agreement was under way in Denmark and should be completed shortly and. the Irish
delegation informed the Conference that Ireland has deposited its instrument of ratification, which
would take effect on 1 August 1992 (Report 7373/92. pp. 7-8. para. 9). See. also, the opinion of John
Neukon, What Price the Community Patent9. [1992] 4 EJPR 111-112.
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This Chapter intends to analyse the Community Patent Convention, although not
yet in force20, in so far as it is the Convention for the purposes of unifying national patent
laws in the EC. The European Patent Convention - which is a Convention for the granting
of patents with the same effect as a national patent for each of the Contracting State
designated in the application (consisting in a "bundle of national patents"), involving not
only EC Member States, but with a broader scope - is very closely related with the CPC
and will be partially analysed within the context of the Community Patent Convention.21
With a more descriptive approach, this Chapter studies primarily the aspects dealing with
institutional arrangements, patentable subject-matter, substantive patent law and the
establishment of a common system of jurisdiction and enforcement, under the auspices of
the CPC
1. General Considerations
The creation of a patent system for the Community was historically envisaged alongside
the creation of a parallel broader system for Europe, established by the European Patent
Convention. The CPC, however, is not intended to replace either national patents or
"European patents"22 All these systems of law will work in harmony23. The main
:oIn accordance with Article 10 of the Agreement, the CPC shall enter into force on the first day of
the third month after the last State had made the deposit of the instrument of ratification.
21 For a detailed study of the laws and practices of the EPC. see Gerald Paterson. note 9. supra.
Also, as a historical reference on the analysis of the provisions contained in the EPC. see M. van
Empel. note 7. supra, and Fried rich-Karl Beier. The European Patent Svstem. (1981) 14
1 'anderbiIt Journal of Transnational Law 1-16.
"For the purposes of definition, patents granted under the EPC shall be called "European patents"'
(EPC. Art. 2(1)) and patents granted under the CPC shall be called "Community patents" (CPC,
Art 2 (1)). Ob\iously, "national patents" are patents granted by national patent offices of the
Contracting States.
23CPC. Arts. 1 (2) and 5. Further, it is worth noting that, through the experience of the European
Patent Convention, it may be predicted that the CPC would replace in the long term the national
patents granting procedures. The European Patent Office, within a short period of time, has achieved
a great level of activity, being in a position of dominance even before the largest national patent
offices (Jeno Staehelin. The European Patent Organisation. [1981] 1 YEL 333-346. p. 346).
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difference between these systems is that national patents are granted with a specifically
national territorial scope, while the applicant for a European patent may designate in which
Contracting States of the EPC he wishes his invention to be protected24. Community
patents, on the other hand, shall have a "unitary and autonomous effect"25. It means that
Community patents will have effect throughout the whole territory of the Community and
"
... may only be grantee transferred, revoked or allowed to lapse in respect of the whole
of such territories"26. Unlike European patents, a Community patent can only be granted
for the whole of the territory of the Community and the designation of one Member State
of the EC is considered as comprising them all.
It is argued that the CPC is the most ambitious system of all:
In effect it sets out to create a unitary system of patent law which in
each EEC member State will govern the whole life of the patent, from
the filing the application to the grant of the patent and after grant of
the patent to the conditions under which the patent is maintained in
force and exploited.27
The main goal of the CPC is "the elimination within the Community of the
distortion of competition which may result from the territorial aspect of national protection
rights"28 and which would create obstacles to the free movement of goods. Community
patents shall also have the same effect as a national patent granted by national law of the
Member States29, having equal effect throughout the territories of the Community.
;4EPC. Art. 3.
_5The Agreement, Preamble, and CPC, Art. 2.
"6CPC. Art. 2 (2). Under the wording of this paragraph it shall also be understood that when a
territory of the Community is designated for the purposes of a European patent, the same unique
character of the patent will apply.




Pursuant to Article 8, the Agreement also permits that a State party of the EPC,
"... which forms a custom union or a free trade area" with the EC, could participate in the
Agreement after a unanimous decisions of the Council. Here, the "enlargement" of the
European Community is clearly envisaged.
The Convention itself is a special agreement within the meaning of Article 142 of
the EPC, a regional patent treaty within the meaning of Article 45 (1) of the PCT, and a
special agreement within the meaning ofArticle 19 of the Paris Convention.
2. Institutional Arrangements
The EPC has established a European Patent Organisation comprising two organs: a
European Patent Office (EPO) and an Administrative Council/0 The CPC, on the other
hand, will establish, under the auspices of the EPO, a Patent Administration Division and
one or more Revocation Divisions31.32 Also, under the Administrative Council of the EPO,
the Community system will establish a Select Committee composed of representatives of
the Contracting States, the representative of the Commission of the European
30EPC. Art. 4.
31 CPC. Art. 6. These "special departments" shall be responsible exclusively for acts relating to
Community patents and the official language of these departments shall be the official languages of
the EPO (CPC. Art. 10) i.e., English, French and German (EPC. Art. 14). Regarding European
patents, the departments in charge are a Receiving Section; Search Divisions; Examining Divisions;
Opposition Divisions; a Legal Division; Boards of Appeal; and an Enlarged Board of Appeal (EPC,
Art. 15). The tasks of these departments are beyond the scope of this Chapter. It will be referred to
only when in relation to the CPC.
3:In the wording of the first version of the CPC. signed in 1975, there should also be one or more
Revocation Boards (CPC 1975, Art. 7 (c)), with the task of examining appeals from the decisions of
the Revocation Divisions and from the Patent Administration Division and of expressing opinions
on the extent of protection of a Community patents (CPC 1975. Art. 10). The developments of this
Convention brought up by the Agreement, excluded the latter and its tasks were transferred to the
Common Appeal Court (COPAC), established by the "Protocol on the Settlement of Litigation
concerning the Infringement and Validity of Community Patents" (OJ 1989 L401/34).
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Communities and their alternate representatives. The same members shall represent the
Contracting States on the Administrative Council and on the Select Committee".
The language of the proceedings before those special departments established by
the CPC, in accordance with Rule 3 (1) of the Implementing Regulations of the CPC, shall
be as provided by Rules 1 to 3, 5, 6 (2) and 7 of the Implementing Regulations of the
EPC. Also, in accordance with Implementing Regulations of the CPC (Rule 2 (2)), the
special departments may be grouped together administratively with other departments of
the EPO so as to form Directorates-General.
The Patent Administration Division shall have administrative responsibilities
relating to Community patents which are not the responsibility of other departments of the
EPO. In particular, the Division will have the task of deciding the entries in the Register of
Community Patents"'4, The President of the EPO shall, with the agreement of the Select
Committee of the Administrative Council, determine in detail the duties of the Patent
Administration Division35.
The Revocation Divisions shall have responsibilities for the examination of
requests for the limitation of and applications for the revocation of Community patents
and, also, for determining, under Article 43 (5) of the CPC, appropriate compensation for
the purposes of licenses of right, when one of the parties requests it36. The number of
Revocation Divisions, as well as the allocation of duties of each, shall be determined,
exclusively, by the President of the EPO"7.
The Administrative Council is empowered to amend time-limits laid down by the
CPC, which are to be observed in relation with the EPO. Also the Administrative Council
33CPC. Art. 11.
3AIbid.. Art. 7(1). The Register of Community- patents is established by Article 63 of the CPC.
35Implementing Regulations of the CPC. Rule 1 (2).
36CPC. Art. 8(1).
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may amend its Implementing Regulations"8, and adopt or amend the Financial Provisions,
the Rules relating to Fees and its Rules of Procedure"9. It is also empowered to take
decisions relating to budgetary matters40 41
3. Patentable Subject-Matter
In the wording of Article 32 (2) of the Protocol, the patentable subject-matter of
inventions under the CPC will be as provided by Articles 52 to 57 of the European Patent
Convention. However, if a Member State of the Community is not a Contracting Party of
the EPC, the national court, acting as a Community patent court, shall apply its national
law, in accordance with the international agreements of which the Contracting State is
part42. The provisions relating to patentable subject-matter, as established by the EPC, are
essentially in conformity with the provisions of the "Strasbourg Convention"43.
3.1. The basic requirements
A Community patent will be granted to "... any inventions which are susceptible of
industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step"44. The EPO will
firstly consider these "positive requirements" of novelty, inventiveness (or obviousness)
and industrial application (usefulness), and, then, the "negative requirements" (exclusions
and exceptions) provided by Articles 52 (2) and 53 of the EPC will be considered. The
3
Implementing Regulations of the CPC, Rule 1(1).
38CPC, Art 16 (1) (a) and (b), respectively.
39Ibid, An. 16 (2) (a), (b) and (c), respectively.
wIbid., Art. 21.
41For a more comprehensive outline of the inter-action between institutional structures of the EPC
and the CPC. see Appendix III.
42Paragraph 2 of Article 32 of the Protocol rules: "On all matters not covered by the Agreement
relating to Community Patents a Community patent court shall apply its national law. including its
private international law"'.
43Note 9. supra.
^PC. Art. 52 (1).
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requirements of novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability are generally provided by
all national systems ofthe participating countries of the Community and, at first sight, does
not raise further conflicts.
The first requirement, that there should be an invention, was mostly dealt with by
the Boards of Appeal of the EPO together with the analysis of the provision of excluded
patentable subject-matter, in Article 52 (2) of the EPC. It is also undertaken that the
assessment to this requirement should be considered separately from the requirements of
industrial application and inventiveness. It is worth mentioning that the EPC does not
attempt to define what should be understood by the term "invention", leaving this problem
to national courts which will consider a juridical definition of invention taking into account
the positive and negative requirements of national laws and practices.
The requirement that an invention must be new, although generally settled by
national laws, has been developed quite differently under the EPC. The need of such
requirement could have been questioned since the assessment of the inventiveness of the
invention seems to be within the subject-matter of a patent, and its concept appears to be
closely related to the concept ofnovelty .45
Firstly, in order to clarify the distinction between the concepts of novelty and
inventive step, it is necessary to describe further the concept of the "state of the art".
Article 54 (1) of the EPC states that "[a]n invention shall be considered to be new if it
does not form part of the state of the art". Then, Article 54 (2), EPC, affirms that " ..
everything made available to the public by means ofwritten or oral description, by use, or
',5The Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO attempted to clarify the distinction between both
concepts - novelty and inventiveness - in Decision G2/88 (MOBIL OIL/Friction reducing additive),
[1990] EPOR 73, stating that "... information equivalent to a claimed invention may be made
available' [lack of novelty], or may not have been made available but obvious [new. but lack of
inventiveness], or not made available and not obvious (new and non-obvious]. Thus, in particular,
what is hidden may still be obvious".
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in any other way, before the date of filing of the European patent application" is comprised
in the state of the art. For the purposes of the application of this provision there is, thus, no
requirement that a ". . .member of the public actually received the information about the
invention. What matters is whether such information was made available"46. Thereupon, it
does not matter in which language the information was made available, "[t]he scale on
which information has been made available to the public .. ,"47, the territory in which the
information was made available to the public, the period of time that the information was
made available, and by which means the information was made available, before the filing
of an European patent application. If anyone of the public could have had access to the
information, the invention will be already included in the state of the art and will lack
novelty.48
In relation with the means by which an invention was made available to the public,
there are at least three circumstances which must be considered. Firstly, Article 54 (2) of
the EPC affirms that an invention will be deemed as comprised in the state of the art by
any means if it has been made available to the public by written or oral description, by use
or by any other means. When an invention is made available to the public by a written
description it will be considered as in the state of the art if a document containing the
^Gerald Paterson. note 9, supra, p. 373. para. 9-05.
41
Ibid., p. 373. para. 9-08. See. also. Decision T381/87 (RESEARCH CORPORATION/Publication),
[1989] EPOR 138, where it was held that the simple fact of placing a copy of a document on the
shelves of a library includes information in the state of the art. In Decision T482/89
(TELEMECANIQUE/Electrical Supply) 11 December 1990 (apud Gerald Paterson. note 9. supra,
para. 9-16) it was held that one single sale of a product would be enough to include the information
as having been made available to the public.
48Note. additionally, that there is a distinction between "absolute" and "relative" novelty. Douglas
Gabriel Domingues. Direito Industrial - Patentes. Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora Forense
(1980). at p. 37. quoting Henry Allart. Traite Theorique et Pratique des Brevets d'Invention. affirms
that the concept of "absolute novelty" should be understood as when an invention is considered part
of the state of the art if it has been made available, by any means, anywhere in the world. The
concept of "relative novelty", on the other hand includes the understanding that an invention will be
considered within the state of the art if it was made available only in the territory of the State in
which such a law applies, within a limited time. In the EPC. the "absolute novelty" concept is the
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written description of the invention has been placed somewhere to which the public has
access, such as a library49.
With regard to an oral disclosure of an invention, the question becomes more
complex if there is no record of such event. If the invention was made available to the
public by oral description and such a description was somehow recorded, thus proving that
sufficient disclosure took place, the evaluation of the disclosure will be made much easier
for a patent office.
The disclosure of the technical features of an invention by use is essentially based
on a prior use of the invention which has been visible to members of the public50, or a prior
sale of the product has occurred. It is also possible to argue that "[i]n cases of alleged prior
use, a product or process may have been used in public, but it may still have to be decided
in each individual case whether such use has made the technical features of the claimed
invention available to the public and thus part of the state of the art"51.
The EPC has also established, in Article 54 (3), the concept of "prior right". This
means that when a European patent application has been filed before a second European
patent application, but the first was published after the second patent application, the
second patent application will be part of the state of the art and will be lacking novelty. It
is necessary to say that this 'legal fiction" created by the EPC applies only for the
one provided as far as it does not matter when and where the invention was made available to the
public to be included in the state of the art.
49See. e.g., Decision T381/87. note 47. supra.
"^See. e.g.. Decision T84/83 (LUCHTENBER/Rear-view mirror) [1979-85] EPOR: C: 796.
"Gerald Paterson. note 9. supra, p. 413. See. also, for further consideration concerning the prior
use of claimed inventions. Decision T482/89. note 47. supra. Decision T93/89 (HOECHST/Polyvinyl
ester dispersion) 15 November 1990. apud. Gerald Paterson. note 9, supra, paras. 9-17 and 9-19.
and Decision T301/87 (BIOGEN/Alpha-interpherons) [1990] EPOR 190.
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examination of novelty, and will not be used when examining the inventiveness of a patent
52
application.
The considerations of the requirement of inventiveness will be taken into account
if the invention was firstly not considered as being part of the state of the art, as above
described. Thus, Article 56 of the EPC states that, "if, having regard to the state of the art,
it [the invention] is not obvious to a person skilled in the art" the invention in question will
meet the requirements of inventiveness. The assessment of inventiveness considers, thus,
that a particular invention had some technical features which are "... not open to the
average or ordinary mind"53. In addition, it is important to note that the date at which the
state of the art has to be determined for inventive step is the filing date. The filing date, in
this case, has to be considered either as the actual date of filing the application or, pursuant
to Article 89 of the EPC, regarding the right ofpriority under Article 87 of the EPC54.
For assessing the inventiveness of inventions the EPO had to develop, through its
practice, consistency in defining the way in which inventiveness would be recognised. This
should lead to legal certainty and reliability for users of the EPO. The general approach to
assess such requirements would take into account, firstly, ".. the necessity to take all
relevant facts which were available, in the sources, to the skilled person, and survey the
relationship of each of these to the invention, before trying to find reasons, if any, to
52See. for further discussion about this matter. Gerald Paterson. note 9, supra, pp. 386-389. paras.
9-31 to 9-36.
53William Cornish. The Essential Criteria for Patentability of European Inventions: Novelty and
Inventive Step. [1983] 6 IIC 765-775.
MIn Decision T24/81 (BASF/Metal refining), [1974-85] EPOR: B: 414. the Technical Board of
Appeal affirmed that "[w]hen examining for inventive step, the state of the art must be assessed from
the point of view of the man skilled in the art at the time of priority relevant for the application". For
further details on the application of the "right of priority" concept, see. supra. Chapter 2. Section 1.
Sub-section 1.1. Paragraph 1.1.2.
211
combine them to generate the claimed subject-matter'55. The EPO, on the other hand, has
considered a quite different approach, described as follows:
The approach tries to retrace the possibilities according to which the
skilled person could consider changes in technology in a non-inventive
manner. It recognises that he might be prompted by an available source
purely by chance and assumes that, if interested, he would be in a position
to formulate technical problems and try to solve any one of them by
searching for features which could modify his primary state of art to
provide the desired effects. He would carefully balance the arguments for
and against such modifications in the light of all technical circumstances
and of his common general knowledge. If the reasons are clearly
overwhelmingly in the direction ofgenerating the invention as a solution of
the problem, he may even find it worthwhile to try out a promising
combination.56
The so-called "problem-and-solution" approach seems to be working satisfactorily
as a method of assessing inventiveness of inventions in the EPO context. This has, in one
sense, provided national courts with more grounds of decision when deciding upon a
dispute which includes the validity of a patent application.
In the wording of Article 57 of the EPC, the requirement of the susceptibility of
industrial application must be understood as such: "... if it can be made or used in any kind
of industry, including agriculture". The questions on industrial applicability have arisen
mostly in the discussions of the results of pharmaceutical or biological processes57. It
seems that, in general, there is not much controversy on the application of the issues on
industrial applicability.
55George S.A. Szabo. The Problem and Solution Approach in the European Patent Office. [ 1995] 4
IIC 457-487. at 460.
56Ibid.. at 487.
5 A number of decisions have been examining the assessment to this requirement on the discussions
of the patentability of pharmaceutical and biological processes. In particular, see Decisions T144/83
(DU PONT/Appetite suppressant), [1987] EPOR 6; T36/83 (ROUSSEL-UCLAF/Thenoyl peroxide),
[1987] EPOR 1: and T385/86 (BRUKER/Non-invasive measurement) [1988] EPOR 357."
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3.2. The negative requirements
It was said in the foregoing Sub-section that there are also some negative requirements
which must be considered for assessing the patentability of the invention. It means that if a
patent application falls within one of the prohibitions which are described in this Sub¬
section, an invention would not be patentable.
Articles 52 and 53 of the EPC list the types of subject-matter which are not
patentable. Paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of Article 52 expressly exclude from patentability
subject-matter which are not to be considered inventions. Further, Article 53 lists the
exceptions ofwhat may be considered inventions, even meeting the positive requirements,
but which shall not be patentable by a decision of the law. This Sub-section will provide a
brief view of both issues. Part 1 of Chapter 5, below, provides more discussion on this
matter.
Under the wording of Article 52 (2) of the EPC, the following are, particularly,
excluded from patentability, not being regarded as inventions:
(a) discoveries, scientific theories, and mathematical methods;
(b) aesthetic creations;
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing
games or doing business, and computer programs;
(d) presentations of information.
Article 52 goes further and states, in paragraph 3, that the subject-matter or
activities referred to in paragraph 2 are excluded from patentability to the extent to which
an European patent application or an European patent relates to the subject-matter or
activities "as such".
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Paragraph 4 of Article 52 also excludes from patentability the subject-matter of
"[mjethods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and
diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body ..." However, this will not
apply to "... products, in particular substances or compositions, for use in any of these
methods".
The discussion of this item should address, more carefully, two specific exclusions:
the patentability of computer programs and methods for treatment of the human or animal
body.
In relation to computer programs, it must be noted that computer software per se
is excluded from patentability. The discussion of a possible patent for computer program,
however, is focused on the computer software which is an essential part of an invention,
i.e. inventions which would not work without the attached software. The German Federal
Court of Justice, in its Decision in Flugkostenminimierung18, interprets this type of
exclusion in such a way that computer programs may be patentable in some circumstances.
The EPO, under its Decision T208/8459, understood that computer software per se is
excluded from patentability in the light of Article 52 (2) (c) of the EPC, and should not be
patentable even in the context of a whole process of an invention. Considering,
nevertheless, that Article 52 (3), EPC, rules that the exclusions set up in paragraph 2 are
addressed specifically to the patentable subject-matter or activities, only to the extent
which a European patent application or a European patent relates to such subject matter
>SBGH Case N. XZR 65/85 GRUR 1986. 531. apud Gerald Paterson. note 9. supra, at p. 318. note
15.
s9T208/84 (VICOM/Computer-related invention). [1986] EPOR 74.
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or activities as such, it would be possible to hold that a computer software should be
patentable as within the whole of an invention60.
In relation to methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or
therapy, it should be noted that the methods themselves are excluded from patentability,
but the products for use in any of these methods are not. At the Intergovernmental
Conference preceding the EPC it was proposed that such methods should not be excluded
from patentability. For ethical reasons this issue was excluded from patentability in the
EPC, however. In addition, at that time most European countries provided for the
exclusions of such methods in their national legal systems. Decisions in the EPO have
discussed such an exclusion but none of them came before the Boards of Appeal to
consider treatment by surgery itself61
Article 53 of the EPC, on the other hand, lists the exceptions to patentability as
follows: (a) inventions contrary to the morality or to the ordre public, and (b) plant or
animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plant or animal
varieties.
In relation to the first item, the Board ofAppeal has had to interpret it only once.62
It seems again that the purpose of the EPC was the creation of reasonably ethical limits for
inventions. In the HARVARD/Onco-mouse case63 the issues arose in the sense that the
genetic manipulation of animals is as dangerous as the genetic manipulation of human
beings, in so far as the patentability and further commercialisation of the results of such
'"JSee. generally. Decisions T208/84, note 59, supra, and T115/85 (EBM/Computer-related
invention), [1990] EPOR 107.
MSee. e.g.. Decisions T603/89 (BEA1 "1 IE/Marker) 3 July 1990 (P), apud Gerald Paterson. note 9,
supra, para. 7-23; G5/83 (EISAI/Second medical indication). [1979-85] EPOR: B: 241; T116/85
(WELLCOME/Pigs I). [1988] EPOR 1; and T385/86 (BRUKER/Non-mvasive measurement), [1988]
EPOR 357. For further analysis on this issues, see Gerald Paterson. The Patentability of Further
Uses of a Known Product under the European Patent Convention. [1991] 1 EIPR 16-20.
62Decision T19/90 (HARVARD/Onco-Mouse). [1990] EPOR 50.
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genetic manipulation involve several ethical controversial issues which have not been
concluded so far.64
The analysis of the exclusions of plant and animal varieties takes another approach.
At the time of the creation of the EPC the importance of biotechnology was not as much
as it is today. The EPC, therefore, makes no difference between plants and animal varieties
and treats both of them as living forms. At the time that the EPC came into force, living
matters were generally not subject to IPRs With the developments of biotechnology and,
consequently, of international law65, the EPO will face different, and probably more
complex, challenges.
3.3. Selected issues
All issues on patent protection in the EC are worth mentioning. In this Chapter, like
Chapter 5, I have chosen three specific matters that might, or might not, fall within
the patent protection field. The discussion that follows is related to the necessary
mechanisms which, within a Common Market, has played a determinant part in the
setting up of necessary rules for the functioning and proper operation of the common
area integrated by the EC Treaty.
631bid.
64Cf note 104. infra, for further reference on the ethical dimension of the protection of
biotechnologtcal inventions.
65See. for instance, further discussion in the international arena in Chapter 5. Part 2, infra. The
issues on biotechnology patenting in Europe is also discussed in more detail in Sub-section 3.3. infra.
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3.3.1. Pharmaceutical products and processes
Several fundamental issues have arisen from the application of the provisions of the
EPC for the protection of pharmaceutical products and processes. In addition, in the
EC context another relevant matter has been implemented in relation to the extension
of term of protection for pharmaceutical products. These are the two subjects of this
Paragraph.
As has been seen, the EPC, in Article 52 (4), excludes from patentability
methods for treatment of the human or animal body. Article 52 (4) also provides for
an exception to this rule when it says, in the last sentence, that substances or
compositions for use in any of these methods will be considered inventions66.
Additionally, Article 54 (5), last sentence, EPC, considers that substances or
compositions which are already part of the state of the art, but where the use is not
comprised in the state of the art, will be patentable, and not considered as lacking
novelty.
This special proviso states that where the subsequent use of a pharmaceutical
product which is patented was not considered in the patent application, the new use
will be capable of patent protection. This, in the light of the legislative history of the
EPC, appears to be within the necessary justification for patent protection of
pharmaceuticals which would reward the inventor for contributing to the state of the
art and, therefore, benefiting the general public with new properties of known
pharmaceutical inventions. In this context, it is assumed that only the first indication is
^ote. in addition, that Article 167 of the EPC permitted signatory States to make a reserv ation to
withhold patent protection for pharmaceutical products, subject to a limit of ten years from the entry
into force of the EPC (7 October 1977). The Administrative Council could extend this period by five
vears.
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protected, but not further and consequent uses of the invention. This is the approach
taken by the EPO, which has raised controversial viewpoints67.
Particularly in the EC a legal mechanism has been discussed and implemented
to provide pharmaceutical patents with a "restoring" mechanism for the duration of
their lives. Considering that pharmaceutical products are the outcome of costly and
time-consuming research, being also subject to governmental approval before
marketing, the EC has issued a Council Regulation concerning the creation of a
supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products68. The SPC Regulation
applies to "[a]ny product protected by a patent in the territory of a Member State and
subject, prior to being placed on the market as a medicinal product, to an
administrative authorization procedure .. ,"69.
Such protection will confer the basic rights as conferred by the original
patents, being subject to the same limitations and obligations, as applied to the
original patents70. It is assumed that the rights conferred by the SPC is a right in
addition to the patent right, but not an extension of the patent term7'. The SPC will
have effect for a maximum period of five years. Such a five year period takes into
account the end of the original patent term for a period equal to the period which
elapsed between the date on which the application of a basic patent was filed, and the
6 See. for more exhaustive analysis of the protection of the first second and subsequent use of a
known pharmaceutical product. Werner Stieger. Article 54 (5) of the Munich Patent Convention:
An Exception for Pharmaceuticals. [1982] 2 IIC 137-161. and Gerald K15psch. The Patentability of
Pharmaceuticals According to the European Patent Convention (EPC). [1982] 4 IIC 457-470.
^Regulation N. 1.768. of 18 June 1992 (OJ 1992 L182/1). Hereinafter the "SPC Regulation".
69SPC Regulation. Art. 2.
°SPC Regulation. Art. 5.
'See. e.g., John Adams. Supplementary Protection Certificates: the Challenge to EC Regulation
1768/92. [ 1994] 8 EIPR 323-326.
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date that the governmental authorisation to market the medicinal product72 took
place7,.
To apply for a Supplementary Patent Certificate (SPC) there must be in
existence a product protected by a original patent in force, with a valid authorisation
to place the product in the market granted in accordance with the Community rules74,
and the product in question must not have been the subject of a certificate before.75
The SPC will be granted to the original holder of the patent or to his
successors in title76, by the competent industrial property office of the Member State
which granted the basic patent or on whose behalf it was granted77. The procedures
will be determined by the national procedural provisions dealing with the granting of
patents78, and the possibility of review of the decisions granting or refusing the SPC
shall be available79.
3.3.2. Biotechnology
Biotechnology and plant varieties protection are discussed in the text of the EPC in a
single provision, but will be discussed here separately, under two headings. The EPC
in Article 53 (b) affirms that, though they may be considered inventions, patent
2For the purpose of the application of the SPC Regulation, the following definitions, in particular,
shall be considered: "(a) 'medicinal product' means any substance or combination of substances
presented for treating or preventing disease in human beings or animals and any substance or
combination of substances which may be administered to human beings or animals with a view to
making a medical diagnosis or to restoring correcting or modifying physiological functions in
humans or in animals;" and "(b) 'product' means the active ingredient or combination of active
ingredients of a medicinal product" (SPC Regulation. Art. 1).
3SPC Regulation. Art. 13.
"The Community rules in question are Directive N. 65/65 (OJ 1965 L22/369), last amended by
Directive N. 341/89 (OJ 1989 L142/11), and Directive N. 851/81 (OJ 1981 L317/1), last amended by
Directive N. 676/90 (OJ 1990 L373/15).
5SPC Regulation. Art. 3.
16Ibid.. Art. 6.
Ibid.. Arts. 9 (1) and 10.
"sIbid.. Art. 18.
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protection shall not be granted to "plant or animal varieties or essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals". Later in the same provision the
EPC concludes that .. this provision does not apply to microbiological processes or
the products thereof'80
Several questions arise from the application of this rule. Firstly, a definition of
neither animal varieties, nor plant varieties is settled. Only vague ideas existed in
relation with the interpretation of what appears to be the meaning of "essentially
biological processes" and "microbiological processes". The EPO has in several
decisions tried to develop such concepts and bring some legal certaintv to patent
applicants.
Probably the most controversial decision on the biotechnology field, and the
one which has raised much attention in the media, has been a result of a patent
application for a "... method for producing a transgenic non-human mammalian
animal having an increased probability of developing neoplasms". The said method
comprises the introduction of"... an activated oncogene sequence into a non-human
mammalian animal at a stage no later than the 8-cell stage"81. Claim 17 of the said
invention went further saying that the applicant wanted protection also for "[a]
transgenic non-human mammalian animal whose germ cells and somatic cells contain
an activated sequence introduced into said animal, or an ancestor of the said animal, at
a stage no later than the 8-cell stage, .. ,"82.
9Ibid.. Art. 17.
gen is also important to note that the wording of Article 53 (b) of the EPC was used as a basic
reference for the drafting up of the text of the TRIPS Agreement of the Uruguay Round of GATT. Cf.
Chapter 5. Part 2 Section 2. Sub-section 2.1. Paragraph 2.1.2. infra.
81Claim 1 of the invention, as quoted in. Examining Division. Application 85 304 490.7 of 14 July
1989 (HARVARD/Onco-mouse), [1990] EPOR 4. at p. 6.
s^Ibid.. Claim 18 has also applied for protection of "[a]n animal as claimed in Claim 17 which is a
rodent"'.
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In relation to the definition of "animal varieties", the Examining Division of
the EPO has considered that, at the time that the text of the EPC was drafted,
legislators had not in mind the question of patenting a transgenic animal, because
modern methods of genetic engineering were then at a very early stage. The EPO has
considered thai, in contrast to the definition of "plant varieties" which will be
discussed further in Paragraph 3.3.3, below, the definition of an animal variety,
though vague, had to be understood "... to be the result of the mere breeding of
animals"83. In this case, Claims 17 and 18 of the application were understood as
containing process features which, in the view of the Examining Division, "... are
concerned with the mere breeding of animals, namely animals which already have the
oncogene incorporated in their genome"84. It seems that so far a clear definition of
what should be understood by an "animal variety" has still to emerge from the EPO
case-law. The HARVARD/Onco-mouse case, which has not been finally decided
yet85, does not give much detailed interpretation on how to solve the problem of
definition of "animal variety".
In relation to the definition of "essentially biological process", the EPO has,
apparently, concluded that such a term should be understood as a process which has
not undergone any intervention through human research. In this case, as clearly
established by Article 53 (b), EPC, the subject-matter of a patent application is not
capable of protection. In the HARVARD/Onco Mouse case, the Examining Division
has understood that the essence of this patent application is "... the introduction of an




obviously concluded that some technical intervention was made and that such a claim
would not fall within the prohibition ofArticle 53 (b), EPC.
In relation to the definition of a "microbiological process", which is not
excluded from patentability by virtue of the last sentence of Article 53 (b), EPC, the
Examining Division has firstly concluded that this part of the provision had to be
interpreted together with the exception in the first sentence of Article 53 (b). Thus, if
a product falls within the prohibition of the first sentence, a side interpretation of the
last sentence could not apply. Following this path, the Examining Division has
concluded that processes producing plant or animal varieties in the sense of the first
sentence are not to be regarded as micro-biological processes, and, therefore, "[t]his
seems to be quite in conformity with scientific terminology which uses microbiology
in relation to microorganisms and biology in relation to plants or animals even at the
cellular stage"86.
It seems however that all such definitions are not clearly established in a
general basis, and that the EPO will consider case-by-case to assess the input given by
the text of the Convention.
In addition to that, it is also worth mentioning that a proposed directive for the
protection of biotechnological inventions was issued by the Commission in October
87
1988 , attempting to harmonise national legislation on the patentability of plants and
animals. This proposed directive, which was supposed to provide greater incentive to
the biotechnology industries in the Community, was refused by the European
85This case has been further submitted to the Technical Board of Appeal of the EPO (T19/90
(HARVARD/Onco-mouse), [1990] EPOR 501) and will be decided probably, after a decision of the
Enlarged Board of Appeal
86Application 85 304 490.7 of 14 July 1989 (HARVARD/Onco-mouse) note 81. supra, p. 9.
8
Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions. OJ 1993
C44/36.
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Parliament on 1 March 1995. The envisaged route that follows the non-approval of
the directive is that the EPO will continue to analyse case-by-case the patentability of
biotechnological inventions, as well as national patent offices, in accordance with their
respective legal basis.88 It appears that, after several modifications of the original
proposal took place during the legislative process of this directive, part of the
biotechnology industry in Europe considered that the decision of the European
Parliament was not entirely unsatisfactory to European biotechnology industry in so
far as the .. proposal had, in its final form, been watered down to such an extent
that it would anyway have been of limited use to industry"89.
The Commission eventually re-issued another "Proposal for a European
Parliament and Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions", on 13 December 199590 The Proposed Biotechnology Directive,
recognising that biotechnology and genetic engineering research is of fundamental
importance for the Community's industrial development and is surrounded by high
investments and risks, affirms that the possibility for researchers to recoup those
investment is through effective and harmonised protection of biotechnological
inventions throughout the Community91.
The Proposed Biotechnology Directive is composed of a Preamble with thirty
three Recitals, and twenty Articles. The main goal of the PBD is to make clearer the
harmonised understanding that should be provided to such complex and controversial
^See. for further discussion on the proposed Commission biotechnology directive. The Chartered
Institute of Patent Agents. Briefing Paper: The European Commission Proposal for a Council
Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, mimeo, August 1992 . Robin Nott.
The Proposed EC Directive on Biotechnological Inventions. [1994] 5 E1PR 191-194; Willi Rothley,
European Parliament Must Think Again About Biotechnological Protection. [1995] 5 I1C 668-670.
89Thomas C. Vinje, Harmonising Intellectual Property Laws in the European Union: Past. Present
and Future. [1995] 8 EJPR 361-377. p. 367.
90COM(95) 661 final, pp. 26-34. Hereinafter the "Proposed Biotechnology Directive" or the "PBD".
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concepts and principles in the field of legal protections of biotechnological inventions.
For this purpose, the Proposed Biotechnology Directive begins by suggesting, in
Article 1, that biotechnological inventions must be protected by national laws of the
Member States92 and that the PBD will not prejudice national and Community laws on
the control and monitoring of research and further commercialisation of the result of
research93. It also defines the concept of "biological material"94, "microbiological
process"95 and "essentially biological process for the production of plants and
animals"96.
Biotechnological inventions which are new, the result of an inventive step and
industrially applicable, are, in general terms, capable of protection97. Particularly the
following will be patentable: biological material98, microbiological processes and
products obtained by means of such process99, and uses of plant or animal varieties for
their production100. The Proposed Biotechnology Directive explicitly excludes from
9,PBD. Recitals (1), (2) and (3).
92Ibid.. Art. 1 (1). If necessary. Member States are required to adapt their national patent laws to the
provisions of the Proposed Biotechnology Directive.
93Ibid.. Art. 1 (2).
94Ibid. Art. 2(1). "(Biological material1 means any material containing genetic information and
capable of self-reproduction or ofbeing reproduced in a biological system".
9SIbid.. Art. 2 (2). [Microbiological process1 means any process involving or performed upon or
resulting in microbiological material; a process consisting of a succession of steps shall be treated as
a microbiological process if at least one essential step of the process is microbiological11.
96Ibid.. Art. 2 (3). '"[EJssentially biological process for the production of plants or animals1 means
any process which, taken as a whole, exists in nature or is not more than a natural plant-breeding or
animal breeding process".
"National legislation must not consider the subject-matter of a biotechnological invention
unpatentable only because "... it is composed of. uses or is applied to biological material11 (PBD. Art.
4(1)). Note, in addition, that the subject of an invention concerning a biological material must not be
considered a discovery or lacking novelty only because this is already part of the natural world (Ibid..
Art. 8). Article 8 of the PBD "... merely emphasizes the need for an invention to be a technical
solution to a technical problem" (COM(95) 661 final, note 90. supra, p. 18. para. 66).
98PBD. Art. 4 (2). This includes "... plants and animals, as well as elements of plants and animals





patentability the following: the human body and its elements in their natural state101,
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals102, and where
its exploitation would be contrary to public policy or morality103. The latter situation
is particularly to be viewed as "... a genuine reflection of the ethical dimension of
biotechnological inventions"104.
With regard to the scope of protection, the Proposed Biotechnology Directive
suggests that the protection conferred by a patent on a biological material possessing
specific characteristics, as a result of the invention, and the protection conferred by a
patent that enables biological material to be produced possessing specific
characteristics "... shall extend to any biological material derived from that biological
material through multiplication or propagation in an identical or divergent form and
possessing those same characteristics"105.
With regard to the scope of legal protection of biotechnological inventions,
the Proposed Biotechnology Directive also suggests the following derogation: (a)
once a patent holder, or someone with his consent, sells a propagating material to a
]mIbid.. Art. 3 (1). However, an element which has been isolated from the human body or otherwise
produced by means of a technical process will be patentable, even if the structure of the element in
question is identical to that of a natural state (Ibid.. Art. 3 (2)).
X02Ibid.. Art. 6.
W3Ibid.. Art. 9 (1). Note, additionally, that such exploitation shall not be deemed contrary to either
public policy or morality only because it is prohibited by law. This seems to imply that the expression
"would be contrary to public policy or morality" will be decided in a case-by-case basis. Moreover.
Article 9 (2) of the PBD lists two particular situations which are to be considered unpatentable: (a)
methods of human treatment involving germ line gene therapy ("i.e. therapy that could alter
reproductive cells capable of transmitting genetic material to descendants", as suggest by COM(95)
661 final, note 90. supra, p. 18. para. 67), and (b) processes for modifying the genetic identity of
animals which are likely to cause them suffering or physical handicaps without any substantial
benefit to man or animal, or if the suffering or physical handicap of such animals are not
proportionate to the objective pursued.
104COM(95) 661 final, note 90, supra, p. 18. para. 67.
105PBD. Arts 10 (1) and (2). Moreover. Article 11 of the PBD emphasises that the protection
conferred by a patent on a product which contains or consists of genetic information must extend to
all material in which the product is incorporated. The scope of protection of biotechnological
inventions within the EC will not apply, however, for biological materials obtained from the
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farmer for agricultural use, such sale implies the authorisation to the farmer to use the
product of his harvest for reproduction or propagation by him on his own farm106; and
(b) the sale of breeding stock to a farmer by the patent holder or by someone with his
consent implies authorisation to use the protected livestock for breeding purpose on
his own farm, in order to replenish their numbers107 108
The Proposed Biotechnology Directive also suggests the inclusion of
compulsory licences mechanisms under the following terms. If a holder of a plant
variety right cannot exploit it without infringing a biotechnological patent, he may
apply for a non-exclusive compulsory licence109. The same applies for the holder of a
biotechnology patent who cannot exploit it without infringing a plant variety right110.
This shall be allowed, however, only if the applicant for the compulsory licence
demonstrates that he tried unsuccessfully to get a licence from the patent or plant
variety holder and the applicant's biotechnological invention or plant variety
constitutes significant technical progress111. Compulsory licences will be granted by
national authorities and with national territorial scope only112.
The PBD also regulates the deposit, access and re-deposit of a biological
material113, and determines that the if the subject matter of a patent is a process for
obtaining a new product, when the same product is produced by someone else, the
third party's product will be considered to have been obtained by the patented
multiplication or propagation of biological material marketed in the territory of a Member State by
the holder of the patent or with his consent (Ibid.. Art. 12).
]06Ibid.. Art. 13 (1).
]01Ibid.. Art. 13 (2).
108The conditions of the derogation provided by Articles 13(1) and (2) will be established by national
laws and practices (PBD, Art. 13 (3)).
,09PBD. Art. 14(1).
noIbid.. Art. 14 (2).
]uIbid. Art. 14(3).
U2Ibid.. Art. 14 (4).
u 3Ibid.. Arts. 15 and 16.
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process114 It is also suggested that Member States would have to implement the
Proposed Biotechnology Directive until 1 January 2000115.
3.3.3. Plant varieties
In relation to plant varieties, as has been seen above, the text of the EPC expressly
prohibits its patentability. In the European Community, however, a common system
for the protection of plant varieties has been established by Regulation N. 2.100, of 27
July 1994, on Community plant variety rights116.117 The regime created by the CPVR
Regulation shall be valid throughout the Community, solely and exclusively118, having
uniform effect within the territory of the Common Market and may be granted,
transferred or terminated in this territory only in a uniform basis119.
The application of a Community plant variety right (CPVR), which shall be
without prejudice to the right ofMember States to grant national property rights for
plant varieties120, applies to all botanical genera and specie including, among others,
hybrids between genera and species121. To be entitled to a Community right a plant
variety has to be distinct122, uniform123, stable124, and new125. Applicants entitled to
UAIbid.. Art. 17.
U5Ibid.. Art. 18(1).
116OJ 1994 L227/1. Hereinafter the "CPVR Regulation". By virtue of Article 118 (1), the CPVR
Regulation entered into force on 1 September 1994.
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Variety, for the purpose of the CPVR Regulation, means "... a plant grouping within a single
botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, which grouping, irrespective of whether the conditions for
the grant of a plant variety right shall be met. can be: defined by the expression of the characteristics
that results from a given genotype or combination of genotypes, distinguished from any other plant
grouping by the expression of at least one of the said characteristics, and considerc a as a unit with
regard to its suitability for being propagated unchanged" (CPVR Regulation. Art. 5 (2)).
I18CPVR Regulation. Art. 1.
u9Ibid.. Art. 2.
l20Ibid.. Art. 3. Cumulative protection of Community and national plant variety rights or any patent
for that variety, however, shall not be permitted (Ibid.. Art. 92 (1)).
]2]Ibid.. Art. 5 (1).
'"'A variety is distinct when "... it is clearly distinguishable by reference to the expression of the
characteristics that results from a particular genotype or combination of genotype, from any other
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claim a CPVR are those who bred, discovered and developed the variety, including
their successor in title. If more than one person did so jointly, a CPVR should be
sought for jointly, and their successors are jointly entitled to claim the right. In the
case of employment, the entitlement to the CPVR will be determined by the
application of the national legislation to the employment relationship .126
To claim a variety right the applicant must be either a national of one of the
Member States or a national of a member of the UPOV Convention, or be domiciled
or have their seat of business or an establishment in such a State. It is also permitted
for others who do not meet these requirements to apply for a CPVR, if the
Commission have decided so.127
Once a right is granted, in accordance with the procedures established by Part
Four of the CPVR Regulation, the Community plant variety holder is the one entitled
to give authorisation inter alia for the following acts, in relation with the variety
constituents or harvested material of the protected variety: (a) production or
reproduction (multiplication); (b) conditioning for the purpose of propagation; (c)
offering for sale; (d) selling or other marketing; (e) exporting from the Community, (f)
importing to the Community; and (g) stocking for any of above purposes.128 This shall
variety whose existence is a matter of common knowledge on the date of application ..." (Jbid.. Art.
7(D).
123Uniformity shall be understood as. "... if, subject to the variation that may be expected from the
particular features of its propagation, it is sufficiently uniform in the expression of those
characteristics which are included in the examination of distinctness. ..." (Ibid., Art. 8).
124A variety will be understood as stable "... if the expression of the characteristics which are
included in the examination for distinctness as well as any others used for the variety description,
remain unchanged after repeated propagation or. in the case of a particular cycle of propagation, at
the end of such cycle" (Ibid.. Art. 9).
125A variety will be deemed new "... if. at the date of application .... variety constituents or harvested
material of the variety have not been sold or otherwise disposed to others, by or with the consent of
the breeder ..." (Ibid.. Art. 10 (1)).
126Ibid.. Art. 11.
]21Ibid. Art. 12.
]28Ibid.. Art. 13 (2). See. also. Article 13 (5).
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not apply to acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes, to acts done for
experimental purposes or to acts done for the purposes of breeding, or discovering
and developing other varieties129 In addition, if any material of the protected variety
has been disposed of to others by the holder or with his consent, in any part of the
Community, the holder's rights will be exhausted1"'0. Compulsory licences are also
available in respect of Community Plant Variety Rights, but only on grounds of public
interest and with the approval of the Administrative Council1'1.
A CPVR shall be granted for a term of twenty five years or. in the case of
varieties of vine or species, for a term of thirty years, following the year of grant1"2.
The Commission may also propose to the Administrative Council an extension of
these terms for up to a further five years1"'3.
A Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) is established, by virtue of Article
4 of the CPVR Regulation, with legal personality134 and represented by its
President1'5 The President is empowered to, inter alia, take the necessary steps to
ensure the functioning of the Office, including the adoption of internal administrative
instructions and publications of notices, to submit yearly a management report to the
Commission and to the Administrative Council; to exercise power in relation with
administrative and personnel management; to draw estimates of the revenue and
expenditure of the CPVO; to supply information as required by the Administrative




U2Ibid. Art. 19 (1).
]33Ibid.. Art. 19 (2).
]3AIbid. Art. 30 (1).
l3>Ibid.. Art. 30 (2). The President and Vice-Presidents of the CPVO will be appointed by the
Council of the European Union, from a list of candidates which is proposed by the Commission after
?">9
CPVR Regulation 1,6 The CPVO may entrust national agencies with the exercise of
specific administrative functions of the Office It may also establish sub-offices in the
Member States, with their consent1'7. The languages of the CPVO shall be the
languages of the Community and any procedures before the CPVO may be done with
any of the languages of the Community' 'x, The European Court of Justice has
exclusive jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in
a contract concluded by the CPVO149 and to any disputes relating to compensation for
damage caused by any of the departments or servants of the CPVO in the
performance of their duties'40.
An Administrative Council is also established with the duty to, inter aha,
advise the CPVO on matters for which they are responsible, or issue guidelines in this
respect; to examine the management report of the President of the CPVO and manage
the Office's activities; to establish rules on working methods; and to issue test
guidelines for the technical examination of plant varieties applications141.
The Administrative Council will be comprised of one representative of each
Member State and one representative of the Commission, and their alternates'42 The
Administrative Council will elect a Chairman and a Deputy Chairman for a renewable
term of three years144 The CPVR Regulation also affirms that one or more Boards of
obtaining the approval of the Administrative Council of the CPVO. for a renewable term of five years
(Ibid.. Art. 43).
U6Ibid.. Art. 42.
137bid.. Art. 30 (4).
li>iIbid.. Art. 34.
l39Ibid.. Art. 33 (2).





Appeal shall be established for deciding on appeals from decisions of the CPVO144.
consisting of one Chairman and two other members145.
4. Substantive Patent Law: General Clauses
The framework of Part II of the Community Patent Convention provides common rules
related to rights to the Community patent (CPC, Chapter 1), the effects of the Community
patent and the European patent application (CPC, Chapter II), aspects of national rights
(CPC, Chapter III), the Community patent as an object of property (CPC, Chapter IV)
and aspects of compulsory licences in respect of a Community patent (CPC, Chapter V).
This section is intended to give a general view of the provisions on substantive patent law.
under the CPC. More prominence will be given in the next section on the provisions
relating to aspects of exhaustion of patent rights and compulsory licences.
The first Chapter of Part II of the CPC provides that if a holder of a Community
patent is not entitled to it under Article 60 (1) of the EPC146, the person entitled to it may
claim the transfer of the patent to him147 Further, Article 23, CPC, stipulates a time limit
of two years from the publication of the grant of the patent in the European Patent Bulletin
for legal proceedings for the transfer of such a patent This provision will not apply if the
proprietor who had the patent transferred to him knew that he was not the inventor148 As
a consequence, when the transfer of proprietorship occurs, under Article 23 of the CPC,
licences and other rights shall lapse after the registration of the person entitled to the
]44Ibid. An. 45 (1) and (2). Cf Art. 67.
] 45Ibid.. Art. 46 (1).
46.Article 60 (1) of the EPC states that the inventor, or his successor in title, is the person entitled to
have the patent. Further, paragraph 1 deals with the problem of inventors who are employees and
leaves the problem to be solved bv national law.
I4"CPC. Art. 23 (1).
14SIbid.. Art. 23 (3).
patent14°, unless the licensees, or the proprietor of the patent, have made, in good faith,
effective and serious preparations to use the invention150 In such cases, the patent may
continue in use provided that a non-exclusive licence is requested151
Chapter II of the CPC provides rules regarding the proprietor's rights over his
patented invention. It is established that he has the right to prevent all third parties, without
his consent, from making, offering, putting on the market, using, importing or stocking a
product or the process which is the subject matter of the patent within the territory of the
Community152 Moreover, the proprietor has also the right to prevent all third parties,
without his consent, from supplying or offering to supply the patented invention to third
parties who are not entitled to exploit the patented product within the Community15 ' On
the other hand, there are some limitations to these rights, which in this case does not
constitute an infringement of a Community patent, in so far as the acts upon this invention
are done, inter alia, privately and for non-commercial purposes, for experimental
purposes, and for extemporaneous preparation for individual cases in a pharmacy of a
medicine in accordance with medical prescription154
The CPC also contains rules for the translation of the claims in examination or
opposition proceedings155, as well as the legal status of the translations156, and rules for the
translation of the specification of the Community patent157.
Moreover, it is provided that when a Community patent - as a result of a European
patent application in which a Contracting State of the CPC is designated - is revoked, the
]A9Ibid.. Art. 24 (1).
]50Ibid.. Art. 24 (3).






effects of that patent, as provided by Chapter II of the CPC. will not apply158. Additionally,
the effects of a Community patent are governed by the provisions of the CPC and the
infringements of a Community patent will be governed by the national law relating to
infringement of a patent, in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on
Litigation'59.
It is also established that if the subject-matter of a Community patent is a process
for obtaining a new product, the same product when produced by another party shall be
considered as a result of the patented process, in absence ofproof to the contrary .160
Further, Articles 36 and 37 of the CPC provide that a prior patent application or a
prior national patent shall enjoy the benefit of the same prior right effect with regard to a
Community patent as a European patent application does in a Contracting State which has
been designated.161 This follows the understanding that, if a national patent application
was not published, for reasons of secrecy, and enjoys a prior right effect with regard to a
national patent in that State having a later date of filing, the same shall apply to a
Community patent162. Further, if a national patent was granted based on a prior use of an
invention or based on a right of personal possession of that invention, the same rights in
respect of a Community patent shall apply for the same invention163. The rights to a
Community patent shall not be extended to acts concerning a product covered by the
patented invention which are done within the territory of a specific Contracting State, if
the owner of that patent has put it on the market in that State. This rule will apply only if





]62Ibid.. Art. 36 (2). '
'63Ibid. Art. 37(1).
the national patent law of that State makes provision to the same effect in respect of
national patents'64165
The CPC, when establishing the provisions dealing with a Community patent as an
object of property, establishes firstly that a Community patent shall be dealt with in the
context of the whole of the territories of the Community and in its entirety, as a national
patent of the Contracting State166, provided that the applicant, or his representative, has its
residence or place of business within the territory of one of the Contracting States and, in
the case of a joint application, if one of the applicants would meet one of these
requirements167. It is also provided that if proceedings relating to judgments or other
official acts being enforced against Community patents, the national courts or other
authorities of that Contracting State shall have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of it.
Furthermore, the Community patent may be transferred168, licensed169 or offered
to any person who would like to license it with the payment of appropriate compensation
for the licensee (licences of right)170 and, as a matter of fact, all European patent
applications, in which a Contracting State of the CPC is designated, will be ruled by the
wording of Articles 38 to 42 of the Community Patent Convention.
]64Ibid. Art. 37(2).
l65See. for further analysis of this matter. John Neukon. A Prior Use Ri&ht for the Community
Patent Convention. [1990] 5 EIPR 165-169. and John Neukon. A Prior Use Right for the
Community Patent Convention: An Update. [1991] 4 EIPR 139-141.
,66CPC. An. 38 (1).
161Ibid. Art. 38 (3).
]6gIbid. Art. 39.
]69Ibid.. Art. 42. A Community patent may be licensed in whole or in part for the w hole or part of the
territories in which it is effective and may be on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis.
1 "ibid.. Art. 43. Cf Rules 9 and 10 of the Implementing Regulations of the CPC.
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5. Substantive Patent Law: Economic Clauses
With regard to the so-called "economic clauses"171, it may be argued that they are one of
the main reasons for the creation of a single unitary system for the protection of patents
within the Community. As has been seen in Chapter 3, patents may be used as trade
barriers between Member States of the Community and, as a consequence, may partition
off national markets and threaten the principle of free movement of goods within the
territories of the Community. The development of European case-law has been already
analysed in relation with the principle of "exhaustion of patent rights172. It may even be
argued that this provision of the CPC was mainly based on the development of the
administrative and juridical jurisprudence of the Community. The granting of a compulsory
licence may also be used as a trade barrier against products from other Member States of
the Community. The CPC attempts to regulate the use of such a mechanism when
employed by national authorities, based on national law. These two issues will be further
described below,
5.1. Exhaustion of patent rights
The monopoly granted by the State to the inventor may, in some ways, be used against the
establishment and functioning of the Common Market in so far as the proprietor of a
patented product has the exclusive right to use the patented invention, which exercise may,
in some cases, be against the principle of the free movement of goods. The proprietor of a
patent has the exclusive right to manufacture and commercialise his invention and/or grant
1 'The economic clauses are probably so called because of the economic effects that they have in the
context of an integrated system.
1 "See. supra .Chapter 3. Section 1.
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licences to third parties. Although the proprietor of a patent, when exercising his rights
over the patented product, is not automatically infringing the rules of the EC Treaty, he
cannot use his patented invention against the objectives of the Community. The exercise of
such a right has to be limited to fit in the Community interest. 17'
Article 28 of the CPC provides that:
The rights conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to acts
concerning a product covered by that patent which are done within the
territories of the Contracting States after that product has been put on
the market in one of these States by the proprietor of the patent or
with his express consent, ...
The wording of Article 28 of the CPC is exactly the same as that provided by the
first version of the Convention (CPC 1975). It is thus understood that, once the
proprietor of a patent, or someone with his "express consent", has put the patented
product on the market of any Contracting State, the rights upon that patent shall be
considered exhausted to the extent that thereafter the patented product may circulate
freely within the territories of the Community. The proprietor of that patent has no longer
the right to prevent the circulation of that product. The same applies "... to rights
conferred by a national patent in a Contracting State", as ruled by Article 76, CPC. The
second part of Article 28 expressly states that the principle established will not apply if,
under Community law, "...there are grounds which...., would justify the extension to such
acts of the rights conferred by the patent"174.
Article 37 (2), CPC, states that the principle of exhaustion of rights will apply if -
in the case of the proprietor of a national patent which has been granted based on prior use
3The development of the distinction between the existence and the exercise of IPRs has been
described in Chapter 3. Section 1. Sub-section 1.1. supra It seems that such a distinction is
becoming of marginal importance within the context of the application of the IPRs within the
Community See. e.g.. references in note 16. Chapter 3. supra.
or personal possession of the invention, which enjoys the same rights in respect of a
Community patent for the same invention - the national law of that State makes provisions
to the same effect in respect of national patents.
5.2. Compulsory licences175
In relation to the granting of a compulsory licence by national law, it is provided by the
CPC that the national provisions shall be applicable to Community patents. However, the
effect of compulsory licences will face territorial limitation with regard to the Community.
These effects will take place only in the territory of the State concerned.176 Upon the
granting of a compulsory licence in respect of a Community patent, the national authority
shall communicate it to the EPO177 Also, each Contracting State shall provide for a final
appeal to a court of law, .. at least in respect of compensation under a compulsory
licence"178
Contracting States are not allowed to grant compulsory licences of a Community
patent on the ground of lack or insufficiency of exploitation, if the patented product,
though manufactured in this State, is put on the market in the territory of any other
Contracting State, "... for which such a licence has been requested, in sufficient quantity
to satisfy needs in the territory of that other Contracting State".179
1 JIt is mainly related with the exception provided by Article 36 of the EC Treaty.
' 5For the purposes of the application of the provisions of the CPC. the term "compulsory licence"
shall include "... official licences and any right to use patented inventions in the public interest"
(CPC. Art. 45 (4)).
176CPC. Art. 45 (1).
]1'lbid. Art. 45 (3).
1 sIbid.. Art. 45 (2). It is generally established by the CPC that "... in actions relating to compulsory
licences in respect of a Community patent, the couns of the Contracting State the national law of
w hich is applicable to the licence" shall have exclusive jurisdiction.
1 9Ibid.. Art. 46. The same applies in relation with a national patents [Ibid.. Art. 77). The CPC
however provides that the Contracting States - for a period of ten years, with the possibility of
extension of this period for another five years - may declare, when the depositing of its instrument of
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It is also established that the principle of exhaustion of patent rights, established by
Article 28 of the CPC, shall not apply either to Community patents180 or to national
patents181, in relation with the granting of compulsory licences upon a patented product .182
6. The System of Jurisdiction
Probably the main difference between the 1975 version of the CPC and that amended in
1989 by the Agreement, is that the latter creates a more complex system of jurisdiction.
While the CPC 1975 established rules for the jurisdiction of national courts with the
possibility of preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice, with reference to the
"Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and Commercial
Matters", signed at Brussels on 27 September 196818\ the amended version of the CPC
goes further and adds, through the Protocol on Litigation184, a system of jurisdiction by
which one will find that national courts will act as Community patent courts of first and
second instance185, and a Common Appeal Court is established186 with the task of ensuring
uniform interpretation and application of the provisions relating to Community patents,
.. to the extent to which th[o]se are not national provisions"187.188 Appendix III, below,
ratification, that it reserves the nght to provide that Articles 46 and 77 will not apply within its
territory to Community. European or national patents (Ibid.. Art. 83).
]S0Ibid.. Art. 45 (1). Last sentence.
mIbid.. Art. 76 (3).
18"See. generally. Chapter 3. Section 1. Sub-section 1.2. Paragraph 1.2.2. supra, for further
information on the jurisprudence of the EC in relation with the granting of compulsory licences and
its legal effects in the Community.




18 The Agreement. Art. 5.
188It is argued, nevertheless, that one of the main problems for the adoption of the CPC and the
establishment of the COPAC has been the possibility of agreeing upon a single first instance
jurisdiction, with uniform national procedural rules. See. e.g.. Robin Lawrence. Patent Litigation
Reform - In Europe7. [1982] 2 EIPR 39-41. p. 40.
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provides an outline, in diagrammatic form, of the system of jurisdiction that will be
discussed in the present Section.
6.1. Jurisdiction under the CPC itself
Part VI of the CPC intends to provide general rules on jurisdiction and procedure in
actions relating to Community patents other than those provided by the Protocol. It is thus
established that, unless otherwise specified by the CPC or by the Protocol, the Convention
on Jurisdiction and Enforcement shall apply to actions relating to Community patents'89.
As a basic rule the jurisdiction will be generally based on the defendant's
domicile'90 However, in patent infringement cases there are two other rules of the
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement which are relevant. Firstly, Article 5 (3)
establishes that, in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, a person domiciled in a
Contracting State may be sued in the courts of another Contracting State where the
harmful event occurred. Secondly, Article 16 (4), Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement, determines that, in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of
patents, "... the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has
been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of an international convention
deemed to have taken place", shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile.
It is also established that national courts of the Contracting State (the national law
of which is applicable to the licence) will have exclusive jurisdiction in actions relating to
compulsory licences in respect of Community patents191 In actions relating to disputes
between employer and employee, the national court of the Contracting State under whose
law the right to a European patent is determined in accordance with Article 60 (1) EPC,
189CPC. Art. 66.
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will have exclusive jurisdiction1)2 Accordingly, these national courts, when dealing with
actions relating to a Community patent, shall treat the patent as valid '
In the case of actions relating to the subject-matter of a national patent granted in a
Contracting State, it is also provided that the national courts referred to above will have
jurisdiction with the limitation of its territorial scope194, and that national authorities in
actions relating to the right of a Community patent or to compulsory licences in respect of
a Communitv patent will be understood within the meaning of "courts" as in the CPC and
in the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement195. Finally, it is established that national
law relating to penal sanction for infringement shall be applicable in case of infringement of
a Community patent196.
6.2. Jurisdiction under the Protocol on Litigation
The Protocol on Litigation may be considered the cornerstone for the application and
enforcement of the patent system which will be established by the CPC. The enforcement
of patent rights in the courts is as important for harmonisation as the other subjects, such
as substantive patent law. It was already argued, during the debates for and against the
CPC, that infringement and validity of patent rights should be examined together in order
to avoid discrepancies in the proceedings before different national courts197.
For the purposes of the establishment of a system ofjurisdiction and enforcement
under the Protocol on Litigation, Contracting States must designate national courts, as
'"Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement. Art. 2.
191 CPC. Art. 67 (a).
}9'Ibid.. Art. 67 fb).
]93Ibid. Art. 72.




required by Article 1 of the Protocol on Litigation, for acting as Community patent courts
of first and second instance, with the purpose of promoting specialisation in patent matters
in certain courts of the Contracting States.108 .Also, a Common Appeal Court (COPAC)
will be established, with legal personality19*' and enjoying extensive legal capacity accorded
to legal persons under national law of the Contracting States. The COPAC shall have
power to acquire or dispose of movable and immovable property and may also be party to
legal proceedings200 The COPAC will sit in plenary session201 and will have a registry"02.
An Administrative Committee with representatives of the Contracting States, the
Commission of the European Communities and their alternate representatives will be
established with, inter alia, the duty to determine the number of judges of the Common
Appeal Court202. It is not yet decided where the COPAC will take place"04.
Again, the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement shall apply to the
provisions of the Protocol in so far as it is not specified otherwise. The Protocol itself,
according to the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement, expressly rules that
jurisdiction shall be based on the defendant's domicile.205
Community patent courts whose jurisdiction is based on the Protocol206 will have
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of acts of infringement committed or threatened within the
9 J.L. Beton, Future Prospects - Harmonisation of National Patent Laws. |January 1979] EIPR 13-
19. at pp 17-18.
198See the list of the courts designated bv the Contracting States in the Annex to the Protocol. OJ
1989 L401/42.
'"Protocol. Art. 3 (1).
200Ibid.. Art. 3 (2).
"0,lt may. also, create chambers (Protocol. Art. 5 (2)).
"""Protocol. Art. 5 (3).
~03Ibid.. Art. 5(1).
™Ibid.. Art. 2 (2).
"05Protocol. Art. 14. Cf. Art. 2. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement.
"^Articles 14 (1) to (4) of the Protocol states that proceedings will be brought before the courts of the
Contracting State where the defendant is domiciled, or has an establishment. If the defendant is
neither domiciled nor has an establishment in one of the Contracting States, proceedings must take
place in the courts where the plaintiff is domiciled or has an establishment. If neither the defendant
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territory of any of the Contracting States, or actions in respect of the use made of the
invention, as specified in Article 32 (1) of the CPC"07. '°8
It is also worth mentioning that the Community patent courts whose jurisdiction is
based on Article 14 (5) Protocol on Litigation - i.e., the possibility of bringing the
proceeding in the court of the Contracting State in which the act of infringement has been
committed or threatened - shall have exclusive jurisdiction only in respect of acts
committed or threatened within the territory of the State in which the court is situated.
6.2.1. First instance
At the first instance level, disputes will be solved either by the Revocation Divisions or by
Community patent courts of first instance. The Revocation Divisions will have exclusive
jurisdiction in relation to actions for limitation and revocation of Community patents, as
provided by Chapters II and III, ofPart III of the CPC.
Community patent courts of first instance are empowered to decide, exclusively,
upon questions regarding all infringement actions, if permitted by national law, and all
actions in respect of threatened infringements relating to Community patents209, in respect
of actions for the declaration of non-infringement, if provided by national law210, in
nor the plaintiff fulfil these requirements, proceedings will take place in the courts where the
COPAC has its seat.
201Ibid.. Art. 17(1).
:08For a more detailed analysis on the issues under the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement
related with intellectual property rights, see Clare Tritton & Guy Tritton. The Brussels Convention
and Intellectual Property. 11987] 12 E1PR 349-354. C.M. Wadlon. Intellectual Property and the
Judgment Convention. [ 1985] 10 EL Rev. 305-315. Also, for a broader analysis of the Convention
see A. McClellan. The Convention of Brussels of September 27, 1968 on Jurisdiction, and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. [1978] 15 CML Rev.
228-243. and Hjalte Rasmussen. A New Generation of Community Law? Reflections on the
Handling bv the Court of Justice of the Protocol of 1971 Relating to the Interpretation of the Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments. 11978] 15 CML Rev. 249-282.
:09ProtocoI. Art. 15(1) (a).
Z]0Ibid.. Art. 15(1) (b). In this case the Community patent courts are not empowered to question the
validity of a Community patent (Ibid.. Art. 15 (4)).
relation to all actions relating to the use made of inventions, by virtue of Article 32 (1)
CPC2", and in relation to actions concerning counterclaims for revocation of Community'
patents212. With regards to a counterclaim for revocation, a Community patent court of
first instance is empowered to order the revocation of the patent, to reject the application
for revocation, or to maintain the patent in amended form21, A copy of the judgment of
the Community patent court regarding a counterclaim for revocation will be sent to the
EPO and. in the event of a judgment in favour of the maintenance of the patent in
amended form, a copy of the text of the patent as amended shall also be sent to the
EPO214. Finally, a final judgment revoking or amending a Community patent will have
effect in all Contracting States, as specified by Article 33 CPC215.
With regards to an European patent application which depends on a decision
related to the patentability of the invention, it is also important to note that any judgment
before a Community patent court of first instance will be given only after the EPO has
granted a Community patent or refused an European patent application.216
6.2.2. Second instance
In the second instance, disputes relating to Community patents will be dealt with before
the Community patent courts of second instance and before the Common Appeal Court.
The Community patent courts of second instance will decide on appeals which
come from the courts of first instance in respect of proceedings in which the latter courts
~uIbid.. Art. 15(1) (c).
~]~Ibid.. Art. 15(1) (d). The court in question will treat the Community patent as valid, unless its
validity has been challenged by the defendant (Ibid.. Art. 15 (2)) and. the Community patent court,
in with which a counterclaim for revocation of a Community patent has been filed, has to
communicate the EPO of the date of filing the counterclaim for relocation (Ibid.. Art. 16).
3Ibid.. Art. 19(1) (a), (b) and (c). respectively.
~uIbid.. .Art. 19 (2) and (3). respectively
2X5Ibid. Art. 20.
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have exclusive jurisdiction 17 An appeal may be lodged in accordance with the national
law of the Contracting State where the court is located218 When an appeal before a
second instance court raises issues within the jurisdiction of the COPAC, the Community
patent court shall stay its proceedings and refer them to the COPAC for a judgment219. In
this case the Community patent court of second instance may give a final judgment only
after the ruling of the COPAC220
The COPAC will have exclusive jurisdiction, acting as a second instance court,
hearing appeals from the Revocation and Administrative Divisions of the EPO221, as well
as on issues concerning infringement and validity of Community patents arising in appeals
from first instance courts"22. The Common Appeal Court will give rulings on fact and
law22' and shall use the provisions of the Agreement as the applicable law224.The
judgements of the COPAC will be binding in further proceedings of the case225.
2]6Ibid. Art. 18.
2rIbid.. Art. 21 (1).
2WIbid. Art. 21 (2).
2]9Ibid. Art. 23 (1).
~2"lbid.. Art. 23 (3). The court of second instance is allowed to continue its proceedings if there is no
possibility of a judgement of the Common Appeal Court being prejudged (Ibid.. Art. 23 (2)).
""lIbid.. Art. 28. The procedure relating to appeals from the Revocation and Administrative
Dnisions is regulated by Article 61 (2) of the CPC. which refers to the application of Articles 106 to
109 of the EPC. It is then argued that the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal, in relation with the
Articles of the EPC above mentioned, will be generally applicable to such appeals (Gerald Paterson.






6.2.3. Third Instance and preliminary ruling
The COPAC will have jurisdiction in appeals from Community patent courts of second
instance, in respect of the issues provided by Article 22 of the Protocol, only if it is
permitted by national law226.
According to Article 5 of the CPC, the Common Appeal Court is empowered to
give preliminary rulings relating to the interpretation of the Agreement, in respect of
matters not falling within its exclusive jurisdiction, and in relation to the validity and
interpretation of the provisions enacted in implementing the Agreement227. Community
patent courts of first and second instance may also raise questions for the COPAC if they
consider that such a ruling is necessary to enable them to give a judgment.
The COPAC, on the other hand, may raise questions to the European Court of
Justice, requesting a preliminary ruling in accordance with Article 177 EC Treaty, in
connection with any provisions of the Agreement which, from its interpretation, may be in
conflict with the EC Treaty228. Also, national courts may request a preliminary ruling from
the European Court of Justice in connection with the interpretation of the provisions on
jurisdiction applicable to actions relating to Community patents"9
Conclusion
Chapter 3, above, described the Community laws and practices towards the
harmonisation of national regulations dealing with the protection of patents. The
examination carried out by Chapter 3 has focused primarily on the effects of the
126Ibid.. An 29.
"'ibid.. An. 30 (1).
~sThe Agreement. Art. 2.
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exercise of patent rights within the territory of the EC, as a means of ensuring that
such exercise does not put into risk the process of trade liberalisation in the
Community. It has also described the legislative, administrative and juridical approach
of the EC in this regard. In its Conclusion, Chapter 3 observed the important role that
the institutional structure of the EC has played for the establishment of a common
understanding on the exercise of patent rights within the territory of the Community.
In general terms, the conclusive remarks of Chapter 3 has also drawn up some
comparisons with the institutional mechanisms provided by the MERCOSUL for the
harmonisation of national laws and regulations, as well as for the co-ordination of the
juridical understanding of the issues arising from the disputes on patent rights.
The present Chapter described the attempt of the EC to establish a common
system of jurisdiction, enforcement and standards of substantive patent law, which
was designed to play a crucial role towards the harmonisation of national laws,
regulations and practices in the field of patent protection, hence contributing to the
establishment and operation of the integrating project. A complex system was built up
in which two different but complementary institutional mechanisms (the EPC and the
CPC) would work in harmony to guarantee that patent rights and its exercise would
be harmonised throughout the Community and beyond. The EPC system, as
mentioned above, has been working efficiently for nearly twenty years and may
provide some guidance for future projects on procedural harmonisation of patent
rights. On the other hand, the CPC framework has never come into force, although a
comprehensive system of jurisdiction, enforcement and substantive law was carefully
designed by the Member States to unify patent protection on a broad basis. Though
229Ibid.. Art. 3.
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the experience of the EPC and the failure to implement a common system for the EC
are different in substance - as far as the latter is designed to be a unitary and
autonomous system with jurisdiction throughout the territory of the EC and the
former is a complementary system to national patent frameworks, with no direct
relation with an integrating process, consisting in a bundle of rights - both examples
are of relevance for the discussion of the harmonisation of patent rights within the
context of the MERCOSUL
In the negotiations of the MERCOSUL, a common existing argument is that a
complex and detailed set of rules are not necessarily a point in favour of
harmonisation of patent laws, but rather against the practical implementation of
common measures within an integrated area. This argument seems to take account of
one side of the discussion only, in so far as there is a need to unify in a minimum basis
substantive patent law principles and concepts, but there is also a need of some degree
of harmonisation of administrative and juridical understanding of the granting of
patent rights and of the control of the exercise of these rights. Some institutional and
legislative mechanisms, within the integrated area of the MERCOSUL, are necessary
in the short term.
Taking that into account, it is possible to affirm that the integrating project of
the MERCOSUL requires more detailed norms on substantive patent law and on the
control of its exercise, than those what have been agreed so far by the negotiators. In
the following two Chapters, the MERCOSUL's attempt to unify patent rights will be
described in more detail and further conclusive remarks will be made. Yet it is
apparent that a common administrative structure is necessary to deal with patent
rights inside the integrated area of the MERCOSUL. The MERCOSUL will face the
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problems of different administrative procedures being applied by national patent
offices. If it is not possible to establish an ambitious system of patent granting
procedures under a common institutional framework, the negotiations in the
MERCOSUL should consider at least the establishment of an organ which would give
preliminary rulings on patent granting procedures, eventually working also as an
instance of administrative appeal, or both. This seems to be a feasible solution for
harmonising the way national patent offices will deal with the granting of patents. On
the other hand, this suggestion could lead to further delays in patent granting
procedures, thus making patents more difficult to obtain and more costly.
In order to have a common structure judging appeals or giving preliminary
rulings from national patent offices, a detailed legal structure has to exist. Without
harmonised rules for patent protection, the establishment of any further organs is not
practical. The MERCOSUL will have to find out how to address several issues
connected to patents and its exercise and must do so in the most comprehensive way
possible. It is necessary to address complex and controversial issues, such as the
protection for pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and plant varieties, as well as
regulations on the free movement of goods and competition within the integrated
area. As has been seen throughout Chapters 3 and 4, the mechanisms used to make all
these issues equivalent are very complex and have required different forms of
harmonisation mechanisms. Thus, the negotiating process of the MERCOSUL must
determine which are the appropriate mechanisms to harmonise several fields of patent
rights, and how they will be applied. The mechanism of inter-State Convention should
be carefully considered, despite the unsuccessful example of the CPC
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It is also necessary to emphasise that disputes with regional territorial scope
will certainly take place in the context of the MERCOSUL, and that national courts
must have a co-ordinated understanding of the issues arising from these disputes. The
analysis of Chapters 3 and 4 seems to emphasise the need of a common juridical
structure for the MERCOSUL which will co-ordinate the juridical actions of national
courts. This appears to be vital for the proper establishment of the Common Market
and for its smooth operation. This will nevertheless be facilitated only after all
instances of discussion are exhausted, i.e. the proper harmonisation of substantive
aspects of patent law and a common and co-ordinated approach towards patent
granting procedures.
Finally, it is worth recalling what has been said in the general Introduction of
the thesis, that the present research has attempted to describe in more detail the
European experience to arrive to general conclusions for the integration project of the
MERCOSUL. The discussion which took place in the present Chapter, about the
experience to set up a common system of substantive patent law and jurisdiction in
Europe, only aims to provide the MERCOSUL with a view of a possible solution
towards patent harmonisation.
CHAPTER 5
SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW: PATENTABILITY
Introduction
This Chapter analyses aspects of patent protection as a means of making a
contribution to the integration process of the MERCOSUL. It is not intended to
impose principles or define complex issues in the industrial property international
discussion. States Parties of the MERCOSUL will nevertheless be obliged to comply
with the provisions included in their international commitments. This Chapter thus
utilises, as a legal basis, agreements, laws and regulations on three levels:
international, national and supranational.
The international level is based on the TRIPS Agreement1 and the treaties and
provisions administered by the WIPO2, particularly the Paris Convention. The latter
does not deal, in detail, with the points which will be discussed below. On the one
hand, the Paris Convention is designed to set up general principles of intellectual
property law, requiring "...Member Countries to observe certain minimum standards
of protection, but their [the Paris and the Berne'' Conventions] main prescription is
that each Member Country should provide national treatment to nationals of other
Member Countries"4. The Paris Convention is not intended to impose a detailed legal
]Cf. Chapter 2. Section 2, Sub-section 2.3, supra.
2Cf Chapter 2. Section 1, supra.
3Cf note 9, Chapter 2. supra.
'Rajan Dhanjee & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS): Objectives, Approaches and Basic Principles of the GATT and of
Intellectual Property Conventions. [19901 5 JHT5-15. at p. 6.
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framework and leaves discretion to the national laws over defining patentable subject-
matter and setting up rules governing enforcement of industrial property rights.5
On the other hand, although the former GATT system dealt only marginally
with intellectual property issues, it accepted that they might become barriers to
international commerce6. The evolution of the international trade system and the
consequent conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations in 1994 sets up a new
legal framework that, more detailed than the Paris Convention, proposes minimum
standards of intellectual property protection which shall be implemented by the
national laws of the Members of the WTO. Members, therefore, must comply with the
standards provided by the TRIPS Agreement within a specified period of time.7 It was
not within the mandate of the Uruguay Round to impose a strict system of intellectual
property law. Neither the Paris Convention nor the TRIPS Agreement are designed to
create procedures, interpret provisions or make definitions. Both are intended to be a
general framework to harmonise national intellectual property laws, although the
TRIPS Agreement is a more detailed text. Current developments in the Paris Union
must also be taken into consideration. The Paris Union has been the founder and the
encouragement for the establishment of an international system of industrial property
law. It is probable that the foreseen conclusion of the negotiations of the PLT8, will
complement the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.
"^The Paris Convention is essentially based on the principles of "national treatment" and the "right of
priority". See. generally, Chapter 2, Section 1, Sub-section 1.1, Paragraph 1.1.2, supra, for further
analysis of these principles.
6There are several provisions of GATT that regulate intellectual property matters in relation to
multilateral trade. See, e.g., GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/6 (22 May 1987) GATT Provisions
Bearing on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Note bv the Secretariat, and
Chapter 2. Section 2. Sub-section 2.1, supra.
Cf. Chapter 2. Section 2, Sub-section 2.3, supra.
^Patent Law Treaty". See. for a complementary view on the negotiations of the PLT. Chapter 2.
Section 1. Sub-section 1.4, supra.
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At the national level, only Brazilian legislation will be taken into
consideration9. It will be analysed primarily in terms of the issues as in Law N. 5.772,
of 21 December 197110. Further, the present Chapter discusses the developments on
the Parliamentary negotiations ofPL N. 824/91n, which eventually became law on 15
May 199612.
The analysis on the regional level utilises the negotiating process of the
MERCOSUL, paying particular attention to the work carried out by Sub-group N. 7,
on Industrial and Technological Policy13, more specifically the negotiations within the
Committee on Intellectual Property14. As a result of the negotiations carried out by
'it was decided that only Brazilian legislation would be analysed in detail. There is no technical
reason for this. It is a decision based on practical and personal grounds.
10As published in INPI (organisation by Denis Borges Barbosa). Legislacao da Propriedade
Industrial e do Comercio de Tecnologia. Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora Forense (1982), and
known as the Industrial Property Code. Hereinafter the "CPU.
"PL is the abbreviation of "Projeto de Lei", or legislative "Bill, in English. PL N. 824/91, which
aims to regulate duties and rights related to industrial property, was submitted to the Brazilian
National Congress, by President Fernando Collor, on 30 April 1991 (Mensagem Presidencial N.
192/91). It was discussed and amended by the Chamber of Deputies (Low Chamber), being further
considered by the Federal Senate (High Chamber), under the number PLC N. 115/93. The text
approved in the Federal Senate was sent back to the Chamber Deputies which decided upon only the
proposed provisions amended by the Federal Senate.
12Law N. 9.279. of 14 May 1996 (hereinafter the "Law 9279/96"). Published in Diario Oficial (the
Brazilian Official Journal), 15 May 1996. Seyao 1. pp. 8353-8366. It is worth noting that, by virtue
of Article 244 of the Law 9279/96, the CPI is revoked. It is also necessary to mention that Law
9279/96 will come into force only after one year counting from the date of publication. Law 9279/96
has, nevertheless, come into force on 15 May 19% for the purposes of "pipeline protection"
(discussed further in Part 2. Section 1, Sub-Section 1.2, supra), and for the protection of
pharmaceutical and chemical products and processes and foodstuff. It has been decided that the
present research would also consider the CPI in detail, because it is the main legal framework for
patent protection which has been in force in Brazil for twenty five years and which will be almost
entirely valid until 14 May 1997. In one way or another, the CPI has determined the evolution of the
Brazilian patent system, by clarifying the distinction between "old" patent norms (the CPI) and
"modern" patent protection rules (Law 9279/96). And the latter follows the trend determined by the
TRIPS Agreement.
13The Treaty of Asuncion, in its Annex V, created various Sub-groups designed to co-ordinate
macro-economics and sectoral policies. Sub-group N. 7. on Industrial and Technological Policy, is
the one which has considered the unification of national intellectual property laws. See. for further
information on the institutional establishment of the MERCOSUL. Chapter 1, Section 2, supra.
1 "Resolution of the Common Market Group MERCOSUL/GMC/RES. N. 25/92 (published in [1992]
7 BILA 37) decides upon the creation of the Committee on Intellectual Property, as part of Sub-group
N. 7. empowered to analyse, negotiate, and propose a common text on the harmonisation of
industrial property laws and policies between the States Parties of the MERCOSUL.
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the Committee on Intellectual Property, there are two instruments which will be used:
firstly, the "Propuesta de Disposiciones Legales en Material de Invenciones y Disenos
Industrials de Armonizacion Prioritaria"15, which is the first written proposal of a
text aiming to harmonise national laws in the MERCOSUL; secondly, the "Proposta
Brasileira de Acordo Visando a Harmoniza^ao de Leis em Materia de Propriedade
Industrial entre os Paises Integrantes do Mercosul"16, which is a document prepared
by the Brazilian government that aims to suggest changes to a draft text agreed
among the States Parties of the MERCOSUL.
This Chapter is, for practical purposes, divided into two parts. Part 1 discusses
the basic conditions for the granting of a patent; exclusions and exceptions from
patentable subject-matter; rights conferred by a patent; and the term of protection.
Part 2 studies the issues about the protection of pharmaceutical products and
processes, biotechnology and plant varieties.
PART 1: GENERAL AND INTRODUCTORY ISSUES
An invention is a result of the intellectual labour of the inventor. "Inventive activity"
as such is always prior to the result which will be finally called an invention. This
activity, thus, is something personal, immaterial and belonging to the inventor17. The
15Document prepared by the International Bureau of the WIPO. on request of the Committee on
Intellectual Property of the MERCOSUL (Geneva: WIPO (May/1994)). Hereinafter the "WIPO
Proposal".
'hereinafter the "Brazilian Proposal". Not published.
'
Douglas Gabriel Domingues. Direito Industrial - Patentes . Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora
Forense (1980), p. 29. There is material property (res quae tangi possunt) and intangible property
(res quae tangi non possunt, quae in jure consistunt). The latter is the one which includes the
concept of intellectual property.
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subject-matter of a patent is, therefore, the right conferred upon this final result: the
18 19
invention .
To analyse the general concept of a patent two aspects may be considered: a
technical and a legal aspect. The first is the technical analysis of the activity which
leads to the invention. The second aspect is related to the patentability of a product or
process, which, legally speaking, includes the technical aspects which have been
referred to.20 The technical and the legal aspects are very much related and will be
taken into consideration in the administrative21 or in the juridical level.
Several basic aspects of a patent must be analysed in the first place. Initially,
the patent applicant must meet the requirements of novelty, non-obviousness and
usefulness. Then, the general exclusions and exceptions of patent laws will be further
lgThe rights included in the concept of IPRs protection may be defined on two levels: nationally and
internationally. At the national level, the essential legal source is the constitutional principle of a
"right of a property". Then, the requirements and rights provided by national secondary law. In the
international level, the multilateral negotiations refers to "general principles of intellectual property
law" and "trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights". The former is normally included in
the international arrangements administered by the WIPO. while the latter is generally related with
IPRs within the context of a trading environment, i.e. the WTO system and regional integration
arrangements.
19The concept of an invention, as such, is beyond the scope of this work. This Chapter does not
intend to go deeper into this discussion in so far as most of the instruments which will be analysed
infra have not tried to do so. Note, however, that the WIPO Proposal states in Article 1(1) that "[i]t
is understood as an invention an idea which is applicable in practice to the solution of a specific
technical problem. An invention may refer to a product or a process". This Chapter analyses only the
legal aspects of the concept. It is worth mentioning, however, that the concept of an invention is
commonly mixed-up with the concept of discovery. In a legal sense, discoveries are not protected
under patent law. An invention, in general, may be protected in three ways: when it is a product and
when it is a process to obtain a product or an industrial result. See, for further discussion. Joao da
Gama Cerqueira. Tratado da Propriedade Industrial. Rio de Janeiro: Revista Forense (1952), V. 2,
Tomo I. pp. 53-67.
°Joao da Gama Cerqueira. Tratado da Propriedade Industrial. Rio de Janeiro: Revista Forense
(1946). V. 1. at p. 229. Gama Cerqueira goes further and states that "[o]nlv the patentable invention
is necessarily within the scope of the law. thereupon varying in accordance with the laws of different
countries. The technical concept of an invention may also vary, in accordance with the state of the art
and the progress of industry. Thus, what is considered an invention today, might be interpreted in the
future simply as innovation without importance".
21 In Brazil the administrative body established to analyse and grant patent for inventions, as well as
deciding upon administrative appeals, is the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI). created
by Law N. 5648. of 11 December 1970. as amended by Law 9279/96. Article 240.
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analysed. In the second place, there are rights conferred against the patent, where an
exception is provided by most industrial property laws, i.e. the mechanism of a
compulsory licence. Finally, the length of time provided for the use of the rights
conferred thereby, is also within the introductory aspects of this Chapter.
1. Basic Conditions
When there is an application for a patent, three basic requirements must be met: the
invention has to be new (novelty), has to involve an inventive step (inventiveness or
non-obviousness) and has to be capable of industrial application (usefulness). The
patent will not be granted if the applicant fails to meet any of these legal requirements.
These basic conditions of patentability are generally of wide acceptance by both
developed and developing countries' national legislation.
1.1. Novelty
The novelty requirement for the patentability of an invention is commonly included in
the laws of various countries as a condition sine qua non for the granting of a
privilege to the inventor. In many cases, there is an invention which is new for the
inventor, but is not sufficiently novel to meet the legal requirements. Commonly, an
invention will be deemed new when not included in the "state of the art". Hereupon,
the "state of the art" shall be understood, generally, as comprising everything which
has been made available to the public.
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Current Brazilian legislation seems to follow a similar approach to that
provided by the EPC22. The CPI requires novelty as one of the conditions for the
patentability of an invention and Article 6 (1) further says that an invention will be
considered new when not within the state of the art.23 In addition, Article 6 (2), CPI,
defines the state of the art .. as including everything which has been made available
to the public before the filing date, by means of written or oral description, by use or
by any other means". The concept of the state of the art includes the disclosure of an
invention within Brazil or in a foreign place.24 AN 17/76, moreover, aiming to
regulate the general concepts provided by the CPI, says that it is included in the state
of the art .. everything, in any field of activity, which has been put into the reach of
the public, anywhere in the world, by any means of communication and/or by use,
before the filing date, ,..".25
Such concept of "state of the art" has been controversial during the
negotiations of the PLT. Where the text of Article 11 (2) (c), PLT, proposes that
Contracting Parties shall be free to exclude from the prior art disclosures which have
occurred in a foreign place, it must be understood that Contracting Parties may opt
either for the absolute or the local novelty system. In addition to the basic proposal,
the US suggested, by means of "... a permitted interpretation or clarification of the
^Cf. Chapter 4, Section 3, Sub-Section 3.1, supra.
3See, also. Ato Normativo INPI N. 17, of 11 May 1976, published in INPI. note 10, supra, Item
1.1.2. Hereinafter the "AN 17/76".
'"'Therefore providing the concept of "absolute" or "universal" novelty. The Brazilian position has
been traditional!) ,>n the application of the absolute concept. See. e.g. statement by the representative
of Brazil in the negotiations of the PLT strongly supporting "the notion of absolute novelty." (PLT I
Conf. Rec.. para. 840. at p. 341). Further. Law 9279/96, in Art. 11 (1). proposes the continuation of
the absolute novelty system in Brazil.
25AN 17/76. in Item 15.5 (e), further says that what is included in the state of the art shall be
considered "in the public domain". Therefore, everything included in the state of the art bv means of
interpretation of Brazilian legislation, shall be considered in the public domain and. as a
consequence, not patentable (AN 17/76, Item 15.5.1).
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meaning of the notion of'made available to the public'"26, that Contracting Parties "...
shall be free to exclude from the prior art matter which is not identified and organized
in a manner that makes the matter accessible to the public"27. The US said that such
limitation should be provided in so far as, for example, a written document which has
been placed on a library shelf, but has not been indexed or in some ways made
retrievable, shall not be included in the state of the art in so far as it is not possible to
define accurately its availability to the public.28 In contrast, with reference to the
example given by the US29, the EPO has stated that:
..., where the written description is in the form of a patent specification
or any other document, the content of the document is admissible prior
art if the document was in a place to which members of the public has
access. Thus a document which is proved to have been on the shelves
of a public library is admissible prior art, regardless of whether any
person looked at it.30
Several countries31 opposed the inclusion of the possibility of the local novelty
concept within the PLT negotiations. As coherently suggested by the representative of
the United Kingdom, legislation should not propose such a limitation. The
interpretation of "...the scope and meaning of the notion of availability..." should be
left to the national courts32.
The TRIPS Agreement, on the other hand, is vague when discussing the
subject and has not suggested any detailed definition of the novelty concept. The
26As interpreted by the German representative, in para. 834.2, PLT I Conf. Rec.. p. 342.
^PLT/DC/SO, of 10 June 1991, as published in PLT I Conf. Rec.. p. 151.
3See paras. 833.2 and 896. PLT I Conf. Rec.. at pp. 340 and 347. respectively.
"^n paras. 833.2 and 896. PLT I Conf. Rec.. pp. 340 and 347.
30Gerald Paterson. The European Patent System: The Law and Practice of the European Patent
Convention. Oxford: Sweet & Maxwell (1992), para. 9-12, at p. 375. See. also. Decision T381/87
(RESEARCH CORPORATION/Publicatton), [1989] EPOR 138.
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provisions of the TRIPS Agreement clearly accept both principles, i.e. the absolute
and relative novelty concepts. It is thus possible to understand that, as a consequence
of the approval of the PLT as a complementary multilateral agreement on patents,
Members of the WTO Agreement will use the Paris Union's bias to exclude the
application of the local novelty concept in a world-wide basis.
As has been analysed above, the wording of the law is generally strict. Once
the disclosure of an invention occurs, such an invention lacks novelty and is therefore
not capable of legal protection. Nevertheless, some exceptions apply to the novelty
concept. In the wording of the Paris Convention there are (1) the "right of priority"
principle and (2) disclosures which will not affect the novelty of an invention within a
specified period of time (the "grace period").
With regard to the right of priority, the Paris Convention establishes that
"[a]ny person who has duly filed an application for a patent,..., shall enjoy, for the
purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of priority during the periods
hereinafter fixed"33. The "right of priority"' principle is thus an exception to the
novelty requirement. The principle accepts that the disclosure of a patentable
invention, for the purposes of filing an application in another country of the Paris
Union, within a period of one year prior to the application will not be considered as
included in the state of the art.
Accordingly, Article 87 of the EPC, Articles 7 and 8 of the CPI and Articles
16 and 17 of Law 9279/96, establish that an applicant who has filed an application for
31
Including Argentina, Brazil. Germany, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Uruguay. See,
generally, for these opinions and others, paras. 830 to 932. pp. 339-352, PLT I Conf. Rec..
3~PLT I Conf. Rec.. para. 907. p. 349.
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a patent in any Contracting Party to the Paris Union (or related bilateral agreements)
shall enjoy a right of priority during a period of one year from the date of filing of the
first application.'"4
The Paris Convention goes further and, considering an improvement to the
novelty principle, accepts that some other type of disclosures, which are not for the
purpose of filing an application, shall be considered by national legislation, according
to the period for priority. This includes, for instance, the introduction of goods into
exhibitions35. Art 11 (1), Paris Convention, says that Members of the Paris Union shall
grant temporary protection to patentable inventions, in respect of goods exhibited at
official or officially recognised international exhibitions held in the territory of any of
the member State of the Paris Union.36
In the EPC, for instance, the disclosure of an invention which has happened
six months before the filing of an European patent application, and if it was due or in
consequence of an abuse in relation to the applicant or to his legal predecessor, or the
fact that the disclosure of the invention has taken place at an official, or officially
recognised, international exhibition, will not prejudice the novelty of such invention'7.
In the latter case, however, the applicant must communicate that the invention has
been disclosed in such an official, or officially recognised, exhibition when filing the
33Paris Convention. Art. 4 (C) establishes that such a period shall be for twelve months for patents.
See. for further discussion on the "right of priority" principle. Chapter 2, Section 1, Sub-section 1.1,
Paragraph 1.1.2, supra.
34The PLT does not refer to the right of priority directly. Article 7 proposes rules governing the
rights of an applicant who wishes to enjoy a priority but. for w hatever reason, has not claimed the
priority. In such case it is suggested by Article 7 (1), that the applicant "...shall have the right to
claim such priority in a separate declaration submitted to the Office within a period to be fixed by the
Contracting Party which shall be at least two months from the filing date of the subsequent
application and not more than four months from the date on which the period of twelve months from
the filing date of the earlier application expired". Cf. Law 9279/96. Art. 16 (1), (3) and (6).
35Paris Convention. Art. 11 (2).
36See. generally, Paris Convention. Art. 11.
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application."8 Moreover, within four months of the filing of the European application,
the applicant shall file a supporting certificate, issued at the exhibition by the authority
responsible for industrial property protection, stating that the invention was exhibited
there and certifying that the invention was displayed during the exhibition. This
certificate must also be accompanied by an identification of the invention.39
In Brazil, the CPI said, in Article 7, that before filing an application, the author
is entitled to priority, if he wishes to "...make a demonstration, a scientific
communication or a official, or officially recognised, exhibition". Article 12 of the
Law 9279/96, on the other hand, fists some disclosures which will not be considered
within the state of the art. Such provision is quite similar to the proposed text of the
PLT. In fact, as stressed during the negotiations on the PLT, the "grace period" is a
consequence of the "first-to-file" system.40
Law 9279/96, for example, considers an exception to the concept of novelty,
just as stated by Article 11 of the Paris Convention {i.e. official exhibition). Law
9279/96 provides that an invention will not be included in the state of the art if it was
done twelve months before the fifing date or the priority of the patent, by the
inventor41; by the INPI using official publication, without the consent of the inventor,
37EPC. Art. 55 (1) (a) and (b).
isIbid. Art. 55 (2).
19Ibid. Art. 55 (2) and Rule 23, Implementing Regulations EPC.
40See. e.g., PLT I Conf. Rec.. paras. 934, 935 and 956, where a clearer link is drafted between the
"grace period" and the ""first-to-file" concept. These discussions have taken place in so far as the US
has emphatically proposed, within the context of the novelty concept, that "[a]ny Contracting Party
that awards patents to the first-to-invent shall be free to also consider as prior art an invention which
was made before the invention claimed in an application ..." (PLT/DC/6, 1 March 1991, as published
in the PLT I Conf. Rec., p. 122). Such a proposal has been controversial and may become one of the
most difficult obstacles barring the conclusion of the PLT. The "first-to-invent" system is recognised
only by the US and the Philippines, in so far as the new Canadian patent law provides for the "first-
to-file" system. See. for more detailed discussions on Art. 11. PLT. paras. 830.3 to 932. PLT I Conf.
Rec..
41 Law 9279/96. Art. 12. (I).
260
and based on information obtained from the inventor or from his acts42; or by third
parties based on information provided directly or indirectly by the inventor or by acts
of the latter43.44
In the territory of the MERCOSUL, national laws require universal novelty as
a condition for the patentability of an invention45, as also suggested by the WIPO
Proposal46. The Brazilian Proposal, on the other hand, requires only that States
Parties shall grant patents to inventions which are new. It seems that the
MERCOSUL negotiators have considered that national laws have already
contemplated the principle of "absolute novelty" and that further discussion about this
matter was not necessary in the text of a common agreement on patents for the
MERCOSUL. In addition, all States Parties of the MERCOSUL are Contracting
Parties to the Paris Convention and must comply with the requirements of the "right
ofpriority" principle.
Some other exceptions to the principle of novelty, as well as further
expansions of the understanding of the right of priority principle, have been
considered in current negotiations within the Brazilian Parliament. Further analysis on
the issues of "pipeline protection" are further discussed in this Chapter, Section 1,
Part 2, infra.
42Ibid.. Art. 12, (II).
43Ibid.. Art. 12, (III).
44Law 9279/96 provides for exceptions to the novelty concept, particularly the so-called "grace
period". Note, in addition, that Article 12. PLT, which proposes for the establishment of the "grace
period", in an international basis, has raised some controversy. See. for more discussion on the
subject. PLT I Conf. Rec.. pp. 352-354. paras. 933-964.
45See Ministerio das Relayoes Erteriores (MRE). Ouadro Demonstrativo de Patentes:
MERCOSUL (19931. p. 8.
46WIPO Proposal. Arts. 3 and 5.
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To conclude, it is important to say that neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the
Brazilian Proposal provide any detailed understanding of the novelty requirement.
Further, in relation with the "right of priority" principle, as established by the Paris
Convention, the Brazilian Proposal makes no reference to the subject. It is necessary
to say, nevertheless, that all States Parties of the MERCOSUL are Members of the
WTO Agreement47 and of the Paris Union. Both require that Members shall comply
with the principle of "right of priority"48
Probably, what the Brazilian Proposal intends to highlight is that States Parties
of the MERCOSUL are already bound by their international commitments. No further
detail seems to be necessary in a future regional arrangement on patent protection for
the MERCOSUL.
1.2. Non-obviousness
Another requirement for the patentability of an invention is the one which says that
the invention must be a result of an "inventive step"49. The requirement of non-
obviousness is also of general application throughout the world.
Article ll (1), PLT, states that an invention will be patentable if it is a result
of an inventive step, and further defines inventive step as follows:
[a]n invention shall be considered to involve an inventive step (be non-
obvious) if, having regard to the prior art as defined in paragraph (2),
it would not have been obvious to a person skilled in the art at the
47HTO Focus. January-February' 1995, N. 1, p. 5.
48Pans Convention. Art. 4. and TRIPS Agreement. Art. 2.
49Alternative A Art. 10 (1) of the PLT; Art. 27 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement; Art. 52 (1) of the EPC;
Art. 8 of the Law 9279/96; Section 5. Art. 1.1 of the Brazilian Proposal; and Art. 3 of the WIPO
Proposal.
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filing date or, where priority is claimed, the priority date of the
application claiming the invention.50
Firstly, it is necessary to note that the concept of "non-obviousness" is
integrated with the requirement of novelty. The state of the art, as conceived here, is
the same as that which will be used in the assessment of novelty. Once the invention
has been legally interpreted as new, i.e. the invention is deemed not to form part of
the prior art; such an invention shall also be non-obvious for a person skilled in the
art. 51
In short, what the law requires is that an invention shall have a substantial
difference from what is already known (the obviousness of the invention). Further, the
inventiveness of the invention will be assessed within the context of the knowledge of
a person who is skilled in that specific art. This assessment shall be made taking into
account the priority date which is claimed.
The discussion on non-obviousness is of immense complexity. The examiner,
or the judge, will have to take into account, firstly, what is the prior art; then, whether
the claimed patent has the technical features which represent a progress in the existing
art. These new advantages or new uses of an invention will take into consideration the
skilled knowledge of someone who has technical qualifications to judge that art and
^TLT. Art. 11 (3). Accordingly, other legislation interprets the subject in a similar manner. See,
e.g., Article 56 of the EPC, and Article 13 of the Law 9279/96. The latter includes the subject into
the Brazilian industrial property law framework. Within the context of the parliamentary
negotiations of the Law 9279/96 no controversy occurred in relation to the "non-obviousness"
requirement.
51
Generally speaking, the term "prior art" shall be understood as something that is already known. In
order to involve an inventive step, therefore, an invention must establish a substantial development
from what is known.
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the improvements in question. That is why the disclosure of an invention is of great
importance for assessing the inventiveness of a claimed invention.
As a means of encouraging research which might arise from the knowledge
included in the invention, the application for a patent must disclose the invention.
Such a disclosure shall be made utilising a clear, concise and precise form, "...as far as
it is permitted to comprehend the technical problem and its solution, where the effects
and advantages of the invention are disclosed, in relation with the state of the art"52.
As better described by Cornish53, the main point is that, for practical purposes,
the skilled knowledge of the technician, "... armed with all the specific information
and general knowledge deemed relevant,..." as described in the application, should be
applicable in so far as he "... could or should do what the patent proposes ..." Cornish
suggests that the matter should be explored under two aspects: "proximity to the prior
art" and the "technical advantages and commercial success" of the invention.
In relation to the proximity to the prior art, Cornish says that:
..., the fact that an idea escapes being anticipated only by the shortest
remove will often jeopardise the chances of its being found inventive.
Indeed, if the claimed invention is a "mere collocation" - where two
known devices are to be placed side-by-side without any working
inter-relationship - it will be more likely to be treated as a claim to
discrete things separately anticipated.54
5~Ato Normativo N. 19, of 11 May of 1976, Item 1.2 (e), as published in INPI, note 10, supra. The
EPO considers the issue in a similar way. Decision Tl/80 (BAYER/Carbonless copying paper),
[1981] Official Journal EPO 206, has understood that the assessment of the inventive step "... has to
be preceded by determination of the technical problem based on objective criteria" (the "problem-
c.nd-solution approach"). For further analysis of the "problem-and-solution approach", see Gerald
Paterson. note 30, supra, para. 10-04. p. 423 and Rule 27 (1) (d). Implementing Regulations EPC.
See. also. Chapter 4. Section 3. Sub-section 3.1, supra.
53W.R. Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents. Copyright. Trade Marks and Allied Rights. London:
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. (1989), 2nd ed., p. 134, para. 5-035.
54Ibid., p. 134. para. 5-036.
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With reference to the assessment of the technical advantage of an invention,
this must be done taking into account the skilled knowledge of the technician.
Usually, such an assessment will not happen at the application stage55. When
discussing the commercial success of an invention as a means of assessing
inventiveness, it is assumed that such a condition should take into account that
"[cjommercial success can help to demonstrate inventive character only if the
invention is the cause of the commercial success", although in some cases this
condition may be used as a "... persuasive indicator of inventiveness"56.
As has been said, disclosure of the invention is an essential condition for the
assessment of inventiveness. In this sense, the CPI did not require inventiveness as a
requirement for the validity of a patent application. The INPI, on the other hand,
considered that the result of an inventive activity, for someone skilled in the art, may
not be an obvious result of the existing prior art, for the purposes of a patent
application57. Though the national legislature did not include in the text of the CPI the
requirement of inventiveness as a primary condition for the validity of a patent
application, the INPI procedural and substantive concepts have included the
inventiveness as a condition for the purposes of a patent application. Law 9729/96,
which revokes the CPI, however, considers the inventiveness as a condition sine qua
non for the patentability of the invention58.
The negotiations of the PLT have not dealt in detail with the subject, apart
from the US which has proposed that the first-to-invent approach should be allowed
to exist in a Contracting Party for the assessment of the inventiveness of the
55Ibid., p. 136. para. 5-037.
*Ibid.
57AN 17/76. Item 1.1 (e).
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invention59. What is clearly a matter of discussion in this case is that the US wants to
include in the text of the PLT a rule considering the first-to-invent system within the
context of a Contracting Party which evaluates inventiveness as such, and that "... it
[the Contracting Party] may make the evaluation as of the time the invention was
made rather than at the filing date, or the priority date if one is claimed"60. Further,
the representative of the US said that such a proposal shall only be considered in so
far as the first-to-invent system is accepted in the text of the PLT.
In the context of the MERCOSUL, only Brazilian industrial property laws
explicitly considers inventiveness as a basic condition for patentability. Argentinean
law also requires inventiveness for the protectability of an invention, but the definition
of inventive activity is included in the concept of absolute novelty and not as one of
the conditions for patent protection. The laws of Paraguay and Uruguay do not refer
at all to such a condition.61
While the WIPO Proposal suggests inventiveness as a condition for the
patentability of an invention62, defining inventiveness as being, for someone skilled in
the art, not the result of an obvious prior art63, the Brazilian Proposal merely says that
58See. e.g., Law 9279/96, Arts. 8, 13 and 14.
59PLT/DC/6. as in PLT I Conf. Rec.. pp. 122-123.
mIbid., at p. 123.
61 See MRE. note 45, supra, p. 8; WIPO, Analisis Selectivo de la Legislacion de Propiedad
Industrial de los Paises del MERCOSUR, Preparado por la Oficina Internacional de la OMP'
(22/3/93), p. 2. paras. 5-7; and WIPO Doc. N. OMPI/MERCOSUR/MVD/94/2 (March 1994;
Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales Sobre Propiedad Intelectual en los Paises Miembros del
MERCOSUR. Organizado por la OMPI en Coordination con el Grupo Mercado Comun del
MERCOSUR v la Asistencia del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (14-15 Marco
1994), p. 12. paras. 34-36.
62WIPO Proposal. Art. 3.
"Ibid.. Art. 6.
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States Parties shall grant protection to inventions which meet the requirement of
inventiveness64.
1.3. Usefulness
The condition that an invention has to be industrially applicable in order to be
patentable is of common application in the laws of various countries. In the first place,
both jurisprudence and doctrine have had some difficulty in defining the scope and the
application of the usefulness of an invention. Some authors even tried to do so in the
past, and wrongly mixed up the concept with other requirements for the validity of a
patent application, i.e. novelty and non-obviousness. Others have tried to use the
examples of jurisprudence to define the industrial applicability of an invention.65
The PLT, which suggests as a condition for patentability that an invention
shall be either useful or industrially applicable, could not arrive at any definition of the
terms in question66. It appears that the term "useful" was included to comply with the
understanding of industrial applicability in the US.
In the EPC "[a]n invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial
application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture"67.
The CPI says that "[a]n invention is considered susceptible of industrial application
when it may be manufactured or industrially utilised"68. In Brazil, an invention is also
^Brazilian Proposal. Item 1.1.
65See. generally, discussion in Joao da Gama Cerqueira. note 19. supra, at pp. 99-103. para. 51.
^LT I Conf. Rec.. para. 928. p. 351.
67EPC, Art. 57.
®CPI. Art. 6 (3).
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considered susceptible of industrial application if it may be produced for consumption
and/or is applicable in at least one productive system.69
Gama Cerqueira has developed the doctrinal concept of industrial applicability
as meaning:
... something which may be the object of industrial exploitation or
which may be applicable in the industry. In this sense, the expression is
applicable to the various types of patentable inventions, i.e. the
invention of new "products" and the invention of new "means",
including the processes, and the new "applications" and
"combinations" of means already known to obtain an industrial
result.70
In fact, the expression of industrial applicability which different laws utilise is
closely related to the scope of the justifications of intellectual property protection,
particularly the benefits that the invention is supposed to bring to society, which is
considered by assessing its practical utility and technical means.
The requirement of usefulness, as a condition sine qua non for the granting of
a patent, is also of general application in the national laws of the countries of the
MERCOSUL. Working towards the harmonisation of national industrial property
laws through a common regional agreement, the WIPO Proposal suggests that an
invention has to be susceptible of industrial application as a condition for
69AN 17/76. Item 1.1.4 states that "[i]t is considered susceptible of industrial application the subject-
matter of an invention which may be produced for consumption and/or applicable in at least one
productive system". Aiming to be more precise, the negotiations on the PLC 115/93 determined in
Article 15 that "[t]he invention and the utility model are considered susceptible of industrial
application when they may be utilised or produced in any type of industry, including agriculture and
manufactured or natural products". It is not clear why, but the final result of the Parliamentary
negotiations of the PLC 115/93, i.e. Law 9279/96. excluded the last part "... including agriculture
and manufactured or natural products" from the definition of "industrial applicability" (Law
9279/96. Art. 15). It seems that the Brazilian legislature decided to leave the matter to the
implementing regulations issued by the INPI, which would be more easily updated vis-a-vis the
international developments in the field of patent protection.
°Joao da Gama Cerqueira. note 19. p. 104. para. 52.
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patentability71 Industrial application must be understood as occurring when the
subject-matter of the patent may be utilised in any type of industry or productive
activity72. For the purposes of the application of this definition, the WIPO Proposal
further suggests that the term "industry" shall be considered in its broadest sense,
including craft industries, agriculture, mining, fishing and other services7'. Such a
detailed definition is not included in the Brazilian Proposal, which merely suggests
that States Parties shall grant patents to inventions which are industrially applicable74.
As one might note from the discussion above, modern national/and or
international laws have tried to define the expressions included in the definition of
industrial applicability, or usefulness, but it appears that this will be a matter for
examiners when a patent application is assessed, and for national judges in the case of
a dispute.
1.4. Disclosure
A patent application must have a clear and complete description of the invention, in
order to permit someone skilled in that art to arrive at the same, or a similar, result as
the inventor. This requirement, normally included on the justification that a patent
shall be fully disclosed to permit technological development and consequent benefit to
society, is necessary to reveal the invention in a way that it could be regarded as
useful information for industry, in general, and anyone who might have an interest in
the patented invention.75
' WIPO Proposal. Art. 3.
2Ibid.. Art. 4. First sentence.
2Ibid.. Art. 4. Last sentence.
4Brazilian Proposal. Item l. I.
5W.R. Cornish, note 53. p. 150. para. 5-058.
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The description of an invention is generally divided in two parts; the
introduction and the description itself In the first part, the applicant must describe the
state of the art and all the information related to the invention which is already within
the public domain and might be deemed useful for the understanding of the invention.
In the second pan - the description itself - the applicant must disclose all the technical
information related to the invention, its functions and aims, as well as a the description
of the ways the invention may work.76
During the GATT negotiations no controversy existed in this field.
Negotiating countries - both developed and developing - generally agreed upon the
requirement that inventors must fully disclose the invention for the purposes of filing a
patent application77. Thus, Members of the WTO Agreement must "... require that an
applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and
complete..." in so far as the invention could be carried out by someone skilled in the
ort-78art .
In Brazil, it is required that patent applicants must describe the invention in a
clear, concise and precise way, permitting the comprehension of the technical problem
and of the respective solution. The applicant shall also highlight the effects and
advantages of the invention in relation to the state of the art.79 Furthermore, the
applicant must describe the methods which shall be used to carry the invention out so
6Joao da Gama Cerqueira. note 19. supra. pp. 158-162. Cf. AN 19/76, Item 1.5 (d), and Law
9279/96. Arts. 24 and 25.
See. e.g., GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG1 l/W/17 (23 November 1987) Suggestion bv Japan for
Achieving the Negotiating Objective, p. 6. and GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/57 (11
December 1989) Communication from Brazil, p. 4. para. 20, for similar positions of a developed and
a developing country, respectively.
sTRIPS Agreement. Art. 29. Under the mandatory obligation of Article 29. there is also a non-
obligatory legal statement that Members may "... require the [patent] applicant to indicate the best
mode for carrying out the invention known to the inventor at the filing date or. where priority is
claimed at the priority date of the application".
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that someone skilled in the art could repeat the invention80. Further, while Article 24
of the Law 9279/96 requires disclosure as one condition for filing a patent application,
Article 25 states that a patent application shall contain a descriptive report of the
invention, highlighting the particularities of the application and defining, in a clear and
precise way, the subject-matter which shall be protected.
In the context of the MERCOSUL, it seems that no further discussion will be
held on this matter. The national laws of the four countries require the disclosure of
the invention, in a clear and precise way, as a basic condition for the patentability of
the invention. Also, both the WIPO Proposal and the Brazilian Proposal have
considered the disclosure of an invention as a condition for the protectability of an
invention81.
2. Exclusions and Exceptions
Not only the requirements discussed above will be used for the assessment of the
validity of a patent application. A further condition for the patentability of an
invention is that it may not be either excluded from patentability or unlawful The
EPC makes a distinction between what is excluded from patentability; i.e. what shall
not be deemed as an invention; and what may be considered an invention but shall not
be protected because it is against the law82. Such a distinction is not clearly
established in the different legal instruments which have been analysed in this Chapter,
apart from the EPC and Law 9279/96. The CPI, for instance, does not provide for
such a distinction and merely refers to "non-patentable inventions", including what is
~9AN 19/76. Item 1.2 (e).
90Ibid.. Item 1.2 (h).
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excluded and what are the exceptions in a single list. This Section does not intend to
discuss such a distinction. In fact, both categories mean that the subject-matter is not
capable of patent protection.
The text of the TRIPS Agreement does not impose a system of exclusions. It
simply says that Members of the WTO Agreement may exclude from patentability
(but are not obliged to do so) inventions against public order, morality, human, animal
or plant life or health, and inventions which shall cause damage to the environment83.
Further, the TRIPS Agreement gives Members the possibility of excluding from
patentability diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans
or animals84, as well as "plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and
essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals other than
non-biological and microbiological processes"85.
The CPI lists what shall not be patentable, by affirming that what is agains-
law, morality, health public order, religions and feelings which are a matter for
respect shall not be protected86. Further, Article 9, CPI, excludes from patentability
the following: (a) a product which is a result of a chemical process87, (b) foodstuffs,
chemical-pharmaceutical products and drugs of any type, including its process88, (c)
81WIPO Proposal, Art. 15 (c), and Brazilian Proposal. Item 6.2.
g2See. also. Chapter 4. Section 3, Sub-section 3.2, supra, for the analysis in the EPC.
83TRIPS Agreement. Art. 27 (2). Further, the last sentence of this provision says that Members are
allowed to excluded these subject-matters from patentability in so far as "...such exclusion is not
made merely because the exploitation is prohibited bv their law".
*AIbid., Art. 27 (3) (a).
s5Ibid.. Art. 27 (3) (b). This provision will be reviewed four years after the entry into force of the
WTO Agreement (TRIPS Agreement. Art. 27 (3) (b), last sentence). Also, this provision states that
Members shall protect plant variety rights. Further discussion on biotechnology and plant variety
protection is in Sections 2 and 3. Part 2. infra.
mCPL Art. 9 (a).
82Ibid.. Art. 9 (b). Note that chemical processes are patentable, what is excluded from patentability-
are chemical products.
™Ibid. Art. 9 (c).
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metal alloys89, (d) the combination of known processes and the mere modification of
size, dimensions and forms of materials90; (e) discoveries, including varieties or
species of micro-organisms91, (f) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods,
excluding tools and machines92; (g), systems, programs, plans, accounting methods
for commercial purposes, for calculations, financing, credit, drawing by lots,
speculation or marketing93, (h) theoretical conceptions and products and processes
involving the atomic nucleus94.95
Article 10 of the Law 9279/96 states that the following shall not be regarded
as inventions:
I-discoveries, scientific theories and mathematic methods;
II-purely abstract conceptions;
III-schemes, plans, principles and methods of trade, accounting,
finance, education, publicity, fiscalisation and lottery;
IV-literary, architectural, artistic and scientific works or any aesthetic
creation;
V-computer programs as such;
VI-presentations of information;
VTI-rules for playing games;
VIII-surgical techniques and therapeutic or diagnostic methods, for
application within the human or animal body; and,
IX-the whole or part of a natural living organism and biological
materials as found in nature or isolated from the latter, including the
genoma or germoplasm of any natural living organism and natural
biological processes.
"ibid.. Art. 9 (d).
"ibid.. Art. 9 (e). Under the CPI, if such a combination or modification was understood as involving
a new technical effect, which was not prohibited by the law. they would be protectable.
9XIbid.. Art. 9 (f). See. further, discussion in Section 2 Part 2. infra.
92Ibid.. Art. 9 (g).
93Ibid.. Art. 9 (h).
94Ibid.. Arts. 9 (i) and (j), respectively.
95Note. however, that as a result of the publication of Law 9279/96. chemical products and processes,
foodstuff, chemical-pharmaceutical products, including its process, and transgenic micro-organisms,
are capable of patent protection. The protection of pharmaceutical products and processes,
biotechnology and plant varieties will be further discussed below, in Part 2.
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The exclusions provided by Law 9279/96 are generally applied by the laws of
different countries. The exclusions of discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical
methods and purely abstract conceptions from the concept of invention is necessary in
order to draw a line between what the law will consider an invention and what it will
not. The same applies to schemes, plans, principles and methods in general,
presentation of information and rules for playing games. It is necessary to remark that
they are excluded from patent protection "...only to the extent that the patent relates
to the conception 'as such'"96. It is not clear however if the same could apply also to
computer program in the context of the application ofBrazilian national legislation97.
With regard to the non-inclusion of literary, architectural, artistic and scientific
works or aesthetic creations and computer programs within the concept of invention,
another justification for exclusion is found. They are all protected under alternative
system of laws; generally their protectability will be assessed under the principles of
copyright protection.98
In relation to the exclusion of methods and techniques for treating the human
or animal body, this is generally based on lack of industrial applicability and, also,
because such methods and techniques, under a public policy approach, should be
disseminated without restrictions.99
The last exclusion listed in Law 9279/96 is related to the limitation upon
biotechnology processes and products. As generally provided, neither natural living
96W.R. Cornish, note 53, supra, p. 139. para. 5-041. Cornish, in pp. 139-141. paras. 5-041 to 5-044,
discusses further the application of the exclusions of discoveries and presentation of information.
97Cf. Chapter 4. Section 3, Sub-section 3.2. supra, which describes that only computer programs per
se are excluded from patentability within the EPO. but computer programs which are essential part
of an invention may be protected as within the whole context of the invention.
^See. generally. Art. 52 (2). EPC. and Section 1. Part II. of the TRIPS Agreement. See. also. W.R.
Cornish, note 53, supra, pp. 141-145. paras. 5-045 to 5-050.
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organisms, nor their varieties, are patentable. Although the TRIPS Agreement accepts
that plant varieties, for instance, could be patentable, it also states that Members of
the WTO Agreement should have the choice of establishing a sui generis system of
protection or any combination of such protection with patent protection.
The Law 9279/96, in Section III, provides that some inventions and utility
models are not patentable. Thus, it simply lists what, although considered an
invention, will not benefit from patent protection.
Art. 18 - The following are not patentable:
I-what is against morality, good habits and public security, order and
health;
II-substances, materials, mixtures, elements or products of any type, as
well as the modification of their physic-chemical properties and their
respective processes for obtention or modification, when resulting
from the transformation of the atomic nucleus; and
III-the whole or part of living organisms, excluding transgenic micro¬
organisms which fulfil the three requirements of patentability - novelty,
inventive activity and industrial applicability - listed in Article 8 and
which are not discoveries.
The first exclusions from patent protection are generally those in respect of
morality, public order, health and security100. The prohibition on protecting inventions
which are against morality or public order is difficult to assess. There is no example of
an invention which is itself against the morality or the public order, although the EPO
has considered this issue in a controversial application101. Actually, what may be
considered against morality or public order is the future use that will be given to an
invention. Of course, the law must not protect an invention which is against morality
"W.R. Cornish, note 53, supra, p. 145. para. 5-052.
100The CPI also excluded from patentability what is against the law. It is however clear enough that
what is against the law is not protectable at all and that there is no need to include it in the text of
industrial property laws. Law 9279/96 therefore has not provided so.
101Decision T19/90 (HARVARD/Onco Mouse) [1990] EPOR 50.
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or public order but, as described by Gama Cerqueira, "[t]he examples of this type of
inventions are generally within the realm of theory and the imagination"102. What the
law rules is merely that the invention which could only be used against morality or
public order will not be patentable. The legislator also included as an exception
inventions which are contrary to good habits. According to what has been discussed
in this paragraph, one will hardly find such an invention. Actually, what could be
against good habits is the further use of such an invention.
The law also says that inventions which are against public security shall be
excluded from patentability. In fact, what could be understood from the wording of
the law is that these are the inventions which are of interest for national defence or
general military use, not those which are a matter of public health. This is another
issue to be discussed. Gama Cerqueira does not agree that there is a need to include
such an exception. He recalls that one will rarely find an invention which, by itself, is
contrary to public security. Further, Gama Cerqueira says that if it is not contrary to
the public security, but militarily necessary, the State has appropriate legal measures
to expropriate the patent when it deems necessary, such as, inter alia, the use of
compulsory licences.
An invention which could be used against public health is also precluded from
patentability. In this case one will find the example provided by the TRIPS
Agreement, which excludes from patentability inventions which could jeopardise
human, animal or plant life or health or which could cause prejudice to the
environment. Generally speaking this exclusion is related to foodstuffs and medical
l0'Joao da Gama Cerqueira. note 19. supra, p. 110. In fact. Gama Cerqueira goes further and says
that what the law excludes is the invention which is itself against the morality, not the probable use
of it.
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products which could cause damage to human, plant or animal health This is a
limitation which will be analysed within a context of a product, a tool or a machine
which will undoubtedly cause damage to the health of the public. Further, with regard
to the protection of the environment a more modern approach has been taken towards
the issues formally raised by the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992103.
Lastly, Law 9279/96 excludes the protection of the whole or part of living
organisms, excluding transgenic micro-organisms which are not discoveries and fulfil
the requirements of novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability. This has been a
matter of controversy over ethical considerations in the Brazilian parliament, and will
be further discussed in this Chapter in Part 2, Section 2, Sub-section 2.2, infra.
In general, national laws of the States Parties of the MERCOSUL appear to
be to the same effect. The WIPO Proposal has suggested that the following should
not be considered inventions: discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical
methods104, aesthetic creations105, purely intellectual activities, plans, principles or
methods for economics and business106, the presentation of information107, and
therapeutic, surgical and diagnostics methods for the treatment of humans or
animals108. Further, the WIPO Proposal has suggested that States Parties of the
""Further discussion in relation with the outcome of the UNCED is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 7. supra.
I04WIPO Proposal. Art. 1 (2) (a).
]0iIbid. Art. 1 (2) (b).
]06Ibid. Art. 1 (2) (c).
101Ibid. Art. 1 (2) (d).
mIbid.. Art. 1 (2) (e).
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MERCOSUL should be allowed to exclude from patentability inventions which are
against morality or public order109.
The Brazilian Proposal, on the other hand, suggests only that States Parties of
the MERCOSUL may consider as not patentable inventions which are against
morality, good habits, security and order or public health.110
While the WIPO Proposal suggests the general standards of exclusions and
exceptions, avoiding discussing the subject of pharmaceuticals, plant varieties and
biotechnology, the Brazilian Proposal includes, only, what is already a matter of
agreement in the laws of the countries of the MERCOSUL. It seems that neither
provision is necessary within the context of a regional agreement. If an agreement
needs to be reached, it should address the most controversial and non-harmonised
issues, such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and plant varieties. Though the latter
subjects are controversial and of common agreement among developing countries, a
policy strategy should be put forward in so far as sooner or later all States Parties of
the MERCOSUL will have to comply with their international commitments, in
particular those of the TRIPS Agreement.
3. Rights Conferred by a Patent
The privilege granted to an invention entitles the successful applicant to the
proprietorship and the exclusive right over the patented product or process for a
limited period of time. The patent holder has therefore the right to manufacture and
exploit his invention commercially, to assign his rights, to conclude licensing contracts
109Ibid.. Art. 2 (1).
1 l0Brazilian Proposal. Item 1.2.
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and to transfer the privilege by succession. The patentee has also the right to prevent
third parties, without his consent, from acts ofmaking, using, offering for sale, selling,
importing, exporting, or stocking a patented product or the process or product
obtained by a patented process. Different laws also establish the obligations of the
patent holder. For instance, the proprietor of a patent must disclose and work the
invention, as well as pay the fees, provide the patent office with the required
documents, etc. Several of these obligations have been, or will be, generally discussed
throughout this thesis.
Different laws also provide for some restrictions and limitations of these
rights, such as the compulsory licensing mechanism. This Section will discuss
generally the basic rights of a patentee and issues about compulsory licences
3.1. Basic rights
According to Gama Cerqueira, the temporary privilege granted to the inventor
includes a positive and a negative aspect. The positive aspect includes the right to use,
exploit and transfer, assign or licence the patented product or process. The negative
aspect includes the right to prevent someone from using, selling, offering for sale,
importing, exporting, etc.111 To sum up, the bundle of rights conferred by the patent
privilege to the patent holder is: (a) the right to exploit the invention, (b) the right to
exploit the patent itself, and (c) the right to impede third parties from exploiting the
patent without the patentee's authorisation.
Firstly, the right to exploit the invention will be considered as those related to
the manufacturing, selling or offering for sale of the invention or the industrial use of
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it. Secondly, the right to exploit the patent is included in the right to assign, transfer
or license the patent. Finally, the right to impede someone from exploiting the patent
in any way is the right to claim, judicially or administratively, infringements against the
112
patent.
The right to use and exploit the invention commercially is at the same time an
obligation, in so far as the patented invention has to be used in order to fulfil the
requirements of the law. It is not necessary that the proprietor of a patent uses,
manufactures or puts into the market the patented invention. He may authorise
someone else to do so or he may sell his rights over the invention.
The patent holder may also exploit the patent itself. He may, for instance,
assign the proprietorship over that invention by act inter vivos or causa mortis. The
assignment may be onerous or gratuitous. Actually, the assignment, as such, is a legal
transfer of the proprietorship of the inventor. In this case the patentee must specify
what has been sold or given. The patent holder, for example, may assign the patent
fully or partially. He fully assigns the patent when all the rights over the invention are
transferred or sold to someone else without any restriction, for the full term of the
operation of such patent. He partially assigns the patent when he transfers or sells
only parts of the rights included in his privilege.
It is important, however, that the assignment is not mixed up with a licensing
contract. While in an assignment contract the patent holder transfers the ownership of
the patent to someone else, in a licensing contract he merely authorises someone to
use, manufacture, sell, offer for sale, import or export the patented product or
"]Joao da Gama Cerqueira. note 19, supra, p. 197.
U2Ibid. p. 198.
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process. In the case of a licensing contract, the ownership of the patent remains with
the patentee. There are several consequences of licensing contracts which are
discussed further in Chapters 3, supra, and 6, infra.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the owner of a patent has the right to prevent the
unauthorised use of the patented product or process. He may claim his rights and
infringements if someone, without his consent, exploits his patent.
The rights conferred by the patent are generally provided in different legal
frameworks. Some light controversy, however, has arisen from the negotiations of the
PLT. Developing countries have affirmed that the rights conferred by a patent should
consist only of the rights of making, selling and using the patent product "... while
whether or not the patent confers a right of importation should be left to the national
laws"113 and that "[t]hey should not extend the protection to products directly
obtained from the process because it could allow extension of protection to
unpatentable subject-matter, or extend the term of a product patent that should have
lapsed"114. In general, it is possible to say that international, regional and national laws
provide similar rights for the patentee and there is not a heated debate on this subject.
3.2. The issues on compulsory licences
The mechanism of a compulsory licence may be defined as a legal tool which
authorises national authorities to grant a licence, without the patentee's consent, to
someone who is capable of producing the patented product or for government use115.
"3PLT I Conf. Rec., p. 509. para. 114.10.
U4Ibid.. para. 114.11.
1,5A compulsory licence is also called a non-voluntary licence. The TRIPS Agreement, for instance,
avoided the use of such term and called it "Other Use [of a patent] Without the Authorization of the
Right Holder" (Title. Article 31). It is also worth noting that the CPC defined the term for the
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Norms on compulsory licences exist in the patent laws of the majority of the countries
of the Paris Union - the major exception being the US116 but the grounds for the
issue of a non-voluntary licence vary substantially between the laws of different
countries.117 The variety of issues included in the compulsory licence discussion has
been of great relevance during multilateral and national negotiations and that has
caused major controversial discussions among developed and developing nations.
The Paris Convention refers generally to the right of Members of the Paris
Union to grant compulsory licences on grounds of failure to work or insufficient
working of a patent118. The Paris Convention says that Members are allowed to
provide for the mechanism of a compulsory licence and further rules that Members
may grant a compulsory licence on the ground of failure to work or insufficient
working only after "...a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent
application or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period
expires last; ..."119. Such a licence "... shall be non-exclusive and shall not be
transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-licence, ,.."120.
The Paris Convention also states that Members shall accept the importation of
products which have been manufactured in any of the countries of the Paris Union as
within the understanding that a patent has been used. The patent shall not therefore be
application of a compulsory licence within the European Community "... as including official
licences and any right to use patented inventions in the public interest" (Agreement Relating to
Community Patents. Chapter 4. note 16. supra. Art. 45 (4)).
116According with Tom Arnold & Ed Goldstein. Compulsory Licensing: The "Uncentive" for
Invention. [1975] 7 Patent Law Review 113. however, the US generally provides compulsory7
licensing mechanisms through legislation regulating federal government activity and case law.
117See, e.g., list provided by GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NGllAV/24/Rev.l (15 September 1988).
Existence. Scope and Form of Generally Internationally Accepted and Applied Standards/Norms for
the Protection of Intellectual Property, pp. 11-12.
n8Parts Convention. Art. 5 (A) (2).
U9Ibid, Art. 5 (A) (4).
]20Ibid.
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forfeit for that reason121. The concerns with local production as against importation as
a means of using patents have probably been the cutting edge of the compulsory
licence debate. While developing countries understand that the use of a patent has to
be on the basis of local production122, industrialised nations propose that importation
shall be sufficient for the use of a patented product123. At the end of the day, the
negotiations in the Uruguay Round favoured the viewpoint of developed nations. The
TRIPS Agreement affirms in Article 27 (1) that "...patents shall be available and
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of
technology and 'whether products are imported or locally produced'"124 and,
consequently, Members of the WTO Agreement shall comply with importation as a
means ofworking of a patent.
The PLT also suggests the inclusion of the compulsory licence in its text. The
PLT proposes, as one of the alternatives, that "...any Contracting State is free to
provide, ..., on grounds of public interest, national security, nutrition, health, or the
development of other vital sectors of the national economy, ,.."125 for the granting of a
compulsory licence126.127
]nIbid.. Art. 5 (A) (1).
122See. e.g., Indian. Peruvian and Brazilian proposals in GATT Doc. N.
MTN.GNG/NG1 lAV/32/Rev.2 (2 February 1990) Synoptic Tables Setting Out Existing International
Standards and Proposed Standards and Principles. Prepared bv the Secretariat. Revision, at pp. 97
and 101. respectively.
1I3See. e.g., proposals of the United States and Switzerland in GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG1 lAV/32/Rev.2, note 122. supra, at pp. 96 and 98. respectively.
1 "'Emphasis added. See, also. Carlos Correa. The GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights: New Standards for Patent Protection. [1994] 8 E1PR 327-335. p. 331.
!25PLT. Alternative B, Art. 26.
126The text of the PLT refers to compulsory licences as "non-voluntary licences"'.
u
There are two alternatives for Article 26 of the PLT. Alternative A proposes that there should be
no provision on the matter and Alternative B proposes a general framework, as mentioned above.
Developing countries favoured Alternative B as "...vital in insuring the balance between the
exclusive rights conferred by patent and the obligations patent holders have to the public" (PLT I
Conf. Rec.. pp. 509-510. para. 114.14). On the other hand, some developed countries, as well as
China and the Soviet Union, supported the non-inclusion of any regulations on compulsory licence
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This subject was discussed and analysed in more detail during the negotiations
towards the TRIPS Agreement. The most important trading nations emphasised, from
the very beginning of the negotiations, that the matter was of concern, and that a final
agreement on TRIPS should address the issues properly128. The agreed text of the
TRIPS Agreement accepts that the law of the Members of the WTO Agreement could
provide for the use of a compulsory licence, in so far as certain conditions are met.
The grounds for the granting of a compulsory licence are, as non-exhaustively listed in
the TRIPS Agreement, government use129, lack of sufficiency of working the
patent130, a remedy against anti-competitive practices131, national emergency1"2 and
dependent patents133. 134
The granting of compulsory licences is nevertheless limited to a certain extent
and can only happen under certain conditions. Thus, Members shall, if allowing the
mechanism of a compulsory licence, respect the conditions listed below: (a)
authorisation to grant a compulsory licence has to be considered on its individual
(PLT I Conf. Rec., pp. 512-513, paras. 116.15, 116.16 and 116.17: pp. 514-515, para. 118.11; and p.
516. para. 120.8. respectively).
128See. e.g., GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/2 (3 April 1987), Statement bv United States at
Meeting of 25 March 1987, p. 2 and GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/7 (29 May 1987).
Submissions from Participants on Trade Problems in Connection with Intellectual Property Rights, p.
4, for the submission by the European Communities: pp. 9-10. for the submission by Japan. an± pp.
26-27. for the submission by the United States.
!29TRIPS Agreement Art. 31, caput.
1 yjOr "public non-commercial use", as referred to in Article 31 (b) of the TRIPS Agreement.
131 TRIPS Agreement. Art. 31 (k). Members will not be required to apply the following conditions:
(a) prior failed negotiations with the patent holder has to happen (Ibid., Art. 31 (b)); and (b) the
compulsory use may be authorised predominantly for the supply of the domestic market authorising
the non-voluntary use (Ibid.. Art. 31 (f)).
n2Ibid, Art. 31 (b).
133Ibid, Art. 31 (1).
134Note that the examples of grounds for the use of a compulsory licence as listed in the TRIPS
Agreement are a minimum requirement. Members of the WTO Agreement are. at least in theory,
allowed to establish other grounds for compulsory licences. See, e.g. Carlos Correa. note 124,
supra, p. 331.
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merits135, (b) failed efforts to obtain authorisation from the right holder have to
precede the granting of the licence136, (c) the scope and the duration of a non¬
voluntary licence will be limited to the purpose for which it was authorised137, (d) the
licence shall be non-exclusive138 and non-assignable139, (e) the use shall be granted
only for the supply of the domestic market of the country which authorises the non¬
voluntary use140, (f) adequate remuneration shall be paid to the right holder141, (g) any
decision relating to the granting of a compulsory licence shall be subject to judicial or
administrative review142, and (h) where a non-voluntary licence is provided to permit
the exploitation of a second patent143, the invention protected by a second patent shall
involve an important technical advance in relation to the invention of the first
patent144. The owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence in respect of
the second patent145 and the use of the first patent shall not be assignable, except with
the assignment of the second patent146.
Most of the issues included in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement have been
generally proposed by the representatives of different countries, mostly by the
delegations of the industrialised nations. The US, for instance, has proposed that a
i35TRIPS Agreement. Art. 31 (a).
]i6Ibid.. Art. 31 (b). It is also necessary to note that this requirement may be waived by Members in
the case of national emergency or public non-commercial use. The patent holder shall be
communicated "as soon as reasonably practicable", in cases of national emergency, and "promptly",
in cases of non-commercial use.
131Ibid.. Art. 31 (c). Note, in addition, that a compulsory licence shall be revoked if "... the
circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikelv to recur" (Ibid.. Art. 31 (g)).
138Ibid.. Art. 31 (d).
]39Ibid.. Art. 31 (e).
1 ^Ibid.. Art. 31 (f). Members are not obliged to apply this provision when a compulsory licence is
granted "... to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti¬
competitive" (Ibid.. Art. 31 (k)).
Ullbid.. Art. 31 (h).
u2Ibid. Art. 31 (i).
U3Ibid. Art. 31 0).
liAIbid.. Art. 31 (1) (i).
U5Ibid.. Art. 31 0) (ii).
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compulsory licence should be available in the TRIPS Agreement solely to address a
case of national emergency or to adjudicate violation of competition laws, as well as
for the use of the government. The delegation of the US has proposed further that, for
these cases, a compulsory licence should be non-exclusive, just compensation should
be paid to the patentee and that all decisions on the granting of a compulsory licence,
as well as the compensation to be paid to the patentee, should be subject to judicial
147
review.
Within the EU, the CPC rules upon the granting of a compulsory licence for
lack or insufficiency of exploitation148 and in respect of dependent patents149. The
CPC also respects the national provisions on compulsory licences, but restricts its
application to the territory of the Member State which granted a specific compulsory
licence150.
]46Ibid.. Art. 31 (1) (iii).
14 GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/14/Rev. 1 (17 October 1988). Suggestion bv the United States
for Achieving the Negotiating Objective - Revision, p. 4. At this point, the issues on TRIPS were
addressed in a general basis. Accordingly was the position of Japan. See. e.g. GATT Doc. N. MTN.
GNG/NG1 l/W/17 (23 November 1987), Suggestion bv Japan for Achieving the Negotiating
Objective, p. 6. and GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/17/Ad<±3 (8 December 1989), Submission
bv Japan - Addendum. The European Communities initially addressed the subject saying that any-
national provision allowing for the granting of a compulsory licence should "..., be to review by a
court of law"; in GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/26 (7 July 1988), Guidelines and Objectives
Proposed bv the European Community for the Negotiations on Trade Related Aspects of Substantive
Standards of Intellectual Property Rights, p. 6.
48CPC. Art. 46. Such a provision rules on the understanding of the use of a compulsory licence. It
says that importation, within the territory of the Community , shall be considered as use of a patent in
so far as it was put into the market "... in sufficient quantity to satisfy- needs in the territory of that
other Contracting State". Further, the CPC says that such a provision will not apply for compulsory-
licences granted on grounds of public interest.
]A9Ibid., Art. 47. In relation to the granting of a compulsory licence which is dependent on a first
patent. Article 47 says that it "... shall be applicable to the relationship between Community patents
and national patents and to the relationship between Community patents themselves". Actually, what
appears to have been the aim of the negotiators, with regards to this provision, is that once the CPC
will be into force, it will have two types of patents; Community patents and national patents. The
negotiators probably just made clear that in the case of a dependent patent both are going to applv.
x50Ibid.. .Art. 45 (1).
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In Brazil, the CPI permits the granting of a compulsory licence on grounds of
lack of effective exploitation of the patent151 and public interest152.153 The CPI
provides also for some conditions: the patentee may oppose the granting of a
compulsory licence154, but in the case where he is not successful he may observe and
examine the production, the selling and the proper use of the invention, demand the
payment of the fixed royalties155, and request the annulment of the compulsory licence
when he can prove that the requirements of the law have not been met by the
licensee156. On the other hand, the licensee has the duty to initiate the effective
exploitation of the patent within twelve months from the date the compulsory licence
is granted and he may not interrupt the use of the patent for a period ofmore than one
151CPI, Art. 33. Actually, what the CPI says is that the holder of a patent will be obliged to give a
licence to someone who has asked for permission to exploit such a patent, if the patentee has not
effectively initiated the use of the patent within three years from the granting of the patent or if the
patentee has interrupted the use of the patent for a period of more than one year. Note, that this
licence, opposing to the provisions of the Paris Convention, is granted on an exclusive basis. The CPI
further considers that the importation may be used as a proof of the use of a patent in the case of a
international agreement in which the country is a participant (Ibid.. Art. 33 (2)). Furthermore.
Article 52 of the CPI rules that it is considered an effective exploitation of an invention, in industrial
scale, either by the production of it by the patentee or by the granting of licences to third parties to
produce the invention. As a result of the ratification of the Stockholm revision of the Paris
Convention (by Decree N. 635, of 21 August 1992) Brazil shall grant compulsory licence in a non¬
exclusive basis (Paris Convention. Art. 5 (4)).
]52Ibid.. Art. 33 (1). The granting of a compulsory licence on grounds of public interest will be
allowed, non-exclusively, if the effective exploitation of the patent does not fulfil the needs of the
market.
153The CPI also provides in Article 39 and Articles 44 to 47. that a patent may be expropriated on
grounds of national security interest. The concept here is not the same as that of a compulsory
licence. The CPI separately deals with the issues on the granting of a licence on grounds of national
security interest for government use.
154CPI, Art. 34 (3). The patent holder is allowed only to oppose the granting of a compulsory licence
administratively. Gama Cerqueira. note 19, supra, at p. 240. affirmed that only the national courts
may revise the right of the inventor, secured by the patent. However, Gama Cerqueira was referring
to the legislation at that time. Today, constitutional provisions refer to the right to have an
administrative decision, taken by a public authority (see, e.g., Art. 5 (LXIX) and Art. 109 (VIII),
Brazilian Constitution).
155CPI. Art. 36.
lS6Ibid.. Art. 37. Cf. Arts. 35 and 36. CPI. for the conditions of the law which shall be met by the
licensor.
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year157. The licensee shall also pay the royalties decided by the national authority to
the patentee and make proper and adequate use of the patented product158.
Law 9279/96, aiming to go further into the matter, allows for the granting of a
compulsory licence as follows: (a) on grounds of anti-competitive practices159, (b)
non-exploitation of the subject-matter of the patent within the national territory, or
the lack of the total use of a patented product160, (c) if the needs of the market have
not been satisfied by the actual commercialisation161, (d) in cases of public interest or
national emergency162, and (e) dependent patents163.
Further, Law 9279/96 establishes some conditions. It says that a compulsory
licence may be requested by anyone who has a legitimate interest as well as technical
and economic capacity to exploit efficiently the subject-matter of the patent. Such a
licence must be predominantly addressed to the national market164. The compulsory
licence may be granted only after a period of three years from the date of the granting
x51Ibid.. Art. 35.
158Ibid. Art. 36.
159Law 9279/96. Art. 68. caput. These grounds for the granting of a compulsory licence may be
considered if the abusive use of the right conferred upon a patent or the abuse of economic power is
proved by administrative or judicial decision (Cf. TRIPS Agreement. Art. 31 (k)). If the compulsory
licence has been granted on grounds of abuse of economic power, the licensee who has proposed
local production of the patented product, has. in addition, one year to carry on importation of the
patent. Within this first year, the licensee must initiate the exploitation of the patent. Such
importation, however, may be made only from a place where the patent was put into the market by
the patentee himself or by someone with his consent (Law 9279/96. Arts. 68 (3) and (4), and 74).
]60Ibid.. Art. 68 (1) (I). The importation of the patent will be allowed, however, if the patentee proves
that local production is economically impossible. A controversial discussion which has arisen from
this provision is that Law 9279/96 links the forfeiture of a patent with the compulsory licence
concept. Article 80 of the Law 9279/96 says that the patent will forfeit if after two years from the
granting of a compulsory licence, such a measure has not been sufficient to prevent the abuse or lack
of use of the patent.
161//>/</.. Art. 68(1) (II).
]62Ibid.. Art. 71.
]aIbid, Art. 70.
]64Ibid.. Art. 68 (2). However, in the case of a compulsory licence required on grounds of anti¬
competitive practices, the person who has required it has to prove by documents the decision upon
such an anti-competitive practice (Ibid.. Art. 73 (2)).
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of the patent165. Also, a compulsory licence shall be non-exclusive and is not subject
to a sub-licence166. The patentee may oppose the grant of a compulsory licence167, but
in the case of the granting of a compulsory licence on grounds of lack of or
insufficient use, the patentee is bound to prove the exploitation of the invention168.
The decision on the adequate payment for the patent holder, which is to be taken on a
case-by-case basis, must consider the economic value of the licence169. The licensee is
bound to exploit the subject-matter of the patent within one year from the date the
licence was granted170. If he does not do so, the patent holder may request the
annulment of the licence171.
Within the MERCOSUL, the Brazilian Proposal suggests that national law is
free to determine the grounds in which the granting of a compulsory licence will take
place172 but, in some cases, limitations apply. If the text proposed by the Brazilian
government becomes a treaty to regulate patent protection within the MERCOSUL,
States Parties will be obliged to meet the following conditions. A compulsory licence
will be granted only if the person who requires the licence has made every effort, in
reasonable terms, to obtain a voluntary licence from the patent holder, but failed to
get a licence from the patentee173. This will not apply for compulsory licences granted
on grounds of national emergency, other cases of extreme urgency, in case of public
]65Ibid. Art. 68 (5).
i66Ibid., Art. 72.
] 61Ibid.. Art. 73(1) and (4).
158Ibid.. Art. 73 (3).
169Ibid. Art. 73 (6).
1 °Ibid.. Art. 74, caput.
xlxIbid.. Art. 74 (1).
1 'With the exception of compulsory licences granted on grounds of a dependent patents. In this case.
Item 7.2.1. of the Brazilian Proposal suggests that a compulsory licence will be granted if a srtuation
of dependency from one patent to the other exists and the second patent is a substantial technical and
economrc progress in relation with the first patent and when the holder of the first patent has not
agreed with the holder of the dependent patent for the exploitation of the former.
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non-commercial exploitation, or when an anti-competitive practice is deemed to have
occurred174. In these cases the patent holder shall be notified at once175.
Furthermore, a compulsory licence shall be non-exclusive176, the scope and
term of the licence shall be limited to the aim of the authorisation177, the licence is not
assignable178 and a compulsory licence will apply solely to meet the needs of the
national market of the country which has granted it179. A compulsory licence shall
exist only during the period that the circumstances which have supported the
compulsory licence remain the same180
The patent holder shall receive adequate remuneration for the non-voluntary
use of his patent, and this remuneration shall take into account the economic value of
the licence181. Decisions upon remuneration shall be subject to judicial control182 as
well as the judicial validity of any decision related to the granting of a compulsory
licence183.
The foregoing description of compulsory licences is not exhaustive. The issue
is controversial. The relevance of this legal mechanism is nevertheless doubtful and its
applicability is rare on a world-wide basis.184 The issue raises controversy, because
developed nations usually see the mechanism of compulsory licence as a possible tool
1 3Brazilian Proposal. Item 7.2 (a).
]1AIbid.
115Ibid.
]16Ibid.. Item 7.2 (c).
1 Ibid.. Item 7.2 (b).
1 *Ibid.. Item 7.2 (d). This norm will not apply in relation to part of the undertaking or fund of
commerce which the licence participates.
1 9Ibid.. Item 7.2 (e).
]S0Ibid.. Item 7.2 (f). In this case, the administrative authority shall have the power to review, after it
has been required to do so. whether or not the circumstances still exist.
mIbid. Item 7.2 (g).
]S2Ibid.. Item 7.2 (i).
]*3Ibid. Item 7.2 (h).
18JSee. e.g.. Douglas Gabriel Domingues. note 17. supra, p. 264.
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used by developing countries against the behaviour of the developed countries' patent
owners, when exercising their rights in the developing countries. Developing
countries, on the other hand, see the mechanism of compulsory licence as a way to
empower the government with some degree of control over the practice of intellectual
property owners. By using compulsory licences, governments can limit the application
of the exercise of IPRs by providing some conditions in which this licence may be
used in a broader way. On the other hand, as emphasised by Douglas Gabriel
Domingues, it is not clear how relevant such a mechanism is. It does not seem to be
used as often as intended. This seems to occur as a consequence of other legal tools
under which governments have to impose restrictions and limit the practice of
intellectual property owners. This discussion, however, must not lead one to think
that such legal mechanism is absolutely unnecessary, in so far as it has endured
throughout several revisions of national and international laws. Some applicability
may be found and some reasons exist to justify the existence of compulsory licences
as part of national and international intellectual property laws.
4. Term ofProtection
The duration of the privilege conferred by a patent is also of importance. While an
exclusive monopoly is granted to the patent holder, this exists only for a period of
time designed to allow the inventor to exploit his patented product and be rewarded
for the investments and efforts which have led to the invention itself.
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The Paris Convention is silent in this regard185 and the PLT negotiations have
not agreed if it would follow the example of the Paris Convention or whether a term
of protection of at least twenty years should be included in its text186. During the
negotiations towards the PLT, developing countries clearly stated that the "... term of
protection was not justified as there was a serious disparity at the development level
between the developed and developing countries. Therefore, duration of patent
protection should be left to national laws"187. On the other hand, industrialised
nations, wishing to include a minimum term of protection, emphasised that "... it was
essential that the Treaty include a provision requiring 'an adequate patent term'" as
related with "[o]ne of the most important and essential features of the patent system
[which] was that it be capable of providing an adequate reward for investment in
research and development"1 .
Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement says that Members of the WTO
Agreement shall protect patents for at least twenty years counted from the filing date.
Such a provision does not define a maximum term of protection. Members may grant
a longer protection for patents without breaching TRIPS rules.
During the negotiations towards the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement the
term of protection for patents was an issue which raised some controversy. While
1 ssThe Pans Convention refers to the duration of protection of patents only in relation with patents
obtained for the same invention in different countries when it rules, in Article Ibis (5) that "[pjatents
obtained with the benefit of priority shall, in the various countries of the [Paris] Union, have a
duration equal to that which they would have, had they been applied for or granted without the
benefit of priority".
186PLT. Art. 22. There are two alternatives: one proposes that no rule on the term of protection of
patents should exist (Alternative A) and the other proposes that the minimum duration of a patent
shall be for twenty years (Alternative B).
181PLT I Conf. Rec.. para. 114.12. The Chinese government however, opposed to the position of
developing nations by stating that they were revising their national industrial property law in order to
include, inter alia, a term of protection of twenty years, thus agreeing with the proposal of
Alternative B.
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industrialised nations proposed a minimum of twenty years for the duration of a
patent189, developing countries suggested that Members of the WTO Agreement
should have the right to establish a term of protection in accordance with their
national interests and policies and, consequently, no minimum term of protection
should be fixed by the TRIPS Agreement190.
In Brazil, the CPI says that the privilege granted for a patent shall last for
fifteen years from the filing date and will become part of the public domain after it has
expired191. Law 9279/96, on the other hand, establishes that a patent shall last for
twenty years from the filing date and this duration shall not be less than ten years from
the date that the patent was granted.192
National laws of the States Parties to the MERCOSUL provide for a term of
fifteen years of protection, counted from the filing date193. On the other hand, both the
WIPO Proposal194 and the Brazilian Proposal195 suggest a term of protection of at
least twenty years counting from the filing date. It seems that no further divergence
will result from current negotiations to harmonise patent law in the MERCOSUL, for
lgsIbid.. para. 116.10.
189See. e.g., proposals of the United States. Switzerland. Canada. Austria. Japan and the European
Communities, in GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG1 lAV/32/Rev.2. note 122. supra, pp. 90 and 91.
Switzerland. Austria and Japan, for instance, proposed that some provisions should be included on
the extension of the duration of a patent which is initially prevented from being launched on the
market because of regulatory approval procedures, in particular for pharmaceutical products. See.
also, discussion on a supplementary term of protection provided for pharmaceutical products in the
context of the European Community, as described in Chapter 4. Section 3, Sub-section 3.3.
Paragraph 3.3.1. supra.
190See. e.g., for the suggestions of Peru. Brazil and India. GATT Doc. N.
MTN.GNG/NG1 lAV/32/Rev.2. note 122. supra, pp. 90 and 91. India even proposed that a provision
allowing developing countries "... to set a shorter duration of patents in sectors of critical importance.
such as the food, pharmaceutical and chemical sectors. ..." should be available. Some countries, such
as Australia and New Zeland proposed that a minimum term of protection for patents should be of
fifteen and sixteen years, respectivelv {Ibid.).
191 CPI. Art. 24.
192Law 9279/96. Art. 40.
193MRE. note 45. supra, p. 10.
194In Art. 9.
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this aspect of patent protection. It seems that, bound by their international
commitments and following international trends in this field of patent protection,
States Parties of the MERCOSUL have decided to put forward instruments of
harmonisation that would not raise further controversy in relation to the term of
protection for patents.
PART 2: PATENTABLE SUBJECT-MATTER
The development of new technologies, together with the needs of modern society,
have brought the issues on intellectual property protection forward. The discussion on
the protectability of new technologies has raised new issues which have, in turn,
brought up new legal discussions and controversy.
The second part of this Chapter studies issues about the patentability of
pharmaceutical products and processes, biotechnology and plant varieties. In my
opinion these issues will be intimately related to technological and social development
in the near future. Technology is an essential tool which will certainly be used further.
It is also of particular importance, when considering the degree of technological
development of Brazil or of the participating countries of the MERCOSUL. For the
drafting of a common science and technology policy for the MERCOSUL the States
Parties will have to consider how patent protection in the field of pharmaceuticals,
biotechnology and plant varieties should be implemented in accordance with the
development needs of the region.
Though there is a major international debate in these fields, until recently there
existed no precise instrument obliging nations all over the world to protect such
l9;,In Item 4.1.
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technologies. In the area of pharmaceuticals, for instance, the debate has been recently
limited to a struggle between industrialised and technologically rich countries and
technologically non-advanced countries. Consequently, the debate on biotechnology
and plant varieties protection has followed a similar path.
For the purpose of the present analysis, Part 2 examines the subject on three
levels: (1) on the international level, where the issues will be brought from the
discussions which have arisen from the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of
Negotiations of the GATT and related international agreements under the auspices of
the WIPO; (2) a national analysis considers current legislation in Brazil and legislative
developments; and (3) at supra-national level, national laws of Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay, and diplomatic negotiating efforts towards a harmonised
system of patent protection are considered.
1. Pharmaceutical Products and Processes
Pharmaceutical industries compete on sales world-wide mainly by the development
and discovery of new drugs. The Research and Development (R&D) activity of
pharmaceutical undertakings is carried out with an enormous amount of financial
investment and time196. Although only a small fraction of R&D investments become
commercially valuable medical products, these few products may gain markets which
would give pharmaceutical companies a return for the financial resources they have
,96lt is estimated that the cost of developing a new drug is between 100 and 200 million US dollars,
dunng a period of about 8 to 12 years until the drug is put into the market. See. for suggested
figures. Commission of the European Communities. Panorama of EC Industry 1991-1992.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (1991), pp. 8-53.
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invested in drugs that failed commercially. Pharmaceutical companies are one of the
world's most profitable industries197.
Patent protection is claimed to be the most effective existing mechanism to
reward pharmaceutical companies for their creative effort and the high risk they have
taken. Gaumont says that "[i]n the economic field, and particularly in the research and
development sector, the law is a tool which must permit a better accomplishment of
the economic objectives. It is in this spirit that patent, in its modern concept, aims at
encouraging the investments necessary for the research and development of the
invention ,.."198. In giving a temporary exclusive right for the exploitation of the
invention, therefore, a patent stimulates investments in pharmaceutical R&D and
makes those investments possible. Moreover, at the same time that patent prevents
other competitors in the pharmaceutical sector from manufacturing, selling or
distributing the invention without the owner's consent, it discloses a basic knowledge
which is of great relevance to encourage others to invest in further research and
improvement of the existing techniques.199
Arguments in favour of patent protection for pharmaceutical products and
processes claim that legal protection of pharmaceutical innovations allows companies
to be rewarded for the high risk investment, permitting further financial resources to
19~See. e.g., Daniel Green. European Companies Take on the World. Financial Times. 20 January
1995. FT500. p. 39, who says that "[sjeven of the top 30 companies in this year's FT500 are
pharmaceutical manufacturers, compared with five last year". Maxwell Gordon, also, in Licensing's
Impact in Pharmaceuticals. [1991] 4 les Nouvelles 160-165, p. 161. says that MERCK (one of the
largest pharmaceutical industry) has more than one billion dollars in sales derived solely from
licensed products. "... but it represents only 15% of the total company pharmaceutical sales".




be provided for research into new products. Also, the inflow of foreign capital and of
relevant technologies will benefit the host country.200
Conversely, arguments against the protection of pharmaceutical products and
processes claim that patents promote monopolistic behaviour, thus affecting prices
and competition; and that patents do not promote the transfer of relevant technology
nor encourage pharmaceutical innovation in the host country.201
Economic studies have tried to prove that arguments in favour of patent
protection have a scientific back up. In particular, Mansfield202 has suggested inter
alia that high social returns will happen for the country in which patent protection is
granted (including economic and technological development) and that new drugs
would not have been introduced to the market, or even developed, in the absence of a
patent-like system of protection203. Nogues204 and Liiallu205 have studied Mansfield's
analysis and concluded, in general, that his conclusions are not based on empirical
research and do not prove the arguments in favour of patent protection.
Challu's study, opposing the arguments in favour of patent protection for
pharmaceuticals, is summed up by the author as follows:
1. No developing countries with product patent laws have succeeded
in inventing new drugs, on the contrary, successful results are
associated with developing countries without patent systems.
°°Toin Helter. Poor Health. Rich Profits: Multinational Drug Companies and the Third World.
Nottingham: Spokesman Books (1977), p. 13.
201W. Duncan Reekie. The Economics of the Pharmaceutical Industry. London and Basingstoke:
The MacMillan Press Ltd (1975). p. 86.
KEdwin Mansfield. Patents and Innovations: An Empirical Study. Management Science, February
1986. apud Julio Nogues. Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: Understanding the Pressures on
Developing Countries. [1990] 6 JT1T81-103.
"03Edwin Mansfield., supra, pp. 84 and 87. respectively.
Julio Nogues. note 202. supra.
"0SPablo Challu. The Consequences of Pharmaceutical Product Patenting. [1991] 2 World
Competition 65-126.
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2. The hypothesis that a product patent system is able to encourage
pharmaceutical invention is not empirically supported. More precisely,
it is seen that these two attributes are dissociated, with no relation to
each other.
3. The analysis of the data shows a close association between a
country's degree of economic development and its inventive success in
the pharmaceutical field206,
4. The hypothesis that the number of pharmaceutical inventions will
increase along with the expansion of patent protection is contradicted
by empirical evidence, and must be considered false. The study shows
that the extent of world patent coverage and the number of inventions
are unrelated. ... In addition, evidence suggests that there is little
probability that a medium income or developing country can succeed
in inventing new drugs simply by establishing a product patent
system.207
Although there are some economic studies, such as Mansfield's one20 ,
attempting to show a close link between expenditure on R&D by pharmaceutical
companies and patent protection - being possible to affirm that such discussion
influenced the governments of the EC, Japan and the US to introduce some sort of
term restoration for patents due to time lost in getting marketing approval -, the
present research attempts to avoid the economic discussion about patent protection
for pharmaceuticals and tries to focus on the modern legal and political descriptive
analysis of the issue.
Additionally, other studies have attempted to describe the impact of
multinational drug corporations on consumers in Latin American, or developing
countries in general. Among the practices in these countries, there is evidence of
"^'Challu himself has affirmed that most countries have adopted patent protection for pharmaceutical
products after having reached a high degree of economic development, where the major exception is
the US. In addition. Challu says that US pharmaceutical industries have benefited from the US
government's policy of blocking German drugs during World War I and further stimulus has arisen
from World War II. where high government demand for drugs to combat infections disease took
place (Pablo Challu. note 205. supra, pp. 74-75).
20 Pablo Challu. note 205. supra, pp. 87-88.
"^Note 202. supra.
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bribery, high-price policy and costly advertising campaigns for selling drugs which
have not been approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)209.210
1.1. International legislation: the TRIPS Agreement
One of the most important and controversial issues of the negotiations during the
Uruguay Round was the patentability of pharmaceutical products and processes.
Current international industrial property laws, in particular the Paris Convention, do
not oblige countries to grant such patents.
The US, Japan and the European Community insistently stressed that the lack
of patentability for pharmaceutical products, in particular,211 was wrong and that the
negotiations in GATT should address the matter more effectively.212 Some other
countries also suggested that the obligation to protect pharmaceutical products should
be made explicit in the text of the TRIPS Agreement213.
"09The FDA is a US governmental body which controls and approves the market of drugs and
foodstuff. The FDA takes into account, among others, human and animal health, biosafety measures,
and environmental-related issues.
"10See. in general. Robert J. Ledogar. nungrv for Profits: US Food and Drug Multinationals in
Latin America. New York: IDOC/North America. Inc. (1975); Jonathan L. Mezrich. The
Patentability and Patent Term Protection of Lifesaving Drugs: A Deadly Mistake. [ 1992] 2 Journal
of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 77-95; and Tom Helter. note 200. supra.
'"The protection of processes for the production of pharmaceutical products was not considered the
main issue. Industrialised nations argued that some countries provided for the protection of
pharmaceutical processes, but it was not satisfactory. There was also a need to protect the final
product as a result of a protected process. See. e.g., GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG1 l/W/7 (29 May
1987) Submissions from Participants on Trade Problems Encountered in Connection with
Intellectual Property Rights, p. 3. for the opinion of the EC; p. 8, for Japan, and; p. 24 for the
position of the US.
A2Ibid.. The EC has also addressed the issue on compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical products (at
p. 4). while the United States has expressed worries in which regards to the term of protection for
pharmaceutical products, as generally not satisfactory, because of the testing and approval
requirements (at p. 25).
"I3See submissions by Austria and Republic of Korea in GATT Doc. N.
MTN.GNG/NG1 l/W/32/Rev,2. note 122. supra, at pp. 86 and 87. respectively.
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Developing countries were strongly against the inclusion of an obligation to
protect pharmaceutical products and processes in the TRIPS Agreement.214 India
particularly opposed the protection of pharmaceuticals, arguing that it would have "...
adverse implications for the growth of indigenous industry as well as research and
development efforts", and that it would result "... in higher price of medicine for the
common man"215
A group of developing countries also proposed, in a more flexible way, that
Members of the TRIPS Agreement should be allowed to exclude from patentability,
"... on grounds of public interest, national security, public health or nutrition, certain
kinds of products or processes for the manufacture of those products ...", in so far as
the national treatment principle would be respected.216 This proposed provision
suggested that a possibility would be given to Members to exclude pharmaceutical
products and processes from patent protection.
Members, at the end of the day, are to protect pharmaceutical products and
processes. The final agreement concluded in Marrakesh, in April 1994, established
that "... patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in
all fields of technology ,.."217. Members may exclude from patentability, however,
"diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans and
animals"218. Although it was not expressly mentioned, the wording of the TRIPS
"HSee. in particular, the submissions by India and Peru, in GAIT Doc. N.
MTN.GNG/NG1 lAV/32/Rev.2. note 122. supra, at p. 85.
"15GATT Doc. N. MTN.TNC/MIN(90)/ST/46 (4 December 1990) India: Statement bv Dr.
Subramanian Swanrv. Union Minister of Commerce, Law and Justice, p. 4.
*!6GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/71 (14 May 1990). Communication from Areentina. Brazil-
Chile. China. Colombia. Cuba. Egypt. India. Nigeria. Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, p. 8. Article 4
(2).
:l TRIPS Agreement. Art. 27 (1).
2]*Ibid. Art. 27 (3) (a).
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Agreement does not give any possibility for Members to exclude pharmaceutical
products and processes from patent protection. It merely allows them to exclude
methods (diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical) for the treatment of humans or animals.
A more detailed analysis on the patentability of pharmaceuticals within TRIPS
is not concluded yet. At least two other issues may be included in the discussion.
Firstly, it must be said that at least the US, Switzerland and Japan believed
that a further term of protection for pharmaceutical products should be encouraged by
the TRIPS Agreement.219 Developing countries, namely India, suggested, on the other
hand, that Members should be permitted to set a shorter term of protection for sectors
of critical importance, such as the food, pharmaceutical and chemical sectors220.
Developed countries have strongly argued that pharmaceutical products
suffered from marketing delays due to "regulatory approval procedures"221 as
required by governments. The "patent term restoration" for pharmaceuticals, provided
for instance by the EC222, is a subject which has been brought to the TRIPS
negotiations by the interests of those countries where such industries are strategic
economic sectors.
The Agreement on TRIPS finally provided that Members are free to determine
longer terms of protection for pharmaceutical products, but there is neither explicit
encouragement nor any obligation to do so. Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement says
"19GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NGllAV/32/Rev.2. note 122. supra, at pp. 90 and 91.
220Ibid.. p. 91.
221 In connection with the "regulatory- approval procedures" required for the marketing of
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products. Article 39 (3) of the TRIPS Agreement
establishes that "the submission of undisclosed test or other data" shall be protected by the
government in question against unfair commercial use and against disclosure, except where
necessary to protect the public.
~Cf. Chapter 4. Section 3. Sub-section 3.3. Paragraph 3.3.1. supra.
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only that Members shall protect patents, in general, for at least twenty years counted
from the filing date.
Another issue discussed during the TRIPS negotiations, as proposed by the
US, that provisional protection should be provided for "...products embodying subject
matter deemed to be unpatentable under its [i.e. a Member's] patent law prior to its
acceptance to this Annex [the TRIPS Agreement], ,.."223 raised more controversy,
particularly, in the negotiations towards the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement
in the Brazilian Parliament224. The so-called "pipeline" protection should be made
available if the subject matter to which the product relates will become patentable
after the acceptance of the TRIPS Agreement225, or if a patent has been issued for the
product in question by another Member of the WTO Agreement226, and the product
has not been marketed and/or commercialised in the territory of the Member
providing the transitional protection for that specific product227.
Considered as an isolated initiative of the US, the proposed "pipeline"
protection has been finally included in the TRIPS Agreement. Although Article 70 (1),
TRIPS Agreement, creates the general rule that the TRIPS Agreement does not "...
give rise to obligations in respect of acts which occurred before the date of application
of the Agreement for the Member in question", Article 70 (8) and (9) of the TRIPS
Agreement has provided for an exception to the general rule.
Article 70 (8), TRIPS Agreement, states that where a Member does not make
available patent protection for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products as of the
223GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/70 (11 May 1990) Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Communication from the United States, at p. 10. Art. 26.
"4See further aspects of the Parliamentary negotiations in Brazil in Sub-section 1.2, infra.
^GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/70, note 223, supra. Art. 26 (1).
226Ibid.. Art. 26 (2).
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date of entry into effect of the WTO Agreement, such a Member must provide a
means by which applications for such patents may be filed228. Further, Article 70 (8)
(b), TRIPS Agreement, determines that the date of the application of the provisions
on the criteria for patentability as established by the Agreement on TRIPS, applies to
these applications "... as if those criteria were being applied on the date of filing in
that Member ..." and that "..., where priority is available and claimed, the priority date
of the application" will apply229.
It is noteworthy that Members are not obliged to grant patents for such
products before the entering into force of the TRIPS Agreement in that Member of
the WTO Agreement, taking into account the transitional period provided in Part VI
of the TRIPS Agreement. Nevertheless, when patents are granted after the Agreement
is effectively applicable in that particular Member, the protection will last for the
twenty year term counted from the filing date, as provided by Article 33 of the TRIPS
Agreement, and for the remainder of the patent term, for those applications which
fulfil the conditions for patentability as laid down by the TRIPS Agreement.230
Further, pursuant to paragraph (9) of Article 70, TRIPS Agreement, Members
shall grant "exclusive marketing rights" for a period of five years, after the marketing
approval procedures have taken place, for those applications which have fulfilled the
conditions for patentability of the TRIPS Agreement. Those rights will no longer be
227Ibid.. Art. 26 (3).
;2xTRIPS Agreement, Article 70 (8) (a).
■^According to Carlos Correa. note 124, supra, at p. 335. Article 70 (8) (b) "... preserves. ..., the
novelty of the application through a legal fiction based on the assessment of novelty (and other
criteria for patentability) as if it were [sic] judged on the date of the filing of the application ... and
not when evaluation actually takes place".
230TRIPS Agreement. Article 70 (8) (c).
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available if the patent is finally granted or if the patent application is rejected in that
Member of the WTO Agreement, whichever period is shorter.
Carlos Correa231 alerts us to the lack of detail regarding the scope and
application of the term "exclusive marketing rights" as used in the TRIPS Agreement,
and poses further questions relating to the type of remedies against infringements
which will be available to the right holder, the application of compulsory licensing
procedures against those rights, and the extent to which acts would be permitted for
third parties that wish to use the invention for experimentation, tests, manufacture or
market approval. However, it is possible to argue that such a detailed analysis of
complex questions should be dealt with by national laws. The scope of the TRIPS
Agreement is limited to setting up general principles and standards for intellectual
property protection. It is not, as one might think, a "model law" imposed on its
Members. Members shall, however, comply with these principles and general rules
according to Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement.
1.2. The legislation in Brazil
Pharmaceutical processes and products were protected in Brazil from the 1930s until
1945, when Decree-Law N. 7.903, of 27 August 1945, came into effect. Past
legislation provided for the protection of both pharmaceutical products and processes.
Decree-Law N. 7.903/45, in Article 8 (2), excluded from protection inventions which
have as a subject matter substances or food products and medicine of any type.
Article 8, Sole paragraph, nevertheless says that such exclusion would not apply to
new processes destined for the manufacturing of such substances or products.
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This situation was changed only in 1969, when the Decree N. 1.005, of 21
October 1969, in Article 8 (b) and (c) respectively, widened the principle established
by the 1945 legislation, and excluded both pharmaceutical products and processes
from patent protection. The CPI has also provided that neither pharmaceutical
products nor processes enjoy patent protection232.
Motivated by the developments of Brazilian international commitments and
the wish to harmonise Brazilian legislation with international practice233, as well as
responding to the constant pressure from the US234, the patentability of
pharmaceutical products and processes has been one of the most controversial issues
during the parliamentary negotiations of Law 9279/96.
231Note 124, p. 335.
232CPI, Art. 9 (c).
"^Mensagem Presidencial N. 192, of 30 April 1991.
234Since 1985 until the approval of Law 9279/96, the US has insistently threatened Brazilian
products with unilateral sanctions due to the lack or insufficient protection of EPRs, in particular
pharmaceutical products. On 7 September 1985, the US President announced the initiation of
investigations under Section 301 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, against Brazilian policy on the
restrictions to computer technology products. On 11 June 1987. the US Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (PMA) filed a petition before the US government requesting unilateral
commercial sanctions against Brazil, on grounds of "unreasonable" protection of pharmaceutical
products. A few months later, on 20 October 1988. President Reagan declared that, under Section
301 of the "Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988", in ten days 100% ad valorem tariffs
would be imposed against some Brazilian paper, chemical and electronic products. The Brazilian
government requested a Panel in the GATT to resolve such a dispute. The unilateral sanctions
imposed by the US were eventually withdrawn on 2 July 1990. after Brazilian President Fernando
Collor submitted to the Brazilian Parliament a legislative Bill (PL 824/91) proposing broader
protection for patents, including pharmaceutical and chemical products, biotechnology, and
foodstuffs (the information provided above was borrowed from Maria Stela Pompeu Brasil Frota.
Protecao de Patentes de Produtos Farmaceuticos: o Caso Brasileiro. Brasilia: FUNAG/IPRI (1993),
pp. 47-53; and Maria Helena Tachinardi. A Guerra das Patents - O Conflito Brasil x EUA sobre
Propriedade Intelectual. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra S.A (1993). pp. 105-112). From 1992 to
1996, however, the US government kept threatening Brazilian products with unilateral sanctions due
to the non-approval of the legislative Bill regulating industrial property rights. Information about US
threats in this regard was widely disseminated by Brazilian newspapers during this period. For some
viewpoints highlighting the contradiction between the US speech and practice in international trade,
particularly related to intellectual property protection see. e.g., Rogerio Cezar de Cerqueira Leite.
Patentes e Pressoes Norte-Americanas. Folha de Sao Paulo. 5 May 1993, Caderno 2. p. 2, and
Eugenio da Costa e Silva. Brasil-Estados Unidos e a Propnedade Industrial. Correio Braziliense, 4
June 1995, p. 7.
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Initially strong opposition against the patentability of pharmaceutical products
and processes took place235, arguing that developing countries do not protect
pharmaceutical products and processes in order to ensure access to cheaper medicines
to the population and to develop a national pharmaceutical industry236.
Despite efforts against pharmaceutical protection, the government was
carefully dealing with the US dissatisfaction with Brazilian current industrial property
law237. The protection of pharmaceutical products and processes has been included in
all versions of the legislative Bill during the negotiations in the Brazilian parliament238
and eventually became part of the recently approved Law 9279/96
There are probably 400 pharmaceutical industries in Brazil with a total
turnover of nearly three billion US dollars per year (1990). About 80% of this total
23"liven a Forum, called "Forum pela Liberdade do Uso do Conhecimento", (or Forum for the
Freedom of Knowledge Use) was established in 17 February 1992. with the participation of various
segments of Brazilian society, including the academic community, the religious community.
Brazilian industries, representatives of the Brazilian Bar Association, and others (in Aldo Rebeio
(ed.). Lei das Patentes e Soberania Nacional. Brasilia: Coordenaqao de Publicagoes. Camara dos
Deputados (1992)). Although the goals of this informal association was to discuss the proposed
industrial property law as a whole, most emphasis was given to the issues on pharmaceutical
products and processes and biotechnology.
236During the Parliamentary negotiations of Law 9279/96. several arguments were used for and
against the protection of pharmaceutical products. The usual argument in favour of pharmaceutical
products was that protection would be the incentive for investment in research and development,
eventually encouraging the transfer of relevant technology to Brazil and. that Brazil was taking a
difficult position in the international arena as a "pirate" of pharmaceutical products. The usual
arguments against the protection of pharmaceutical products were that the national pharmaceutical
industry has not had time to develop further, and that multinational pharmaceutical corporations
would monopolise the market with high prices medicines. For a general survey of the positions of the
national and multinational pharmaceutical industries, see Maria Stela Pompeu Brasil Frota. note
234. supra, pip. 91-96.
'3
Cf. note 234, supra.
238The first version, in the Brazilian Parliament, modifiying the legislative Bill submitted to the
National Congress by President Fernando Collor (i.e. Mensagem Presidencial N. 192/91. which
became "Projeto de Lei" N. 824/91), suggested, however, the exclusion from patent protection of
pharmaceutical products which are listed as essentials by the World Health Organization (WHO) (in
PL 824-B/91. Article 18 (VI)). This provision was eliminated from the text of the legislative Bill
even before it was sent to the Federal Senate. Thus, in PLC 115/93 this provisions was no longer
available.
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representing the turnover of only fifty foreign industries. The remaining 20% is the
turnover of the Brazilian industries, representing less than 1% of the total turnover.239
When, in 1969, protection for pharmaceutical products and processes was no
longer available in the Brazilian territory, it was expected that Brazilian
pharmaceutical industries would develop technologies based on foreign practice.
Clearly, the figures quoted in the last paragraph demonstrate that Brazilian national
development in the field of pharmaceuticals has not been as expected. One may argue
that this is because there was not the necessary scientific and technological policy
efforts to build up a strong national pharmaceutical industry. Not only the non-
protection of pharmaceutical patents is necessary to develop an industry.
The arguments against the protection of pharmaceuticals are no longer
effective. Law 9279/96 contains rules that may be used against the abuse or misuse of
the privilege conferred upon a pharmaceutical patent holder. Also, there are laws to
regulate market behaviour, prices and competitive activities of different economic
sectors in Brazil.240
In the pharmaceutical debate, what was a matter of great controversy during
all stages of Parliamentary negotiations of the Law 9279/96 was the inclusion of the
^Cicero Gontijo, Fernando Antonio Lyrio Silva, Francisco Eugenio Machado Arcanjo &
Ronaldo Bayma Archer da Silva. Contribuicao a Compreensao do PLC 115, de 1993. Brasilia:
Assessoria Legislativa do Senado Federal, mimeo. 22 September 1993, p. 21. An interesting fact, to
corroborate the argument that patent protection is not necessarily a condition sine qua non for
encouraging investment in R&D made by foreign undertakings in developing countries, is an
advertisement published by AKZO, a Dutch pharmaceutical and chemical corporation, in the back
cover of the Economist of 13 November 1993, V. 329. which quotes the following declaration from
Roberto Schverdfinger, General Manager of Organon Argentina SA: "I'm proud to work for a
pharmaceutical company - within Akzo - that invests a large part of its income in R&D. New or
improved pharmaceuticals are important to everyone's well-being. But it is of special relevance here
in Argentina. Argentinean law does not protect medical patents, so the market is flooded with
hundreds of me-too products. Despite this tough competition we have doubled our sales during the
last two years ".
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"pipeline" protection for pharmaceutical and chemical products241. Article 230 of the
Law 9279/96 states that the foreign holders of rights over pharmaceutical, chemical
products and processes and foodstuffs can apply for a patent, in the case of a patent
that has not been granted in the country of origin and the subject matter of the
claimed patent has not been put into the market, directly by the right holder or by
someone else with his consent. Further, it is required that a third party, in Brazil, has
not taken effective ana serious preparation for the exploitation of the subject matter of
that patent. The successful patent applicant will enjoy the privilege for a period which
takes into account the filing date and the remaining term of protection that such
patent enjoys in the country of origin242.
Pipeline protection will be also allowed for Brazilian nationals or someone
domiciled in the country, subject to the same conditions as applied to foreign
applicants.243 The successful patent, in this case, will enjoy twenty years of protection
counted from the filing date244.
It is also important to note that the pipeline protection, as provided by Law
9279/96, has already been in force since the date of publication of the Law
9279/96245. In addition, the Brazilian President is expected to sign a Decree granting
exclusive marketing rights for medicines and other products which are not patentable
in Brazil, but are registered abroad. It seems that this Decree is a provisional measure
which is intended to harmonise Brazilian industrial property laws and procedures with
:40For further reference on regulatory provisions on competition practices, its development and
interpretation, in Brazil, see Chapter 6, Section 2. Sub-section 2.2. infra.
241
Cf Paragraph 1.1, supra, for the US "pipeline" proposal during TRIPS negotiations.
:42Law 9279/96, Art. 230 (4).
242 Ibid.. Art. 231.
244Ibid.. Art. 231 (3).
245Ibid.. Art. 243.
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the country's international commitments, namely the TRIPS Agreement246. The INPI,
on the other hand, is already discussing a draft internal regulation to discipline the
procedural aspects of the pipeline protection247.
1.3. The negotiations in the MERCOSUL
The legislation of all States Parties, except recently approved Brazilian Law 9279/96,
excludes pharmaceutical products from patent protection. Brazil was the only country
to exclude also the process for the production of a pharmaceutical product.248
The WIPO has suggested, in accordance with the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement, that patents should be granted to all inventions, whether product or
process249. In the WIPO Proposal, only methods (therapeutical, surgical or diagnostic)
for the treatment of humans or animals should not be considered as an invention250
The Brazilian Proposal has suggested that States Parties of the MERCOSUL
shall grant patents to inventions which fulfil the requirements of novelty, inventive
activity and industrial application251. Further, the Brazilian Proposal suggests that
States Parties may adopt measures to impede or limit the exploitation of patented
:46In SBPC Hoje (4 September 1995), N. 393. It is also reported that foreign industries have already
filed at least 100 patent applications in the INPI for pharmaceutical products or processes.
24 Info ' ?on provided by letter from the President of the INPI. Vanda Scartezini, (OF/INPI/PR/N.
62/96, c. Z5 April 1996) to the President of ABPI, Juliana Laura Bruna Viegas.
248WIPO Doc. N. OMPI/MERCOSUR/MVD/94/2 (March 1994) Reunion de Expertos
Gubernamentales sobre Propiedad Intelectual en los Paises Miembros del MERCOSUR, Organizado
por la Organization Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual (OMPI) en Coordination con el Grupo
Mercado Comun del MERCOSUR v la Asistencia del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el
Desarrollo (PNUD), p. 9, para. 22, and; MRE, note 45, supra, pp. 4-5. It is important to note that.
recognising the difficulties for the patent owner to prove an infringement on process patents, the
TRIPS Agreement determined, in Article 34, that either the defendant or the alleged infringer will be
obliged to prove, during civil proceedings, that the process to obtain an identical product is different
from the patented process.
249WIPO Proposal. Art. 1 (1).
^Ibid.. Art 1 (2).
"^'Brazilian Proposal Item 1.1.
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inventions, when necessary to guarantee public order, public morals, including the
protection of human, plant or animal health252. It is possible that this provision could
be considered as leaving to States Parties the possibility of interpreting the common
law as, in some cases, impeding or limiting the commercial exploitation of a patented
invention. All patented inventions may fall within the limitation considered for the
MERCOSUL. That provision shall not be considered when analysing either the issues
on compulsory licence or matters related to the exclusions and exceptions of
patentable subject-matters. States Parties are only allowed to limit the unsafe
commercial exploitation of an invention.
2. Biotechnology
A definition of biotechnology has been formulated by the UNTDOAVHO/UNEP
Working Group on Biotechnology Safety as "... the application of biological systems
and organisms to scientific, industrial, agricultural and environmental processes and
uses", where the term '"[ojrganisms' includes plants, animals and microbes that occur
naturally or that have been genetically modified"253.
Also, the Paris Union Committee of Experts on Biotechnological Inventions
and Industrial Property, in its First Session, decided that, for the purposes of that
specific study, biotechnology should be understood as all technological
252Ibid., Item 1.3.
253UNEP Doc. N. UNEP/Bio.Div.3/Inf.5 (23 May 1990) Biotechnology: Concepts and Issues for
Consideration in Preparation of a Framework Legal Instrument for the Conservation of Biological
Diversity, p. 3. para. 3. Accordingly, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 31 ilxt 818
(1992), defines biotechnology, for the purpose of its application, as "... any technological application
that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or
processes for specific use" (CBD. Art. 2).
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developments concerning living organisms (which include animals, plants and
microorganisms) and other biological material..." 254
Although considering the ethical questions related to biotechnological
developments in relation with humans, it was decided that such study at WIPO would
cover all living organisms and the term "animals" should include non-humans and
human beings. The WIPO study, nevertheless, would not consider in detail questions
on the patentability of inventions relating to human beings.255
A further analysis of the concept of biotechnology may be divided in two
ways. For thousands of years, man has used "traditional biotechnology", which
includes inter alia the basic fermentation techniques, methods of selective breeding
and cross-breeding of plants and animals (mostly cattle) and the production of serum
and vaccines for human or animal health. The evolution of human knowledge, in
general, and the developments of new technologies have brought research to very
sophisticated levels.
"Modern biotechnology" is probably the technology which will have greatest
strategic importance for the drawing up of national science and technology, and
industrial policies. Such a technology was only possible with the advance of
knowledge regarding genetic and molecular structures. Its concepts include
techniques of genetic engineering and other technologies derived from cellular and
molecular biology, and the production of transgenic plants or animals.256
254WIPO Doc. N. BioT/CE/I/3 (9 November 1984) Committee of Experts on Biotechnological
Inventions and Industrial Property. First Session. Geneva. November 5 to 9. 1984. at p. 7. para. 22.
255Ibid., p. 7, para. 25.
:56See, generally, Cicero Gontijo et at., note 239, supra, p. 25, and Willian Antonio Cerantola
Estrategias Tecnologicas das Empresas de Biotecnoloria no Brasil. [1992] 2 Revista de
Administra/pao 5-14, p. 7.
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The results of biotechnological processes are widely applicable. Biotechnology
can be used in several economic and technological sectors, such as agriculture, cattle
breeding, cattle raising, chemistry, energy, environment, foodstuffs, mining, and
pharmaceuticals. Particular areas which seem to obtain larger economic advantages
from biotechnology R&D activities are health and agriculture. The issues about
pharmaceutical257 and plant varieties258 protection are closely linked with the issues on
the protectability ofbiotechnology.
Within the conceptual discussion on the legal protection for biotechnological
processes and products, environmental law also plays a very important role in modern
discussion. The inclusion of environmental discussion in the biotechnological debate
was formally established after the commitments reached at the UNCED in 1992.259
Several aspects of "biodiversity prospecting" are worth considering, as well as
its relationship with modern discussion of IPRs. Below, Chapter 7, which is added as
a complementary discussion to the present analysis, studies the issues further aiming
to propose a link between the provisions of the CBD and this research.
2.1. International legislation
On the international level, there are legal instruments established to protect
biotechnological inventions. They are the International Convention for the Protection
of New Varieties of Plants260, which is the first international agreement set up to
protect biotechnology and which will be analysed in Section 3, infra, and the
25 Considered in more detail in Section 1. supra.
258Considered in more detail in Section 3. infra.
"Particularly the issues as in the CBD.
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Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms
for the Purposes ofPatent Procedure261, established in 1977 to set up a system for the
transmission and/or storage of micro-organisms to an international depositary
authority, for the purposes of patent applications. The TRIPS Agreement also sets up
mandatory obligations regarding the protection of inventions in the field of
biotechnology.
2.1.1. The Budapest Treaty
A depositary mechanism for patent purposes is regarded as necessary "... partly to
guarantee the existence of the microorganisms and partly to supplement the
description, ,."262 in so far as the disclosure of the patent, as well as the conditions of
novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability, can be effectively assessed.
Apparently, there are still some doubts regarding the assessment of the
conditions of sufficient disclosure, in connection with the requirement of repeatability
which may be considered in the following way:
... the disclosure ha[s] to enable an average expert to arrive at the
same, or at least largely the same, result as the inventor. Repeatability
did not only exist, if the disclosure consisted of a full description, but
also, if, in the case of a microorganism, the major part of the disclosure
was in the form of a deposit of the microorganism.263
260Known as the "UPOV Convention" and done on 2 December 1961. being revised at Geneva on 10
November 1972, 23 October 1978 and 19 March 1991 (Geneva: International Union for the
Protection ofNew Varieties of Plants (1992)).
261Known as the "Budapest Treaty", done at Budapest on 28 April 1977 and amended on 26
September 1980 (published with the Regulations, Geneva: WIPO (1989)).
262WlPO Doc. N. BioT/CE/I/3 (9 November 1984) Committee of Experts on Biotechnological
Inventions and Industrial Property, First Session, Geneva. November 5 to 9, 1984. p. 16. para. 70.
:63WIPO Doc. N. BioT/CE/H/3 (7 February 1986) Committee of Experts on Biotechnological
Inventions and Industrial Property, Second Session, Geneva. February 3 to 7, 1986. p. 14, para. 70.
-> 1 ->
J1J
For the purposes of depositary procedures, the Budapest Treaty establishes
that a depositary institution, which has acquired the status of an international
depositary authority264, will provide for the receipt, acceptance and storage of the
micro-organism and the furnishing of samples.265
Rule 2.1 of the Regulations of the Budapest Treaty says that an international
depositary authority may be a government agency, a public government body related
to a public institution, or a private entity, in so far as such an authority has staff and
facilities able "... to store the deposited microorganisms in a manner which ensures
that they are kept viable and uncontaminated"266, and that sufficient safety measures
are taken to minimise the risk of losing deposited micro-organisms267.
The international depositary authority shall accept any kind or certain kinds of
micro-organisms268 and be available, for the purposes of deposit, to any depositor269
under the same conditions270, being impartial and objective in its procedures271.
The international depositary authority shall also refuse to accept the micro¬
organism, notifying the depositor of such refusal and the reasons for that decision272,
where the authority is technically not in a position to perform the tasks established by
264To qualify for the status of an international depositary authority, a depositary institution must be
located in the territory of a Contracting State of the Budapest Treaty and must benefit from
guarantees provided by the State in question that the said institution complies (Budapest Treaty. Art.
6(1)) with the requirements which will be discussed further in this Paragraph.
26%udapest Treaty, Art. 2 (vii) and (viii).
266Regulations of the Budapest Treaty, Rule 2.2 (i).
261Ibid.. Rule 2.2 (ii).
268Budapest Treaty, Art. 6 (2) (v).
269"'[Depositor' means the natural person or legal entity transmitting a microorganims to an
international depositary authority, which receives and accepts it", and any successor in title of the
said natural or legal entity (Budapest Treaty, Art. 2 (iv)).
'"'^Budapest Treaty, Art. 6 (2) (iv).
™Ibid, Art. 6 (2) (iii).
272Regulations of the Budapest Treaty. Rule 6.4 (a).
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the Treaty, because of the exceptional properties of the micro-organism273, and where
the micro-organism is supplied on conditions that indicate that the micro-organism is
missing or which for scientific reasons preclude the acceptance of the micro¬
organism274. Any international depositary authority may require that the micro¬
organism be deposited in the form and quantity necessary for the purposes of the
Budapest Treaty275.
The depositary authority must also issue to the depositor, in respect of each
deposit of micro-organism, a receipt confirming the fact that it has received and
accepted the micro-organism for deposit purposes276. The authority shall also test the
viability of each micro-organism which has been deposited before it277, and shall issue
a statement concerning its viability278.
In its capacity as international depositary authority, the depositary institution
shall store the micro-organism for a period of at least five years after the most recent
request for the furnishing of a sample was received, and, in any case, for a period of at
least thirty years counted from the date of the deposit.279
The depositary authority may provide samples to interested industrial property
offices, for the purpose of patent procedures related to the micro-organism280. It may
also furnish samples to the depositor on his request or, with the authorisation of the
depositor, to any authority, natural person or legal entity at the request of such
213Ibid, Rule 6.4 (a) (ii).
214Ibid., Rule 6.4 (a) (iii).
215Ibid., Rule 6.3 (a) (i).
276Budapest Treaty, Art. 6(1) (vi), and Regulation of the Budapest Treaty, Rule 7.1.
27Regulations of the Budapest Treaty, Rule 10.1.
2 sBudapest Treaty, Art. 6(1) (vi), and Regulations of the Budapest Treaty, Rule 10.2.
2,9Regulations of the Budapest Treaty, Rule 9.1.
280Budapest Treaty, Art. 6 (vui). and Regulations of the Budapest Treaty, Rule 11.1.
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281 282
party" Depositary authorities shall not, except under the foregoing circumstances,
give any information to anyone concerning any micro-organism deposited with it
under the Budapest Treaty283.
The depositor must supply the depositary authority with a written statement
bearing his signature and containing the details of the conditions necessary for the
cultivation, storage and testing of the viability of the micro-organism284, and shall
indicate the properties of the micro-organism which are or may be dangerous to
health or to the environment285. The depositor must also provide the depositary
authority with his name and address286, must indicate that the deposit is made under
the Budapest Treaty, giving a guarantee that the deposit will not be withdrawn for at
least thirty years287. The depositor must also give an identification (numbers, symbols,
etc.) to the micro-organism288. It is strongly recommended that the depositor includes
in the written statement "... the scientific description and/or proposed taxonomic
"78Q ton
designation of the deposited microorganism" If any of these conditions .are not
281 Ibid.. Art. 6 (viii), and Regulations of the Budapest Treaty, Rule 11.2.
282Under certain conditions, established by Rule 11.3 of the Regulations of the Budapest Treaty, an
international depositary authority shall also furnish samples of a deposited micro-organism to parties
legally entitled to it. However, discussions have taken into consideration that samples of a deposited
micro-organism should be made generally available to the public upon request (WIPO Doc. N.
BioT/CE/III/3 (3 July 1987) Committee of Experts on Biotechnological Inventions and Industrial
Property. Third Session. Geneva, June 29 to July 3, 1987. pp. 25 to 29, paras. 114-144).
283Budapest Treaty, Art. 6 (vii), and Regulations of the Budapest Treaty, Rule 9.2.
284Regulations of the Budapest Treaty, Rule 6.1 (a) (iii).
2X5Ibid., Rule 6.1 (a) (v).
286Ibid., Rule 6.1 (a) (ii).
1X1Ibid., Rule 6.1 (a) (i).
^Ibid, Rule 6.1 (a) (iv).
289Ibid, Rule 6.1 (b).
"90These are the requirements regarding "original deposits". The requirements for "new deposits"
are almost the same but in addition the depositor must state the relevant reasons for making a new
deposit and must affirm that the micro-organism is the same (Implementing Regulations of the
Budapest Treaty, Rule 6.2 (a) (ii)). He shall also provide the most recent scientific description and/or
taxonomic designation of the micro-organism, if the same was provided for the original deposit
(Ibid., Rule 6.2 (a) (iii))
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met, the depositary authority shall notify the depositor immediately and invite him to
comply with the missing requirements291.
As a final point, it is important to note that, in the light of the provisions of the
Budapest Treaty, no definition of a micro-organism exists. During the Diplomatic
Conference on the Budapest Treaty, it was agreed not to adopt a provision defining
micro-organisms, leaving the question to the depositary authorities, who are free to
accept deposits of everything they consider a micro-organism, under the terms
established by the Budapest Treaty.292
It is also worth mentioning that, as at 1 January 1996, most European
countries (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden and the UK) as well as Japan and the US are
Contracting Parties to the Budapest Treaty. On the other hand, no States Party of the
MERCOSUL is Contracting Party to the Budapest Treaty.293
2.1.2. The TRIPS Agreement
Biotechnology was also a major issue in the TRIPS negotiations. Developed
countries, in general, suggested that biotechnological inventions should be protected
more widely under the patent system294. The US argument was that the two existing
291
Regulations of the Budapest Treaty, Rule 6.4 (b).
292WIPO Doc. N. BioT/CE/I/3 (9 November 1984) Committee of Experts on Biotechnoloeical
Inventions and Industrial Property, First Session. Geneva. November 5 to 9. 1984. p. 21, para. 100.
293WIPO Doc. N. 423 (E) (1 January 1996) States Party to the Convention Establishing the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WTPO and/or the Other Treaties Administered bv WIPO and/or
to the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) - Governing
Bodies of WIPO. of the Unions Administered bv WIPO and their (Permanent) Committees, and of
the Rome Convention, p. 22
:94See. generally, GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/7. note 211, supra, at pp. 29 and 30 (opinion
of the US), GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/12/Rev.l (3 February 1988) Compilation of Written
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international conventions dealing with biotechnology protection matters - the
Budapest Treaty and the UPOV Convention - were not widely adhered to295, causing
a lack of harmonisation on national laws on this matter, or even the absence of any
protection at all296.
Some other industrialised nations suggested more limited ways of protecting
biotechnology. The EC, for instance, recommended, in accordance with the provisions
of the EPC, that Members of the WTO Agreement should be allowed to exclude from
patentability plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the
production of plants and animals, excluding microbiological processes or products
and plant varieties297.
Developing countries proposed that plant or animal varieties or essentially
biological processes for me production of plants or animals should be excluded from
patent protection altogether.298 Understanding that biotechnology is such a new and
complex subject, with effect on several influential sectors of national economies,
Submissions and Oral Statements, at p. 14, para. 41 and GATT Doc. N.
MTN.GNG/NGllAV/32/Rev.2. note 122, supra, at p. 86 (the suggestion of Austria) and p. 87 (the
suggestion of Republic of Korea).
^GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG1 l/W/7. note 211, supra, p. 30.
296See, generally, GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NGllAV/24/Rev. 1 (15 September 1988) Existence.
Scope and Form of Generally Internationally Accepted and Applied Standards/Norms for the
Protection of Intellectual Property, Note Prepared bv the International Bureau of WIPO. Annex II. p.
96 pouits (ii) and (iv) and p. 97, point (v).
^GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/68 (29 March 1990) Draft Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, p. 10, Art. 23 (2) and (3). Note, however, that in the first
place the EC suggested that patents should not be available at all to plant or animal varieties or
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals, excluding microbiological
processes or the products thereof (GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/26 (7 July 1988) Guidelines
and Objectives Proposed bv the European Community for the Negotiations on Trade Related Aspects
of Substantive Standards of Intellectual Property Rights, p. 6). It is also worth considering that the
Nordic countries did not urge "... broad patent coverage without exclusions for plants and living
organ- ms"', as stated by Julie Chasen Ross & Jessica A. Wasserman. Trade-Related Aspects of
Intell al Property Rights, p. 50, point 3, in The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History
(1986 992). edited by Terence P. Stewart. Deventer/The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation
Publishers (1993). Conversely, in GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG1 lAV/32/Rev.2. note 122, supra, at
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developing countries urged that the consequences of biotechnology protection should
be assessed more carefully.299
The final text of the TRIPS Agreement suggests that within such a complex
and controversial discussion a balance should prevail. The provision of the TRIPS
Agreement which deals with biotechnology must be analysed as considering three
matters in particular.
Note, firstly, that sub-paragraph (b) of Article 27 (3), TRIPS Agreement,
authorises Members to exclude from patent protection "plants and animals other than
micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants and
animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes". Carlos Correa'00
has expressed concerns in connection with two potential problems arising from the
interpretation of this provision. He, firstly, examines the question of terminology
when plants and animals are excluded from protection without any classification
(varieties, races or species). This leads to a broad interpretation of the concept which
includes plants and animals per se, as well as varieties, races and species of those
which may be contradictorily excluded from patent protection by national laws.
Secondly, Carlos Correa points out that the exclusion "essentially biological process"
is limited by the reference to processes which are neither "non-biological" nor
p. 85, Nordic countries suggested basically the same as the EC proposal, adding that "[a]s regards
biotechnological inventions, further limitations should be allowed under national law".
298GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/71, note 216, supra, p. 8, Art. 4 (1) (ii).
299See, e.g., Peru's proposal in GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NGllAV/32/Rev.2, note 122. supra, p.
85. Canada, also, shared the views that with regard to the protection of biotechnology, a "... more
technical study is required both domestically and internationally concerning the most appropriate
form of protection and the conditions under which it should be accorded" (GATT Doc. N.
MTN.GNG/NG11AV/47 (25 October 1989) Standards for Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights,
Submission from Canada, p. 7, point (iv)). Canada has thus proposed that Members should be
allowed to deem not patentable "multicellular life forms or processes for producing new multicellular
life forms" {Ibid., at Annex, p. 11).
30ONote 124. supra, at p. 328.
319
"microbiological". There are no complex doubts about "microbiological processes" as
a matter capable of patent protection, in so far as the intention of the letter of Article
27 (3) (b), TRIPS Agreement, is to extend biotechnological protection to both
traditional biotechnology and modern biotechnology. However, in connection with the
introduction of the reference to processes with are "non-biological", it is not clear
what the TRIPS Agreement wanted to define. As well put by Carlos Correa "[h]ow
can a plant or an animal be produced by a process which is not totally or in part
biological? The source and grounds of this text are untraceable"'01.
Secondly, the second sentence of Article 27 (3) (b) says that Members shall
protect plant varieties. Nevertheless, Members may protect such a variety "... either
by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof'.
Further analysis of such a provision, its consequences and its origins will be given
below, in Section 3.
The last sentence of Article 27 (3) (b), TRIPS Agreement, may be regarded as
the most important one, in so far as it states that the provisions of sub-paragraph (b)
"... shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement". It is clear that the negotiators of the TRIPS Agreement were not fully
satisfied with the system they had themselves established for protecting
biotechnology. Also, in the light of the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, one might
say that neither developed nor developing countries agreed totally with what has been
included in the final text. Coincidentally, such a four-year term for the revision of the
TRIPS provision is exactly the same period as was given to developing countries to
comply with the provisions of the Agreement. The discussion about biotechnology
320
protection is not settled on a world-wide basis. Further revision of this provision is
expected to consider more carefully the ethical and moral issues which have not yet
been completely clarified.
2.2. The legislation in Brazil
The CPI does not contain any exclusion regarding patent protection for animals,
plants, micro-organisms or micro-biological processes. This is because it was only
two years after the approval of the CPI that the first gene of a bacterium was
cloned""02. As a consequence of the silence of the law, 146 applications were filed in
the INPI, between 1980 to 1990, for patents in the field of biotechnology, namely
genetic engineering and mutations, while the two major areas in which patents have
been sought are health and agriculture303. Almost half of those applications have been
filed by US companies304.305
Law 9279/96 establishes that the whole or part of natural living entities and
biological material found in nature, or even that which has been isolated from nature,
including the genoma and germoplasm from any living entity and natural biological
processes, shall be excluded from patent protection"06. It seems that the national
legislature has decided to include a general rule - i.e. exclude from patent protection
302See. e.g., Richard Burnett-Hall. Environmental Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell (1995), at p.
779, note 2. where he says that "[t]he now standard DNA splicing techniques used in genetic
engineering were first developed by Stanley Cohen and Herbert Bover in around 1973".
303Appendix IV, Box 1, infra.
^Appendix IV, Box 2, infra.
305In a public debate held at the Committee of Economic Matters of the Federal Senate, on 10 August
1995, the Minister of Science and Technology ofBrazil. Jose Israel Vargas, affirmed that the INPI is
currently analysing over 300 patent applications in the area of biotechnology and patents have
already been granted in the area of tissue culture (Glaci Zancan, Patentes: Nao para Vegetais e
Animais Jornal da Ciencia Hoje, 25 August 1995, p. 7).
306Law 9279/96. Art. 10 (IX).
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everything which may be found naturally as a biological resource in the country - in
order to determine how the implementation of the principles established by the
Convention on Biological Diversity would take place. The aspects relating
biotechnology to biological diversity will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7,
supra
Several other aspects of the patentability of biotechnology have been included
in the legislative debate of the Law 9279/96. The issue has been controversial and
there has been strong opposition from certain sectors of the Brazilian economy and
society. The debate has firstly been on whether micro-organisms should be protected
or not and, then, whether micro-organisms should be defined, and, if so, whether
micro-organisms should be protected as a process or as a product or as both''07
Micro-organisms have not been defined in Law 9279/96. One of the
arguments is that no satisfactory definition is possible308, and that national juridical
systems, together with the administrative structure granting intellectual property
rights, should build a jurisprudential interpretation of what is meant by micro¬
organisms. An attempt to detail the law, at the current stage of doubt in this area,
could make the law obsolete in just a few years309.
T version of Law 9279/96 which was discussed in the Federal Senate under
the number PLC 115/93, determined that animals and plants should be excluded from
30 Lucas Furtado. Patenteamento de Microorganismos. Brasilia: Assessoria Legislativa da Camara
dos Deputados. mimeo, 1993, pp. 4-5.
308
Argument opposed by Lucas Furtado. note 307. supra, at pp. 4-5. He suggests two definitions for
the term micro-organisms for legal application.
309See. generally. Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciencia. Patentes em Discussao no
Senado. Jomal da Ciencia Hoje. 25 August 1995, p. 1. where the Brazilian Minister of Science and
Technology defends the view that micro-organisms should not be defined by Law 9279/96 (at that
time PLC 115/93), but through complementary measures, which would be more easily update in
accordance with the development of science.
patent protection and that micro-organisms would not be protected when isolated
from an industrial process.310 Patent applications for inventions related to micro¬
organisms would, nevertheless, be capable of protection since utilisation would occur
only for a specific process which engenders a specific product. The interpretation of
such provisions could lead someone to understand that all animal and plant varieties
would be excluded from patent protection and that just the biotechnology process as
such, not the product, would be capable of protection.
The final version of Law 9279/96, however, changed substantially, the
wording of Article 18 (III), which now reads as follows:
Art. 18 - The following are not patentable:
I-...
II - ...
III - the whole or part of living organisms, excluding transgenic micro¬
organisms which fulfil the three requirements of patentability - novelty,
inventive activity and industrial applicability - listed in Article 8 and
which are not discoveries.
Article 18, Sole paragraph, in addition, defines transgenic micro-organisms as
organisms which, under direct human intervention in its genetic structure, expresses a
characteristic which is not reachable by the said species in natural conditions. This
excludes the whole or part of plants and animals.
The legislative evolution of the aspects of biotechnological protection of the
Law 9279/96 seems to be in accordance with the international interests, since any
organisms which has been under human intervention, and which holds a characteristic
that is different than that which appears in natural conditions, will be capable of patent
protection. Obviously, as stated by Article 18 (III), Law 9279/96, such transgenic
organism has to fulfil the requirements of novelty, inventiveness and industrial
applicability. What is not clear is the cross-reference to the requirements of Article 8
and to the emphasis of discovery in the wording of Article 18 (III), Law 9279/96.
Under the patent system, all the basic conditions of patentability will apply to all
inventions. Also, discoveries are already excluded from patent protection, by virtue of
Article 10 (I), but Article 18 (III), Law 9279/96, emphasises that transgenic micro¬
organisms which meet the basic requirements of patentability listed in Article 8, Law
9279/96, are capable of protection. It appears that such a repetition of the
requirements of the law are not imperative and that was included only as a matter of
unnecessary emphasis.
2.3. The negotiations in the MERCOSUL
National laws of Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay do not refer at all to the
protectability of biotechnology. Argentina and Uruguay have particularly considered
the matter of plant variety protection and have specific legislation regulating that field,
but have nothing in the field ofbiotechnology in general.
Neither the WTPO nor the Brazilian Proposal have considered this subject. The
lack of common provisions on this matter might not be the most relevant issue in this
context. The absence of a MERCOSUL patent granting body, together with the lack
of a common way of harmonising jurisprudential interpretation, will create problems
for all States Parties. There is no formal sign that the issue will be further considered
310PLC 115/93, Art. 18. (III).
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in the near future. It is possible then to assume that regional negotiators are waiting
for further developments which will occur under the auspices of the WTO311.
3. Plant Varieties
Plants are living organisms belonging to the "vegetable kingdom"312. Plants have
always been essential nutrients and sources for medical therapy products, since the
beginning of civilisation. They have the capacity of growing, living and breeding.
Human practice, in the agriculture field, has intervened in the natural process - even
though by very rudimentary methods - and has improved plants' capacities for, inter
alia, producing more and better quality products and showing resistance against
plagues and other climate or natural conditions.
Plant breeders were first recognised as proprietors of rights derived from the
improvement of their plant varieties with an Edict published in 1883 by the Papal
States. While recognising that men deserve the right to be rewarded for their research
applied to the discovery of " .. new products and, to the invention, improvement or
introduction of new types of culture or technical solutions ...", the Recital of the Edict
enacted by the Papal States, concludes that:
We have now to concern ourselves with guaranteeing also the
ownership of those works that relate to the progress of agriculture and
its techniques by a more reliable and more expeditious method than
31'The revision of the provisions in this matter, as determined by Article 27 (3) (b), Last sentence,
TRIPS Agreement.
31The natural world may be divided in three areas: "animal, plant/vegetable and mineral kingdoms"
(A.P. Cowie (ed.). Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1989).
4th ed.).
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that practised hitherto with respect to the grant of specific exclusive
privileges.313
Although the Edict provided for industrial property mechanisms for the
protection of the products related to agriculture, such as the enjoyment of exclusive
temporary rights, grace periods for failure to work, and term of protection, these
regulatory provisions were never put into effect.314
Later, the Diplomatic Conference on the Paris Convention, which concluded
work in 1883, decided upon a Final Protocol, considered as an integral part of the
Paris Convention, which says that "[t]he words 'industrial property' should be
understood in the broadest sense; they relate not only to the products of industry in
the strict sense but also to agricultural products (wines, grain, fruit, cattle, etc.) ,.."315.
Then, at the beginning of the century, strong pressures from the agricultural
sector forced the US government to enact a law in 1930, in which a special type of
patent (plant patents) would be granted by the US Patent Office for the asexual
reproduction of new plant varieties, excluding 'tuber plants'316. After being amended
twice, in 1952 and 1954, this Act was included as an specific chapter in the Title on
patents in the US Code.317
Further developments on the issues of plant protection, either by patents or by
a breeders' rights system, have been considered at different levels of international,
313As quoted by Andre Heitz. The History of Plant Variety Protection, in UPOV, The First Twentv-
Five Years of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. Geneva:
UPOV (1987), pp. 53-96, at p. 60.
3lAIbid. pp. 60-61.
il5Ibid.. p. 59.
31Essentially potato and Jerusalem artichoke.
317Andre Heitz. note 313. supra, pp. 63 and 64; and UPOV Doc. N. UPOV/INF/11 (10 December
1985) The Protection of Plant Varieties and the Debate on Biotechnological Inventions, presented for
the information meeting of January 10. 1986. p. 12, note 13.
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regional and national laws. Developments have taken place at all three levels, as will
be seen below.
3.1. International legislation
In the late 1950s, international efforts were devoted to the establishment of an
international arrangement regulating the protection of plant varieties. In its second
session, in 1961, the Diplomatic Conference for an International Convention for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants, concluded work on the UPOV Convention,
which was recently updated in 1991.
Questions, and probably attempted solutions, have also been established by the
concluded TRIPS Agreement of the Uruguay Round. The interface between plant
patents, breeders' rights and advanced biotechnology has not been clearly concluded
yet. These, and other issues, will be analysed under the international discussion below.
3.1.1. The UPOV Convention
The needs of breeders have brought pressures to bear upon national governments and
the international community for a more appropriate type of protection for newly bred
varieties of plants. Although a small number of countries have been granting breeders'
rights through the traditional system of patent protection, the latter did not seem to be
a system which would consider, in more detail, the characteristics of a protectable
plant variety, therefore not satisfying the needs of the agricultural community."18 This
is, in summary, the reason for the establishment of an international arrangement in the
field of plant varieties.
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The UPOV Convention establishes a Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants, with legal personality319, and whose Members are Contracting
Parties to the UPOV Convention"'20. The Union has its seat in Geneva, Switzerland321,
and has as its permanent organs, the Council and the Office of the Union322
The Council, which consists of the representatives of the Member of the
Union323, meets at least once a year, in ordinary session324, and has the task of inter
alia appointing the Secretary-General of the Office^25, studying appropriate measures
to safeguard the application of the provisions of the UPOV Convention326 and taking
all necessary decisions to ensure the efficient functioning of the Union'"27. The Office
of the Union carries out all duties and tasks entrusted to it by the Council328, under the
direction of a Secretary-General329, who will be responsible for all the administrative,
financial and budgetary measures necessary for the functioning of the Union""'0. The
official languages of the Union are English, French, German and Spanish331.
Under the UPOV Convention, Members shall protect breeders' rights332,
where a "breeder" is the person who bred, or discovered and developed, a variety, or
his successor in title33'.
3WIbid.. UPOV Doc. N. UPOV/INF/11, pp. 13-14, para. 20
3,9UPOV Convention. Art. 24 (1).
320 /bid.. Art. 23.
321 Ibid.. Art. 24 (3).
822Ibid.. Art. 25.
323Ibid., Art. 26 (1).
32AIbid.. Art. 26 (3).
325Ibid.. Art. 26 (5) (iii).
326Ibid.. Art. 26 (5) (i).
3"
Ibid.. Art. 26 (5) (x).
328Ibid.. Art. 27 (1). First sentence.
325'ibid.. Art. 27 (1), Second sentence.
330Ibid.. Art. 27 (2) and (3).
331 Ibid.. Art. 28 (1).
332Ibid.. Art. 2. Whether dual protection should be allowed has been a matter of some controversy
During the 1991 Diplomatic Conference for the revision of the UPOV Convention an amendment to
the mandatory provision of Article 2 (which reads "Each Contracting Party shall grant and protect
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Two initial points must be highlighted here. Firstly, it should be noted that the
employer is entitled to be defined as the breeder if the person who has bred,
discovered or developed a variety is under his employment and the law of the
Contracting Party so provides. Also, it is important to note that discoveries of new
plant varieties are protected under the UPOV system of laws. UPOV states that it
appears necessary to have the protection of discoveries for new varieties of plants
because "... a large number of valuable new varieties are obtained by the selection
and reproduction of plants that owe their existence to a spontaneous mutation (that is
one which has not been artificially obtained and is therefore not repeatable at will, at a
given moment)"334.
Protection under the UPOV system applies to all plant genera and species335,
and lasts for a minimum of twenty years, counted from the date of the grant of the
breeder's rights336. National treatment337 and right of priority338 principles shall apply.
The UPOV system requires Members to provide that a plant variety must fulfil the
breeders' rights") was filed. Denmark and Sweden have jointly proposed (1991 UPOV Conference
Records: Proposal for the amendment of Article 2 - DC/91/33 (4 March 1991), p. 108 and Proposal
for the Amendment DC/91/51 (5 March 1991)) that breeders' rights as granted in the UPOV system
should be the only form of protection which would be allowed to Members of the UPOV Convention.
From the records of the discussion of the 1991 UPOV Diplomatic Conference (1991 UPOV
Conference Records, pp. 212-218, para. 248-272) it is possible to affirm that the actual text of Article
2 is not clear in its entirety. In my opinion. Members of the UPOV have to protect breeders' rights,
under the conditions and limits established by the convention. They may, however, do so using either
patents or a sui generis system of protection, or both. In the case of patents or another system, for
protecting plant variety rights, national laws will have to be amended, however, to comply with the
UPOV mandatory conditions: i.e. noveltv. distinctness, uniformity and stability.
333Ibid.. Art. 1 (lv).
334UPOVDoc. N. UPOV/INF/11, note 317, supra, p. 16, para. 23.
335UPOV Convention. Art. 3.
336Ibid., Art. 19 (2), First sentence. For trees and wines, breeders rights shall be granted for a period




conditions of novelty, distinctness, uniformity and stability, in order to be
protectable339
The concept of novelty under the UPOV framework differs substantially from
its definition in patent laws. With regards to the latter, an invention will be considered
new if it is not part of the prior art, where prior art is understood as everything which
has been made available to the public. In the light of the UPOV Convention, a plant
variety will be considered as included in the prior art - and as such not protectable - if
the right holder, or someone with his consent, has commercialised or disposed of the
plant variety, for purposes of exploitation of the variety'40.
The condition of distinctness is considered fulfilled if the plant variety for
which protection is sought is "clearly distinguishable from any other variety whose
existence is a matter of common knowledge at the time of the filing of the
application"341. Further, a plant variety will be deemed to be uniform if it is sufficiently
uniform in its characteristics342. And, finally, a variety shall be considered stable
if"... its relevant characteristics remain unchanged after repeated propagation or, in
the case of a particular cycle or propagation, at the end of each such cycle'"43.
Pursuant to Article 14 (1) (a) of the UPOV Convention, the following acts
related to the protected variety may not be carried out without the express
authorisation of the breeder, who may give his authorisation subject to certain
conditions and limitations'44: (a) production or reproduction (multiplication); (b)
339Ibid.. Art. 5(1). Members are not allowed to impose on applicants further and different conditions
(Ibid. Art. 5 (2)).




3AAIbid.. Art. 14 (1) (b).
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conditioning for the purpose of propagation; (c) offering for sale, selling or other
marketing; (d) exporting or importing; and (e) stocking for any of the purposes
mentioned above.445 These acts are not exhaustively imposed by the UPOV system.
Parties may therefore provide in their national legislation for further activities which
require the authorisation of the breeder346. These legal requirements, as related with
the rights conferred to breeders, shall also apply to (a) varieties which are essentially
derived from the protected variety, (b) varieties which are not clearly distinguishable
from the protected variety, and (c) varieties whose production requires the repeated
use of the protected variety347. It is also worth noting that breeders' rights may be
subject to compulsory licences, but only on grounds of public interest and that such a
non-voluntary licence must ensure that the breeder receives equitable remuneration
for the use of his rights348.
It is also important to mention that once the breeder, or someone else with his
consent, has sold or marketed any material349 of the protected variety or any material
derived from the latter, his rights will be exhausted in that specific national market'50.
The exhaustion of rights principles shall not apply to the acts of selling or marketing
the material of a protected variety when such acts involve further propagation of the
345Note that the above-listed acts in respect of harvested material, including entire plants and parts of
plants, which have been obtained through the unauthorised use of propagating material of the
protected variety (Ibid., Art. 14 (2)); and acts in respect of products made directly from harvested
material through the unauthorised use of the said harvested material (Ibid., Art. 14 (3)); shall require
the authorisation of the breeder, unless he has had a reasonable opportunity to exercise his right in
relation with the said propagating material.
i46Ibid, Art. 14 (4).
341Ibid., Art. 14 (5). Conversely, the rights granted to breeders will not apply to (a) acts done
privately and for non-commercial purposes, (b) acts done for experimental purpose, and (c) acts done
for the purpose ofbreeding other varieties (Ibid., Art. 15 (1)).
i4SIbid., Art. 17.
349For the purposes of the application of this principle "material" in relation to a variety means
propagating material of any kind, harvested material (including entire plants and parts of plants) and
any product derived from the harvested material (Ibid., Art. 16 (2)).
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variety in question or include the exportation of the material of the variety into a
country which does not protect varieties of the plant genus or species to which the
variety belongs, except where the exported material is for final consumption351.
3.1.2. The TRIPS Agreement
The issues about the patentability of new varieties of plants were formally considered
as a specific subject in the TRIPS negotiations. Discussions in this field were always
included in the negotiations about the provisions on the protection of biotechnological
products and processes. The provision of the TRIPS Agreement regulating this matter
is necessarily based on the proposal of the EC which was based on the wording of the
EPC352.
The EC suggested, in the first place, that plant varieties and essentially
biological processes for the production of plants should be excluded from
patentability^5". Although the EC considered initially that plant varieties should not be
patentable at all, it suggested later that Members would be allowed to exclude new
varieties of plants from patentability354, but under the obligation to protect new
varieties of plants by patents or by an effective sui generis system355. It means that,
bound by the commitments reached in the Uruguay Round, Members may choose the
appropriate system for protecting plant varieties.
iMIbid.. Art. 16(1).
3MIbid.. Art. 16 (1) (i) and (ii).
352See Article 53 (b) of the EPC.
353GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG1 lAV/32/Rev.2. note 122. supra, p. 85. See. also, in the same page
of this document, similar proposals from the Nordic countries and Peru
354GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11AV/68. note 297. supra, p. 10. Art. 23 (2).
i55Ibid.. p. 10. Art. 23 (3).
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The agreed text of the TRIPS Agreement, namely Article 27 (3) (b), includes
the EC suggestion. It has gone further and considered that not only could patents or
an effective plant breeders' rights system be used, but also any combination of both
legal systems may be used by Members of the WTO Agreement to protect new plant
varieties.
Though it is not expressly mentioned in the actual text, the TRIPS Agreement
has taken into consideration further developments of the UPOV Convention, and the
best example of the sui generis system, as proposed by Article 27 (3) (b), is the one of
the UPOV. The statement of the representative ofGATT, during the 1991 Diplomatic
Conference for the revision of the UPOV Convention, emphasised that the Uruguay
Round negotiations had not reached an agreement in the discussion of the
patentability of plant varieties. Negotiators have thus opted for a more flexible
method, and Members would be free to decide whether to use patents, a sui generis
system - "such as the UPOV system" - or any combination ofboth'56.
It is noteworthy, lastly, that the last sentence of sub-paragraph (b) of Article
27 (3) calls for a review of the provisions on biotechnology and, also, plant varieties,
in expectation of further international legal developments in the field of the
protectability of plant varieties.
3.2. The legislation in Brazil
The protection of the rights over new plant varieties was firstly recognised in Brazil
by Decree Law N. 2.679, of 7 October 1940, which aimed to regulate the registration
and requirements of industrial property attorneys before the National Department of
Industrial Property. In Article 1, Sole paragraph, of Decree-Law No. 2.679/40, new
plant varieties are considered as an industrial property right, capable of protection in
this field of law. It affirmed that "[t]he protection of industrial property refers to all
industry and commerce, applying to the inventions which deserve the privilege, utility
models, industrial design or model, new varieties of plants, trade marks, ..."
No industrial property application for plant varieties has been filed in the
Brazilian industrial property office. The CPI, for instance, does not refer at all to the
protection of new varieties of plants.
PL 824/91, in its original version as submitted by the Brazilian President to the
National Parliament, considered that all non-modified biological material found in
nature could not be an invention'57. Further, the first version of the Bill stated that
patents would not be granted to plant varieties'"58 and that a specific law would
regulate such a subject759
The final version of PL 824/91, i.e. Law 9279/96, does not suggest explicitly
that plant varieties should be protected by a sui generis system. It merely excludes
from patentability all living matter360. It seems that the national legislature did not
deem it necessary to refer explicitly to the subject. The expectation is that a sui
generis system, in accordance with the UPOV Convention, will be established in the
near future361.
356In 1991 UPOV Conference Records, at p. 180. paras. 74.1 and 74.2.
357PL 824/91. Art. 10 (EX). The discussion in the Federal Senate, where the legislative Bill was
numbered as PLC 115/93, under the same Article number, improved the writing of such provision
but maintained the general principle. The final version. Law 9279/96. contains the same wording of
that of PLC 115/93.
358PL 824/91, Art. 18 (HI).
359Ibid.. Art. 18 (2).
360Law 9279/96, Art. 18 (III).
%1Glaci Zancan. note 305, supra, contains information on a declaration by the Brazilian Minister of
Science and Technology who affirms that the Brazilian government is negotiating towards the
334
Senator Odacir Soares proposed a Bill, numbered as PLS N. 199, of 22 June
1995 (PLS 199/95), establishing rights over the development or discovery of new
varieties of plants. Institutionally, it is established under the auspices of the Ministry
of Agriculture, the National Service for the Registration and Protection of Plant
Varieties (SNRPC). The SNRPC, which will have its administrative organisation
determined by specific legislation'62, will be the authority in charge of the registration
and protection of new plant varieties363.
PLS 199/95 will make protectable a new variety of plant, as described in
specialised publications available to the public, which is clearly distinguishable'64 from
other known varieties, with specific denomination, and that is homogeneous'65 and
stable366.367 The subject-matter of the protection is the reproduction or multiplication
material of the whole plant368.
The right entitles its holder to reproduce a new variety commercially in the
Brazilian territory. The acts of selling, offering to sell, reproducing, importing,
exporting, packing, storing or assigning the new variety are allowed to third parties
only with the holder's consent.369
accession of Brazil to the UPOV Convention and that Brazil was therefore considering further
measures in this field.
362PLS 199/95. Art. 1.
363Ibid., Art. 43. The tasks and objectives of the SNRPC are provided in more detail in Articles 44 to
57, PLS 199/95.
364A variety shall be considered distinct when it is clearly different from any other variety which, at
the date of the registration is known (PLS 199/95, Art. 4 (IV)).
365A variety is homogeneous when it is utilised in the plantation, in a commercial scale, and presents
minimum variability in relation with the morphological, physiological or biochemical characteristics
utilised in the description of the variety (PLS 199/95, Art. 4 (V)).
366A variety is considered stable when it is reproduced in commercial scale and it maintains its
homogeneity through successive generations (PLS 199/95, Art. 4 (VI)).
^PLS 199/95. Arts. 3 and 6. If the variety does not hold any more the conditions of homogeneity or
stability, the rights over that variety will not longer exist (Ibid., Art. 36 (III)).
368 Ibid., Art. 7.
369 Ibid.. Art. 8. This rule will not apply in three cases: (a) when someone plants or store the seeds
for personal use (Ibid., Art. 9 (I)); (b) when someone uses or sells, as foodstuff or raw material, the
Any person or legal entity, and their successors, (nay apply for protection"70
When the applicant is a legal entity, the name of all the persons responsible for
developing the new variety"71 will be provided"72.373
PLS 199/95 suggests that the term of protection shall be fifteen years, counted
from the date of the grant of the breeders' rights. Fruit and ornamental plants shall be
protected for a period of twenty five years.374
With regard to the granting of compulsory licences, PLS 199/95 says that a
variety may be declared as of "restricted public use" on grounds of public interest or
on grounds of abuse of dominant position, for a renewable period of two years375. In
addition, Article 29(1) defines "restricted public use" as the authorisation granted to
third parties to exploit the variety, during the term fixed by the administrative
authority, against the respective payment of royalties to the right holder."76 The
authorisation as proposed by this Bill, for the use of a variety by third parties, on
grounds of abuse of dominant position, is against the mandatory rule of Article 17(1)
product obtained from the cultivation of the variety {Ibid., Art. 9 (II)); or (c) when the variety is
utilised as source for genetic improvement or in scientific research {Ibid.. Art. 9 (III)).
310Ibid., Art 5. caput and (1). Application for varieties which have been obtained by the efforts of two
or more persons may be filed jointly or separately {Ibid.. Art. 5 (2)).
3 ,IThe person who has bred, discovered or developed a new variety, in the light of the PLS 199/95. is
called a "developer" (PLS 199/95, Art. 4 (I)). Although differently formulated from the definition
provided by the UPOV Convention, the "developer" is actually the "breeder". He is the natural
person responsible for the development of the new variety and for the establishment of the
morphological, physiological or biochemical characteristics of the variety which may differentiate
that variety from the others.
312lbid., Art. 5 (3). See, also. Articles 31 to 35, for the provisions on the development of a variety
which occurred under the existence of an employment agreement.
313Foreign natural or legal persons are also entitled to protect their breeders* rights, under the
application of the national treatment principle {Ibid.. Art 10), if the country where the variety was
developed recognises the rights over the varieties obtained in Brazil, similarly to those obtained in
the foreign country {Ibid., Art. 10. Sole paragraph).
314PLS 199/95, Art. 12. Note that national legislator will have to consider that if the interest of the
Brazilian government is to adhere to the 1991 UPOV Convention, such a term of protection does not
fulfil the requirements of the UPOV, where the minimum term of protection is of twenty years (Cf
Art. 19 (2). UPOV Convention).
31sIbid., Art. 29. caput.
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of the UPOV Convention which limits the granting of a compulsory licence only to
situations of public interest. This is another issue which is not in accordance with
current moves towards Brazilian accession to the UPOV Convention. The current
version of PLS 199/95 also fails to address the issues on the right of priority and
exhaustion of rights.
3.3. The negotiations in the MERCOSUL
Only the national laws of Argentina and Uruguay provide for the protection of new
plant varieties through a "breeders' rights" system. Both have also adhered to the
UPOV Convention377.
Neither of the legal instruments which have been proposed in the
MERCOSUL negotiations refer to protectability of plant varieties. There is also no
indication that the matter will be discussed in detail in the MERCOSUL, at least at
this stage. The fact is that there is a regional trend among the States Parties of the
MERCOSUL, to adhere to the UPOV system and therefore harmonise the protection
of new varieties of plants.
Conclusion
The first thing to be said, as a conclusive remark arising from the present analysis, is
that to undertake legislative actions towards the harmonisation of substantive patent
law is a very complex activity and that current negotiations within the MERCOSUL
3 6An user who identifies the conditions established by Article 29 may also request to the Ministry of
Agriculture the grant of a "restricted public use" on grounds of public interest (Ibid.. Art. 29 (2)).
3 'Argentina on 25 December 1994 and Uruguay on 13 November 1994 (WIPO Doc. N. 423 (E).
note 293. supra, p. 25). The UPOV Convention has. as at 1 January 1996. thirty Members (Ibid.).
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are not addressing this matter in detail. When one looks at the draft texts which have
emerged from the negotiations in the MERCOSUL, these reveal a lack of detail in the
provisions agreed so far. For example, it is possible to note that the WTPO Proposal is
a very detailed text, but fails to address complex and controversial issues. It must be
said that the WIPO Proposal does not form the basis for intellectual property
discussion within the MERCOSUL. The "detailed" suggestion of WIPO should be
understood rather as a list of provisions which could be included in the laws of the
States Parties of the MERCOSUL or in a common agreement on industrial property.
On the other hand, the Brazilian Proposal, which seems to represent more closely an
outcome of the negotiating process towards a common set of norms for the
MERCOSUL, is superficial and vague. The Brazilian Proposal fails to address not
only the most controversial issues, but also matters related to very basic conditions for
patentability. The Brazilian Proposal, unfortunately, seems to form the basis for
industrial property discussion in the MERCOSUL.
As described above in Chapter 1, Section 2, Sub-section 2.3, Paragraph 2.3.1,
the MERCOSUL has just recently defined a more precise institutional framework for
its functioning. It lacks a judicial body, which would harmonise juridical interpretation
and settle conflicts between national and community laws. This is particularly the case
when looking at the issues on IPRs. There is a need for a more efficient legislative
process, made effective and applicable by an administrative and a juridical structure.
It is true that the European Union, which is at a higher stage of integration,
has not yet agreed upon a common and unified mechanism for patent protection
within the Community, as has been generally described in Chapter 4, supra. Also, the
MERCOSUL has different characteristics, features and established goals, if compared
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with the EU. Within the context of an integrated market, and considering the
differences among the national provisions which will be governing patent protection in
the territory of the MERCOSUL, more careful consideration must be given to the
application of general intellectual property principles. The lack of defined provisions
and the absence of a harmonised system to interpret the legal framework of the
MERCOSUL, may create problems in the near future. It is necessary to agree upon a
more institutional approach. For the protection of IPRs, perhaps the setting up of a
common administrative body, such as a patent office, which would analyse, judge and
grant industrial property privileges, at an administrative level, could contribute to the
necessary process of institutional and commercial integration.
All these institutional mechanisms, however, are only worth existing if a
minimum set of common rules exist. The MERCOSUL has failed, so far, to discuss in
depth several aspects of patentable subject matter. There is a need for more detailed
provisions determining the conditions of patentability, exclusions and exceptions, term
of protection, and rights conferred by a patent. In addition, there should be a detailed
legal understanding about the application of each of those provisions which will be
used throughout the territory of the MERCOSUL. Hence the negotiations should go
beyond the simple process of listing industrial property principles. When one
considers, for instance, the definition of the basic conditions of patentability - i.e.
novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability - it is necessary to bear in mind that
if there is no definition on how national patent offices should address these issues, a
diverse application of these conditions will definitely occur. Moreover, the conditions
for the granting of compulsory licences should be limited, to fit into the necessary
boundaries of an integrating project. These are introductory issues which deserve
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careful consideration in the context of a common agreement to harmonise patent
protection in the MERCOSUL. It is also necessary to consider the establishment of
limits for the setting up of the conditions and obligations for the use of the patent vis¬
a-vis the requirement of local production of the protected product.
Particularly in relation with the latter issue, States Parties of the MERCOSUL
should bear in mind that the TRIPS Agreement establishes that Members of the WTO
Agreement must accept importation as a condition of the use of a patent. The example
of the recently approved Brazilian industrial property law could provide some
guidance in this regard, in so far as it determines that importation will be accepted as
the use of a patent only if the patentee proves that the conditions for local production
are economically impossible. This is, for example, the situation of products which do
not have a market which justifies its local production. Otherwise, local production
should be required.
Some could argue that the TRIPS Agreement does not allow such
interpretation from the wording of Article 27 (1) which says that "... patents shall be
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of the
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced".378
The foregoing reference to Article 27 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement have to be
read in conjunction with Articles 7 and 8 of the same Agreement. Article 7 of the
TRIPS Agreement determines that the protection and enforcement of IPRs should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
378See, for further discussion on the application of Article 27, TRIPS Agreement. Peter Kolker,
Should Importation Be Considered as working'? A Study of Article 27 of the GATTATRIPS
Agreement London: The Intellectual Property Institute (1996).
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dissemination of technology. It is quite clear that such promotion, transfer and
dissemination of technology would only take place effectively if production of the
patented product occurs in the place where such product will be commercialised.
Article 8(1), TRIPS Agreement, goes further and determines that Members of the
WTO Agreement, when implementing the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, may
adopt measures to promote the "...public interest in sectors of vital importance to
their socio-economic and technological development ..." The adoption of national
measures must be done in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, but, by virtue of
Article 8 (2), TRIPS Agreement, a broader interpretation of the wording of the
TRIPS Agreement may be necessary to prevent practices "... which unreasonably
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology". Local
production of a patented product, as a means of promoting the necessary transfer of
technology, is a possible mechanism that is not contrary to the letter of the TRIPS
Agreement. On the one hand, the TRIPS Agreement's goal is to promote enforcement
and harmonisation of intellectual property laws, while supporting the dissemination
and transfer of technology. On the other hand, the TRIPS Agreement recognises the
technological gap between developed and developing economies, by granting the
latter, in Article 65, an extra period of time to implement the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement.
Furthermore, when one looks at the issues on patentable subject-matter,
particularly those related with the protectability of pharmaceuticals, biotechnology
and plant varieties, even more detailed analysis should be included in a common text
aiming at the harmonisation (or unification) of national laws in the MERCOSUL. The
setting up of common provisions for the protection of the above mentioned issues,
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however, have to be drawn up within a much broader context. Science and
technology, as well as industrial and environmental policies have to be part of the
legislative considerations of these matters. Further conclusions in this regard will be
provided in Chapter 7, which draws up a line between patent protection and the
exploitation of natural resources, and in the final conclusion, below.
When one considers particularly the conceptual aspects of patentability of
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, several considerations must be made. For
pharmaceuticals, a common arrangement on the harmonisation of national patent laws
in the MERCOSUL must consider the issues on pipeline protection (as a means of
implementing the TRIPS Agreement), and procedural matters, such as the second and
further uses of known substances or products. With regards to the discussion whether
pharmaceutical products and processes should be protected or not, this seems to be a
debate which belongs to the past. States Parties of the MERCOSUL are obliged by
the TRIPS Agreement to protect pharmaceutical products and processes. If States
Parties have to protect them, a common and unified understanding of the issue has to
be included in the common text on patent rights for the MERCOSUL.
In the field of biotechnology, possible provisions of a common agreement in
the MERCOSUL will have to consider, firstly, the non-finalised agreement in this
matter in the international forum. The TRIPS Agreement, as has been described in
Part 2, Section 2, Sub-section 2.1, Paragraph 2.1.2, supra, provides a doubtful and
vague definition of biotechnological protection. The wording of the TRIPS
Agreement is not clear and leaves much discretion to national laws to interpret its
letter. Further, by calling for a revision of Article 27 (3) (b) of the TRIPS Agreement,
the negotiators accepted that the discussion about the protection of biotechnology has
342
not yet been concluded. Therefore, a common agreement on patents for the
MERCOSUL has to determine provisionally the ethical, social, economic and
technological circumstances of the region, though accepting that some degree of
protection for biotechnological products is necessary. The MERCOSUL should
provide technology owners and users with some expectation of legal certainty.
Common provisions on the protection of biotechnology should attempt to define the
concepts on a provisional basis, making sure that a definite set of rules for
biotechnology would become available once the international community, particularly
under the TRIPS Agreement, agrees upon a clearer provision in this field.
With regards to the protection of plant varieties, it is more likely that
negotiations would move towards a breeders' rights system, under the UPOV
auspices. As has been mentioned in Part 2, Section 3, Sub-section 3.3, above,
Argentina and Paraguay are already Contracting Parties to the UPOV Convention and
Brazil is negotiating accession to the UPOV Convention and discussing, in
Parliament, a breeders' rights system of protection. The discussion on the
harmonisation of laws and regulations for the protection of plant varieties has, thus, to
be considered separately from the discussion on patent harmonisation.
Another aspect that I should like to mention is related to the legislative
mechanism which will be utilised for the harmonisation of substantive patent laws in
the context of the MERCOSUL. The diverse application of the several aspects related
to the protection of pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and plant varieties will probably
lead the negotiating process in the MERCOSUL to discuss these issues under
separate legal frameworks. It is difficult to foresee a common agreement covering in
detail all these complex and distinct matters. In my opinion, there are more
appropriate legislative measures to harmonise all these issues which may be taken by
the organs of the MERCOSUL and which are directly binding upon the States Parties.
This appears to be more feasible than the mechanism of inter-State Convention. Past
negotiations on common rules for patent protection through the mechanism of inter-
State Convention in the MERCOSUL could be used to back up future negotiations
under a new approach which considers other legislative methods that will discuss each
issue in a separate way.
The present Chapter attempted to describe the international and national
trends on substantive patent law, informing the reader about the current stage of the
negotiations in the MERCOSUL. The following Chapter will take a similar path and
describe the international and national trends on integration-related aspects of IPRs
(i.e. free movement of goods and competition law principles), informing the reader
about the current stage of negotiations in the MERCOSUL. The descriptive analysis
that follows intends to be complementary to that of Chapter 3, below.
CHAPTER 6
SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW: COMMERCIAL ISSUES
Introduction
Envisaging a commercially integrated market, as first put into practice by the
European Community, there are, inter alia, two important principles to be considered
for the success of the process itself, which are of particular concern to the present
research. They are the principle of free movement of goods and the mutual application
of competition rules throughout the territories of the participating countries.1 These
common constitutional provisions of regional arrangements are of particular interest
when analysed under the understanding that patent rights are granted nationally - or if
granted in a regional basis, that these rights will certainly be analysed by national
courts as national patents2 - and that the resulting goods will be marketed in that
territory, without being subject to any type of quantitative restrictions or any
measures having equivalent effect3.
The first principle is that goods shall circulate freely throughout the territory
of the Member States, without being affected by tariff or non-tariff barriers4. This is a
principle which, together with the so-called "four freedoms"5, specifies the essential
features and goals of political arrangements towards a free trade zone, a customs
1 See, generally, the main structure of part 4 of the work done by David A. O. Edward & Robert C.
Lane. European Community Law: An Introduction. Edinburgh: Butterworths & Law Society of
Scotland (1995), 2nd ed, and, particularly, pp. 76 to 86 and 102 to 121.
2See, generally, Chapter 4, supra.
TC Treaty, Art. 30. Peter Oliver, Free Movement of Goods in the EEC under Articles 30 to 36 of
the Rome Treaty, London: European Law Centre Limited (1982), at p. 1, says that the application of
the principle, as established by Article 30, "... covers a multitude of other trade restrictions
covering "... such questions as intellectual property, price controls and indications of origin"
The "free movement of goods" principle as established by regional agreements. See, e.g., Articles
30-36 of the EC Treaty and Article 1 of the Treaty of Asuncion.
Tree circulation of goods, persons, services and capital.
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union or a Common Market. The temporary monopoly conferred by the State upon an
intellectual property holder may, in some cases, infringe the principle of free
movement of goods. This problem has been dealt with, particularly in European case
law6, by widening the territorial application of the principle of exhaustion of patent
rights.
Additionally, it is indispensable for the establishment and functioning of an
integrated economic and commercial area that competitive practices in the territory of
the participating countries do not affect the process of liberalisation of trade in that
particular integrated area7. Again, the exercise of the right of a patent may, in some
circumstances, affect trade between Member States, which shall be deemed unlawful.
The European Court of Justice and the Commission of the European
Communities have played a very significant part in the process of commercial
integration in Europe. Both the free movement of goods and competition law
principles, as studied in Chapter 3, have been frequently used as a very important
guide and reference for future integrating projects.
In this Chapter, the concerns about the application of the free movement of
goods and anti-competitive rules will be analysed on the international, national and
regional levels. Again, following similar structure to Chapter 5, relevant agreements,
laws and regulations will be considered as follows.
When analysing the questions related to the application of the principle of the
free movement of goods, and the consequent exhaustion of patent rights in a specific
territory, Section 1 studies the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for an
Afore detailed discussion on European case law in this field is provided by Chapter 3, SecUon 1,
supra.
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international view. Then, it discusses the issues under Brazilian national legislation,
paying particular attention to the CPI and the relevant aspects of parliamentary
negotiations of Law 9279/96. Lastly, the issues are analysed in the context of the
negotiations carried out in the MERCOSUL.
When analysing the issues on competition law, Section 2 considers, at the
international level, the Paris Convention and the rules established by the TRIPS
Agreement. At the national level national legislation on competition law, the CPI and
the parliamentary negotiations of the Law 9279/96 will be studied. At supranational
level, Section 2 analyses the application of Article 4 of the Treaty of Asuncion and
current stage ofnegotiations towards common rules on competition law.
1. FreeMovement ofGoods
The free movement of goods principle has been commonly applied by national laws
when connected with the use of intellectual property rights in national territories.
When rights are granted by the State to a patent holder, at the same time the use and
the exploitation of these rights are limited to national boundaries. That is the essence
of an intellectual property right. The international community has attempted to
harmonise, multilaterally, the application of intellectual property principles, while
avoiding the discussion on the international exhaustion of IPRs.
This is of particular interest when, in the context of an integrated market, it is
said that participating countries must not impose restrictions on the circulation of
products. In this particular case, the application of patent rights are considered with
great care. The holder of a patent has a temporary monopoly which allows him to
See, e.g., Articles 3 (g) and 85 to 94 of the EC Treaty and Article 4 of the Treaty of Asuncion.
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exploit the patented invention and to be rewarded for the financial investments and the
efforts which have led to the invention. The exercise of his right has nevertheless to be
limited. The analysis in Chapter 3 concluded that, in the European Community, once a
patent holder, or someone with his consent, markets the patented product for the first
time in the territory of one of the Member States of the Community, his rights over
the distribution of that product are exhausted and he is not allowed to impose any
barriers to the further circulation of the patented product in the Community.
1.1. International legislation: the TRIPS Agreement
The debate about the exhaustion of intellectual property rights has been a major line
of distinction between the interests of developed and developing countries. The
former understands that the exhaustion of rights doctrine should remain as
traditionally applied, within national jurisdictions. Developing countries, on the other
hand, argue that the principle of exhaustion of rights should apply on an international
basis.
The differences of view in this regards are essentially based on the further
commercialisation of the patented product. While developed countries, which are the
owners of technology, want to have monopoly rights over patented products in a
national basis, thus impeding further circulation of the protected product in an
international basis without the owners' consent, developing countries want to have
the possibility of acquiring protected products wherever in the world they have been
marketed at lower prices. Under the national exhaustion system, intellectual property
owners would be allowed to license their protected products in every national
territory and the product in question could not be exported to other countries unless
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the owner authorises someone else to do so or does so himself. On the other hand,
under the international system of exhaustion of IPRs, protected products would be
allowed to circulate freely throughout the world, after being introduced into the
market by the right holder or someone with his consent, eventually enhancing
competition and keeping prices down.
This discussion has been of particular concern during the negotiations of the
TRIPS Agreement, though neither developed nor developing nations have explicitly
referred to the issues of international exhaustion of IPRs.8 In general both groups of
countries insisted that EPRs should not be used as barriers to international trade,
which was the most important goal to be achieved by the TRIFS Agreement. Thus, it
is important to remark that, in essence,
... international exhaustion corresponds more to the spirit of GATT
since it does not rely upon the exceptions provided for in Articles XX
(d) and XXTV on customs unions and free trade areas. Licensing
ideally implies, from a GATT perspective, that new competition is
created which is beneficial from a point of view of efficiency.9
It is necessary to remark that, from the reading of the negotiating documents
of the TRIPS Agreement "[n]o party was willing to make any commitment in this
complex field, which is often left to national courts"10 and national laws.
sNote, however, that during the negotiations on the PLT, a group of developed countries has taken a
position that "[t]he right to control importation was ... a necessary corollary to the right to make the
patented product" and that "[t]he right to prevent the making of a patented product was only
controllable territorially, and a loophole in the protection would occur if a third party could import
an infringing product manufactured in a country other than the country where the patent had been
granted" (PLT I Conf. Rec., p. 511, para. 116.7). In addition, the representative to the Soviet Union
has expressed its position in favour of Alternative B, of Article 19, PLT, which says that the
exhaustion of rights principle may be accepted either nationally or in a regional basis (Ibid., p. 515,
para. 120.3).
9Thomas Cottier, Intellectual Property in International Trade Law and Policy: the GATT
Connection. A ussenwirtschafi. 47 Jahrgang (1992), 79-105, at 97.
10Thomas Cottier, The Prospects for ntellectual Property in GATT. [1991] 28 CML Rev. 383-414,
p. 399.
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The final agreement on TRIPS has thus established that nothing in the TRIPS
Agreement "... shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights" for the purposes of dispute settlement procedures11. Although it is
possible to affirm that this provision has "caused a considerable amount of disquiet in
some circles" - presumably the industries of developed nations which feared that it
would impose a system of international exhaustion of IPRs12 - most authors, when
analysing this issue, have understood that this is a "neutral" type of provision which
leaves to national legislation and courts the discretion to adopt whichever system is
deemed better13.
It is also noteworthy that the GATT provisions, in particular Article XX (d),
allow Parties to adopt and enforce national legislative or regulatory measures in
relation to IPRs if the following conditions are met: (a) if these laws and regulations
are not contrary to the GATT law; (b) if these laws and regulations are necessary to
secure compliance with GATT law; and (c) if such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute either a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade.
In fact, GATT enables parties to take legislative measures which, otherwise,
would be contrary to its principles. A broader interpretation of Article XX (d) could
nevertheless lead one to think about the obligation imposed upon Contracting Parties
to apply the principle of international exhaustion of rights, in so far as national
"TRIPS Agreement Art. 6.
i:J5rg Reinboth & Anthony Howard, The State of Plav in the Negotiations on Trips
iGATT/Uruguay Round). [1991] 5 EIPR 157-164, p. 159.
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exhaustion may be considered restrictive of international trade, constituting a barrier
to the free flow of goods and hence contrary to GATT principles. This interpretation
is not clear though and, taking into account the foregoing discussion on Article 6 of
the TRIPS Agreement, it is possible to argue that the application of Article XX (d) to
international exhaustion of rights is no longer effective because the TRIPS Agreement
has explicitly allowed its Members to adopt either national or international jurisdiction
on the application of the exhaustion of rights doctrine.
1.2. The legislation in Brazil
The CPI has not dealt with the issues of international exhaustion of patent rights.
Juridical and administrative understanding has however applied the international
exhaustion doctrine in Brazil as a general rule.
The negotiations towards Law 9279/96 in the Brazilian Parliament considered
this matter in more detail. In the first version submitted to Parliament, the principle of
international exhaustion was present. The rights of a patentee would be considered
exhausted once the patented product had been put into the national or international
market by the patent holder, or by someone with his express consent. As highlighted
by Mensagem Presidencial N. 192/91, the option for the inclusion of the international
exhaustion principle in a new legal framework considered, particularly, the Brazilian
national policy of free market which took into account GATT existing rules14.
13See, generally, J5rg Reinbothe & Anthony Howard, note 12, supra, Thomas Cottier, note 10,
supra, and Clive Bradley, The Role of " VTT in Intellectual Property. [1991] 3 Copyright bulletin
11-15, p. 14.
14See, above, in Sub-section 1.1, a description of some concerns that have been expressed in relation
to the interpretation of Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement. It seems to be clear, as it has been pointed
out in Sub-section 1.1, supra, that the goal of Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement appears to be that
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It was clear from the beginning of the negotiations of Law 9279/96 that
Members of Parliament in Brazil were not very familiar with the consequences of the
application of such principles. Questions have then arisen from the understanding of
the principle as related to the patentee's right to impede someone from exporting or
importing the patented product without the consent of the patent holder. Actually,
what seems to have been the doubtful concern of the Brazilian Parliament was the
limitation applied to the application of the rights to impede someone to export or
import the patented product. After some clarification it appeared that the patentee will
have the exclusive right to market the patented product, or to authorise someone to
do so, anywhere in the world. If someone else does so, on a national or international
basis, without the patentee's express authorisation, this act will be deemed unlawful
and thus subject to criminal and/or civil sanctions and penalties.15
Law 9279/96 deals with the subject as follows. Where the rights of the
patentee are established16, Law 9279/96 says, in Article 43 (IV), that the rights
conferred to the patentee will not apply to products which have been manufactured in
accordance with a product or process patent which has been put into the internal or
external market directly by the patent holder or with his consent.
Opting for the international exhaustion doctrine, Brazilian legislation seems to
be moving towards the protection of its own industries and technologies. Note that, as
an importer of technology, Brazilian industries would be allowed to import products
national Parliaments and national courts are free to adopt either the national or the international
system of exhaustion of IPRs.
!5See, generally, discussion during the Seventh, Tenth and Twelfth Meeting of the Special
Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, where some discussion took place in relation to the inclusion
of the international exhaustion of IPRs doctrine into Brazilian legal framework. It is noteworthy that
no controversy has taken place, but only some doubts concerning the application of such principle.
16As described in Chapter 5. Part I, Section 3, supra.
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which are manufactured in other countries, with the patentee's consent or by himself,
where such product is marketed with cheaper prices. This seems to be of particular
importance when taking into account the practice of multinational pharmaceutical
companies which usually make their products available in the markets of developing
countries with much higher prices than anywhere else in the world.
It is also important to say that Law 9279/96, considered the insertion of the
country in the process of economic liberalisation ofworld trade. The drafters of Law
9279/96 have undoubtedly considered that the application of the principle of
international exhaustion of IPRs will affect also products patented, manufactured and
marketed in Brazil.
1.3. The negotiations in the MERCOSUL
While the issues related to the protection of intellectual property rights are a matter
for national jurisdiction based on the application of the national sovereign rights, this
is broadened by the prospect of an integrated market in which goods circulate free of
any type ofbarriers.
The Treaty of Asuncion affirms in Article 1 that the MERCOSUL shall be
based on the "[f]ree movement of goods, services and factors of production between
countries through, inter alia, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff
restrictions on the movement of goods, and any other equivalent measures".
As far as the granting of EPRs is essentially a national measure, the application
of these rights are limited to national boundaries and may be used as restrictions
having effect on the free circulation of goods throughout the territories of the States
Parties.
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Estrella Faria affirms that the establishment of the principle of free movement
of goods is dependent on two major groups of rules: "a programme of tariff
reductions and the principle of national treatment, on the one hand, and the
prohibition of quantitative restrictions17 and measures having equivalent effect, on the
other"18.
Estrella Faria also affirms that three regulatory aspects must be included in this
discussion: tariff reductions and national treatment, the elimination of non-tariff
barriers and safeguard clauses. The issues which will come out from this discussion
and which are related to the territorial applicability of EPRs in the territory of the
MERCOSUL are essentially the third aspect, i.e. the elimination of non-tariff barriers
among the participating countries.
In connection with the application of the international exhaustion of rights
principle, the current legislation of the four countries of the MERCOSUL does not
deal expressly with the subject. The WIPO Proposal has nevertheless suggested that
the rights over a patent do not include the right to impede a third person to use a
patented product commercially after it has been introduced to the market of any State
Party of the MERCOSUL by the patent holder or by someone with the patentee's
consent or economically linked to him19. The WIPO Proposal suggested the
application of the general principle of regional exhaustion of rights, but left open the
doubtful question of the meaning of a economically linked person in this context.
nTreatv of Asuncion, Annex I (Trade Liberalisation Programme), Article 2 (b), defines the term
"restrictions" as such: "'Restrictions' shall mean any administrative, financial, foreign exchange or
other measures by which a State Party unilaterally prevents or impedes reciprocal trade".
18Jose Angeio Estrella Faria, O MERCOSUL: Princimos. Finalidades e Alcance do Tratado de
AssuncJo. Brasilia: MRE/SGIE/NAT (1993), p. 76.
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The Brazilian Proposal has also suggested that the rights conferred by a patent
do not include a "manufactured product in relation to a patent of process or product
which has been put into the internal market or in any State Party directly by the patent
holder or with his consent"20.
It does not seem that the issues on exhaustion of patent rights are
controversial in the current stage of negotiations in the MERCOSUL. States Parties
know that the rights over a patent will be exhausted somehow by virtue of the
application of the principle of free circulation of goods, after the product has been
lawfully put into the market in the territory of the MERCOSUL. What seems to be
lacking so far is the application of the general principle in the context of the disputes
that may come up. Considering the experience of the EC the application of this
principle is not necessarily an easy task. Several situations, with different economic,
commercial and legal characteristics, will occur at some stage. National juridical
understanding will have to be harmonised for the effective application of this principle
as a means of ensuring the proper operation and functioning of the integrated area of
the MERCOSUL. This may be done in a limited basis through the institutional
mechanisms established by the Ouro Preto Protocol21.
I9WIPO Proposal, Art. 13 (1). In paragraph 2, Article 13, says that the expression "someone
economically linked with the patent holder" should be understood as someone who may perform,
directly or indirectly, a decisive influence in respect with the exploitation of the patent.
20Brazilian Proposal, Item 5.1. (IV).
21
Cf. Chapter 1, Section 2, Sub-section 2.3, Paragraph 2.3.1. supra.
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2. Competition Law
The concept of competition law has been developed, in accordance with Gabriel
Leonardos22, based on two particular types of rights and obligations: antitrust laws
and unfair competition laws.
In accordance with Gabriel Leonardos, antitrust laws' aim is the assurance of
free competition, by the imposition of fines and sanctions against its infringer, and is
part ofwhat may be called "Criminal Economic Law". It is assumed that the concept
of antitrust law emerged in the United Kingdom in 1410 by juridical developments in
the national courts and that the first legal mechanism setting up measures to regulate
antitrust law principles was provided in Germany, on 27 May 1896.23
Unfair competition law, on the other hand, regulates the activities of
undertakings in a particular market, making sure that their actions do not establish a
unfair market for other competitors. This concept is part of industrial property law
principles. It is assumed that the concept of unfair competition emerged in France in
1850 based on decisions from national courts24, and was finally established as a legal
mechanism in the 1900 revision of the Paris Convention.25
In the context of a free market economy, a set of legal norms or juridical
understanding is usually established to regulate and control the commercial practice of
undertakings. This is necessary not only to prevent the honest competitor from unfair
22Gabriel Francisco Leonardos. A Relacao entre o Direito Antitruste e o Direito da Propriedade
Industrial, paper presented during the 16th National Seminar of Industrial Property, Sao Paulo.
Brazil, 20 August 19%.
:3Hermano Duval. Concorrencia Desleal. S2o Paulo: Editora Saraiva S.A. (1976), at p. 124.
24WlPO, Protection Afain<a Unfair Competition Geneva: WIPO (1994), pp. 15-17, paras. 12-17.
^For further discussion on Article 106/s of the Paris Convention, which is the provision dealing
particularly with the protection against unfair competition, see Paragraph 2.1.1., infra.
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business practices, but also to ensure that the consumer will benefit from the
competitive market - generally with lower prices and higher quality products - and
that the market itself will not be distorted by anti-competitive practices of
undertakings.
It is also possible to affirm that, in theory, the market itself could regulate the
practices of undertakings within a territorial limit, through the approach taken by the
consumers themselves towards the products which have been offered to them by both
honest and dishonest undertakings. In practice, however, self regulation mechanisms
to ensure that competition takes place in the market, and that consumers have direct
benefits from that does not seem viable.26
Additionally, when one links competitive practices with the rights conferred by
a patent, the situation becomes more complex. Generally speaking, a bundle of
mechanisms is granted to the patent holder allowing him to use juridical or
administrative tools to prevent others from infringing the temporary exclusive rights
which have been granted to him by the State. These legal mechanisms are often
provided by national industrial property laws and are more closely related to the use
of legal measures against the infringement of the patentee's rights to exploit his
patented invention. Sometimes, however, industrial property regulations are not
exhaustive in relation to the protection against anti-competitive practices by right
holders.
26WIPO, note 24, supra, pp. 11-12, para 6-8. In fact as highlighted by this WIPO study, in
paragraph 6, "[a]s an economic situation becomes more complex, consumers become less able to act
as referees. Often they are not even in a position to detect by themselves acts of unfair competition,
let alone react accordingly. Indeed it is the consumer who - along with the honest competitor - has to
be protected against unfair competition".
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One should bear in mind that not only should the practices of third parties
against the rights conferred upon the patentee be regulated, but also the practices of
the patentee himselfwhen using and exploiting his temporary rights. In relation to the
exploitation of patent rights, therefore, two general practices will need to be
controlled: the acts against the right conferred upon the patent holder and the acts of
the patent holder himself, when using, licensing or assigning his rights.
It is generally established that the patentee has the exclusive right to impede
acts carried out by someone else without his consent which relates to the
manufacturing, storing, selling, offering for sale, importing or exporting of his
patented product. National industrial property regulations usually provide mechanisms
which may be used by the patentee to prevent such practices as a means of protecting
his individual rights. This may happen in different situations which will be discussed
throughout the present Section.
It is also necessary to consider that there are the acts which distort
competition in a specific market, against the public interest. These practices are
usually related to the patentee's right to license or assign his rights which in some
cases may create a situation which is unlawful. In Chapter 3, for instance, these acts
have been discussed in more detail when related to licensing agreements in the EC.
Industrial property laws that regulate unfair competition are also
complemented by specific rules on protection against unfair competition, as well as by
juridical understandings of the national courts. Firstly, it is necessary to point out that
national legislation containing the rules regulating the commercial practices of
undertakings are used to complement the provisions included in national industrial
property laws which are related to anti-competitive acts arising from an intellectual
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property right. A GATT study found out that the type of legislation generally used to
regulate competitive practices, in connection with intellectual property protection, is
intellectual property, competition and transfer of technology laws27. Industrial
property and competition laws, in principle, "... deal with matters arising from the
use, licensing and assignment of any EPR, ... only technology-related EPRs are
normally dealt with the transfer of technology legislation"28.
Additionally, pure competition laws will be assessed taking into account that
"... the basic criteria generally employed are whether a practice restricts, distorts or
prevents competition or the free movement of goods in the market-place, or whether
there is an abuse of a dominant market position"29. The basic criteria to assess a
competitive practice in connection with a technology-related intellectual property
right, through transfer of technology regulations, are generally provided for
transactions between a foreign provider of technology and a local party in the
acquiring country. These regulations will thus "... seek to ascertain whether certain
wider interests related to the economic and technological development of the
technology-receiving country are being served, in particular whether technology is
being transferred to the country on reasonable conditions"30
In relation to the building up of juridical understanding of national provisions
on the protection against unfair competition, it is necessary to recall that national
courts will decide upon a specific dispute and judge whether or not a specific act is
against national legal provisions. National courts may nevertheless develop further
27GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NGI1/W/64 (I February 1990) National Legislation and Practices
Deemed Restrictive in Connection with Intellectual Property Rights. Note bv the Secretariat, p. 1,
para. 3
2iIbid., para. 5 (ii), p. 3.
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understanding on the interpretation of the law. Their rulings will then establish the
juridical approach towards a national legal framework for industrial property
protection, broadening the interpretation of industrial property, competition and
transfer of technology regulations.
This Section discusses the subject considering the international legal
framework, in particular the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, national
legislation and current legislative developments in Brazil and the negotiations in the
MERCOSUL.
2.1. International legislation
The regulation of anti-competitive practices in the international arena was first
recognised by the Brussels Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Paris
Convention in 1900, with the inclusion of Article 106/5 into the text of the Paris
Convention31. When the Paris Convention first recognised that competition rules
should be regulated in relation to industrial property protection, Article 1 Obis stated
that national laws regulating unfair competition should be applied to nationals of other
Members of the Paris Union, only considering the application of the national
treatment principle to foreign competitors32.
Moreover, and taking into account the developments of international industrial
property laws, the TRIPS Agreement has also considered the issues on measures
29Ibid., para. 6, p. 3.
30Ibid., para. 7, p. 3.
31 See, e.g., WIPO, note 24, supra, p. 9.
32The first version of Article 106/s stated that "[njationals of the Convention (Articles 2 and 3) shall
enjoy, in all the States of the Union, the protection granted to nationals against unfair competition"
(as quoted in WIPO. note 24, supra).
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against unfair competition on a limited basis. The following is an analysis of the issues
in both international instruments.
2.1.1. The Paris Convention
Initially, the Paris Convention in Article 1 (2) determines that along with patents,
utility models, industrial designs, trade-marks, service marks, trade names, and
indications of source or appellations of origin, the protection of industrial property, as
thereby provided, includes the repression of unfair competition. The purpose of this
provision is only to determine that the repression of unfair competition is also the
subject-matter of industrial property protection.
After being subject to several modifications drawn up by the subsequent
revisions of the Paris Convention, Article 1Obis, which deals in more detail with the
rules on the repression ofunfair competition, currently reads as follows:
(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such
countries effective protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters constitutes an act ofunfair competition.
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
1. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means
whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or
commercial activities, of a competitor;
2. false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to
discredit the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or
commercial activities, of a competitor;
3. indications or allegations the use ofwhich in the course of trade is
liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing
process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the
quantity, of the goods.
The Paris Convention firstly sets up in Article 1 Obis (1) a general obligation.
Members of the Paris Union are therefore requested to make effective protection
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against unfair competition under their national laws or jurisprudence. As highlighted
by the WlPCf3, this may be done by the enactment of specific legislation on protection
against unfair competition, by including specific provisions within broader statutes, by
the application of general tort provisions or by a combination of civil principles, case
law and specific laws34.
Alongside Article 106/s (1), Article 10ter of the Paris Convention states that
legal remedies must be available to assure protection against unfair competition, in
particular those "... to permit federations and associations representing interested
industrialists, producers, or merchants, ,.."35 to undertake measures allowing them
protection against acts ofunfair competition.
According to Article 106/s (2), Paris Convention, acts of unfair competition
are those contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. In this
connection, it is worth noting that the Paris Convention leaves a great degree of
discretion to Members of the Paris Union to interpret and define further what shall be
considered an act contrary to honest practices. It is possible to assume that national
legislation, together with the approach taken by national courts and administrative
authorities, will attempt to limit the application of such term. It is clear that this is a
general and broad concept which must be developed further by national authorities.
33Note 24, supra, pp. 20-22.
34Accordingly, the WIPO study, note 24, supra, emphasises in paragraph 26, p. 21, that most of the
Members of the Paris Union use a combination of all the systems referred to.
35Paris Convention, Art. 10ter (2).
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As pointed out by the WIPO study36, a reference has to be made in connection
with the subjective element of an act which is unfair or dishonest. In this sense, WIPO
states the following:
At first sight, the notion of "honesty" seems to refer to a moral
standard, and some sort of "legal/ethical standard" is indeed involved.
This, however, has to be distinguished from the question whether an
act of unfair competition can be established in the absence of any fault,
bad faith or negligence. Where unfair competition law has been
developed on the basis of general tort provisions [for instance], the
"tort of unfair competition" requires some kind of subjective element
such as "fault" or "bad faith". In practice, however, the element of
fault or bad faith is often assumed by the courts. Such subjective
elements are therefore not essential to the notion of fairness in
competition.
The above quotation seems to be limited in essence. Not only national courts
will play the role of defining the limits and boundaries of the subjective element of an
act which is to be considered in connection with the competitive practices of honest
competitors or against the consumers or the public interest in general. Administrative
authorities may also play a very important role in this context. In addition, it is
important to note that some degree of interpretation of an act which involves "fault,
bad faith or negligence" is to be developed by national legislation.
An example ofwhat has been said in the foregoing paragraph is the list of acts
which are against fair competition, provided by Article 10Z>/5 (3) of the Paris
Convention. In a minimum basis, and indeed non-exhaustively, the Paris Convention
determines that all acts which aim to create confusion37, and false allegations in the
36Ncie 24, supra, para. 32, p. 24.
3 Pans Convention, Art. 106/5 (1) (1).
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course of trade^8, in relation to the establishment, the goods or the commercial or
industrial activities of a competitor, will be prohibited by national legislation.
Although these acts are directly related to the infringement of trade-marks or trade
names, it is possible that a patented product, bearing a particular mark and produced
by a specific competitor, will fall within the wording ofArticles 106/s (3) (1) and (2).
Article 10bis (3) (3) states that any indications or allegations which in the
course of trade could mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process,
the characteristics, the suitability or the quantity of goods shall be also prohibited.
Again the goods in question, or the manufacturing process which is used, may relate
to a patented product.
2.1.2. The TRIPS Agreement
During the TRIPS negotiations discussions on the protection of competition divided
developed and developing countries. On the one hand developed countries generally
suggested that the provisions on protection against unfair competition should deal
only with the disclosure of proprietary information, i.e. trade secrets39. Developing
countries, on the other hand, pushed for more effective rules in the field of
KIbid., Art. 106/5(1) (2).
39See, e.g., the opinion of the European Community (GATT Doc. N. MTNGNG/NG11AV/68 (29
March 1990) Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Art. 28. pp.
12-13), of the United States (GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG1 l/W/70 (11 May 1990) Draft
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Inte tual Property Rights. Communication from the
United States. Art. 31. p. 13), and of Switzerlai.. GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/73 (14 May
1990) Draft Amendment to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on the Protection of Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights. Communication from Switzerland. Art. 241. p. 17).
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competition law, explicitly opposing the inclusion of trade secrets in the TRIPS
40
negotiations .
The position of developed countries is well expressed in the Japanese
proposal41 where it was affirmed that "[f]or the purpose of protecting domestic
industries, a certain number of governments put licensing of intellectual property
rights under their authorization, and lay down various restrictions on licensing
agreements made between enterprises of industrialized countries and ones of the
,-42
countries in question
The Japanese statement clearly leads one to think that those "countries in
question" are some developing countries. What may be generally understood from this
is that administrative authorities of developing countries tend to control and limit the
application of licensing contracts. Developing countries are primarily importers of
technology and, in my opinion, it is advisable that licensing agreements between the
provider of technology and its receiver should be controlled by national governments,
as a means of setting up the necessary limits to licensing agreements and of
guaranteeing that technology transfer will take place in a fair manner.43
'"'The argument of developing countries was that trade secrets were not regarded as IPRs, thus not
within the mandate of the Uruguay Round of negotiations. See, for example, the opinion of Peru.
Brazil and India in GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NGll/W/32/Rev.2 (2 February 1990) Synoptic
Tables Setting Out Existing International Standards and Proposed Standards and Principles, p. 121.
41GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/7 (29 May 1987) Submissions from Participants on Trade
Problems Encountered in Connection with Intellectual Property Rights, p. 17.
42See also, for similar argument, the opinion of Canada in GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/47
(25 October 1989) Standards for Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights. Submission from
Canada, para. 6, pp. 2-3.
43lt seems that even the debate among developed countries was not entirely settled. The EC, for
instance, has yielded to the need for more detailed provisions to avoid the abusive use of IPRs, in
accordance with the law and practices of the European Common Market itself (GATT Doc. N.
MTN.GNG/NG11AV/15 (20 November 1987) Guidelines Proposed bv the European Community for
the Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, p. 3).
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In opposition to that, "[a] number of participants have referred to conditions
in licensing agreements which are abusive or anti-competitive and thereby represent
unwarranted restrictions on international trade in goods"44. Such statement is entirely
based on the position taken by a group of developing countries. A joint proposal
submitted to the TRIPS negotiations highlighted two points in connection with
competition law, which represents the opinion of developing nations. Firstly, it was
suggested that parties should co-operate with each other to ensure that goods would
circulate freely and that EPRs would not be used to create restrictions or distortions to
international trade or to engage in anti-competitive practices which would have
adverse effects on trade45. Secondly, there was a proposal that national legislation
should specify which practices would constitute an abuse of an intellectual property
right in connection with licensing contracts46.
The position of developing countries was more detailed than that of developed
countries. They have not, however, tried to establish how national authorities should
deal with the concept of abusive use of IPRs, nor have they suggested which clauses
in a licensing agreement should be considered as anti-competitive. It is possible to
assume that developing nations wished to have a broad concept in the text of the
TRIPS Agreement which would leave discretion for the setting up of more detailed
rules on this matter to national authorities and national courts.
The concluded text of the TRIPS Agreement has indeed included some of the
suggestions of developed and of developing countries. The final text contains three
^GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG1 l/W/12/Rev. 1 (5 February 1988) Compilation of Written
Submissions and Oral Statements. Prepared by the Secretariat. Revision, para. 85, p. 30.
45GATT Doc. N. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71 (14 May 1990) Communication from Argentina, Brazil,
Chile. Colombia. Cuba. Egypt. India. Nigeria Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay. Art. 5, p. 4.
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provisions dealing with protection against unfair competition. Two are likely to be the
result of the initiative of developing countries, dealing specifically with matters on
competition law47. The third provision is very much a proposal of developed nations
and relates to the protection of trade secrets or undisclosed information48.
Article 8 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement accepts that "[appropriate measures,
..., may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders
or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology". This provision, though not mandatory, appears
to be a very important step towards fairer rules on the transfer of technology and,
above all, a recognition of the needs of technologically poor nations. It is in the
interest of developing nations to have just and fair terms in technology transfer
agreements enabling these countries to develop their own technological capabilities.
The TRIPS Agreement has thus accepted that national legislation could establish
appropriate rules governing agreements which include the transfer of technology,
aiming to promote the exchange of technology between North and South. It also
recognises that national legal measures may be necessary in some circumstances to
avoid practices which would constitute an abuse of an intellectual property right,
therefore creating adverse effects on international trade. This provision will not apply,
however, if the conditions established by national regulations are contrary to the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
In addition to the general principle established by Article 8 (2), Article 40 (1)
of the TRIPS Agreement affirms that "Members agree that some licensing practices or
"Ibid., Art. 15. p. 11.
47TRIPS Agreement. Arts. 8 (2) and 40.
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conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain competition may
have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and dissemination of
technology". Members of the WTO Agreement are therefore allowed to specify in
their national legislation which licensing practices and conditions should be considered
an abuse of an intellectual property right or an anti-competitive practice. As a
consequence, Article 40 (2), TRIPS Agreement, affirms that a "Member may adopt,
consistently with the provisions of this [TRIPS] Agreement, appropriate measures to
prevent or control such practices, ..." Paragraph 2 of Article 40 also provides for a
non-exhaustive list of examples which may be regarded as anti-competitive49.
Article 40, TRIPS Agreement, suggests a consultation mechanism between
two countries when an anti-competitive practice by an undertaking of one of the
countries in question takes place. When an undertaking acts against competition rules
or abuses its EPRs in a particular country, the latter country shall enter into
consultation, upon request, with the country in which the undertaking is a national or
domiciled, without prejudice to any action under the law of the country whose rules
have been breached. The addressed country shall, therefore, co-operate by supplying
publicly available non-confidential information or other information which could be
relevant to assess the anti-competitive condition of such undertaking. The country
which received such information must, however, safeguard the confidentiality of the
information which has been provided.50
48Ibid., Art. 39.
19The examples provided by Article 40 (2), TRIPS Agreement, are exclusive grant-back clauses, no-
challenge clause and coercive package licensing.
3°TRIPS Agreement, Art. 40 (3).
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Additionally, if a country whose nationals or domiciliaries are subject to
proceedings in another country in relation with violation of the other country's laws
and regulations, the first country may also request consultations under the same
conditions of Article 40 (3) of the TRIPS Agreement51.
Apparently, the intention of the negotiators, when drafting such provisions,
was that national proceedings concerning anti-competitive or abusive practices could
be hastened if information from the domiciliary country can be provided and, in
addition, misunderstandings and future disputes between Members of the WTO
Agreement could be avoided. In practice, however, if one considers the several
circumstances in which a breach of competition law may take place and the nature of
such acts, it is possible to predict that such consultative proceedings are likely to have
very limited effect.
In addition to the provisions directly addressing anti-competitive practices, the
TRIPS Agreement has accepted the suggestion of developed countries and included
the protection of trade secrets, under the heading "Protection of Undisclosed
Information". Article 39 (1), TRIPS Agreement, says that, taking into consideration
the wording of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention, and aiming to ensure protection
against unfair competition, Members of the WTO Agreement shall protect
undisclosed information52, and data which has been submitted to government
authorities, when such data is required for the purposes of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products53.
51
Ibid., Art. 40 (4).
52Ibid., Art. 39 (2).
53Ibid., Art. 39 (3).
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2.2. The legislation in Brazil
The legal mechanism for the protection of acts against unfair competition was first
recognised in Brazil by Decree N. 11.385, of 16 December 1914, which is the legal
instrument on the ratification of the Paris Convention. It was included in the national
legal framework, however, only after the publication ofDecree N. 24.507, of 29 July
1934. The general principle established by the original wording of the Paris
Convention and improved by the revision of the Paris Convention in the Hague, in
1925, promulgated in Brazil by Decree N. 19.056, of 31 December 1929, has not
been of practical effect, because until the publication of Decree 24.507/34 the
mechanism for the protection of competition was completely ignored in Brazil. Later,
Decree-Law N. 7.903, of 27 August 1945, provided for a more detailed
understanding on this matter.
Modern legislation in Brazil has taken into account international developments
and Brazilian policy towards an open market. This Sub-section analyses the subject
considering several national constitutional and ordinary provisions, both in the field of
industrial property and in the field of competition law.
2.2.1. The constitutional basis
Protection against unfair competition is the subject of two constitutional provisions in
Brazil. First, the Brazilian Constitution, in Article 170 (IV), establishes that the
Brazilian economic order is based on, inter alia, the principle of free competition.
This principle, which is intended to ensure that a healthy competitive approach
370
prevails in the Brazilian market, is further considered in'Article 173 (4) which says
that "[t]he law shall repress abuse of economic power seeking to dominate markets,
to eliminate competition and to increase profits arbitrarily".
Following an analysis of the provisions above quoted, it is possible to affirm
that the Brazilian Federal Constitution initially recognises the existence of economic
power in market forces, which will be prohibited or condemned by the constitutional
principles once exercised in a manner against honest practices. What will be
prohibited, by virtue of Article 173 (4), is the exercise of this economic power which
may eventually be anti-social and, consequently, anti-economic54. This behaviour will
be regulated by national ordinary legislation, based on constitutional principles.
It is important to note that two different approaches have been taken to
protect the Brazilian market against the dishonest commercial practices of
competitors. Firstly, the Brazilian constitution recognises in Article 170 (IV) that free
competition will be one of the principles which shall prevail in the Brazilian economic
order. That is because the intention of the national legislature, gathered as a
"Constitutional Convention" from 1985 to 1988, was to establish a new order for the
application of the economic, commercial and social principles of the new period of
redemocratisation of Brazil.
Secondly, aiming at the appropriate regulations which will control and limit
these practices, the Brazilian Constitution has understood that some undertakings may
exercise this economic power in ways which will not be acceptable. The detailed
regulation of commercial practices will be established by national ordinary legislation
54Jose Afonso da Silva. Curso de Direito Constitutional Positivo. S3o Paulo: Editora Revista dos
Tribunals (1991), 7th ed, p. 666.
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that will formally repress the abuse of economic power which seeks to dominate the
market, to eliminate competition or to increase profits arbitrarily. This may be done by
applying a single set of rules or by using a bundle of legal provisions, as included in
different laws. The constitutional provision in question recognises that some practices
which constitute an abuse of economic power may distort the free market, thus being
against the principle of free competition. Therefore, the constitutional rule will be
breached if the commercial practice of a particular company distorts the market by
abusing its economic power. Not only the actual practice of a particular undertaking,
but also the mere existence of a dominant position seeking abusive dominance of
markets or the distortion of competition will be prohibited. National ordinary
legislation, however, will have the task of regulating this matter in more detail.
Some authors, particularly Jose Afonso da Silva55, understand nevertheless
that the way in which the modern world has developed has made anti-competition
laws an ineffective regulation when put into practice. He says:
What is necessary to recognise, in fact, is that there is no longer
economic market nor free competition, since capitalist production
developed to oligopolistic forms. To talk today about decentralised
economy, as market economy, is to try to hide a reality of divers
e nature.56
The author seems to emphasise that in the capitalist world market behaviour is
based on large gatherings of companies, through mergers and other practices, which,
in one way or another, makes legislation in favour of competition rather ineffective. It
is true that in such a world some difficulties arise when one attempts to control and
55Ibid.
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limit the competitive practices of large undertakings which are dominating the markets
on a global basis. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that different regulations
will be made necessary to regulate commercial practices in three levels of application
and jurisdiction: international, regional and national.
The international level is regulated by the rules of international organisations,
particularly that of the former GATT, now the WTO. GATT's troublesome origins
transformed its rules in a confuse form of international organisation57. Nowadays, the
WTO seems to be leading the multilateral process of liberalisation international trade -
or, somehow, confirming its historical leadership - with the approval of the Final Act
as a result of the Uruguay Round of negotiations. The WTO system was provided
with a rather broad framework of principles for international trade and with a more
pragmatic method to resolve disputes.
In the regional level, the EC experience is a major modern example that would
be taken into consideration. The EC showed that a process of political, economic and
commercial approximation of countries could be supported by the principles of of free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital. As a consequence of the
application of these principles, competition law appears to be a necessary approach
towards regional control ofmarket behaviour and activities. The problem which arises
in this situation is that in the context of an integrated area there should be a minimum
degree of unification of national competition law principles and, above all, a unified
method to enforce competition norms. The latter need will be fulfilled only by some
56Ibid., pp. 666-667.
57Cf. Chapter 2, Section 2. supra.
373
degree of transference of national sovereign rights to a regional institution with supra¬
national powers.
In the national level, the application and enforcement of competition rules
differ in substance from the two other levels discussed above. Generally speaking,
States have their own administrative, legislative and juridical structure to deal with
several aspects of law and society. This structure, fully (and most of the times)
recognised as sovereign, makes legislative process, management and application of
competition rules more feasible.
2.2.2. As in industrial property laws
The crimes against unfair competition were originally established, in connection with
the protection of intellectual property, by Article 196 of Decree-Law N. 2.948, of 7
December 1940, the Penal Code. This provision was then revoked and substituted by
Article 178 of Decree-Law N. 7.093, of 27 August 1945 (Decree-Law 7093/45),
which was an early version of the CPI. The CPI has, in Article 128, established that
the early provisions of Decree-Law 7093/45, in particular Article 178, would apply
until Decree-Law N. 1.004, of 21 October 1969, came into effect. The latter,
however, has never entered into force, which makes Article 178 of Decree-Law
7093/45 the legislation still in force under the Brazilian legal framework.
Article 178 of Decree-Law 7093/45 may be divided into two main branches.
First, Article 178 deals directly with the type of crimes constituting an act of unfair
competition, described by Article 178 (I) to (XII) that lists twelve crimes. Second,
one finds the acts of unlawful competition giving rise to civil protection by way of
damages which may eventually be paid to the honest competitor. This type of legal
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mechanism is provided only by Sole Paragraph of Article 178, aiming at broadening
the limited approach taken by Article 178 (I) to (XII). The differences between the
two approaches will be discussed below, followed by the new provisions of Law
9279/96.
Article 178 affirms that a crime against unfair competition law58 will arise in
the following circumstances: publication in the press, or by other means, of a false
declaration against a competitor, aiming at gaining advantage from the latter59;
dissemination of false information about a competitor, causing losses to the latter60,
use of unlawful means to take away clients of a competitor61; manufacture, import,
export, storing, selling or offering to sell goods with false indications of origin62, use
on the label of a product of terms which would induce the consumer to think that the
product in question is related to a product which is manufactured and/or sold by
another undertaking63; substitution for one's own business or natural name of the
current name of a product which has not been produced by him, without the consent
of the real producer of the product with that name64; using, as means of industrial or
commercial publicity, of distinctions that have not been given to him65; selling or
offering for sale counterfeit goods in the package of another product66; giving or
offering money or other benefits to the employee of a competitor, aiming at unlawful
5SCf CPI, Art. 2 (d).
59Decree-Law 7093/45, Art 178 (I).
60Ibid., Art 178 (II).
61 Ibid., Art. 178 (HI).
62Ibid., Art. 178 (IV). Cf. CPI. Arts. 65 (9) and (10), 66 (trade-marks) and 70 (certificate of origin).
62Ibid., Art. 178 (V). Cf. CPL Arts. 65 (9) and (10), 66 (trade-marks) and 70 (certificate of origin).
64Ibid., Art. 178 (VI). Cf. CPI. Art. 119.
65Ibid., Art. 178 (VII). Cf. CPI, Art. 119.
66Ibid., Art. 178 (VIII).
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advantages67; and divulging or exploiting, without authorisation and when employed
by someone, trade secrets of the latter which have been disclosed under the terms of
the employment agreement68. The penalties for all the crimes above listed are
imprisonment from three to twelve months, or fines.69
Article 178, Sole Paragraph of Decree-Law 7093/45, also provides for what
has been called unlawful competition. This provision considers that the crimes listed in
Article 178 (I) to (XII) do not preclude civil actions for losses and damage which may
have occurred as a consequence of the practices above listed. Decree-Law 7093/45
has taken into account that the criminal sanctions available are not sufficient and that
damage or losses to the honest competitor may occur in those situations. It is
therefore understood that once there is a juridical ruling concerning the crime which
has been committed by someone, the competitor who has suffered from that practice
may automatically claim his civil rights in connection with the damage and losses that
he has suffered70. This juridical civil action, which follows the criminal action, is
limited to the quantum of losses and damages71. Hermano Duval affirms that in
most cases, breach of the rules against unfair competition is more a civil matter, where
damage and losses have to be assessed, than one of criminal sanctions. The honest
competitor who has suffered from the practices of a dishonest one will probably be
61
Ibid., Ait. 178 (DC). On the other hand, it is understood as a crime against unfair competition to
accept money or other benefits against the disclosure of information which will give unlawful
advantage to a competitor of the employer (Ibid, Art. 178 (X)).
68Ibid., Art. 178 (XI). This will apply even after the employment agreement has finished (Ibid., Art.
178 (X3I)). Cf. TRIPS Agreement, Art 39.
69Cf. Decree-Law 7.093/45, Arts. 169 to 174 for a list of crimes against patent, utility model,
industrial model and industrial design.
°Civil Code. Art. 1.525 and Civil Proceedings Code, Art. 63.
'Hermano Duval, note 23, supra, at p. 226.
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more keen to receive the appropriate compensations for the damage which has been
caused to him rather than seeing his competitor in jail72.
The negotiations in the Brazilian Parliament have considered, during the
discussions of Law 9279/96, the inclusion of provisions dealing directly with crimes
against unfair competition. Article 195 of Law 9279/96 considers the subject exactly
as it has been analysed in the Decree-Law 7093/45, but does not include the
distinction between unlawful and unfair competition. Such a distinction has not been
included possibly because the general principles of civil law for the protection of
honest competitors against damage or losses would apply collaterally.
In addition. Article 195 (2), Law 9279/96, determines that when the
government divulges, without authorisation, the results of tests or other data
submitted to the government for the purpose of market approval, in order to protect
the public, this will not be considered against the unfair competition.
2.2.3. As in competition law
Law N. 8884, of 11 June 199473, says that any acts aiming at or with the possibility of
causing the following effects, shall be considered an infringement of the national
economic order: to limit or, by any form, cause damage to free competition or the free
market; to dominate a relevant market of goods or services or the abuse of a
dominant position74; or to raise profits arbitrarily75 76
12Ibid.
^Hereinafter "Law 8884/94".
4Law 8884/94 considers that a dominant position exists when an undertaking or a group of
undertakings controls a substantial part of a relevant market either as a supplier, buyer or
intermediate agent or sponsor of a product service or technology (Ibid., Art. 20 (2)). A substantial
part of the relevant market occurs when it reaches 30% of that specific market (Ibid., Art. 20 (3)). It
is necessary to mention that when an undertaking or a group of undertakings reach the dominant
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Additionally, the following acts, among others, if within the conditions listed
in the foregoing paragraph, will be considered an infringement of the economic order:
concerted practices among competitors; the partition of markets of services or
products; to limit or impede access of other undertakings to the market; to create
difficulties for the establishment of other undertakings; to hinder access for
competitors to raw materials, technology equipment or distribution mechanisms, to
demand or give exclusivity for advertisement in any form of communication; to
regulate goods and services markets by the establishment of agreements to limit or
control research and technological development; to monopolise or impede the
exploitation of intellectual property or of technology; to sell goods below the
production price; and to impose excessive prices or to raise prices without
justification.77
Those who act against the economic order, as above described, will be subject
to penalties. An undertaking, for instance, will be liable to pay a fine from 1 to 30% of
its total turnover in the last fiscal year78. In the case of a manager who is responsible
directly or indirectly for the violation of the economic order by his company, he will
have to pay a fine of 10 to 50% of the fine imposed upon the undertaking in question,
but such a fine is the exclusive and individual responsibility of the manager79.
position bv efficiency, it will not be considered as a violation of the economic order {Ibid., Art. 20
(D).
sLaw 8884/94. Art. 20 (I) to (IV).
These provisions will apply to natural or legal persons, of private or public character, and the
responsibilities upon the acts referred to in Article 20 (I) to (IV) of the Law 8884/94, are of the
undertaking in question and of its directors or managers {Ibid., Arts. 15 and 16).
11
Ibid., Art. 21.
18Ibid.. Art. 23 (I).
19Ibid.. Art. 23 (II).
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Other penalties may be imposed upon an undertaking, cumulatively to those
described in the paragraph above. These additional penalties include the publication of
the decision of the Administrative Council for Economic Protection (CADE), paid by
the violating undertaking, in a newspaper indicated in the decision, for two
consecutive days, from one to three consecutive weeks80. Other penalties may be
imposed under the terms above described, such as the prohibition of the undertaking
from making commercial agreements with public undertakings, or even the
recommendation of the granting of a compulsory licence to the product of the
violating company81.
For the assessment of the appropriate penalty, the following aspects or
circumstances shall be considered: the seriousness of the infringement; the goodwill of
the violator; the advantage reached or aimed at by the violator, and in this situation
whether or not he reached the advantage; the degree of damage, or the threat of
damaging the national economic order, the free competition rules, and consumers or
other competitors; the negative economic effects on the market; the economic
situation of the violator; and the contumacy or eventual continuous disobedience of
the violator.82
The institutional mechanism designed to regulate competitive practices in the
Brazilian Market was, until recently, based on the CADE, as included in the
institutional framework of the Council of Ministers83. By virtue of Law 8884/94 the
CADE was transformed in a federal government agency and its powers were
90Ibid., Art. 24 (I).
Sllbid., Art. 24 (II) and (IV) (a), respectively.
S2Ibid, Art. 27.
83Law N. 4.137, of 10 September 1962.
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extended. This paragraph will consider only the provisions and institutional
framework as in Law 8884/94.
The CADE is composed by a President and six Counsellors appointed by the
President of Brazil and approved by the Federal Senate84, for a renewable mandate of
two years85. The President of CADE is empowered inter alia to represent the
organisation; to preside and vote in its plenary meetings; to distribute to one of the
Counsellors administrative proceedings relating to competitive practices; to request
the enforcement of the decisions of the plenary; and to sign all the commitments
related with the administrative proceedings analysed by the organisation86.
The Counsellors, on the other hand, are empowered to vote for the decisions
of the plenary of CADE, to report on the processes that are distributed to them; to
submit to the plenary session ofCADE request of information from anyone, including
public and private entities, to adopt interim measures and penalties related to the non-
fulfilment of the decisions of the plenary of CADE; and to perform other duties
conferred to him by the Rules ofProcedures ofCADE87.
The Plenary ofCADE must perform, inter alia, the following duties: to decide
upon the existence of a violation of the economic order and to impose the respective
penalties; to decide upon the processes initiated by the Secretary ofEconomic Law of
the Ministry of Justice (SDE)88; to establish the necessary measures for the
84Law 8884/94, Art. 4, caput. The President and the Counsellors of CADE will be chosen among
Brazilian citizens with more than thirty and less than 65 years with recognised legal or economic
knowledge.
85Ibid., Art. 4 (1).
S6Ibid., Art. 8.
Ibid., Art. 9.
88The SDE is headed by a Secretary appointed by the Minister of Justice and has the following
functions: to follow, permanently, the commercial practices and activities of natural or legal persons
who are in a dominant position; to carry on preliminary investigations for the setting up of
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interruption of the violation of competition rules; to decide upon appeals; to request
information from anyone, either natural or legal entities; to request the Judiciary to
enforce decisions taken by the plenary of CADE; and to inform the public about the
various forms of infringement of the economic order.89
An administrative proceeding will be always initiated by the SDE90, after it
carries out preliminary investigations and send it to the analysis of the CADE91. Once
the SDE concludes its preliminary investigations, which shall be done in sixty days, it
will determine either the initiation of administrative proceedings or will conclude that
there is not enough evidence to characterise an infringement against the economic
order92.
If the preliminary investigations conclude for the initiation of administrative
proceedings these shall start in eight days, counted from the date of the conclusion of
the preliminary investigations. The violator will be invited to produce his arguments
within fifteen days. This initial phase of the proceeding includes the assessment of
proofs and documents and the hearing of witnesses. Once this phase is concluded, the
case will be submitted for judgement before the CADE.
administrative processes; to initiate an administrative process; to submit for the consideration of the
CADE decisions on the conclusion of preliminary investigations or on administrative proceedings; to
carry on research and studies aiming at guiding national policies on the repression of acts against the
economic order, and to inform the public about the various forms of violation of the economic order
which are prohibited by law (Law 8884/94, Art. 14).
89Law 8884/94. Art. 7.
90Ibid., Art. 14 (VI).
91 Ibid.. Arts. 30. Cf. Art. 14 (IE).
92Ibid., Art. 31. In the case of concluding that there is no breach of the rules on competition law. the
SDE shall submit such considerations to the CADE for final decision.
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Once the proceedings are received by the CADE, it will collect all the
documentation necessary, request legal advice from the its Legal Counselling
Department93 and will decide upon the case94.
There is also provided a consultation mechanism in which anyone may submit
a situation to the CADE, asking for their advice on whether such situation would be
characterised as against the economic order or not. The consulting party shall produce
all the documentation necessary to enable the assessment of the specific circumstance
and the CADE will issue an opinion within sixty days. If the situation object of
assessment is found against the economic order, the CADE is not allowed to impose
sanctions or penalties upon the consulting party.95
Any act which is capable of being against the economic order must be
submitted to the CADE. If the following conditions are met, such acts will not fall
within the prohibitions determined by Law 8884/94: (a) that their object is to increase
productivity, to raise the quality of the product or service in question or to stimulate
technological and economic development; (b) that the benefits arising from the act in
question are equally distributed among the consumers; (c) that such behaviour does
not favour the elimination of competition in a substantial part of the relevant market;
and (d) that limits are imposed to reach the proposed objectives96. Additionally, those
acts necessary on grounds of national economic needs and common benefit, and that
will not cause damage or loss to the consumer, will be allowed97.
nCf. Arts. 10 and 11.
94Law 8884/94. Arts. 42 to 51. The decisions of the CADE are not subject to any other administrative
appeal (Ibid., Art. 50).
95Ibid.. Art. 59.
96Ibid.. Art. 54 (1).
91Ibid.. Art. 54 (2).
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2.3. The negotiations in the MERCOSUL
The setting up of common rules for the protection of competition within an integrated
market, and the relation of the participants of this integrated area with the outside
world, is an essential condition for the proper functioning and operation of a Common
Market. These issues have been discussed in detail in the context of the European
integration process. In the MERCOSUL, the Treaty of Asuncion did not provide such
a detailed framework as the EC Treaty did, but a general rule was established.
The Treaty ofAsuncion, in Article 4, states that " .. States Parties shall ensure
equitable trade terms in their relations with third countries". This will be done by
using their domestic legislation "... to restrict imports whose prices are influenced by
subsidies, dumping or any other unfair practice". Additionally, Article 4, Last
sentence of the Treaty of Asuncion determines that "... States Parties shall coordinate
their respective domestic policies with a view to drafting common rules for trade
competition". The first part of Article 4 clearly suggests that States Parties are
committed to use their existing legal mechanisms to restrain advantages given to
foreign companies by their own governments when they will be competing with the
products of the MERCOSUL. Last sentence of Article 4, on the other hand,
determines that States Parties of the MERCOSUL will negotiate common rules on
competition, aiming at harmonising the rules related with the competitive practices of
undertakings from third countries. But States Parties shall also agree upon common
rules to regulate the commercial practices of their own undertakings. Negotiations are
in the process of deciding upon these common rules, though the present Sub-section
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will deal only with the negotiations towards the MERCOSUL's common internal
competition rules.
It is firstly important to mention that, as far as competition rules are
concerned, Argentina and Brazil appear to be the most advanced countries in this field
in the MERCOSUL. This is not only because they are the most competitive markets
among the participating countries of the MERCOSUL, but also because they have,
from the beginning of the century, established a legislative history in this field98.
Current negotiations in the MERCOSUL are in the stage of considering a list
of priority points of harmonisation for the protection of competition in the
MERCOSUL99, issued during the Ministerial Meeting at Ouro Preto, Brazil, in 1994.
These listed points are the result of the negotiations that have been carried out at the
Committee on the Protection of Competition, as part of Sub-group 10 of the Treaty
of Asuncion and are considered the basis for common rules on competition.
The Annex of Decision 21/94 divide the issues into two major parts. Firstly it
suggests norms for regulating agreements between undertakings, and, secondly, it
proposes mechanisms for controlling the practices of undertakings which are in a
dominant position in substantial part of the MERCOSUL or in the whole of its
territory.
Point 3 of the Annex of Decision 21/94 suggests that agreements and
concerted practices between undertakings, as well as associations of undertakings
98Jose Matias Pereira, Regimes the Concorrencia e Politicas de Concorrencia na America Latina: o
Caso do MERCOSUL. [1995] 16 BILA, as downloaded from
http://www.mre.gov.br/getec/webgetec/bila/I6/4notas/4nota.htm, states that the first legislation
aiming at the protection against unfair competition in Latin America emerged in Argentina (1919).
Mexico (1934), Brazil (1938), and Chile (1959).
"included in the Annex of Decision MERCOSUL/CMC/N. 21. of 15 December 1994. Hereinafter
referred to as "Decision 21/94".
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aiming at, or with the effect of, impeding, restricting or distorting competition, will be
prohibited100. Point 3 lists some practices, in the context of agreements or concerted
practices, or associations between undertakings, that will be considered against unfair
competition law, such as: fixing, directly or indirectly, buying or selling prices, as well
as any other conditions for the production or commercialisation of products or
services; limiting or controlling production, distribution, technological development or
investments; dividing markets for products or services or dividing sources of supply of
raw materials; co-ordinating actions which affect, or may affect, competition,
contests, auctions or public bidding; adopting, in relation to other contracting parties,
uneven conditions, putting the third contracting party in a condition of disadvantage
in relation to other competitors; making the availability of commercial contracts,
either oral or written contracts, linked to other matters which have no relation to the
subject-matter of the contract in question; and putting pressure on clients or suppliers
to act in a specified way.
With regard to dominant position of undertakings, Point 4 of the Annex of
Decision 21/94 affirms that the abuse of a dominant position in part or in the whole of
the MERCOSUL should be prohibited101. A non-exhaustive list of examples of abuse
of a dominant position is given as follows: to impose, directly or indirectly, selling or
buying prices or other conditions; to restrain, without justification, production,
distribution or technological development, causing damage to other companies or to
consumers; to apply better conditions to contracts having the same subject-matter to
100It is also considered by Point 3 of the Annex of Decision 21/94 that these acts are also prohibited
when they have the object or effect of impeding, restricting or distorting the free access to the
production, processing, distribution and commercialisation of products or services, in part or in the
whole of the MERCOSUL, being able to affect the internal trade in the MERCOSUL.
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different contracting parties; to refuse, without justification, the sale of goods or the
provision of services; and to sell goods or services at prices below the usual price, or
prices below the cost of production, aiming at eliminating competition in the market.
Co-operation among the States Parties will take place in order to assure that
competition rules are applied in adequate forms throughout the MERCOSUL. This
co-operation mechanism may be through the exchange of information, consultation,
advice, technical co-operation or other mechanism102. The MERCOSUL Trade
Commission will be empowered to apply the legal instruments for the protection
against unfair competition103.
Conclusion
Chapter 3, above, described the complex set of constitutional rules and secondary
legislation designed by the European integration project to implement the principles of
free movement of goods and competition law. As has been seen, the EC has
established, already in its constitutional mechanism (the EC Treaty), detailed rules
guiding the implementation of such principles. In contrast, the Treaty of Asuncion, as
a constitutional pre-project of a Common Market, provided little, if any, guidance to
the implementation of such principles, but recognised its importance for the
establishment and operation of the envisaged Common Market.
The fact that the Treaty of Asuncion only recognises the importance of the
establishment of those two principles, without providing further detail on how they
101The practices of all undertakings which have a participation above 20% of a relevant market will
be controlled by the States Parties (Annex of Decisions 21/94, Point 5).
102Annex ofDecision 21/94. Point 6.
103Ibid. Point 8.
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should be implemented, is not necessarily a fact which runs against the successful
implementation of the integrating project of the MERCOSUL. It is necessary to
remember that the Treaty of Asuncion is a regional agreement 'Tor the establishment
of a Common Market". As a consequence, the necessary legal and conceptual
definitions of these principles should be determined as part of the process itself, while
a final agreement in this regard should be built through the implementation of the
Common Market as such.
In relation to the application of the free movement of goods principle a few
remarks are necessary. In the first place, it is possible to affirm that the approach
taken by the Treaty ofAsuncion seems correct, for the purposes that it was designed.
The Treaty of Asuncion only states that free movement of goods is one of the
components of the Common Market that will be established between the States
Parties of the MERCOSUL. However, as the Common Market goal is approaching,
further interpretation of the application of this principle is necessary. Implementation
of such general understanding seems vital in the very near future. Secondly, and
particularly related to the application of the principle in connection with intellectual
property protection, it is necessary to include clear guidelines on a common
agreement on IPRs for the MERCOSUL. Such agreement should provide detailed
understanding of the questions that may arise from the application of this principle
vis-a-vis the exercise of IPRs. The legislative and juridical experience of the EC can
be used as a very important example for the establishment of such rules. Chapter 3 has
proved that, in practice, the implementation of the general principle that goods shall
circulate without restrictions in the territory of a Common Market is not necessarily
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an easy task. Several circumstances arise from the interpretation of the law and they
must be established in a harmonised and coherent way.
With regards to the implementation of common competition rules, the
MERCOSUL has already agreed upon advanced points of law which should be
implemented in this context. It is probably possible to argue that the negotiations
towards the regulation of ami-competitive practices in the MERCOSUL has reached a
more comprehensive level of discussion than other intellectual property-related
matters. The discussion currently held in the context of the MERCOSUL will
probably lead the States Parties to agree upon a detailed legal framework for the
application of anti-competitive rules for the integrated area.
The harmonisation of legislation, in this regard, however, seems limited if
there is no institutional mechanisms designed to apply the common rules in the whole
territory of the MERCOSUL. As has been pointed out several times in the present
research, the way that national authorities and national courts will deal with the
subject is still a question left for the future. In relation to the enforcement and
application of these common rules, particularly those described in this Chapter and
directly related with common policy instruments, the MERCOSUL Trade
Commission seems to be the appropriate administrative organ to impose the
application of the common rules on the free movement of goods and competition law
principles. The problem arises when disputes are brought to national courts. A non-
harmonised approach towards the application of such principles will definitely take
place, which emphasises the need of a common juridical mechanism to unify the
interpretation of the common legislation of the MERCOSUL.
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It may appear to reader that the discussion attempted throughout the present
research, as within the limits determined by the general Introduction of the thesis,
would be near to conclusion. However, it is this researcher's personal opinion that the
discussion proposed would not be completed without the inclusion of another very
important and modern aspect relating EPRs to technological development and
liberalisation of trade. The issues on biodiversity protection and sustainable
development, liberalisation of trade and EPRs are very much inter-connected. The
following Chapter was included hence as a complementary discussion attempting to
make these links clearer, by discussing the "Biodiversity Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights".
CHAPTER 7
BIODIVERSITY-RELATED ASPECTS OF IPRs
Introduction
The present research analysed in the foregoing Chapters what may be called the
"traditional" debate about patent protection. This discussion is broad and includes
several other issues that are similarly important. Above, emphasis was given to the
commercial aspects of the exercise of patent rights within an integrated area, such as
the free movement of goods and anti-competitive law principles (discussed in
Chapters 3 and 6, supra), and the substantive aspects of patent protection, such as
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and plant varieties (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5,
supra). Unavoidably, some discussion about institutional aspects related to patent
rights has taken place, particularly referring to the European integration project
(Chapter 4) and to the international negotiations on patent protection (Chapter 2).
Within the context of the MERCOSUL, particular attention will be given to
the modern discussion about the protection of the environment and its relationship
with IPRs. The territory of the MERCOSUL is rich in natural resources and the
commercial or scientific exploitation of these resources may give rise to other legal
consequences in the context of an integrating project. There is a need to determine
how the integrated area of the MERCOSUL will deal with these modern aspects of
IPRs and how to envisage a framework of regional science and technology and
environmental policies. The establishment of common policies on access to genetic
resources and biodiversity conservation must be viewed in regional terms, as an
attempt to develop strategies and mechanisms for technology transfer from
technologically-developed countries or regions.
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This Chapter must be viewed as a complementary resource to guide the
regional implementation of multilateral principles for biodiversity protection and
sustainable use, by providing an overview of the legal discussion in the international
level and in Brazil.
1. The Setting Up ofNewInternational Regulations
In the last decade, the debate on the protection of the environment has grown
impressively. The progressive misuse of the environment has led to the destruction of
natural resources, consequently threatening the "biological diversity"1 that still
remains in the world. Further, considering the industrial progress and the "needs" of
modern society, dangerous consequences have been noticed in the climate and
atmospheric conditions of the planet. As noted by Bergel, industrialised nations - on
grounds of unlimited progress and free market principles - have been disrupting the
balance between ecological systems. In fact, "the dominant paradigm of development
is contrary to the inter-relationship between the various natural processes and the
argument that human life is placed in an environment which does not exist to be
destroyed"2.
Within the UN system, concerns on environmental protection have been
present since the early 1960s as a result of technical studies carried out by some UN
organisations or specialised agencies in their specific field of activities. The growing
'See note 17, infra, for the definition of biological diversity.
"Salvador Dario Bergel, Desarrollo Sustentable v Medio Ambiente: La Perspectiva
Latinoamencana. [1992] 41 Revista del Derecho Industrial 303-343, at 303. See, also. Jorge A.
Kors. Nuevas Tecnologias y Derecho Ambiental. [1992] 41 Revista del Derecho Industrial 389-419,
at 397, where he affirmed that there is a need to include an ecological dimension in the debate on
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importance of this issue, however, was formally recognised by the UN during the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE)4, held at
Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972.4
The UNCHE resulted in an Action Plan for the Human Environment5, which
rearranged all the recommendations approved by the conference, and a Declaration on
the Human Environment6, comprised of twenty six principles. Within this framework
general principles were established, providing a basis for the necessary measures to
protect the human environment and for an institutional framework to co-ordinate
actions on environmental protection.
A Resolution on Institutional and Financial Arrangements7 suggested the
establishment of a programme, under UN auspices, to co-ordinate all environmental
activities on national and international levels, to monitor the environment, to support
environmental education programmes, and to attempt to create international laws, as
well as to develop environmental guidelines and model laws to be used in the
implementation of the Action Plan for the Human Environment. As a consequence,
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was formally created by
General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVII) of IS December 19728.
industrial and technological development, aiming at maximising the quality of the environment
when related to the negative repercussion of economic expansion.
3This conference was convened by General Assembly Resolution 2398 (XXIII) of 3 December 1968
(Rfidiger Wolfrum & Christiane Philipp. United Nations: Laws. Policies and Practice. London:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1995) V. 1, p. 488).
4A comprehensive chronological list of international arrangements in the field of environmental
protection is available in Edith Brown Weiss (ed.). Environmental Change and International Law,
Tokyo: United Nations University Press (1992), Appendix B. pp. 479-490.
5Published in 11ILM1421 (1972).
"Tublished in 11 ILM 1416 (1972).
"Published in 11 ILM 1466 (1972).
8UNEP is an integrated programme, not a specialised agency of the UN, although it enjoys a
reasonable level of autonomy. It is comprised of the following bodies: the Governing Council, the
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Twenty years after the Stockholm conference, the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED) was held from 3 to 14 June 1992 in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil. The UNCED approved the following instruments: the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (the Rio Declaration)9; the Agenda
2110; a Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests11; the Framework
Convention on Climate Change12; and the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD)13.14
Although other non-legally binding instruments which have arisen from the
UNCED15 contain principles and plans of actions relating with the conservation and
the sustainable use16 of biological diversity17, the CBD will be used as a main
reference in this Chapter.
Environment Secretariat, the Environment Co-ordination Board, and the Environment fund See. for
further information about the UNEP. Riidiger Wolfrum & Christiane Philipp, United Nations:
Laws. Policies and Practice. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1995), V. 2. pp. 1296-1304.
'Published in 31 /LA/874 (1992).
1 "Published in Earth Summit 1992. London: The Regency Press Corporation (1992).
"Published in 31/LA/881 (1992).
i:Published in 31 /LA/ 849 (1992).
I3Published in 31 /LA/ 818 (1992). The CBD has entered into force on 29 December 1993 (in
http://www.unep.chybiodiv.html) and on 8 March 1996, has been ratified by 144 countries (in
http://www. unep. ch/bio/ratifica. html).
14The full text of all the documents above-mentioned are also available in the Internet as follows:
gopher://infoserver.ciesin.org./l1/human/domains/political-policy/intl/confs/UNCED/unced-finals.
I5Particularlv the Rio Declaration and the Agenda 21.
16Article 2 of the CBD defines "sustainable use", for the purpose of the application of the
Convention, as "... the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not
lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the
needs and aspirations of present and future generation".
'
Article 2 of the CBD defines biological diversity (or biodiversity) as "... the variability among
living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part: this includes diversity within
species, between species and of ecosystems". Although the CBD did not attempt to define species
within this context it has provided a definition, also in Article 2. of "biological resources": "...
includes genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of
ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for humanity".
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The biological diversity of the planet is regarded as one of the most significant
sources of products that may be developed in the future by multinational companies in
the pharmaceutical and/or biotechnology fields18. Both economic sectors are planning
their future based on the exploitation of the unknown resources that the world's
biodiversity may provide. A high percentage of the products developed today in these
areas come from the raw materials contained in the forests of developing countries.
The CBD's approach to the use and exploitation of biological material is seen by the
private sector as a critical threat to future plans. The uncontrolled use of these
resources will be a significant threat to the environment and to the biological diversity
that remains for present and future generations. These key economic sectors have,
therefore, seen the environmental crisis, and the legal response thereto in the CBD, as
a mechanism which might threaten future research into new products that use, as a
primary basis, genetic resources19 which are found mostly in the territories of
developing countries.
The use and exploitation of biological resources is undoubtedly one of the
most controversial issues in the international debate. For example, during the signing
of the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992, the United States refused to accept
18Darrell Posey, Intellectual Property Rights and Just Compensation for Indigenous Knowledge.
[1990] AAnthropology Today 13-16, at p. 15. estimates that the annual market for medicines derived
from medicinal plants discovered from indigenous peoples is of 43 billion US dollars. Further, he
reckons that "... less than 0,001% of profits from drugs that originated from traditional medicine
have ever gone to the indigenous peoples who led researchers to them". See, for further estimates,
Stephen Brush, Indigenous Knowledge of Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights: the
Role of Anthropology. [1993] American Anthropologist 653-686, and UNEP Doc. N.
UNEP/Bio.Div./Panels/Inf.2 (28 April 1993) Expert Panels Established to Follow-Up on the
Convention on Biological Diversity - Report of Panel II: Evaluation of Potential Economic
Implications of Conservation and Its Sustainable Use and Evaluation of Biological and Genetic
Resources.
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"... the text's treatment of intellectual property rights ... technology transfer and
biotechnology"20. Further, the Commission of the European Communities has
expressed its concerns in relation to the interpretation given to some articles of the
Convention, in particular Articles 15 (access to genetic resources), 16 (access to and
transfer of technology), 19 (handling of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits)
and 22 (relationship with other international conventions)21. It is possible to assume
that - taking into account the reaction of the most important trading nations - when
industrialised countries became concerned wdth the protection of the environment,
their main interest was far from the protection of the environment itself. Economic
and commercial interests have probably been of more importance, when included in
this discussion, rather than the need to save the planet's biological diversity.
As highlighted by Lesser22, "IPRs and biodiversity are conceptually unrelated,
at least at the primary and secondary levels .... Where they are associated is through
the Biodiversity Convention, and there in the public mind largely because then-US
President Bush opposed signing in response to an interpretation unfavourable to
IPRs".23 Later, Lesser notices that the issues raised by the US focus primarily on
modern biotechnology and, where the CBD establishes the right of national
governments to control the access to genetic resources, in Article 15, it
19The CBD. in Article 2, defines "'genetic resources" as "... any genetic material of actual or potential
value", whether "'genetic material' means any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin
containing functional units of heredity".
20Declaration of the United States of America, as in 31ILM 848 (1992).
21Commission of the European Communities. Draft Interpretative Declaration (on the occasion of
the ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity. (16 April 1993).
^W. Lesser. Institutional Mechanisms Supporting Trade in Genetic Materials: Issues under the
Biodiversity Convention and GATT/TRIPS. Geneva: UNEP (1994), p. 22.
23The US eventually signed the CBD. under Clinton's administration, on 4 June 1993. See. for this
information. Joseph Straus. The Rio Biodiversity Convention and Intellectual Property. [1993] 5 IIC
602-615. p. 608. para. 12.
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does not specifically refer to EPRs as is done in Article 16 (3). The
connection may, however, be made by noting that IPRs would provide
a possible mechanism for controlling the movement and use of genetic
resources as authorised by this Article.24
Concerns about environmental protection have raised several issues in
connection with the exploitation of biodiversity, consequently changing the ecological
and economic importance of the subject. The traditional concept of IPRs has been
broadened substantially in accordance with the development of new technologies and
the needs of modern society.25 After the commitments achieved by the UNCED,
namely the CBD, other aspects of intellectual property protection were raised.
The CBD's main objectives are three-fold: the conservation of biological
diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of
the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources. These goals are to be
achieved by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of
relevant technologies, which has given rise to the methodological division that follows
in the present Chapter. Access to genetic resources and access to and transfer of
technology are however all inter-connected issues.26
"4W. Lesser, note 22, supra, p. 23.
25See. generally, Chapter 2. supra, for further analysis of the international debate on intellectual
property protection.
:sThe objectives of the CBD. as well as the mechanisms described for attaining such objectives, are
listed in Article 1.
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2. Access to Genetic Resources and Related Issues
For millennia genetic resources were regarded as "the common heritage of
mankind"27. Although the CBD is the first legally-binding international instrument to
admit that States have sovereign rights over their own genetic resources, the
discussion on national jurisdiction to biological resources is not really a very
contemporary one. UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 196228
declared, for the first time, the permanent sovereignty of States over their natural
wealth and resources and that national jurisdiction and legislation should apply for the
control and the exploitation of these resources.
The Declaration on the Human Environment of 1972 also affirms, in Principle
21, that States have sovereign rights to exploit their own resources based on their
own environmental policies. States are additionally liable to ensure that activities
under their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to areas beyond the limits of
their national jurisdiction29.
The provisions which have arisen from the text of the CBD have brought these
issues on to a much more complex level of discussion, linking economic activities with
sustainable use of natural resources by accepting the market value of the latter30. But
: The expression "common heritage of mankind" has emerged from the UN's efforts to codify
international law of the sea and of the outer space in the late 1960s. The concept includes the idea
that some territories (such as the Antarctica) and some resources are of importance to all. and that
"... they should be preserved in the common interest of all states, or explored and used in a way that
allows all states to participate and enjoy their benefits" (Riidiger Wolfram & Christiane Philipp,
note 3, supra, p. 149).
™Apud Ian Brownlie (ed), Basic Documents in International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1983),
3rd ed., pp. 231-234.
29Article 3 of the CBD literally repeats Principle 21 of the Declaration on Human Environment.
30This link is mar, clear by the reading of the Preamble of the CBD which initially recognises "...
the intrinsic value of biological diversity and of the ecological, genetic, social, economic, scientific.
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the acceptance that genetic resources are within national jurisdiction does not appear
to be exhaustive. There are several other concerns related to the conservation and
sustainable use of these resources which were expressed by the CBD in connection
with the exploitation ofbiological diversity.
The CBD recognises that genetic resources are within the sovereign rights of
national States, which will have the authority to create legal mechanisms to control
the use of these resources. The CBD, further to the application of this principle,
affirms that access to genetic resources shall be facilitated, but such access should be
with the prior informed consent of the country providing the genetic resources, which
will also be entitled to a equitable and fair share of the benefits that may arise from the
commercialisation of the resources. The country which provides the genetic resources
shall also be entitled to participate in the scientific researches based on the genetic
resources in question.
2.1. A brief assessment of the application of the sovereign rights
principle
The CBD, in Article 15 (1), recognises that States have sovereign rights over their
natural resources and that "... the authority to determine access to genetic resources
rests with national governments and is subject to national legislation""1. There are
several considerations which arise from the wording of Article 15 (1), CBD, which
educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values of biological diversity and its components".
Further, while the CBD recognises States' sovereign rights over their biological resources it affirms
that States are also "...responsible for conserving their biological diversity and for using their
biological resources in a sustainable manner".
31
Cf Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration.
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are to be taken into account in the context of the implementation of the general
principle.
It is not clear, in the light of Article 15 (1), CBD, whether the concept of
sovereign rights precludes or reaffirms the concept of proprietorship in connection
with access to genetic resources. In order to assess this apparent ambiguity, it is
necessary to examine the wording ofArticle 15 (1), CBD, in more detail.
The concept of sovereignty emerged in the Middle Age from the notion that
the sovereign had supreme power over his territory. This was regarded as necessary at
that time to secure the power of a sovereign constantly threatened by civil war and by
conflict with the Catholic Church. This concept has led to the notion of sovereign
States, which has been interpreted in several ways through the centuries.32
Today, the concept of sovereignty of States is closely dependent upon the
international legal order made applicable by the principles of international public law.
Sovereign rights thus mean that a State is recognised by the international community
as such, having legal personality, and that "[t]he legal competence of states and the
rules for their protection depend on and assume the existence of a stable, physically
delimited, homeland"33. It seems clear that the concept of sovereignty is mainly
applicable to a specific territory where a particular State has exclusive jurisdiction34.
32See, e.g., Celso D. de Albuquerque Mello, Direito International Econdmico. Rio de Janeiro:
Renovar (1993), p. 46, and Malcom N. Shaw. International Law. Cambridge/United Kingdom:
Grotius Publications Limited (1991), 3rd ed. p. 25.
'Ian Brownlie. Principles of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1990), 4th
ed. p. 108.
34As described by Malcom N. Shaw, note 32, supra, at p. 393, "jurisdiction concerns the power of
the state to affect people, property and circumstances and reflects the basic principles of state
sovereignty, equality of states and non-interference in domestic affairs. Jurisdiction is vital and
indeed central feature of state sovereignty, for it is an exercise of authority which may alter or create
or terminate legal relationships and obligations".
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Sovereign States are, therefore, responsible, under their own
institutional/governmental framework, to rule upon the lives of their citizens and their
public or private undertakings, to determine their legal obligations and the legal
framework, and to exercise this power against the threat of other nations to their
territory.
On the other hand, the concept of ownership, in this connection, seems to be
closely related to the concept of sovereignty. The State is the proprietor of its
territory establishing, through its constitutional framework, what is to be considered
therein. Territorial sovereignty does not preclude the ownership, but merely reaffirms
it35.
Having said that, one must understand that the wording of the CBD, after
giving emphasis to the sovereign rights concept in relation to access to genetic
resources in the Preamble and Article 3, points out that States, in addition to the
recognition of sovereign rights over their own natural resources, have the authority to
determine by national law how these resources are to be exploited, in Article 15 (1).
It seems that the discussion of sovereignty in this context is vital for the debate
and of paramount importance for developing countries which possess much of the
biological diversity of the planet. If one begins to challenge the concept of
sovereignty, as precluding ownership36, this will involve a major change in the
international legal framework by putting aside the development of the sovereign rights
"Opposing to this argument Lyle Glowka, Franpoise Burhenne-Guilmin & Hugh Synge (in
collaboration with Jeffrey A McNeely and Lothar Gundling), A Guide to the Convention on
Biological Diversity. Gland/Switzerland and Cambridge/United Kingdom: IUCN (1994), p. 76, says
that "... questions of ownership are not addressed by the text of the Convention, but are determined
by national law".
36As Lyle Glowka et a!., note 35, supra, has done.
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principle despite its well established historical and legal framework. Although it is
possible to argue that the concept of sovereignty does not necessarily assume the
State's ownership over genetic resources, this is not the question at this specific
moment. Constitutional laws, indeed, may play a determinant part in this context by
affirming the proprietorship of natural resources within national territory, but, as a
matter of fact, the CBD in no way avoids the concept of States' proprietorship over
genetic resources.
The CBD suggests mechanisms that will have to be considered by both
developed and developing nations' legal practice when utilising genetic resources for
scientific or commercial purposes. As a consequence, national law will have to
provide detailed mechanisms to implement the principle of sovereign rights over
genetic resources so that this could apply in practice. A more detailed analysis of
measures to be considered by national law will be provided below.
2.2. Mutually agreed terms and the requirement ofprior informed
consent
Based on the application of the principle of sovereign rights, the CBD has also
established that access to genetic resources shall be on mutually agreed terms and
subject to "prior informed consent" (PIC)j7. These are different, but complementary,
measures which will be determined by national legislation in this field.
The expression "mutually agreed terms" as used by the CBD is not defined in
the Convention but seems to imply the existence of two parties in a contractual
relationship: the provider of genetic resources and the potential user of it. This
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relationship will be constructed by the consent of both parties and mutually agreed.
The provider of genetic resources, the State, will have to define upon what terms this
will apply, in combination with other aspects such as participation in research and
development and the equitable and fair sharing of the benefits arising from the
utilisation of genetic resources38. Glowka39 understands that access agreements may
become the most relevant mechanism to authorise parties to exploit genetic resources
and to agree upon the terms of such exploitation. Therefore, either existing national
contractual regulations or a more detailed form of legal mechanism will be created to
provide the means of access agreements. A combination between the existing system
regulating contract law and the system regulating access agreements is also
foreseeable.
Some have suggested, for instance, "Material Transfer Agreements" (MTAs)
as a mechanism that could possibly be used for regulating the relationship between the
provider and the user seeking access to genetic resources. This type of agreement is
commonly used by biotechnology industries and the academic community to facilitate
the sharing of biological material aiming at mutual gain. At least two types ofMTAs
could be used for the purpose of accessing genetic resources: research-based and
commercially-based agreements.40
3 CBD. Arts. 15 (4) and (5), respectively.
38Discussed further in Sub-section 2.3. infra.
39Note 35, supra, p. 80.
40MTAs, as a possible contractual tool for regulating access to genetic resources, are suggested by
some authors and by the Conference of the Parties of the CBD. See. e.g., Walter Reid,
Biotechnology, Technological Change, and Regulation of Access to Genetic Resources, paper
presented at the Global Biodiversity Forum "95, Jakarta. Indonesia. 4-5 November 1995, pp. 17-20;
Daniel Putterman. Model Material Transfer Agreements for Equitable Biodiversity Prospecting.
mimeo (1995); and UNEP Doc. N. UNEP/CBD/COP/2/13 (6 October 1995) Access to Genetic
Resources and Benefit-Sharing: Legislation, Administrative and Policy Information, pp. 25-26.
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It is possible to argue that such a contractual relationship, either through
MTAs or through other mechanisms, between the provider and the user of genetic
resources will contain at least the following clauses: (a) the type of genetic resources
for which access is to be authorised and for what purpose (commercial or
scientific/academic) it is granted; (b) in which geographical area, if any, such
resources are allowed to be exploited; (c) research participation; (d) technology
transfer and ownership (IPRs) of the results of research; (e) royalty fees for accessing
genetic resources; (f) limits on third party transfer; (g) measures regulating the
handling, transport, export and release of products arising from the research on
genetic resources; (h) the duration of the access; and (i) dispute settlement.
The CBD additionally states that "[a]ccess to genetic resources shall be
subject to prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such resources,
unless otherwise determined by the Party"41.
Although the concept of PIC is present only in one other international
instrument42, it seems to be an important mechanism for the sustainable use of genetic
resources. The idea of the introduction of the mechanism of PIC is closely related to
the discretion of national legislation to regulate access to genetic resources. Although
the CBD leaves discretion to the provider countries to decide whether to require prior
informed consent or not, this seems to run counter to the objectives of the CBD itself.
If there is no control for accessing genetic resources, or no prior consent authorising
such access, the exploitation of genetic resources could be carried out without any
41CBD, Art. 15 (5).
12The Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposals, done at Basel in 1989 (Lyle Glowka et al.. note 35. supra, p. 80).
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further regulation, possibly causing damage to the environment, destroying genetic
resources and, of course, being against the sustainable use of biological diversity. In
my opinion, it is unlikely that national legislation will fail to include provisions on PIC
when discussing access to genetic resources.
PIC will probably take place through a written certificate granting the third
party in question an authorisation to exploit and use genetic resources under the terms
and conditions of the agreement which has been agreed mutually before consent is
granted. A government authority will probably have to be created (or an existing one
will have to be empowered) to grant such certificates, and will have the additional
tasks of analysing the conditions previously established by the agreement in question
and of controlling compliance by the third party to the terms of the access agreement.
Such a certificate will be probably based on the terms and conditions created by the
agreement, and will be enforced by national laws of the country providing genetic
resources. Probably, when establishing administrative mechanisms for granting or
refusing access to genetic resources, national laws will also provide for some kind of
administrative appeal against decisions denying access to genetic resources, and for
penalties and sanctions for non-compliance with the terms of the access agreement or
non-fulfilment of the requirement of having a written form of PIC before exploitation
of genetic resources occurs.
Lastly, it is important to mention that for all that has been said above to take
place, it is necessary that the country providing genetic resources has the capacity to
analyse and negotiate all the information provided by the third party wishing to have
access to genetic resources, as well as technical ability to assess whether or not such
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access will take place in an environmentally sound manner43. This technological
capability may not be present in most of the countries which are providers of genetic
resources, but can be built through technology transfer arrangements and through
international co-operation among developing countries themselves It also seems to be
the task of the Conference of the Parties of the CBD to find mechanisms to be used in
building up such capabilities.
2.3. Scientific research on genetic resources
As has been mentioned in the foregoing Sub-section, the CBD attempts to regulate
the situation between the country providing genetic resources and the user. Genetic
resources are recognised today as the main source of products for research in the
pharmaceutical, biotechnological, and agricultural fields.
There are at least two types of research which will use genetic resources as a
main basis and which shall be regulated by national legislation by virtue of Article 15
of the CBD. The country providing this genetic material will have to consider, firstly,
if the resources in question will be used only for academic and research purposes, only
for commercial purposes, or for both. This difference leads to distinct approaches
which must be considered by national legislation and by access agreements.
The CBD requires that there be equitable sharing of the benefits of the use of
genetic resources on a financial, scientific and technological basis. The sharing of
these benefits shall moreover be in compliance with the other two objectives of the
43John Mugabe. Governing Access to Genetic Resources: Emerging National Policy. Legal and
Administrative Regimes, paper presented at the Global Biodiversity Forum '95. Jakarta. Indonesia.
4-5 November 1995. p. 3.
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CBD, i.e. the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its
components44. The sharing of the benefits is to be considered taking into account both
how genetic resources are going to be used, if commercially or only for scientific
purposes, and what type of benefits will be shared (financial, scientific or
technological).
When countries providing genetic resources negotiate the supply of genetic
resources to third parties, they will have to consider their participation in the scientific
research that will be carried out, the sharing of the benefits arising from this research,
and whether or not this research, or the result of it, may cause risk or damage to the
environment or to human, plant or animal health.
2.3.1. The full participation of the provider
The CBD considers the level of technological development of developing countries
which are the providers of genetic resources and suggests that scientific research
based on genetic resources provided by a specific country should be with the
participation of such country and should take place in the provider country.45 These
provisions aim at encouraging appropriate transfer of technology and building the
capacity of developing countries.
The wording of Article 15 (6), CBD, is general and not obligatory. The
provision says that participation shall be encouraged in this manner. Although this
seems to be addressed directly to developed nations' governmental agencies and
^CBD, Art. 1.
45CBD. Art. 15 (6). Similarly, the CBD suggest the participation of the country provider in scientific
research based on genetic resources, in Articles 18 and 19 (1).
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private research companies, the letter of Article 15 (6), CBD, also appears to suggest
that such mechanism should be encouraged by national legislation of the country
providing the genetic resources and by access agreements.
These measures must be defined by national legislation and determined by the
access agreements. The cost of participation in scientific research and the material for
building capacity for provider countries shall be considered. Generally speaking,
countries and/or undertakings utilising genetic resources for scientific research shall
bear the costs of the participation of the country providing these resources.
In relation to the aspects of EPRs arising from research based on genetic
resources, there are other important considerations. This seems to be a matter to be
decided by the negotiations on the access agreements. Usually the participating
country, as a contributor to the scientific research, should also be able to share the
"ownership" of the EPRs which are a possible outcome of the scientific research in
question. However, provider countries may consider giving up the EPRs of the
outcome of scientific research if the user company or country invests considerable
amounts in the transfer of relevant technology and on the human resources and
capacity building of the country providing the genetic resources. A balance shall be
permitted by national legislation and shall be considered in the setting up of national
science and technology and industrial policies.
The issues about EPRs will also have to be considered in the context of the
agreement itself. If the agreement is merely for scientific research with no commercial
aim, it seems that the issues of IPRs could not be relevant if this scientific aim is
explicitly referred to in the access agreement and no commercial end is envisaged. On
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the other hand, if the access agreement has the objective of directly or indirectly
developing a product which will be commercialised, the issues of IPRs will have to be
taken into account in more detail.
2.3.2. Fair and equitable share of the benefits
Article 15 (7), CBD, obliges Contracting Parties to take legislative, administrative or
policy measures to share " .. in a fair and equitable way the results of research and
development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of
genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources". This shall be
done on mutually agreed terms46.
It is firstly necessary to mention that the wording of Article 15 (7), CBD, is
addressed to both developed and developing nations, implying a two-way relationship.
These measures (legislative, administrative or policy) will have to be complemented
by each other's understanding of the results of research and development of genetic
resources, and the research or commercial value of the genetic resources provided will
have to be considered in a case-by-case basis.
Article 15 (7), CBD, makes a clear distinction between two benefits that may
arise from scientific research based on genetic resources: scientific benefits, or
research and development results; and the commercial or other benefits as an outcome
of the research based on the genetic resources provided.
It is difficult to predict all types of benefit that might arise from the use of
genetic resources, either as a result of pure scientific research or by the further
46Cf. Sub-section 2.2, supra.
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commercialisation of these results, and how these benefits should be shared. Thus,
national legislation will have to be flexible in considering the wide range of benefits
that may be shared.
In relation to the sharing of scientific benefits, for instance, there are a few
questions to be considered. One should bear in mind that the results of research and
development may lead to the creation of products and/or technologies which may be
deemed strategic for both parties, the country providing the genetic resources and the
user who access has been granted to. In this situation, the sharing of the benefits may
be based on technology transfer and support of the development of human resources.
The provider country may, for instance, request the user of genetic resources to bear
the costs of the participation of scientists in the research and development activities
based on the genetic resources in question. The provider country may also request
that the research and development activities take place in its territory and that the
equipment and all infra-structure necessary to carry on the research be left in the
country provider.
The user of genetic resources may also suggest some conditions for sharing
the benefit of the results of scientific research. He may, for instance, request to be the
holder of the appropriate EPRs on the results of the research, and to be in a more
favourable position to have access to other genetic resources in the provider country.
He may also wish to have exclusive rights over those genetic resources for a specific
period of time.
In considering the sharing of benefits arising from the commercial use of
genetic resources, other aspects must be analysed. It is firstly necessary to mention
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that, when commercial activities are linked with research based on genetic resources,
monetary benefits will play the most determinant part. Monetary benefits will take
several forms in practice. The country providing the genetic resources may require
advance payment for collecting genetic resources, payments for samples collected,
minimum royalty fees for the future development of commercially valuable products,
or a combination of all these. National legislation will also have to provide for
mechanisms which recognise the value of indigenous and local knowledge in research
on genetic resources. All these monetary benefits may be used as an additional fund to
promote the sustainable use of genetic resources and, therefore, to protect biological
diversity.
It is also important to note that Article 15 (7), CBD, makes reference to
Articles 16 and 19 of the Convention. The main purpose of this cross-reference is to
provide further support for technology transfer from the developed to the developing
world (Article 16), and to expand the participation of the country providing the
genetic resources in biotechnological research and in the benefits arising from
biotechnological research which makes use of genetic resources (Article 19)47. It also
has the objective of enhancing the appropriate and effective protection of IPRs related
to research on genetic resources (Article 16).
Article 15 (7) also refers to Articles 20 and 21 of the CBD, which deals -with
the financial mechanisms to support biodiversity conservation. It is possible that the
Convention aims at suggesting that "... the agreed full incremental cost of sharing
research and development results and other benefits could be financed through the
47Lyle Glowka et al., note 35, p. 82.
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Convention's financial mechanism, if the Conference of the Parties decides that such
activities are potentially eligible for funding (.. ,)"48.
2.3.3. Measures to regulate biosafety
Research based on genetic resources is likely to have as a final result products which
are modified somehow by either traditional or modern biotechnology49. The
modifications of the structure of living matters may have adverse effects on the
environment and human, plant or animal health. It seems that, by its nature, modern
biotechnology which genetically modifies living organisms by transferring genes
between species, genera, and phyla, may be more likely to have adverse effects when
deliberately released. This is also enhanced by the limited knowledge that modern
science has on the future effects that products resulting from biotechnological
research may have on the environment, human, plant or animal health.
As the CBD is designed to protect biodiversity by several means, including the
use of biotechnological research techniques based on genetic resources, the issue of
"biosafety"50 is present, directly or indirectly, in several provisions. By virtue of
48Ibid., p. 83. The "financial mechanism" of the CBD is provided by Article 21 and supplemented by
Article 20. Article 21, CBD, calls for the establishment of a mechanism funded by the Contracting
Parties (particularly developed countries) to provide financial resources to developing countries
under the framework of the Conference of the Parties of the CBD. Such mechanism should also
consider the existing financial mechanisms to provide financial resources for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity. In addition. Article 20 determines a commitment for all
Contracting Parties to the CBD to fund the protection of biological diversity, also calling for
additional funds from developed nations. It also takes full account of the specific needs of least
developed countries in relation to funding and technology transfer.
49Cf. Chapter 5, Part 2, Section 2, infra.
^Since the first studies on infections acquired within the laboratories where biological research was
conducted, in the 1960s, the definition of "biosafety" was developed. The 1960s saw a great advance
in biotechnological research enhanced by the development of new technologies in genetic
engineering methods. In the mid-1970s the World Health Organization (WHO) published a manual
on biosafety in which this concept was widened by the inclusion of questions related with the
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Articles 8 (g) and 19 (3) and (4), the CBD directly addresses the subject on two
levels: national and multilateral. In several other provisions, the CBD addresses the
subject of biosafety mechanisms indirectly or as a means of implementing the main
goal of conserving and using genetic resources in a sustainable way51. This Paragraph
analyses only the provisions which address the issues on biosafety in a direct sense.
Article 8 (g) of the CBD calls for the establishment of regulations to "...
control the risks associated with the use and release of living modified organisms
resulting from biotechnology which are likely to have adverse environmental impacts
that could affect the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking
also into account the risks to human health". The CBD by the wording of this
provision has attempted to broaden the traditionally applied concept of "genetically
modified organisms" (GMOs) by using the term living modified organisms" (LMOs).
During the negotiations of the CBD, it seems that the prevailing notion was that the
risks of release of GMOs were present more widely in the context of biodiversity
conservation and that, in some circumstances, traditionally developed or bred
prevention of risks of various type, including physical, radioactive, chemical and biological risks.
Developed countries, in particular European countries, started to issue regulations on the control of
biosafety and, developing countries such as Brazil, with less biotechnological research capacity,
regulated this issue for the first time in 1995 (Carlos Medici Morel, Biosseguranca: Uma Nova
Ciencia?. Anais da 47a. Reuniao Anual da Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciencia, V. 1
(July 1995), pp. 25-26). For further information on the existing instruments or guidelines dealing
with biosafety measures see UNEP Doc. N. UNEP/Bio.Div./Panels/Inf.4 (28 April 1993) Expert
Panels Established to Follow-Up on the Convention on Biological Diversity - Report of Panel IV:
Consideration of the Need for and Modalities of a Protocol Setting Out Appropriate Procedures
Including, in Particular. Advance Informed Agreement in the Field of the Safe Transfer, Handling
and Use of Any Living Modified Organism Resulting from Biotechnology that may Have Adverse
Effect on the Conservation and Sustainable I Tse ofBiological Diversity, Annex II.
51 Ibid.. UNEP Doc. N. UNEP/Bio.Div./Panels/Inf.4. states that it was agreed that other provisions of
the CBD were also relevant to the discussion on the modalities and needs of a protocol on biosafety,
such as Articles 6 (b); 7 (c); 8 (h); 14 (l)(a), (c) and (d); 17 (1); and 18 (3).
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organisms could also pose risks to the environment and to the sustainable use of
biodiversity52.
The rationale of the obligation imposed by Article 8 (g), CBD, seems to be
directly linked with national mechanisms for the control of the release of
biotechnological research results, which should take place in a precautionary manner,
based on the assessment of the risks and the subsequent management of the release of
these products. It is, however, important to bear in mind that this obligation is
addressed only to sovereign countries which are allowed to extend the application of
such regulatory measures based on their own national legal framework. The CBD has,
thus, approached the subject firstly on the national level to recognise, further, the
need of a multilateral mechanism to control the release and handling of products that
are the result ofbiotechnological research.
In Article 19 (3), therefore, the CBD has claimed that Contracting Parties
should consider the need of a protocol to the Convention "... setting out appropriate
procedures, including, in particular, advanced informed agreement, in the field of the
safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified organism resulting from
biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity". By analysing the wording of Article 19 (3), CBD, one should
consider firstly that the negotiators accepted the need of domestic measures, in the
light of Article 8 (g), CBD, but recognised that national law would be aided by the
establishment of international standards in this regard. The CBD has also, by
suggesting an assessment of the need for a protocol, accepted that the control of the
52Lyle Glowka et al., note 35, supra, p. 45.
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release and handling of LMOs is necessarily a matter of concern to all, and the
recognition of measures to regulate such actions should have a multilateral approach
in order to be effectively applied in a harmonised way world-wide. The release,
without control, of a product resulting from biotechnological research in any area of
the planet could have adverse effects on the biodiversity in any other place, which
would run counter to the objectives of the CBD.
In this sense, one may argue that national measures in this matter could be
undermined by the establishment of multilateral measures for biosafety. It appears that
the objective of the negotiators was nevertheless in the opposite sense, that the CBD
recognised the need of national measures which would be aided and in the future
harmonised by the establishment of guidelines created by the protocol.
Article 19 (3), CBD, aiming at the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity, has also included a term which shall be analysed further:
"advanced informed agreement". It is possible that the negotiators of the CBD
intended, with this expression, to create a set of procedures, incorporated in the
principle that States have sovereign rights to control the transfer, handling and use of
LMOs, including the right to refuse the importation of LMOs. Advanced informed
agreement sounds similar to the mechanism of PIC discussed above in Sub-section
2.2. It is probably a mechanism which grants States rights to refuse the importation of
LMOs which do not fulfill the requirements established by national legislation or, in
this case, by the protocol on biosafety under the CBD53
53The importer of LMOs will probably have to provide basic information in relation to the organism
that is intended to be imported into national territories, such as: the intended use. including the scale
of use; the site for the intended use; information relating to the organisms, such as their common
names, characteristics, where they are indigenous or commonly used; information on prior related
414
It is also important to note that the CBD does not necessarily claim that a
protocol will be established. It merely calls for an assessment of the needs and
modalities of such a protocol. In this way, the first meeting of the Conference of the
Parties to the CBD, held in Nassau, Bahamas, from 28 November to 9 December
1994, established an "Open-ended Ad Hoc Group ofExperts on Biosafety" (Biosafety
Ad Hoc Group) with the mandate of considering the needs and modalities of such a
protocol and assessing the existing knowledge, experience and legislation in this field.
The Conference of the Parties to the CBD decided also to establish a panel of fifteen
government-nominated experts to prepare a background document for the Biosafety
Ad Hoc Group. The government-nominated experts group met in Cairo from 1 to 5
May 1995 and the Biosafety Ad Hoc Group met in Madrid, from 24 to 28 July 1995
The Biosafety Ad Hoc Group clearly concluded that there is a need for a protocol by
virtue ofArticle 19 (3) of the CBD.54
It is also clear that the CBD, in addition to the call for an assessment of the
needs of a biosafety protocol, further concluded that some bilateral-type of obligation
on the import and export ofLMOs was necessary. Article 19 (4), CBD, thus creates a
bilateral obligation to provide information about LMOs before actual transfer of them
takes place. Article 19 (4), CBD, establishes that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall, ...
releases: information concerning national risks assessments; information regarding the conditions of
the release, for example, the quantity and time of release, the natural conditions of the geographical
area where it is supposed to be released, and the characteristics of the flora, fauna and the
environment that could be affected by such release: an analysis of the national socio-economic
implications and impacts of the release; the type of transportation that will be used to transfer the
organism, including the packaging and labelling characteristics; and information regarding the safe
handling and use of the organisms (IJNEP Doc. N. LTNEP/Bio.Div /Panels/Inf.4. note 50, supra.
Annex IV).
54See. generally, UNEP Doc. N. UNEP/CBD/COP/2/7 (3 August 1995), Report of the Open-ended
Ad Hoc Group ofExperts on Biosafetv.
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provide any available information about the use and safety regulations required by the
Contracting Party in handling such organisms, as well as any available information on
the potential adverse impact of the specific organisms concerned to the Contracting
Party into which those organisms are to be introduced". This implies two types of
obligation. The first obligation is the one which requires the exporting Contracting
Party to provide information on the regulatory measures that it utilises for the safety
handling of LMOs. In addition, exporting Contracting Parties could provide available
guidelines and policies in this regard. This type of obligation is of a general character.
The second obligation is related to the supply of any information regarding
possible adverse impacts of the LMOs which will be imported. The wording of Article
19 (4), CBD, i.e. "... any available information on the potential adverse impact ..." is
very broad and seems to imply that the information in question could be concerned
with adverse impact on biodiversity, as well as on human or animal health. In addition,
this second obligation does not appear to require exporting Contracting Parties and
private or public undertakings to generate information, but only to provide the
information that is currently available55.
Current negotiations on a protocol on biosafety lead one to think that such a
protocol would contain at least the following provisions: (1) transfer of LMOs would
take place after a minimum set of information is provided; (2) the supply of
information must consider, primarily, the overall characteristics of the organisms, the
potential receiving environment, and the interaction between these components; (3)
regulation of biosafety should be based on a case-by-case and step-by-step approach,
55Lyle Glowka et al., note 35, supra, pp. 98-99.
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assessing whether or not there is enough experience and documentation available for
the release of the organisms; (4) risk assessment and risk management should take
place prior to the release of the LMOs; (5) assessment of the socio-economic impact
of the release of organisms has to be provided, and (6) a clearing-house mechanism
should be created to provide an effective link between national authorities, to support
interaction among national authorities, to provide technical and scientific advice to
national authorities, to establish relevant database on the release of LMOs, and to
serve as the international body for overseeing the advanced informed agreement
procedure.
Although that is not clear within the context of the negotiations of the CBD, a
future biosafety protocol would need to contain clauses on liability and compensation
in case the release of LMOs in the environment causes damage or risks to the
conservation ofbiological diversity, human or animal health or life.56
2.4. An overview of the legislative developments in Brazil
As early as 1988, the Brazilian Constitution recognised the need to support
environmental protection as a means of providing better standards of living for its
population. The general constitutional principle, created by Article 225, caput,
establishes that "[e]veryone has the right to an ecologically balanced environment,
which is a public good for the people's use and is essential for a healthy life".
Additionally, Article 225, caput, Brazilian Constitution, affirms that both the
56See. generally, information provided by UNEP Doc. N. UNEP/Bio.Div./Panels/Inf. 4. note 50.
supra, pp. 17-23.
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government and the community "... have a duty to defend and to preserve the
environment for present and future generations".
By establishing such a principle, the Brazilian Constitution acknowledges the
value of environmental protection as a means of protecting the public interest in a
higher quality of life for its population which is to be considered as beyond the
discussion about economic development, focusing primarily on social development
and duties.57
Several measures to be taken by governmental authorities are listed in Article
225 (1), Brazilian Constitution. Among others, the government must preserve the
country's genetic patrimony and supervise "... the entities dedicated to research and
manipulation of genetic material"58. Moreover, Article 225 (4), Brazilian Constitution,
certifies that "[t]he Brazilian Amazon Forest, the Atlantic Woods, the Serra do Mar,
the Pantanal of Mato Grosso, and the Coastal Zone are the national patrimony, and
they shall be utilized, ... under conditions assuring preservation of the environment,
including use of genetic resources".
Broadly speaking, the Brazilian constitutional principles establish the general
guidelines for biodiversity protection and access to genetic resources. It is important
to bear in mind that all Brazilian ecosystems, in their totality, are part of the patrimony
of the country and their use shall be in accordance with the regulations implementing
the constitutional principles. Regulatory mechanisms, however, must be created to
' See. generally, Jose Afonso da Silva. Curso de Direito Constitucional Positivo. Sao Paulo: Editora
Revista dos Tribunals (1991), 7th ed., pp. 708-710.
58Brazilian Constitution. Art. 225 (1) (II).
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interpret and control the use of the Brazilian environment in a way which leads to its
preservation for present and future generations.
Considering its constitutional principles and the outcome of the UNCED,
namely the CBD and the Agenda 21, the Brazilian federal government created in
December 1994 the National Program for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of
Biological Diversity (PRONABIO), under the institutional framework of the Ministry
for the Environment and the Amazon Region, with the task of suggesting policy
guidelines, legislative measures and institutional mechanisms to control the use of
Brazilian biodiversity and the exploitation of its resources59. In spite of these
institutional efforts, no regulatory proposals were suggested by the Brazilian federal
government to Parliament. Current legislative developments within the Brazilian
Parliament are the initiative of Members of Parliament themselves. At the moment
there are two legislative Bills in the Brazilian Parliament dealing with access to
genetic resources: PL N. 2.057, of 23 October 1991, on the Statute of Indigenous
Societies, and PLS N. 306, of 9 November 199560, on instruments to control access
to genetic resources. This Sub-section intends to highlight only the measures
proposed by PLS 306/95. Further discussion on PL N. 2.057, of 23 October 1991,
takes place in Section 3, Sub-section 3.3, Paragraph 3.3.2, infra.
59For this information see. Ministry of Science and Technology, SUSBIO: Sustainable Use of
Biodiversity - A Strategy for the Use of Biodiversity Leading to Sustainable Development - Model
Proposal for Brazil, mimeo, August 1994, p. 8.
hereinafter the "PLS 306/95".The acronym PLS stands for "Projeto de Lei do Senado". or
legislative Bill which originated in the Federal Senate. PLS 306/95 was suggested by Senator Marina
Silva. on 9 November 1995. Senator Marina Silva was awarded the Goldman Environmental Prize of
1996. This prize is regarded by many as the Nobel Prize for environmental issues (Time
International, 29 April 1996, V. 147, N. 18).
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In the justification to PLS 306/95, Senator Marina Silva explicitly affirms that
the intention of this legislative Bill is to . create a concrete space for discussion and
decision-making about one of the crucial aspects of the biodiversity problem, which is
access to genetic resources, In doing so, Senator Marina Silva calls for the
opening up of discussion on biodiversity prospecting between society, scientists,
governmental and non-governmental organisations, Members of Parliament, and local
and indigenous communities, in order to create a legal framework which is compatible
with the sustainable use of biological diversity and with necessary Brazilian presence
in the international debate62.
PLS 306/95 is, therefore, divided in seven chapters, setting up general
principles for the conservation and use of biological diversity, institutional
mechanisms, regulatory measures to access genetic resources, the protection of
traditional knowledge and the development and transfer of technology, and
administrative penalties.
In its first chapter, entitled General Provisions, general principles to guide
access to genetic resources are established. The government is therefore empowered
to preserve the diversity, integrity and sustainable use of the "country's genetic
patrimony"63, as well as to monitor the work carried out by public and private entities
dealing with research into and manipulation of genetic material64. This public task has
to be conducted in the light of the following principles: (1) sovereignty and
slPLS 306/95, Justification, p. 6.
62Ibid.
63Which includes, by virtue of Article 3, PLS 306/95, all biological and genetic and maritime
resources from the continental coast and from Brazilian islands which are within the Brazilian
territory, as well as to migrating species that are in the national territory because of natural causes.
^PLS 306/95, Art. 1, caput.
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inalienability of the rights over the biological diversity and over the existing genetic
resources in the national territory65; (2) participation of local communities and
indigenous peoples in the decisions that have as their subject-matter genetic resources
in the areas that they occupy66; (3) national participation in social and economic
benefits arising from the use of genetic resources, particularly to benefit the local and
indigenous communities involved67, (4) to give priority access to genetic resources for
those who research them in the national territory68; (5) to promote and support the
development of technologies in the country, giving emphasis to strengthening the
national technological capacity69; (6) to provide protection and incentive for cultural
diversity, particularly cultural diversity related to traditional knowledge and practices
in connection with the conservation and sustainable use of biological and genetic
diversity7 ; (7) to guarantee biosafety and the country's environmental and food-
supply strategies71; and (8) to recognise knowledge associated with biodiversity, as a
means of ensuring its protection and remuneration72.73
Within this framework of principles, it is possible to identify three major
groups of guidelines. Firstly, PLS 306/95 suggests the reaffirmation of the principle
created by Article 15 (1), CBD, on the national sovereignty over genetic resources
65Ibid, Art. 1 (I).
66Ibid.. Art. 1 (II).
61Ibid., Art. 1 (IE).
^Ibid., Art 1 (IV).
83Ibid., Art. 1 (V).
10Ibid., Art. 1 (VI).
llIbid., Art. 1 (VII).
2Ibid, Art. 1 (VHI).
3It is also worth mentioning that the provisions of PLS 306/95 shall apply to all natural or legal
persons, national or international, which extract use. store, commercialise or transfer genetic
resources within the national territory (PLS 306/95, Art. 2). This law does not apply, however, to
parts or genetic components of human beings and to the inter-exchange of biological resources
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Additionally, the first principle listed by Article 1, PLS 306/95, emphasises the
application of the sovereign rights principle by also stating that the rights over
biodiversity are inalienable.
Secondly, this legislative Bill recognises, broadly, the application of the
traditional knowledge and practices of local and indigenous communities by affirming
that they shall participate in the decision-making process over genetic process in the
territory they occupy, that social and economic benefits which arise from the
exploitation of genetic resources shall be particularly shared by them when they are
somehow involved, and by recognising their cultural diversity associated with the
sustainable use of genetic and biological resources74. By accepting the need to
guarantee individual and collective rights over knowledge related with biodiversity,
recognising not only its protection but also its remuneration, PLS 306/95 also
emphasises the need to protect the traditional knowledge and practices of local and
indigenous communities as a means of accepting their constitutional rights75.
The third characteristic of these principles is related to procedural aspects for
the setting up of national strategies and policies in relation to the exploitation and use
of biological and genetic diversity. By doing so, PLS 306/95 has recognised the two
first group of principles which have been mentioned and also highlights the need for
national participation in the economic and social benefits arising from the use of
genetic resources. It also provides recognition of the necessity to have research on
genetic resources taking place in the national territory, by giving priority to genetic
among indigenous communities, by their own means of communication, for their own ends and
based on their customary practice (Ibid., Art. 4).
l4Cf., PLS 306/95. Arts. 1 (II), (III) and (VI), respectively.
75C/ PLS 306/95. Art. 1 (Vm).
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resources to those who will carry on research in the national territory, and also by
supporting the development of new technologies, giving emphasis to the development
of national technologies, and providing principles on biosafety and national strategies
related to environmental and food-supply issues.
Institutionally, PLS 306/95 approaches the subject by proposing the creation
of a committee composed of representatives of the federal and state governments, the
Federal District, the scientific community, non-governmental organisations and
private entities. Such a committee would be empowered to co-ordinate, evaluate and
assure the development of activities aiming at the conservation of the national genetic
patrimony.76 There are also several institutional tasks suggested by PLS 306/95, such
as: (a) to produce a report in two years after the publication of this law regarding the
level of threaten to biodiversity and concerning the potential impacts over sustainable
development strategies of its destruction, such report to be up-dated once every five
years; (b) to set up technical and scientific guidelines aiming at the establishment of
priorities for the conservation of biodiversity; (c) to create a list of endangered genetic
resources; (d) to create mechanisms for controlling and disseminating information on
the national biodiversity; (e) to develop strategies and policies focusing on the
conservation of biological diversity and on the sustainable use of it; (f) to control and
prevent the introduction of alien species in the national territory; (g) to create
mechanisms to consider the sustainable use or loss of biological resources as part of
®PLS 306/95. Art 5 (I).
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national accounting procedures; and (h) to identify priorities in the field of human
resources related to the conservation and sustainable use ofbiodiversity77.
The procedural aspects of access to genetic resources are set out by
Chapter ID of PLS 306/95. Article 6, caput, PLS 306/95, proposes to establish,
firstly, a PIC mechanism for works aiming at the collection of biodiversity resources.
Consent will be granted or refused after the following information is provided by the
natural or legal person willing to collect resources: (a) detailed and specific
information about the resource for which access is requested, including its actual or
potential use, its sustainability and eventual risks that may occur as a result of the
access; (b) detailed description of the methods, techniques, collection system and
instruments to be used; (c) precise definition of the geographical area where collection
of genetic resources will take place; and (d) indication of the place where the material
collected will be taken and its probable posterior use78. In the case where access is
requested for collection or research, and these resources are located in the territories
of indigenous or local communities, PLS 306/95 calls for the establishment of
regulations in this regard which will, at least, assure the hearing of the populations in
question and the participation of at least one member of the community in the
collection and research79.
The respective national authority will then decide whether or not to grant
authorisation for the required access80. If it decides to grant authorisation, it will be
See. generally, PLS 306/95, Arts. 5 (II) to XH.
78PLS 306/95, Arts. 6 (I) to (IV).
9Ibid.. Art 6, Sole paragraph.
80Authorisation to access genetic resources does not imply that exportation of genetic resources is
authorised (PLS 306/95, Art. 12). PLS 306/95 also determines that the transfer of alien genetic
resources into the national territory is subject to authorisation of the competent authority (Ibid.. Art.
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accompanied by the following obligations, listed as a minimum basis: (a) that the
entity which has been granted access will be bound by national rules, particularly
those related to sanitary control, biosafety, customs and environmental protection, (b)
that the Brazilian federal government will have access, without restrictions, to all
knowledge produced and to all information resulting from the research in question; (c)
that Brazil will be given priority treatment to utilise the products which are the result
of genetic resources; (d) that national participation in the economic, social and
environmental results of the products and processes arising from the research based
on genetic resources will take place; and (e) that those to whom access has been
granted will deposit a sample of the genetic resource in question in a Brazilian
institution81. The Brazilian authority in charge of access to genetic resources is
empowered, together with the Brazilian technical-scientific institution assigned to
follow the collection and the research82, to make sure that the obligations set out in
the authorisation are met83. The national authority may also request that the entity
which is carrying out research based on and collection of genetic resources, should
provide a study on the impact assessment as a result of the research or collection in
16). It is also worth mentioning that if genetic resources are collected or researched without formal
authorisation, rights over collection and research will not be recognised by Brazilian national
legislation, including IPRs (Ibid.. Art. 15).
81 Ibid.. Art. 8. All research and collection of genetic resources in the national territory will be
followed by a Brazilian scientific-technical institution with the scientific capacity in the area subject-
matter of research, which will be assigned by the competent authority and will be deemed liable for
the fulfilling of the obligations set out in the authorisation (Ibid., Art. 7).
%2Cf PLS 306/95, Art. 7.
83PLS 306/95. Art. 9, caput.
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question84, as well as requiring financial compensation to the federal government for
access to take place85.
Article 17, caput, PLS 306/95, also suggests that the rights of local and
indigenous communities should be recognised and protected, and that just
compensation should be granted to these communities by using the mechanisms of
intellectual property protection and others. It also recognises that, when it is not
possible to identify individuals as holders of rights, collective rights over intellectual
property protection will be used as a legal tool86.
Traditional communities are also empowered to refuse access to genetic
resources in their territory or in other area outside their territory. In the latter case, it
will have to be proved that access to genetic resources in areas outside their territory
will threaten the integrity of their natural and cultural patrimony87.
PLS 306/95 also calls for two further measures to be taken in connection with
the IPRs of local and indigenous communities. Firstly, it states that individual EPRs
related to biological or genetic resources will not be recognised - registered either in
Brazil or abroad - if they utilise the collective knowledge of traditional communities
or if they are acquired without the authorisation for access or to export88. Secondly,
9,4Ibid.. Art. 9, Sole paragraph.
95Ibid.. Art. 10. The financial resources acquired from researchers on genetic resources, for access to
be granted, will be deposited in the National Fund for the Environment (Ibid., Art. 10. Sole
Paragraph).
86Ibid.. Art. 17. Sole paragraph. By virtue of Article 18. PLS 306/95, the collective rights of
traditional communities is a recognition of the rights traditionally acquired by, including industrial
property rights, copyrights, breeders' rights, trade secret and others. These collective rights have to
be implemented within one year counting from the date of publication of this law. under the
following guidelines: (a) identification of the type of IPRs to be used in each case: (b) determination
of the requirements and procedures for these rights to be recognised; and (c) creation of a registry




PLS 306/95 suggests, in Article 22, that the government should review all patent or
intellectual property rights based on Brazilian genetic resources which have been
registered abroad, so that compensation may be claimed or a declaration of nullity
may be obtained.
With regard to the transfer and development of technologies, PLS 306/95
affirms that the government shall promote and support the development of national
sustainable technologies for use and advancement of species and varieties, giving
priority to the traditional uses and practices of local and indigenous communities
within the national territory, according to their own aspirations89. Alongside the
support and promotion of the development of national technologies, the federal
government may allow the utilisation of foreign biotechnology, as far as such use is in
accordance with this law and national regulations on biosafety. The exporter of the
technology in question must accept all responsibility for any damage caused to the
environment, health and local cultures, in the present or in the future90.
Article 25, PLS 306/95, calls for the creation ofmechanisms to guarantee and
facilitate access to and transfer of technologies which are relevant for the conservation
and sustainable use of biodiversity to national researchers91. In the case of a transfer
of relevant technologies which are capable of intellectual property protection, the
government shall create conditions to guarantee that such transfer of and access to the
technology in question will be in accordance with the adequate protection of EPRs92.
i9Ibid., Art. 23. For the application of this principle a survey and evaluation of traditional and local





Lastly, PLS 306/95 requires the federal government to establish a system of
administrative penalties for those who infringes the rules on access to genetic
resources. Such system should include, inter alia, the arrest of samples, materials and
equipment utilised in the unlawful action, fines, and abrogation of the authorisation to
access genetic resources93. These sanctions should not preclude the application of
other civil or penal sanctions94.
3. Technology Transfer and IPRs in the CBD
The CBD regards technology transfer as a vital approach towards biodiversity
conservation and sustainability. This is expressed by almost the entire text of the
Convention and particularly emphasised by the CBD's Preamble:
Acknowledging that the provision of new and additional financial
resources and appropriate access to relevant technologies can be
expected to make a substantial difference in the world's ability to
address the loss ofbiological diversity,
Acknowledging further that special provision is required to meet the
needs of developing countries, including the provision of new and
additional financial resources and appropriate access to relevant
technologies, ...
The CBD has thus addressed all States, whether developed or developing
economies, recognising that technology transfer is one of the major step towards
biodiversity conservation. It has further accepted that a technological gap between
developed and developing nations is evident by acknowledging that developing
nations require special provision on access to technologies. Signatory States to the
93Ibid., Art. 27.
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CBD have therefore called for a broader form of assistance which includes scientific
and technical co-operation.
Also in its Preamble, the CBD has recognised "... the close and traditional
dependence of many indigenous and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles on biological resources, ..." and further suggested that it is desired to share
equitably the benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge and practices of
these communities. This leads one to understands that traditional knowledge and
practices represent traditional technologies which are relevant ror the conservation
and sustainable use ofbiological resources.
Obviously, the implementation of the wording of the CBD's Preamble has
given rise to more detailed provisions on this matter, which have been further
considered in the text of the CBD and will be analysed in even more detail in the
context of national rules aiming at implementing the biodiversity principles. This
understanding leads naturally to discussions about the use of mechanisms to protect
IPRs appropriately and effectively.
This link between traditional and modern technologies and intellectual
property protection is probably the major issue of the CBD and has been subject to a
controversial debate. The wording of the CBD is not detailed and leaves much
discretion to national legislation. This appears to have posed a threat to the plans of
major multinational companies, particularly in the biotechnological field, which have a
great interest in the exploitation of genetic resources as a raw material for the
research and development of new products.
94Ibid., Art 27, Sole Paragraph.
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A possible solution for building up scientific and technical capacities related to
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use is by scientific and technical co¬
operation. By virtue of Article 18, CBD, this should take place by the development of
national policies, training of personnel and exchange of experts, and by the promotion
of joint research programmes and joint ventures for the development of technologies.
The system suggested by Article 18 (3), CBD, to promote scientific and technical co¬
operation is the establishment of a clearing-house mechanism which would provide an
information exchange service, serving as an instrument for the development of local,
national and global policies, supporting the establishment of national institutional
capacities, assisting countries to develop partnerships, and assisting the Executive
Secretariat of the CBD by integrating and disseminating scientific, technological and
technical information. In its first phase of operation, the clearing-house mechanism
would give emphasis to the development of national capabilities, the facilitation of
technology transfer , and the promotion of partnerships. It would thus operate as an
accessible electronic data network, a decentralised network of national and regional
centres, based as far as possible on existing institutions, using existing databases,
information, services and networking capabilities. The Executive Secretariat of the
CBD would be the international focal point of such a mechanism and responsible for
gathering, organising and disseminating information of interest to the Contracting
Parties and to the sustainable use ofbiological diversity.95
95UNEP Doc. N. UNEP/CBD/COP/2/6 (29 September 1995) Establishment of the Cleanng-House
Mechanism to Promote and Facilitate Technical and Scientific Co-operation.
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3.1. Incentive to technology transfer with appropriate IPRs
An important step towards the implementation of the CBD's provisions on
technology transfer is to ensure that Contracting Parties will have access to relevant
information. It is, nevertheless, necessary to bear in mind that the intention of the
CBD is not only to promote the exchange of information about specific technology,
but also to promote and encourage the transfer of complete systems of technology
such as know-how, goods and services, and organisational and managerial skills. This
obviously includes both "hard" technologies, such as plant, equipment and computers,
and "soft" technologies, such as know-how, skills, training and maintenance.96
Article 16 of the CBD attempts to create mechanisms to promote transfer of
technology in a general way. This provision is probably the most controversial in the
whole biodiversity debate and has raised several arguments from the US government,
which has been strongly lobbied by its biotechnology industries. The ambiguous and
imprecise wording ofArticle 16, CBD, reflects the complexity of the discussion in this
field, which was determined as a result of the struggle between the interests of
developing countries, which considered technology transfer to be a crucial element to
the CBD, and the interests of developed countries strongly opposing the inclusion of
technology transfer mechanisms to favour developing nations97.
96UNEP Doc. N. UNEP/Bio.Div./Panels/Inf.3 (28 April 1993) Expert Panels Established to Follow-
Up on the Convention on Biological Diversity - Technology Transfer and Financial Issues: Issues
and Options from Panel IIL p. 1, para. 1.2.
^Lyle Glowka et al., note 35, supra, p. 84.
431
Taking into account that technology includes biotechnology98, and that
technology transfer among Contracting Parties is a vital element for the conservation
and sustainable use of biodiversity, Article 16 (1), CBD, claims that Contracting
Parties shall " .. provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other Contracting
Parties of technologies that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity or make use of genetic resources and do not cause damage to the
environment".
It is firstly necessary to note that the wording ofArticle 16 (1), CBD, makes a
suggestion rather than imposes an obligation. Contracting Parties shall "provide
and/or facilitate" access to and transfer of technology. This provision does not
necessarily impose an obligation on Contracting Parties to provide technology to
other Contracting Parties, but proposes that mechanisms facilitating technology
transfer should exist.
Also, while Article 16 (1), CBD, lists three types of technology for the
purpose of technology transfer (technologies relevant to the conservation of
biodiversity, technologies relevant to the sustainable use of biodiversity, and
technologies that make use of genetic resources), it emphasises that such technologies
shall not cause significant damage to the environment.
Access to and transfer of technology to developing countries, by virtue of
Article 16 (2), CBD, "... shall be provided and/or facilitated under fair and most
favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms where mutually
agreed, and, where necessary, in accordance with the financial mechanisms established
"Cf Art 2, CBD.
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by Articles 20 and 21". Such access and transfer shall be in accordance and consistent
with .. the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights". This
provision shall be consistent with Articles 16 (3), (4) and (5), CBD.
Article 16 (2), CBD, is divided in three parts. The first part aims at creating
more favourable conditions for developing countries access to and transfer of
technologies. The second part requires access and transfer to be consistent with the
protection of IPRs. The third part connects this paragraph with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5
ofArticle 16.
The first part of Article 16 (2), CBD, clearly recognises the lack of
technological development of developing countries. Again, developed countries are
not obliged to transfer and give most favourable terms of access to technology to
developing economies, but technology access and transfer shall be "provided and/or
facilitated" fairly and under most favourable terms. Developed countries, as holders of
modern technologies, are thus not obliged to give such preferential treatment to
developing economies. This probably suggests that such conditions will be put into
practice once access to genetic resources is regulated under national legislation and a
bargain type of relationship will take place. Developing countries will then authorise
access to genetic resources that are present in their territory in exchange for access to
and transfer of technologies. This technology transfer will obviously be mutually
agreed between both parties.
The first part of Article 16 (2), CBD, also links access to genetic resources
with the financial mechanisms of Articles 20 and 21, CBD. This necessarily implies
that the institutional framework of the CBD may be used to provide funds for
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facilitating access to and transfer of technologies to developing countries, aiding both
parties to overcome the legal and economic difficulties included in the technology
transfer."
In the second part, Article 16 (2), CBD, requires that when technology which
is the subject of transfer to developing countries is protected by IPRs, such protection
shall be made effective and in accordance with the international mechanism of
intellectual property protection. In this regard, it is necessary to mention that there are
at least two situations in which IPRs are going to be dealt with. Firstly, the effective
protection of technology which has been entirely developed by a natural or legal
person or by a governmental institution, and which is transferred to a particular
developing country, shall take place once such adequate and effective protection of
IPRs over that technology is guaranteed. This is obvious, and transfer will not take
place if such guarantee is not given. A second circumstance that raises more questions
is that relating to a particular technology which has been developed by a natural or
legal person, or governmental institution, based on genetic resources which are
present in the national territory of the developing country in question. If authorisation
was given by the latter, the terms of the authorisation of access to genetic resources
will certainly contain clauses regulating IPRs as a result of research on genetic
resources. However, if a natural or legal person, or governmental institution, has
carried out research on a particular genetic material present in the territory of a
developing country without the authorisation of the latter, IPRs over the result of
such research will not arise. The developing country in question will certainly not
"Lyle Glowka et al., note 35, supra, p. 86.
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recognise intellectual property protection for such technology and will probably claim
the nullity of IPRs on a national basis. For developing countries to claim the nullity of
IPRs on an international basis, however, further multilateral mechanisms should be
agreed to grant all countries with some necessary tools allowing them to claim
international nullity of IPRs which are the result of research on genetic resources that
were carried out without the authorisation of the provider country.
This leads to the third part of Article 16 (2), CBD, which calls for consistency
of this provision with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, of Article 16, CBD. Article 16 (3),
CBD, requires Contracting Parties to take
... legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, with
the aim that Contracting Parties, in particular those that are developing
countries, which provide genetic resources are provided access to and
transfer of technology which makes use of those resources, on
mutually agreed terms, including technology protected by patents and
other intellectual property rights, where necessary, through the
provisions of Articles 20 and 21 and in accordance with international
law and consistent with paragraphs 4 and 5 below.
Paragraph 3, therefore, addresses specifically the issues on technology transfer
in connection with access to genetic resources. That is why it has been mentioned in
the foregoing paragraph that the issues on IPRs will have to be consistent with the
national measures - legislative, administrative or policy measures - regulating access
to genetic resources and transfer of technology. It is also noteworthy that Article 16
(3), CBD, does not require measures only in developing countries in whose territory
genetic resources are present. All Contracting Parties shall take measures in this
regard, which highlights that the CBD has recognised that a two-party relationship
will always occur in this regard and that measures shall exist on both sides. The CBD
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has thus recognised that all Contracting Parties are potential providers and users of
genetic resources and, at least in theory, potentially entitled to receive
technology making use of genetic resources"100. Article 16 (3), CBD, has in addition
connected technology making use of genetic resources with the financial mechanism
of the CBD, i.e. Articles 20 and 21, and required "mutually agreed terms"101 to be the
basis of transfer of technology based on genetic resources.
Legislative, administrative or policy measures are also required by the CBD, in
Article 16 (4), "... with the aim that the private sector facilitates access to, joint
development and transfer of technology referred to in paragraph 1 above for the
benefit of both governmental institutions and the private sector of developing
countries ...". By saying this the CBD has accepted the obvious: holders of modern
technology, and particularly biotechnology, are mostly in the private sector of
developed countries. The commitment reached by Article 16 (4), CBD, implies that
the private sector which owns technology102 will consider "access to, joint
development and transfer of technology" if there are national measures which
encourage such actions. These measures are particularly relevant when arising in
developing countries, but the wording of this paragraph suggests that measures are
necessary in all Contracting Parties, whether exporters of technology or providers of
genetic resources. It seems, therefore, that some degree of co-ordination is necessary
to make such a provision prevail, with encouragement from developed countries
which need genetic resources as a raw material for research and development and the
looIbid., p. 90.
]mCf Section 2, Sub-section 2.2, supra.
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necessary obligations created by national legislation of developing countries which
need to develop their technological capacity in order to conserve biodiversity. At the
end of the day, the letter of Article 16 (4), CBD, proposes measures which are of
interest for both providers and users of genetic resources.
Article 16 (5), CBD, finally makes an incisive statement towards the
protection of IPRs, by recognising that patents and other IPRs may have influence on
the implementation of the CBD and by inviting Contracting Parties to co-operate in
order to ensure that EPRs are supportive of and do not run counter to the objectives
of the Convention. As mentioned by Lyle Glowka103, this paragraph suggests that
Contracting Parties to the CBD have not concluded whether IPRs have a positive or a
negative impact over biodiversity conservation. Co-operation among Contracting
Parties is therefore suggested as a means of agreeing upon the necessary measures on
intellectual property protection which are supportive of and do not run counter to the
goals of sustainable use and conservation ofbiological diversity, and equitable and fair
sharing of the benefits arising from the use of biodiversity. Such co-operation is
indeed necessary and unavoidable if a balance between economic and environmental
interests is to be reached. The US government, however, has suggested that the
wording of Article 16 (5), CBD, leads one to interpret the Convention as giving "...
Contracting Parties authority to restrict or ignore intellectual property rights"104. This
does not seem to be the case. Article 16 (5), CBD, clearly affirms that such co¬
operation shall be subject to national legislation and international law. The latter has
102The technology referred to here is threefold; technology relevant for conversation, technology
relevant for sustainable use, and technology which makes use of genetic resources. This is a
consequence of the reference made to Article 16 (1), CBD.
I03Note 35, supra, p. 91.
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as a basis the TRIPS Agreement which proposes a minimum basis of protection in
accordance with US interests. Of course, if IPRs would somehow run counter to the
objectives of the CBD, Contracting Parties may consider not granting protection for
inventions which are not environmentally friendly
3.2. Biotechnology, participation in research and sharing of benefits
Although Article 19, CBD, does not refer explicitly to the protection of intellectual
property, it does contain obligations about the participation of countries providing
genetic resources in biotechnological research and the sharing of results and benefits
of such research, paying particular attention to developing countries.
Article 19 (1), CBD, requests each Contracting Party to "... take legislative,
administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, to provide for the effective
participation in biotechnological research activities by those Contracting Parties,
especially developing countries, which provide genetic resources for such research". It
also requires that biotechnological research using genetic resources should, where
feasible, take place in the provider country.
There are two characteristics ofArticle 19(1), CBD, to be looked at in more
detail. By suggesting the participation of Contracting Parties which provide genetic
resources in the biotechnological research using those resources, the CBD aims at
encouraging the building up of human capacity in the provider country. This leads to
several positive consequences for these countries, such as the development of a
community of scientists trained particularly in relation to national genetic resources
104Joseph Straus, note 23, supra, p. 607.
438
which as a consequence may lead to the training of other researchers of that particular
country by those who have participated in the biotechnological research. This all may
lead to the creation of the countries' own technological capabilities and, as a
consequence, to the development of biotechnological products for the local, national
or global markets. The letter of Article 19 (1), CBD, is extremely direct when it
requires "effective" participation of the countries providing genetic resources in the
biotechnological research. By contrast with the wording of Article 15 (6), CBD,
which requires Contracting Parties to encourage the participation of the countries
providing genetic resources, Article 19 (1), CBD, makes a strong claim for such
participation.
The second characteristic of Article 19 (1), CBD, is that biotechnological
research should, where feasible, take place in the territory of the country providing the
genetic resources. This suggests that the CBD has accepted that when research takes
place in the territory of the provider country, particularly when such a country is a
developing one, it may involve transfer of "hard" technologies such as laboratory
equipment necessary for biotechnological research. When the research is concluded,
this equipment may, depending on the terms of the access agreement, stay in the
provider country, helping the latter to develop its own capacities and train other
researchers by using such equipment. Also, the participation of researchers from the
provider country may be in larger numbers if it takes places in the territory of this
country.
Article 19 (2), CBD, also requires all Contracting Parties to take measures "...
to promote and advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis by Contracting
439
Parties, especially developing countries, to the results and benefits arising from
biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by those Contracting Parties".
This access must be on mutually agreed terms.
This provision acknowledges, by accepting that benefits exist, that genetic
resources have a commercial, economic and scientific value, entitling the Contracting
Parties providing such resources to have priority access to the results and benefits, on
a fair and equitable basis and on mutually agreed terms.
The expression "priority access" is not defined by the Convention but seems to
imply a preferential treatment for those countries providing genetic resources in the
sharing of the results and benefits of biotechnological research. Neither "Results" nor
"benefits" are defined by the CBD. It seems that this is to be defined by national
legislation or access agreements. "Benefits", however, seems to be a broad concept
and may be applied to a variety of consequences of biotechnological research. Some
commercial benefit may arise from products developed by biotechnological research.
These products (the results) will certainly be commercialised. National legislation or
access agreements will thus provide for the payment of royalties to the provider
country as a means of benefit-sharing. Also, scientific results may be of interest to
developing countries which are the providers ofgenetic resources and mechanisms are
to be created by national law or access agreements to guarantee effectively the
participation of the such country in the benefits. Scientific benefits are broad and
could include the training of personnel, access to technology (both hard and soft) and
the maintenance of laboratory equipment. The vague wording of the CBD, however,
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leaves discretion to national legislation and access agreements to define how these
terms are to be implemented and applied.
3.3. Traditional practices and knowledge
The traditional concept of EPRs has been broadened substantially in accordance with
the developments of new technologies and needs of modern society.105 After the
commitments achieved by the UNCED, namely the CBD, another aspect of
intellectual property protection was raised. The CBD, in its Preamble recognises that
it is desirable that the "... benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge,
innovations and practices ..." of indigenous and local communities should be shared
equitably.
Later on, Article 8 (j), CBD, establishes a broader intellectual property
principle, when says that national laws shall, as far as possible and as appropriate,
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of
indigenous and local communities embodying their traditional lifestyles
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity
and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement
of the holder of such knowledge, innovations and practices and
encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the
utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices.
It is firstly necessary to understand that the CBD clearly accepts that the
knowledge, innovations and practices of local and indigenous communities are
relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity106. Two other
105At the international level, several efforts have been made to harmonise intellectual property
protection. See, for further information, Chapter 2, supra.
106The importance of traditional knowledge for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity is supported by the CBD in two other provisions. The Preamble affirms that"... traditional
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important points on the application of this international principle, however, must be
considered. Firstly, it is necessary to say that the CBD claims that traditional
knowledge, innovations and practices of local and indigenous communities have a
commercial value, once it is accepted that benefits arise from the utilisation of such
traditions, and that these benefits are to be shared. Also, the CBD determines a link
between sustainable development and commercial value within the traditional concept
of IPRs. The CBD even utilises the vocabulary typically used for the definition of the
proprietor of an intellectual property right when it entitles local and indigenous
communities to be the holders of their knowledge, innovations and practices. In my
opinion, it is possible to interpret the wording of the CBD as including the traditional
practices and knowledge of local and indigenous communities within the current
system of national and/or international intellectual property laws. After all, the
international community has considered such problems and further has included its
understanding of this matter in the text of the CBD. The discussion in this field is
widening in a legal sense and further commitments and principles may be created in
the near future.
3.3.1. A sui generis system and the TRRs concept
The "Western" concept of proprietorship and commercial value has been applied to
protect tangible and intangible manifestations of human society. The legal instrument
knowledge, innovations and practices [are] relevant to the conservation of biological diversity and to
the sustainable use of its components". Moreover, Article 17 (2), listing the type of information that
may be relevant, for exchange purpose, to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity,
includes "... indigenous and traditional knowledge as such and in combination with the technologies
referred to in Article 16, paragraph 1".
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traditionally used for this purpose is EPRs. Phillips and Firth107 have suggested that the
traditional concept of IPRs could be defined in two ways: (a) in a colloquial sense,
EPRs include everything which emerges from the exercise of the human brain; and (b)
in a legal sense, IPRs are understood as " .. the legal rights which may be asserted in
respect of the product of the human intellect".
The application of these legal rights, however, is costly and complex in
technical terms. The development of technologies has led to a broader approach
towards intellectual property protection, developing new legal mechanisms, concepts
and principles which could include the technological development of contemporary
society. Until recently, however, the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices
of local and indigenous communities were not considered to be capable of legal
protection. But the CBD has formally accepted such a concept, raising doubts
concerning the legal instrument that could be used to implement the principle created
by Article 8 (j), CBD.
As the lifestyle of local and indigenous communities has relevant qualities and
assets for genetic resources prospecting, the issues of whether intellectual property
rights include traditional practices, innovations and knowledge was raised. Industries
which deal primarily with modern technology, particularly biotechnology industries,
have a growing interest in traditional knowledge and practices108 and this has, even
more effectively, raised concerns about how to include traditional lifestyles under
107
Jeremy Phillips & Alison Firth, Introduction to Intellectual Property Law. London, Dublin and
Edinburgh: Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd (1990), 2nd ed, p. 3.
108Stephen R King, The Source of Our Cures. [1991] Cultural Survival Quarterly 19-22, at p. 19,
estimates that "[r]oughly 74 per cent of the 121 plant-derived compounds currently used in the global
pharmacopoeia have been discovered through research based on ethnobotanical information on the
use ofplants by indigenous people".
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legal protection, to secure benefit-sharing, conservation and sustainable development
ofbiological diversity.
Several international gatherings on this subject have taken place among
scientists, indigenous and local communities themselves, ecologists and
ethnobiologists, and a conclusion is that IPRs will not assure protection for the variety
of rights included in the lifestyle of traditional societies.
Aware of these difficulties and of the need to discuss further a legal
mechanism that could be used to protect the rights of indigenous and local
communities, a Working Group on Traditional Intellectual, Cultural and Scientific
Resource Rights (or the Working Group on Traditional Resources Rights)109 has
developed a concept that could be used for the protection of all these rights of
indigenous and local communities in a single instrument, with sui generis
characteristics, and entitled 'Traditional Resource Rights" (TRRs).
Posey and Dutfield110 define TRRs as such:
... the term "traditional resource rights" (TRRs) was adopted to reflect
the necessity of rethinking the limited and limiting concept of IPRs.
The term "traditional" refers to the cherished practices, beliefs,
customs, knowledge, and cultural heritage of indigenous and local
communities who live in close association with the Earth; "resource" is
used in its broadest sense to mean all knowledge and technology,
aesthetic and spiritual qualities, tangible and intangible sources that,
together, are deemed by local communities to be necessary to ensure
109In 1989, the International Society for Ethnobiology's "Declaration of Belem" called for the
development of effective strategies to stimulate the responsible use of traditional knowledge and
"biogenetic" resources to benefit indigenous and local communities, while securing self-
determination for these peoples. As a result, a "Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights" was
established After, the Working Group was renamed "The Working Group on Traditional
Intellectual, Cultural and Scientific Resource Rights" to reflect the broadened scope of the subject.
noDarreil Posey & Graham Dutfield, Beyond Intellectual Property Rights: Towards Traditional
Resource Rights for Indigenous and Local Communities Gland/Switzerland and Ottawa: WWF-
International & IDRC (forthcoming).
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healthy and fulfilling lifestyles for present and future generations; and
"rights" refers to the basic inalienable guarantee to all human beings
and the collective entities in which they choose to participate of the
necessities to achieve and maintain the dignity and well-being of
themselves, their predecessors, and their descendants.111
The concept ofTRRs has thus emerged to define the variety of rights that may
protect the rights of local and indigenous communities, aiming, at the same time, at
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, and respect for the
lifestyles and basic human rights of these societies. TRRs, therefore, includes plants,
animals, and other objects that may have material, sacred, ceremonial, or aesthetic
value to indigenous communities. So far, the concept of TRRs has defined eighteen
binding and non-binding principles of international law that may be utilised to form
the basis of the concept. Among others, one will find the principle of human rights,
EPRs and neighbouring rights, the right to self-determination, the right to privacy and
prior informed consent, rights to protection of cultural property, folklore and cultural
heritage, recognition of customary law and practice, and farmers' rights112.
From the application of all these rights together, a sui generis system could be
created and the application of intellectual property principles would be included within
a broad concept and therefore adapted to the specific circumstance of indigenous and
local communities. It appears, however, that the execution of such a concept, as a
means of implementing Article 8 (j) of the CBD, by national legislation would only
limit the possible enforcement and application of these rights. A multilateral
agreement in this regard seems to be the most effective way to protect the traditional
ulIbid., Introduction, inhttp://www.idrc.ca/books/799.html.
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rights and practices of local and indigenous communities. Multilateral negotiations,
would however have to consider the views of indigenous and local communities and
their own concepts towards an international agreement in this field.
3.3.2. An overview of the legislative developments in Brazil
Although provisions on the protection of indigenous rights have been in the Brazilian
legal framework for more than three centuries113, they have rarely been effective in
practical terms.
At the beginning of the 1970s Law N. 6001 , of 19 December 1973 (Law
6001/73), was created to set up a basic principle of indigenous rights and institutional
mechanisms for the application and enforcement of these rights. Among other
principles, Law 6001/73 determined that all laws of Brazil apply to indigenous
communities and individuals as it is applied to all Brazilians, but their traditions,
customs, practices and particular conditions shall be respected114. However, taking
into account the juridical understanding of the application of indigenous rights at that
time, such respect to the indigenous' customs, practices and traditional lifestyles did
not take place effectively.113
112For a comprehensive list of the "bundle of rights" that are included in the TRRs concept, see
Appendix V, supra.
U3Jos6 Afonso da Silva, note 57, supra, at p. 719, advises that already in the colonial period the
rights of indigenous communities over the land they have traditionally occupied has been a
mechanism ofBrazilian/Portuguese colonial legal framework: Charter of 1 April 1680, followed and
confirmed by Law of6 June 1755.
11Yaw 6001/73, Arts. 1, Sole paragraph and 2 (VI).
U5Article 6 of the Brazilian Civil Code (Law N. 3071, of 1 January 1916, and amendments,
published in Juarez de Oliveira (organiser) Codieo Civil. S3o Paulo: Editora Saraiva (1987) 37th
ed.) states that the silvicolous were "relatively uncapable" of exercising some judicial acts (at Art. 6
(HI)) and that they were subject to a tutelage regime (Art. 6, Sole paragraph).
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Following the above mentioned period, the Brazilian Parliament, gathered as a
"constitutional convention", promulgated a new Brazilian Federal Constitution on 5
October 1988, opening the way for the country's redemocratisation. The 1988
Brazilian Constitution exposes the legislature's great effort to set up constitutional
principles which could effectively protect indigenous peoples' rights and interests.
Article 231, caput, Brazilian Constitution, affirms that "[t]he social
organization, customs, languages, creeds and traditions of Indians are recognized, as
well as their original rights to the land they traditionally occupy"116. Further, it
establishes that the lands that indigenous communities have traditionally occupied "...
are destined for their permanent possession, and they shall be entitled to the exclusive
usufruct of the riches of the soil, rivers and lakes existing thereon"117.
Firstly, it is necessary to recall that the Constitution refused to use the
expression "indigenous nations", based on the controversial premise that the
expression "nation" has a strict understanding that a nation is an independent country
with sovereign rights118. Secondly, it is remarkable that indigenous communities were
recognised as such, with the debate going beyond the question on land rights,
embracing also rights related to their creeds, customs, traditions and practices.
Implementing legislation shall thus regulate the collective rights owned by indigenous
communities taking into consideration that constitutional provisions defined two basic
rights over those lands: the right ofpermanent possession and the right ofusufruct.
U6"Lands traditionally occupied by Indians are those on which they live on a permanent basis, those
used for their productive activities, those indispensable for the preservation of environmental
resources necessary for their well-being and those necessary for their physical and cultural
reproduction, according to their uses, customs and traditions" (Brazilian Constitution, Art. 231 (1)).
"'Brazilian Constitution, Art. 231 (2).
U8Jose Afonso da Silva, note 57, supra, p. 715.
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The permanent possession of the lands that indigenous communities have
traditionally occupied is necessarily a broad concept. It should not be understood only
as the ius possessions, but also as the ins possidendi, because this exposes also the
right to possess the res with a legitimate legal character of contiguous utilisation.119
The exclusive usufruct of the wealth of the soil, rivers and lakes existing
thereon represents a civil law concept that grants a person (the usufructuary) the right
to enjoy the fruit or profits of property that is owned by another and the duty to
maintain the substance of the property.120
In addition, all acts aiming at the occupation, dominion and possession of the
lands traditionally occupied by indigenous communities, "... or at the exploitation of
the natural wealth of the soil, rivers and lakes existing thereon, are null and void,
producing no legal effects ,.."121.
Finally, the Brazilian Constitution has provided that Indians, their communities
and their organisations have the right to sue and to defend their rights and interests,
with the Public Ministry intervening in all stages of the procedure122. The Public
Ministry is a permanent institution, constitutionally considered essential for the
functioning of the judicial system, with the duty of defending the legal order,
democracy and social and individual rights123. The Public Ministry, among other
U9Ibid, at p. 720.
I20The lands that are occupied by indigenous peoples are the property of the Brazilian State, pursuant
to Article 20, XI, Brazilian Constitution.
I21Brazilian Constitution, Art 231 (6).
mIbid., Art 232.
123Ibid., Art 127, caput.
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functions, has the "institutional function" of defending the rights and interests of
indigenous populations124.
Though not very clear, it is possible to interpret Brazilian constitutional
provisions as protecting the intangible rights of indigenous communities and
individuals. Nevertheless, the details of this interpretation shall be worked out by
national authorities and by national courts, aided by the provisions arising from
secondary legislation in this matter. Thus, following an old expression nemo index
sine adore (that the judge will decide upon a case only if he is required to), case law
may play an essential role in the development ofjudicial concepts designed to protect
indigenous intangible rights and, as a consequence, to regulate one of the tools for
prospecting biological resources.
The Brazilian Parliament has been negotiating further developments of the
rules governing the rights of indigenous communities. In 1991, five Brazilian
Members of Parliament proposed a Bill, PL N. 2.057, of 23 October 1991 (PL
2057/91)125, which aims to update national legislation regulating indigenous rights126.
PL 2057/91 suggests several novel and important provisions concerning the
124Ibid., Art 129 (V).
125PL is the acronym for "Projeto de Lei" or, legislative Bill, in English. Five other legislative Bills
were attached to PL 2057/91 - PL 4916/90, PL 2451/91, PL 2160/91, PL 2619/92 and PL 4442/94 -
and, with the exception of the latter, all suggested mechanisms to protect traditional knowledge,
innovations and practices. A Special Committee has been created to analyse the subject and to decide
upon amendments or modifications to the proposed texts. Hereinafter, when this paper refers to PL
2057/91, it means the version approved by the Special Committee on 15 June 1994, and which has
considered the attached proposals. PL 2057/91 will be sent to the Federal Senate for consideration. It
will then return to the Chamber of Deputies which will decide upon probable amendments made at
the Federal Senate. Only after the Chamber of Deputies approves or modifies the version sent back
by the Federal Senate, the Bill goes to the President for sanction.
126The legislation currently into force in Brazil is Law 6001/73. When PL 2057/91 becomes legally
applicable (Article 174 ofPL 2057/91 says that it will enter in force at the date of publication in the
Brazilian Official Journal), Law 6001/73 will be automatically revoked (PL 2057/91, Art 175).
449
protection of indigenous rights and, in particular, those regarding their intellectual
rights. These provisions are the subject of the following discussion.
PL 2057/91 initially addresses some procedural questions and states that the
indigenous communities have legal personality and that their legal existence does not
depend upon any type of registration or any act of government127. Further, it
recognises all civil, political, social and labour rights, as well as the fundamental rights
and guarantees of the Brazilian Constitution128. PL 2057/91 further lists, in Article
14, what constitutes indigenous assets, including author's rights129 and industrial
property rights130.
Title II, Chapter EL, PL 2057/91, suggests legal tools designed to protect
traditional practices and knowledge, undoubtedly aiming at the implementation of the
provisions of the CBD which has been referred throughout the present analysis. It also
determines criminal and civil responsibilities, provisions on enforcement, juridical
application of these rights and substantive aspects of industrial property protection.
It also proposes a new concept for the application and patentability of
indigenous industrial property rights, when it establishes a principle for the
protectability of indigenous traditional knowledge which is not capable of patent
protection.
I27PL 2057/91, Art 8. Andree Lawrey, Contemporary Efforts to Guarantee Indigenous Rights
Under International Law. [1990] 4 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 703-777, at p. 714,
stresses that the positivist approach to international law has traditionally denied legal personality to
indigenous communities.
12*Ibid., Art 9. Note that, amongst the fundamental guarantees and rights, as established by
Brazilian Constitution, there are author's rights (Art 5 (XXVII)) and industrial property rights (Art
5 (XXIX)).
129Ibid., Art. 14 (IV).
120Ibid., Art 14 (V).
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(a) Patentable subject-matter
In the first place, PL 2057/91 determines that indigenous communities have the
fundamental right to maintain the confidentiality of the traditional knowledge they
possess. This will apply, in particular, to knowledge about the characteristics and
properties of ecosystems and natural habitats, living species, plants or animals, micro¬
organisms, pharmaceuticals and natural essences, or any biological or genetic
processes.131 Further, Article 18 (1) suggests, on a minimum basis, that the rights
above-listed include the right to refuse, without any justification, access to their
traditional knowledge. They may also refuse to authorise the disclosure or utilisation
of their traditional knowledge, for scientific, commercial or industrial purposes. As a
matter fact, any violation of the fundamental right established by Article 18, caput,
will be subject to criminal132 and civil133 responsibilities134.
Note that, before considering further the issues on industrial property
protection of indigenous knowledge, Article 18, PL 2057/91, established a new
principle in the field of industrial property protection, explicitly recognising that their
knowledge is particularly important in the pharmaceutical and biotechnological fields.
131Ibid., Art 18, caput.
132Title VII, PL 2057/91, sets up general principle of penal law and lists the crimes against the
Indians and the respective penalties. Articles 157 and 158 are of particular interest to the present
analysis. Article 157 considers it a crime to utilise, commercially or industrially, genetic or biological
resources, in the indigenous peoples lands, without the previous written consent of the indigenous
society which owns that land. Article 158 considers it a crime to utilise, commercially or industrially,
directly or not, traditional indigenous knowledge, patentable or not, without the previous written
consent of the indigenous society which has the permanent possession of the traditional knowledge in
question.
133Civil responsibilities will be governed by Brazilian Civil Code, note 115, supra, and includes any
moral and/or material damages against indigenous societies.
I34PL 2057/91, Art 18 (2).
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Further, it is established that indigenous communities, or any of their
members, have the right to apply for a patent of invention, utility model, industrial
model or industrial design which has been developed utilising their traditional
collective knowledge135. The patent will be always granted under the name of the
respective indigenous community and, as a consequence, will be considered null and
void if granted individually136.
It is also established by PL 2057/91 that the access, utilisation and application
of indigenous traditional rights in scientific research aiming at industrial or commercial
ends will be allowed only with the previous written consent of the indigenous
community137. The consent in question shall have the form of a written contract138,
drafted with the legal assistance of the Public Ministry, in which the specific
contractual conditions will be determined, including a just and equitable share of the
industrial or commercial benefits of the results of the research139. All the information
that has been provided by the indigenous communities during the negotiations of the
contract, which includes indigenous knowledge, will be considered confidential and
will require previous authorisation from the community to be transmitted to someone
else140.
Also, the current version of PL 2057/91 considers that the indigenous
communities will be deemed automatically co-proprietors of any invention, utility
135Ibid., Art. 19, caput.
]36Ibid., Art 19 (1).
131Ibid, Art. 20, caput. Cf. Art. 157.
13*Cf PL 2057/91, Art. 46, which states that any type of contract between an indigenous community
and a foreign person, entity or undertaking will be supervised by the Brazilian government who will
defend, coraterally, the interests and rights of the respective communities in the national and
international forum.
139PL 2057/91, Art 20 (1).
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model, industrial model or industrial design which has utilised, directly or indirectly,
their traditional knowledge or models.141 Taking that into account, anyone who
applies for a patent based on traditional knowledge or model must mention which
indigenous community shall be included as co-proprietor of the patent142.
This part of PL 2057/91 also refers to several procedural and administrative
rules which shall be briefly considered. Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that all
acts aiming at the commercial or industrial use of indigenous knowledge or model will
be deemed null and void if there is no written authorisation of the indigenous
community in question and/or if the co-proprietorship of the patent is not considered
in the contract143. Secondly, the fees related to the patent application and maintenance
of the rights do not apply to indigenous communities144, but in the case of a co-
proprietorship, the other patent owner, if not an indigenous community, will be liable
to pay the full amount of the fees145. Also, most of the requirements in question do
not apply to pure scientific research which has no aim of profit146.
It is important to remark also that the indigenous communities may request,
administratively or judicially, the declaration ofnullity of a patent or model, which has
been based on indigenous traditional knowledge or model, contrary to the provisions
of this law147. Brazilian administrative or judicial148 authorities will have exclusive
140Ibid., Art. 20 (3).
141 Ibid., Art. 21, caput.
142Ibid, Art. 21 (1).
U3Ibid., Arts. 19 (1), 20 (4), 21 (1) and 22, Sole paragraph.
l44Ibid, Art 19 (2).
145Ibid., Art. 23.
x 46Ibid., Art. 29.
141Ibid, Art 22, caput.
148According to Article 109 (XI) of the Brazilian Constitution, the Federal Justice has exclusive
jurisdiction to decide upon any dispute on indigenous rights. PL 2057/91, in Article 25, Sole
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jurisdiction to resolve any dispute related to judicial acts regarding the intellectual
property rights of indigenous communities149.
(b) Non-patentable subject-matter
A single provision of PL 2057/91 is the one which proposes more effective
understanding of industrial property issues in connection with indigenous knowledge,
practices and innovations. As has been briefly mentioned before, indigenous
traditional knowledge and models do not quite fulfil the requirements of patentability,
in particular those related to the state of the art and its consequent legal novelty. It is
possible that administrative and juridical interpretation of existing laws could apply
patent principles taking into account the particular characteristics of indigenous
traditional knowledge and practices.
PL 2057/91 has therefore proposed in Article 28 that the protection
determined by Chapter II, Title II, PL 2057/91, includes traditional indigenous
knowledge about characteristics or properties of ecosystems, natural habitats, living
species, plants or animals, micro-organisms, pharmaceuticals and natural essences, or
any biological or genetic process or application, which is not capable of patent
protection. In simple words, the national legislature has defined the broad application
of indigenous rights. It has, nevertheless, forgotten to define which legal mechanism
will be provided for the protection ofnon-patentable subject-matter. It is a matter that
Paragraph, and Article 56, repeats the constitutional provision giving exclusive jurisdiction to the
Federal Justice to decide upon such disputes.
149PL 2057/91, Art. 25, caput.
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will certainly be considered in more detail after the law is interpreted by administrative
authorities150.
It seems that the national legislature decided to create a legal mechanism to
include the broad application of indigenous knowledge under legal protection. This
new industrial property principle will probably lead national patent offices to create
administrative jurisprudence on the analysis of the conditions of a patent application
which includes the utilisation of indigenous knowledge. Consequently, national judges
will be bound to consider the broad application of indigenous communities'
intellectual property principles when deciding upon disputes.
(c) Copyrights
The issues of copyright protection over the intellectual productions or spiritual
creations of indigenous communities is also discussed extensively by PL 2057/91.
Indigenous communities are therefore considered the owners of the moral and
economic rights over intellectual productions and spiritual creations which have been
produced collectively and performed somehow151. It is noteworthy that PL 2057/91
150In the case ofBrazil, the authority with the functions of analysing and granting patents, as well as
deciding upon administrative appeals, is the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI), created
by Law N. 5.648, of 11 December 1970.
151PL 2057/91, Art 31, caput. Further, Articles 31 (1) to (VII) lists exhaustively examples of
intellectual property rights of indigenous communities, and in Article 31 (VII) it emphasises that any
other intellectual production or spiritual creations of indigenous communities are protected, even if
they have been transmitted orally, independent of its origin in time. In the case of intellectual
production or spiritual creations which have been developed individually, the provisions of Law N.
5.988, of 14 December 1973, which regulates authors' rights, will apply.
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considers the protection of both the economic152 and the moral153 rights over these
intellectual productions.
Thus, any form of reproduction, utilisation or communication to the public,
directly or indirectly, by any means, of indigenous collective creations is allowed only
with the express written authorisation of the community in question154. This
authorisation will have the form of a written contract, done with the legal assistance
of the Public Ministry, and in which will be included the authorisation to divulge the
intellectual production which is the subject-matter of the contract, as well as the just
and equitable payment to the community in question155 and the other terms of the
156 157
contract
PL 2057/91 also considers that the reproduction, application, publication or
communication to the public - by any form, process or means - of indigenous
intellectual creations, for the purposes of education, information, scientific studies or
152The economic rights are those which entitle the author to authorise reproduction, translation or
adaptation of his work, as well as its public performance, against the appropriate payment of
royalties.
153Article 6bis (1), Berne Convention, defines moral rights as those which entitle the author to claim
authorship of his work and to object to modifications or mutilations of his work which would be
prejudicial to his honour or reputation. It further emphasises that moral rights continue to exist even
after the author has transferred his economic rights. Conversely, Article 9 (1), TRIPS Agreement,
says that"... Members shall not have rights or obligations under this [TRIPS] Agreement in respect
of the rights conferred under Article 6bis of that [Berne] convention or of the rights derived
therefrom".
154PL 2057/91, Art 38, caput. Cf. Art 37 which says that indigenous communities have all the
rights to use their intellectual and/or spiritual creations themselves, and also the right to authorise
their utilisation by third parties.
155Ibid., Art 38 (1).
156Ibid., Art 38 (2). If the contract does not mention the duration of its obligations, it will be deemed
null.
157Note also that it is recognised that indigenous communities have the right to manage the financial
resources received for their authors' rights (PL 2057/91, Art. 38 (3)).
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charity, without profit ends, will not be considered to be against the provisions
established by PL 2057/91158.
Some institutional mechanisms for the protection of indigenous intellectual
production are also created by PL 2057/91. Firstly, it is established that the federal
organ responsible for indigenous matters will provide free service for the registration
of the intellectual productions or creations of indigenous communities159. The
indigenous federal organ will also have other tasks such as the arbitration of disputes
over indigenous intellectual property rights160 and all the administrative structures for
the protection of authors' rights of indigenous communities, including a funding
mechanism161.
4. A Possible Outcomeof theWTO System
The results of the Uruguay Round of negotiations of GATT are also relevant to the
present discussion. The conclusions of the Uruguay Round have re-modelled the
international trade system and agreed upon the most comprehensive set of regulations
on intellectual property protection.
In addition to the institutional structure described in Chapter 2, Section 2,
supra, the Ministerial Meeting of the GATT in Marrakesh, held on 14 April 1994,
158FL 2057/91, Art. 40 (I). Also, the quotations of indigenous productions in books, articles,
periodicals or other type of academic analysis are allowed, pursuant to Article 40 (II). In any case,
the name of the community, author of the work, has to be acknowledged and a copy of the work has
to be sent to the community (Ibid., Art 40, Sole paragraph).
x 59Ibid., Art. 34, caput. Note, however, that this registration is not compulsory for the purposes of
validity and application of the indigenous' rights provided by PL 2057/91 (Ibid., ArL 34 (4)).
X60Ibid., Art 34 (1) (V).
161Ibid., Art 34 (1) (VII), and Arts. 34 (2) (I) and 01).
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adopted a Decision on Trade and Environment162 which calls for the establishment of
a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) open to all Members of the WTO.
The CTE shall initially address "... the relationship between the provisions of the
multilateral trading system and trade measures for environmental purposes, including
those pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements"163, inter alia, and "... will
consider ... the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights as an integral part of its work,.. ,"164.
As a consequence, the analysis of the relevant provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement, together with the analysis of the relationship between the WTO and
multilateral environmental agreements, might lead the CTE to discuss the provisions
of the CBD which deals with access to genetic resources, access to and transfer of
technology, biotechnology, and the protection of the rights of local and indigenous
communities. In fact, it seems that the CTE has already started to consider several
issues in the context of environmental protection and its relationship with the TRIPS
Agreement165. Although this discussion is still at a very early stage within the WTO
162GATT, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts.
Geneva: GATT Secretariat (1994), pp. 469-471.
163Ibid., p. 470.
l6AIbid, p. 471. From the announcement of the first drafts of the Final Act up to 1994 Decision on
Trade and Environment, note 162, supra, discussions of environmental issues were generally
unsatisfactory. However, at the end of the Uruguay Round of negotiations there was an agreement on
the terms of reference for the development of a work programme on the links between trade,
environment and sustainable development. See, e.g., Charlie Arden-Clarke. The GATT Report on
Trade and Environment - A Critique by the World Wide Fund for Nature. Gland/Switzerland: WWF
(1992), Foundation for Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), The Multilateral Trade
Organization: a Legal and Environmental Assessment Gland/Switzerland: WWF Research Report,
September 1992, and Piritta Sorsa, GATT and Environment [1992] 1 The World Economy 115-
133.
1 "Michael Flitner, Review of National Actions on Access to Genetic Resources and IFRs in Several
Developing Countries. Gland/Switzerland: WWF (1995), affirms that during a meeting in June 1995
the CTE addressed for the first time the issues on IPRs and biodiversity, and that some delegations
expressed worries in relation with the patentability of life forms.
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framework, the CTE is already taking a step in the direction of clearing the doubts on
the relationship between the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the principles
created by the CBD.
Within the TRIPS Agreement there are some provisions that are likely to
conflict with the principles of the CBD. It is worth noting that the TRIPS Agreement
aims to provide a minimum basis for the harmonisation of national intellectual
property laws which will lead to stronger protection of IPRs through a governmental
authorisation to the right holder to exploit, under exclusive terms, the rights conferred
to him. The CBD accepts that IPRs are part of technology transfer agreements and of
the actions aiming at the exploitation of biological diversity. The CBD, however, is
concerned primarily with technologies which may be developed to support the
conservation and sustainable use ofbiological resources. Property rights systems shall
not run counter to the objectives of the CBD.
Probably most of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are of interest in the
present analysis. This Section shall, nevertheless, consider, in particular, two areas
which may lead to some solutions or conflicts between the two international
arrangements.
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that Members of the WTO
Agreement shall grant protection to all inventions, in all fields of technology, which
are new, which involve an inventive step, and which are capable of industrial
application166. Members of the WTO Agreement are nevertheless authorised to
exclude from patent protection inventions which are against public order, morality,
166TRIPS Agreement, Art 27 (1).
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human, animal or plant life or health, or those inventions which are likely to cause
serious prejudice to the environment167.
As has been noted, the TRIPS Agreement considers the issues on
environmental protection in very broad terms. How far this provision would authorise
Members to take further action towards environmental protection, even by denying
patent protection for some inventions on "environmental" grounds, is still a matter left
for future interpretation.
Article 27 (3) (b) of the TRIPS Agreement also allows Members of the WTO
Agreement to exclude from patent protection plants and animals and essentially
biological processes for the production of plants and animals. Members are,
nevertheless, required to protect micro-organisms, non-biological and microbiological
processes and plant varieties168.
In this regard, a few points must be made. Firstly, the wording of the TRIPS
Agreement in relation with the protection ofbiotechnological products or processes is
very vague in substance. It is not yet clear how this will be enforced by the dispute
settlement mechanism of the WTO. It is also not clear if the developed economies will
accept that developing countries' use, on grounds of "environmental" protection, of
the exception provided by Article 27 (2), TRIPS Agreement, to refuse the granting of
patent rights to biotechnological invention, even if the invention is a micro-organism,
a non-biological or a microbiological process. In addition, it is not clear what the
negotiators of the TRIPS Agreement meant by a non-biological process for the
161Ibid., Art. 27 (2).
168Plant varieties are to be protected either by patents, by an effective sui generis system or by any
combination thereof. Cf Chapter 5, Part 2, Section 3, Sub-section 3.1, Paragraph 3.1.2, supra.
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production of plants or animals. How a plant or animal could be produced by a
process that is not partly or entirely a biological process is still to be determined and
does not seem to be very feasible. It appears that the TRIPS negotiators intended to
mean that a non-biological process is the one which does not use the reproductive
system of the plant or animal in question to reproduce itself. The wording of Article
27 (3) (b), TRIPS Agreement, however, fails to suggest how Members of the WTO
Agreement, particularly developing countries, would implement this provisional rule.
Secondly, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, although not expressly
mentioned, are to a large degree based on the wording of the 1978 revision of the
UPOV Convention. Developing countries may benefit more from the 1978 version of
the UPOV Convention which accepts a rather flexible approach to protection. While
the 1991 version of the Convention states in Article 2 that "[e]ach Contracting Party
shall grant and protect breeders' rights", the same provision in the 1978 text accepts
that Contracting Parties may recognise the right of a breeder either by the plant
breeders' rights system, by patents, or by a combination ofboth systems169.
Finally, it is important to remark that it was decided that Article 27 (3) (b)
should be reviewed in four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement. In the future, it is possible that issues concerning the "biodiversity-related
aspects of intellectual property rights" will become more important within the context
of the TRIPS Agreement and perhaps it will be the task of the CTE to enhance this
importance. It is definitely necessary that further consideration is given in this regard
169According with James Cameron & Zen Makuch, The UN Biodiversity Convention and the WTO
TRIPS Agreement: Recommendations to Avoid Conflict and Promote Sustainable Development.
Gland/Switzerland: WWF (1995), p. 12, to accede to the 1978 version of the UPOV Convention
States should had done so by the end of 1995.
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by Members of the WTO Agreement, to avoid future conflicts between the principles
and norms of the CBD and those of the TRIPS Agreement, and to promote
sustainable development ofbiological resources.
In addition to the provisions on patent protection, the TRIPS Agreement
governs the protection of undisclosed information which, in my opinion, may be used
as a legal tool to protect traditional knowledge of local and indigenous communities.
Despite juridical and doctrinal doubts whether trade secrets are intangible property or
"subjective rights" and, therefore, if they are protectable under the current system of
intellectual property laws'70, Article 39 (2), TRIPS Agreement, rules that Members of
the WTO Agreement shall give the possibility to anyone (either natural or legal
person) "... of preventing information lawfully within their control from being
disclosed to, acquired by, or used by other without their [owners'] consent in a
manner contrary to honest commercial practices ..." The conditions to be fulfilled
before protection may be granted are the following: (a) the existence of information
which is secret; (b) the information has commercial value because it is secret; and (c)
all reasonable steps have been taken to keep such information secret. In the absence of
any provision regulating the term of protection of undisclosed information, it is
possible to conclude that the TRIPS Agreement grants protection for valuable
undisclosed information for an unlimited period, if the conditions above-listed are met.
This seems to be of great importance in protecting knowledge that has been
developed and which has endured throughout the centuries. However, some
substantive requirements of the law apparently cannot be met by indigenous societies.
™Cf. Chapter 2, note 169, supra.
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In the case of a patent, for instance, the conditions of novelty and inventive activity,
as traditionally established in connection with the prior art concept, are unlikely to be
fulfilled by indigenous knowledge and practices. Also, in relation to trade secrets it is
possible to argue that protection of information as a secret is no longer available in a
legal sense in so far as indigenous communities and individuals have been exchanging
information about their environment on a large scale. Case law may broaden the
interpretation of legal concepts and recognise, within the traditional intellectual
property system, indigenous intangible rights.
Conclusion
The present Chapter has described the "modern" approach towards the protection of
IPRs as in connection with biodiversity conservation. Probably one of the greatest
challenges that the international community is facing at the turn of the century is to
determine a balance between the common interest ofbiodiversity conservation and the
private interest related to the activities of industries which use biodiversity resources
as a main source of materials. This balance is not easily reached and the legal
mechanisms agreed so far do not cover the subject exhaustively. The international
community, however, has agreed upon very important principles which have
undoubtedly influenced the debate about the sustainable use and conservation of
biodiversity.
It is obvious, from the present discussion, that the CBD did not attempt to set
up very strict and detailed norms. The text of the CBD must be seen rather as a list of
binding principles to guide national legislative initiatives. These principles aim at the
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conservation ofbiological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair
and equitable share of the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources.
The goal of fair and equitable share of the use and exploitation of genetic resources is,
for the purposes of the present analysis, the most important one, in so far as the CBD
recognises the intrinsic economic, commercial and scientific value of biodiversity
resources, providing thus a link between international and national trade and
biodiversity conservation.
I tend to think that the established international economic order should be re¬
thought. The present system is unfair. Of course, there will always be the rich and the
poor. Recently, however, the gap has grown too wide and the situation is becoming
unbearable. In 1992, the UNCED appears to have concluded that the primary sources
of the destruction of the planet's environment are firstly, the industries of the First
World, secondly, the poverty of the Third World and, thirdly, the deforestation which
is occurring in the impoverished South. Not surprisingly, the discussions have dealt
primarily with the last of these sources.
The valuable biological resources held by the poor countries might be used as
an essential bargaining tool to restrict the practices of the rich countries. Moreover,
these resources can be used to further the economic and technological development of
the poor countries. If the trading world continues to use the traditional concepts of
the established international economic order which maintain the current system of
international power, the planet's environment will be put in jeopardy. Thus, although
it is claimed that the protection of the environment is the most important priority, this
would not in fact be the case. Trade must take into account the priorities of the poor
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as well as the investments and needs of the rich. Profits must be used to move
towards a more just, equitable and stable society with a higher shared welfare. The
implementation of the provisions of the CBD must take into account not only
practical, economical and commercial aspects, but also the social and technological
needs of developing countries and the ethical and moral rights of indigenous and local
communities.
It is necessary, therefore, to give emphasis to the fact that the implementation
of the concept of sovereign rights over genetic resources, in this context, is an
strategic issue. As has been mentioned, national legislation have exclusive jurisdiction
for regulating access to genetic resources and this includes the discretion to determine
national proprietorship over biological. The mere affirmation of the sovereign rights
principle, however, is not enough. Technology transfer, as recognised by several
provisions of the CBD, is an essential mechanism to enhance the protection and the
sustainable use of the biodiversity of the planet. Thus the application of the sovereign
rights principle must be looked at in broad terms. National legislation shall draw up
guidelines which are sustainable for the purpose of biodiversity conservation and that
accept the importance ofmodern technology, as well as of the traditional practices of
local and indigenous communities.
The evolution of the principles and substantive law for the conversation of
biological diversity - including access to genetic resources, transfer of technology and
the protection of indigenous rights - is not really a matter of controversy. National
legislative measures seem necessary, but they must go beyond environmental policy
considerations. National science and technology and industrial policies must take into
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account measures necessary to protect the environment in its broadest sense. Access
to genetic resources presents a unique possibility of bargaining against the capitalist
world. If biological resources will be exploited - and they will be by indigenous
communities, national governments or foreign undertakings - regulatory measures are
indeed necessary.
Legislative initiatives should be welcomed, but they are not necessarily the
easiest - or the shortest - way to achieve the goals established by the CBD. Edesio
Fernandes171, discussing the implementation of environmental international principles
into the Brazilian legal framework, pointed out that,
As a matter of fact, it is not a case of enacting more laws: on the
contrary, even if it is true that some laws need to be improved and
updated, the point is to guarantee the proper use of the potential
offered by the existing legislation.
And that is the specific circumstance that has been discussed in this Chapter.
While there is no adequate legislation to apply and enforce intangible indigenous
rights and to regulate access to genetic resources, this matter could be analysed by
national administrative and judicial authorities, bringing together existing ordinary and
constitutional laws, international rules which are already part of the national legal
framework and forthcoming principles arising from the legislative debate. National
authorities are bound by the instruments mentioned above and will have to decide
upon it when analysing the conditions of an intellectual property application (national
industrial property offices) and when judging a particular dispute concerning either
171Edesio Femandes. Law, Politics and Environmental Protection in Brazil. [1992] 1 Journal of
Environmental Law 41-55, at p. 43.
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access to genetic resources or indigenous rights (national courts). Juridical
understanding of the matter will be then construed, and further interpretative
approach to forthcoming legislation could be enriched.
The foregoing introductory remarks are necessary to present further
conclusions arising from the issues analysed in this Chapter. As has been mentioned,
compared with the government itself the Brazilian Parliament has shown a higher
degree of legislative initiative in relation with biodiversity conservation matters. The
government has failed to address the subject in a legislative form which has led to a
lack of co-ordinated actions aiming at implementation of the CBD. This may create an
inappropriate interpretation of the principles established by the CBD and by the
Brazilian Federal Constitution. A clear example of this situation is that a legislative
Bill, originating in the Chamber ofDeputies (PL 2057/91), discusses the issues on the
protection of traditional knowledge and practices of indigenous communities while
another legislative Bill, originating in the Federal Senate (PLS 306/95), proposes
norms to regulate access to genetic resources, dealing also with the issues on the
protection of traditional knowledge and practices. Government and both Houses of
Parliament should work in harmony to draw up the necessary legal measures to
implement the principles ofbiodiversity conservation.
PLS 306/95, in particular, should be subject to some modifications. Firstly,
Article 1 (HI), PLS 306/96, determines that the country shall participate in the
economic and social benefits arising from the exploitation of genetic resources, but it
does not give emphasis to the participation in the scientific benefits as a necessary
mechanism to determine national measures on the implementation of the fair and
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equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the exploitation of national genetic
resources. Scientific benefits are, indeed, a crucial principle to be included together
with the economic, commercial and social benefits.
Moreover, the committee created by Article 5 of PLS 306/95 fails to include
representatives of local and indigenous communities as part of the composition of
such institutional mechanism created to monitor biodiversity conservation and
sustainability. All biodiversity-related matters must consider an effective participation
of indigenous and local communities in the decision-making process and during the
development of strategies. This is a basic condition to consider an appropriate
implementation of the CBD, in so far as research on genetic resources may have,
directly or indirectly, influence in the lifestyle and cultural habits of local and
indigenous populations.
PL 2057/91 and PLS 306/95 are in general terms compatible with the CBD.
The CBD leaves a great degree of discretion to national legislation and does not
discuss further how each of its principles should be interpreted by national law. It is
important to consider, in this context, that national laws have great opportunities to
develop further legal mechanisms which are compatible with their economical, social
and technological needs. The implementation of the CBD by national legislation
should be a result of a national debate with the participation of all parties involved,
including Parliament, the scientific community, local and indigenous communities,
non-governmental and governmental organisations, universities, as well as private and
public undertakings. Within this discussion a national strategy towards biodiversity
sustainability and conservation should be drawn up. Further suggestions on methods
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for policies and institutional mechanisms in this context are provided in the final
conclusion below.
In my opinion, there seems to be no further doubts in relation to the use and
exploitation of genetic resources and of traditional knowledge and practices, within
the context of an integrated area. This is more a matter of national jurisdiction.
Obviously, once technology is protected by national law, and put into practice on
national markets, the existing common rules for the MERCOSUL will apply to that
technology, including the free movement of goods and competition law principles. In
this context one problem that may occur is related to the recognition, by other States
Parties, of similar legal rights protecting traditional knowledge and practices of local
and indigenous communities. If other States Parties do not agree with the protection
of indigenous and local communities' intangible properties, national administrative
and juridical authorities will decide upon this particular situation taking into account
either the common rules of patent protection for the MERCOSUL or the national
legal framework. Interpretation of different frameworks, or even of a common legal
structure, may lead to a diverse understanding of the subject. It is thus necessary to
discuss the matter in more detail within the context of the MERCOSUL, although it
appears that such an issue is particularly strategic only to Brazil.
CONCLUSION
It is necessary to bear in mind that the integrating project of the MERCOSUL is
distinct from the process of integration in the European Union. The MERCOSUL has,
at least in this stage, different goals if compared with those established by the EU. It
does not appear that the MERCOSUL attempts to strengthen its political integration
process as the EU has done. I am also not sure whether the MERCOSUL aims at
having an integrated monetary policy put into practice by a common currency.
There are several circumstances that makes this distinction clear. Firstly, the
European Union is predominantly an integrating project among developed nations
with a high capacity for innovation and a long-established industrial structure. Though
there are some countries that are not in this pattern of technological and/or industrial
development, the wealthy nations of the region may subsidise the development of the
others. Under some circumstances, and viewing it in general terms, this may also be
the situation in the MERCOSUL. Argentina and Brazil, for instance, could finance the
economic development ofParaguay and Uruguay, if their technological and industrial
development levels were as competitive as those of the most advanced world trading
nations, namely some Member States of the EU, Japan and the US. This, however,
does not seem to be feasible in the short term.
A second difference which must be considered is that one of the supporting
justification for the integration process of Europe has understood that peace, in
Europe, would be assured by a more stable political system and by economic
development, which would help the participating countries to recover from the
Second World War. Of course, this is not to suggest that a system of economic
integration necessarily leads to peace throughout the integrated system. It is simply to
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state that to date it would seem that this has been the case for Europe. Moreover, it is
hoped that the same will be true for the MERCOSUL, although the way in which
peace is to be understood in the countries of the MERCOSUL differs from the
European concept. Peace for the participating countries of the MERCOSUL is a
much broader concept which includes the furtherance of their technological
capabilities and the removal of their social inequalities.
A third circumstance is that the political goals of the two projects of
approximation differ in substance. While the participating nations of the European
Union work on, at least, the maintenance of their current condition concerning
industrial and technological development and their position in the international
market, the countries of Latin America have been struggling to advance their
technological skills, with little, if any, help from developed nations and to increase
their participation in the international market with manufactured goods rather than
with raw materials or agricultural products. Technology transfer agreements in the
new world order seems to be a mechanism used mainly by developed nations among
themselves or by multinational corporations between their headquarters and their
subsidiaries. Sometimes it seems that EPRs perform more efficiently the task
established by the goals of the developed world, as technology owners.
It is also necessary, however, to recall that there are some similarities between
the European integration project and the negotiations to establish the MERCOSUL.
At some stage both integrating projects aim at economic and technological
development and at providing better standards of living for their population. This is to
be attained by the creation of an area where goods, persons, capital and services
circulate without being restrained by any barriers and by the establishment of a
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common trade policy which includes a common external tariff, the harmonisation of
macro-economic policies and co-ordinated action in international negotiations. These
are the principles that form the basis of both integrating projects, and their
implementation is vital for the successful functioning of the integrated area. The
methods used for implementing these goals are to be regulated on a regional basis,
however, and will obviously differ in technical terms.
It is also apparent that the experience of the EU provides the MERCOSUL
with many practical examples. Particularly in the field of patent protection, the EU
practice is of great relevance for the setting up of common patent regulations in the
MERCOSUL. There are, nevertheless, considerable differences between the two
projects in their institutional and legislative framework, as well as in their level of
economic and technological development. This should be considered by the
integrating project of the MERCOSUL in the drafting of a common science and
technology and industrial policy, as well as during the legislative initiatives aiming at
the harmonisation of national legislation in the territory of the MERCOSUL. It is,
however, necessary to remark that as the States Parties of the MERCOSUL are in a
lower level of technological development, in comparison with the EU, the setting up
of common regulations for patent protection and licensing should consider the
possibility of having a growing technology regional market as a result of the
technological co-operation efforts between the States Parties1 and as a result of the
1Such co-operation in the field of science and technology is particularly suggested by the Preamble of
the Treaty of Asuncion which says the following: "Convinced of the need to promote the scientific
and technological development of the States Parties and to modernize their economies in order to
expand the supply and improve the quality of available goods and services with a view to enchancing
the living conditions of their populations".
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trade liberalisation process itself. This will lead to the need of stronger and more
detailed common rules regulating technology transfer and patent licensing agreements.
There are at least two major areas of analysis that should be taken into
consideration for the setting up of policy guidelines in the context of the negotiating
process of the MERCOSUL. I should like to place them under the following
classification: legislative measures and institutional prospects. Both are closely related
to each other and will be considered as such.
"Legislative measures" are undoubtedly necessary and have been considered in
the light of current negotiations of the MERCOSUL by virtue of Article 1 of the
Treaty of Asuncion that calls for, inter alia, the harmonisation of national legislation
"... in the relevant areas in order to strengthen the integration process". One of these
relevant areas is the harmonisation of regulations which deal with substantive patent
law.
With regard to the harmonisation of national regulations on substantive patent
law, Sub-group 72 has taken actions in this direction. The latest version of a text
dealing with patent regulation mechanisms is nevertheless superficial and seems to
avoid the most controversial issues. Some consideration is particularly necessary in
the following areas: pharmaceutical products and processes, biotechnology, plant
varieties, free movement of goods and competition law principles, and "biodiversity-
related aspects of intellectual property rights".3
2Cf. Chapter 1, Section 2, Sub-section 2.2, Paragraph 2.2.2, supra.
3For the discussion about pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and plant varieties, see Chapter 4, Section
3, Sub-section 3.3, and Chapter 5, Part 2, supra. For an analysis of the establishment of common
rules on free movement of goods and competition law principles, see Chapters 3 and 6, supra. For an
analysis of the "biodiversity-related aspects of intellectual property rights", see Chapter 7, supra.
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1. The protection of pharmaceuticals appears to be of no further controversy.
This is an international trend, imposed by developed nations, that seems unavoidable
vis-a-vis the international commitments of the participating countries of the
MERCOSUL. The TRIPS Agreement has defined the scope of protection and States
Parties of the MERCOSUL will have to comply with it.
Although legal protection for both products and processes is agreed - or will
be as a matter of law - there are several other questions that should be considered.
The fact that patent protection will be available is not enough in this regard. In
addition to the protection of pharmaceutical products and processes, a common policy
has to focus on the development of a pharmaceutical industry in the region with the
technological capacity of, at least, producing generic drugs. Medicine is, and has
always been, an strategic concern ofall nations.
Alongside policy in this area, another concern emerges. There are in the
territory of Brazil several biodiversity components that may be very valuable to the
development of new drugs. Legal mechanisms are necessary to enable the
participation of the country provider of such resources in the research that will lead to
the development of new medical products. Such a policy has to consider not only the
just and equitable sharing of the economic benefits that may arise from the
commercialisation of a new product but also the participation of the provider country
in the research itself. This would help the country in which genetic resources are
present to develop human resources capabilities which may lead to the development
of their own technologies in the medium or long term. Indeed, a science and
technology policy has to consider broadly the aspects of human resources, access to
and transfer of technologies and the sharing of economic and scientific benefits.
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2. In connection with the protection of biotechnology, it is clear that neither
the international community nor the participating countries of the MERCOSUL have
reached a common position yet. On the international level, for instance, the TRIPS
Agreement shows that a common position could be reached during future
negotiations. Brazilian legislation, on the other hand, seems to have taken a
reasonably serious approach towards the subject by providing for the granting of
protection for biotechnological inventions in definite terms. But how is the problem
going to be dealt with in the context of a Common Market? The negotiations of the
MERCOSUL have firstly to decide whether protection is going to be granted or not.
If it is to be granted, they will have to decide under which terms such protection will
be made available. Are animal and plant varieties going to be included in the scope of
protection? How are micro-organisms and transgenic varieties going to be defined in
this context? The most reasonable approach in this area is to wait for further
definition in the international discussion to set up more pragmatic legal mechanisms
for protecting biotechnological inventions. In the meantime, the negotiations of the
MERCOSUL could reach an agreement to set up a provisional type of protection for
biotechnological inventions. They may provide protection for micro-organisms and
transgenic varieties of plants and animals in a provisional basis, making clear that this
type of protection would be granted for a specific period of time and that
modifications would be forthcoming. Once the negotiations in the international and
regional levels are more well defined, further discussion could take place and a more
detailed legal mechanisms could be created.
Additionally, when one talks about the protection ofbiotechnological products
there are several other issues that have to be considered. Biosafety measures will have
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to be created on a regional basis to regulate the storage, transportation and marketing
of products which are the result of biotechnological research. Provisions contained
only in national laws will certainly create conflicts with the other national legal
frameworks of the participating countries of the MERCOSUL. The harmonisation of
national laws on the protection of biotechnological inventions will have to consider
the aspects of biosafety as a necessary mechanism to complement the system of
biotechnology protection as a whole.
3. With regard to the protection of plant varieties the situation is the
following. Argentina and Uruguay are already Contracting Parties of the UPOV
Convention and have national measures to protect plant varieties under the breeders'
rights system. Brazil is apparently negotiating its accession to the UPOV Convention,
but a national legal mechanism to regulate plant varieties protection is unlikely to be
established soon. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement, although provisionally, permits
that Members of the WTO Agreement grant protection to plant varieties either by
patents, by the UPOV system or by a combination of both mechanisms. If each State
Party of the MERCOSUL grants protection for plant varieties under different
approaches, it seems that conflicts will arise from such a non-harmonised framework.
If all countries are likely to become Contracting Parties to the UPOV Convention, it is
possible to suggest that the negotiations of the MERCOSUL should consider the
UPOV system to implement a common system for the protection of plant varieties,
agreeing, thus, upon a common system of protection for the entire area. That seems to
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be a quite reasonable approach to the problem. Note, for example, the solution found
by the EC Plant Variety Regulation4.
4. In relation with the harmonisation of national laws implementing the
principles that goods shall circulate freely and that a healthy competitive market shall
prevail in the context of the MERCOSUL, a few other considerations shall be made.
It is first necessary to recognise that the appropriate implementation of both principles
is vital for the successful and full establishment of the integration process itself. They
are also totally inter-related. The implementation of one of these principles will have
to consider the other in a complementary manner.
With regard to the harmonisation of the understanding on the free movement
of goods principle, I should like to suggest in the first place that a common
understanding of the application of this principle should be created. As has been seen,
the Treaty of Asuncion only determined that one of the principles for the
establishment of a Common Market was that goods shall circulate freely. No other
guidance was provided in this regard by the Treaty of Asuncion. It is thus necessary
to determine, first, what the principle is and how it should be viewed within the
context of the integration process. Once general rules are established in this regard,
secondary regulations, dealing with particular aspects of the integration process, such
as the exercise of IPRs in the integrated area, must consider the specific
characteristics of the application of the principle of free movement of goods in such
particular context.
4Discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, Section 3, Sub-section 3.3, Paragraph 3.3.3, supra.
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The regulation of competition in the integrated area is also of paramount
importance for the successful implementation of the Common Market. A common
mechanism, as has been seen in Chapter 6, Section 2, Sub-section 2.3, supra, is in the
process of being established. The common approach to the subject has suggested
provisions on unfair competition which appear sufficient and clear. There are,
nevertheless, particular characteristics related with the exercise of IPRs in the
integrated area. Licensing agreements, for instance, require very detailed regulations
which consider the particular properties of licensing practices. The way that
technology, know-how and patents are to be transferred and "commercialised" in the
MERCOSUL has to be harmonised in order to ensure that the competitive market
prevails and that consumers are benefited by such practices.
5. The issues relating to the implementation of the Convention on Biological
Diversity are also complex and broad. There is a need to determine how the integrated
area of the MERCOSUL will deal with these modern aspects of IPRs. The
implementation of common provisions in this field, however, must be looked at from a
more pragmatic viewpoint. Environmental considerations of the policy-making
process has to be part of the whole system of science and technology and industrial
policies. An EPRs framework must, therefore, consider the particular characteristics of
access to genetic resources, technology transfer agreements, biotechnology and the
protection of traditional knowledge and practices. All these areas, as has been
described in Chapter 7, supra, are completely inter-connected and they must be
harmonised as such.
To consider the harmonisation of the "biodiversity-related aspects of
intellectual property rights" one must firstly consider some policy measures which are
478
part of the overall context. A system must be created to determine a decentralised
approach towards biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. More decision¬
making powers shall be given to local and indigenous communities, while financial
and legal assistance shall be provided by national governments.
Complementarity, a more effective interaction between all "stakeholders"
should be encouraged by a common regulation aiming at monitoring and preserving
biodiversity. The concept of the expression "stakeholders" in this context has to be
broadly defined by a common legislation as well. "Stakeholders" are local and
indigenous communities, public interest, scientific and academic communities, private
sector and governmental and non-governmental agencies. This is indeed a broad
definition of the concept. The difficulty presented here is not related to the definition
of the concept itself, but with the establishment of the role of each "stakeholder" in
the process of biodiversity conservation. This role has to be determined by policy
guidelines on environmental conservation, considering, obviously, science and
technology and industrial policies as part of the process in its entirety. Legal
instruments will only determine the degree of application of the guidelines provided by
policy measures.
Policy measures must also consider the development of administrative and
institutional guidelines. At this stage of the establishment of mechanisms for
biodiversity conservation, it seems that the functions of some administrative organs
are overlapping other governmental and non-governmental organs' functions. This
overlap does not lead only to unnecessary repetition of work, but also to gaps which
are not fulfilled by either organs.
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A common policy for the MERCOSUL in the area of biodiversity prospecting
must be considered as a development strategy. The MERCOSUL may gain economic
and technological capacity from the establishment of common policies on access to
genetic resources in its broadest sense. Such a policy must foster the interaction
between legal protection in the field of pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and plant
varieties with national strategies on access to genetic resources. Though sovereign
rights over genetic resources regulation rests with national legal instruments, it is
possible to develop common strategies to implement the application of national
norms. These strategies must include the establishment of a unified understanding on
the protection of traditional practices and knowledge, biosafety measures and on the
recognition of national regulations dealing with procedural and substantive aspects of
access to genetic resources. These strategies must additionally consider mechanisms
which encourage technology transfer instruments as a means of developing further the
national and regional capacities in the field of biotechnology, agriculture, medicines,
etc. Strategies, within the context of the MERCOSUL, should be viewed in regional
terms and should consider the technological and economic development of the region
as going beyond national interests. At the end of the day, if States Parties of the
MERCOSUL co-ordinate their actions on institutional and legislative developments in
the field ofbiodiversity the mutual gain would benefit all.
Moreover, there are key elements which should be also considered within the
context of the MERCOSUL to determine the level of technology transfer from
developed countries to the region. These elements should be used as the basis of
national or regional regulations in this field: (a) training and access to information; (b)
development of technological capacity in biodiversity prospecting through technology
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transfer agreements; (c) development of regional negotiating power in biodiversity
prospecting, which would consider the balance between environmental, economic and
scientific benefits; (d) encouragement of access to technology which is
environmentally friendly through co-ordinated strategies on "North/South" relations;
and (e) encouragement of innovations in public or private national or regional
industries, by supporting their participation in the process ofbiodiversity prospecting.
On the international level, it is possible to draw up further actions towards
international recognition and acceptance of the sovereign rights principle over genetic
resources and of the value of traditional practices and knowledge. Co-ordination in
the actions of the States Parties of the MERCOSUL are necessary to work towards
the inclusion of multilateral acceptance of biodiversity principles. Within the WTO
system, particularly, co-ordinated actions should move towards the inclusion of strong
provisions on the recognition of the sovereignty of national regulations on access to
genetic resources. The forthcoming revision of Article 27 (3) (b) of the TRIPS
Agreement should therefore contain provisions which guarantee the multilateral
acceptance of the need for the creation of a sui generis system for the protection of
traditional knowledge and practices of local and indigenous communities as well. Co¬
ordinated actions in this manner could be also negotiated under the auspices of the
WIPO
Under the heading "institutional prospects", other considerations are required.
The current institutional framework of the MERCOSUL seems superficial, leaving
several gaps for future agreement. This is probably an outcome of the nature of the
integration process itself, which considers the MERCOSUL rather as a negotiation
process than as an integrated area. The final goals of the MERCOSUL have not been
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defined so far, and a more precise institutional framework will be probably drafted in
more detail once the Common Market is fully established. I propose to address the
subject on three levels: political, administrative and juridical.
1. Strictly speaking the Council of the Common Market is the only political
institution of the MERCOSUL. Very limited in essence, this political body is
composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Economy of the
States Parties. Although the Ministers of the States Parties will be advised by other
sectors of national economies, by other institutions of the MERCOSUL and by other
intergovernmental bodies, in order to formulate policies and promote measures for the
establishment of the Common Market, this is still limited as a negotiating process.
Probably the most traditional and effective way for the setting up of an
institutional framework which represents the population of the countries involved is
the creation of a regional Parliament. Though the national Parliaments are represented
in the MERCOSUL by the Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC), the latter's task is
very much limited to speeding up the process of implementation of the decisions taken
by the organs of the MERCOSUL and to assisting with the harmonisation of
legislation. Indirectly, the JPC has a very effective legislative power because it will
function as an intermediate organ between national Parliaments themselves and
between the institutional framework of the MERCOSUL and the Parliaments of the
States Parties. Every national Parliament, however, with its own ideological and
political tendencies, may harmonise common measures for the MERCOSUL in
different ways, taking into account the political and cultural distinctions between the
participating countries in connection with the level of industrial and technological
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development of each and the national political characteristics, which includes the
degree of support that the President of each State Party has in his own Parliament.
Probably the wills of the national economic and social sectors of each State
Party will be institutionally expressed by the Economic-Social Consultative Forum
(ESCF). But, as underlined by its own name, the Economic-Social Consultative
Forum will have only consultative functions. No decision-making power was given to
either the ESCF or the JPC.
2. On the administrative level, and particularly related to patent protection
mechanisms, the MERCOSUL lacks a regional institutional arrangement to deal with
administrative procedures for granting and judging patent rights. Thus, even if a
common agreement on the unification of national patent laws is reached, the
administrative application of the common principles will vary between national patent
offices. Joint efforts could make patent granting procedures more efficient by
centralising it into one single body with a highly capable structure of human resources
with the required technical skills to assess patent applications in the several fields of
protection. This institutional mechanism could be designed to work together with
national patent offices or, even, to operate as a second instance body which would
have the main function of harmonising the technical assessment of national patent
offices. Such a common organ could also provide preliminary rulings on questions
raised by national patent offices.
3. Another difficulty that may arise during the implementation of the common
principles of the MERCOSUL is the lack of a common juridical structure designed to
harmonise national court rulings. Though there is a MERCOSUL Trade Commission
which will consider complaints originated by States Parties or by individuals, relating
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to the implementation and application of the rules created by the Treaty of Asuncion,
its Protocols and by the Decisions taken by the organs of the MERCOSUL, the task
of the MERCOSUL Trade Commission, and of the Ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal,
under the Protocol of Brasilia, will be limited. Their decisions are directly applicable
in the national legal framework, but are limited to the specific dispute in which it was
called upon to decide. With a predominant cultural and social diversity, national
courts in different regions of the territory of the MERCOSUL may very likely decide
upon similar issues in different ways. As a consequence, discussion on, for example,
the application of competition rules and the implementation of the free movement of
goods principle may suffer strongly from the lack of a harmonised juridical approach
towards the subject, particularly in the case ofdisputes involving patent rights.
All that was said above must be considered for the setting up of a common
policy for the MERCOSUL. In addition, there are other structural changes that may
have to take place to enable proposals of guidelines for science and technology,
environmental and industrial policies.
Taking all that into account, I would like to say that there are foreseeable
solutions in the medium term. It is also possible to make assumptions related to the
role of the harmonisation of national laws on patent protection in scientific and
technological development for the region, if there is a co-ordinated policy for science
and technology which considers the setting up of environmental and industrial policies
as inter-connected concepts.
The following suggestions of guidelines for policy-making are to be
considered within a broad concept which includes the harmonisation of legislation and
the strengthening of institutional mechanisms:
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(a) Legislation of the participating countries has to be harmonised - or unified
by the mechanism of inter-State Conventions - in detail, taking account of
the most controversial and complex issues. If a common position cannot
be reached in the negotiation level, general principles must be established.
The harmonisation, or unification, of legislation has to consider the
following aspects in detail: the scope of application of protection of
pharmaceutical products and processes; the system which will be used for
the protection of plant varieties; common rules for regulating competition
and for implementing the free movement of goods principle within the
integrated territory; and common rules to regulate and control access to
genetic resources, including regional acceptance of a sui generis system to
protect traditional knowledge of local and indigenous communities.
(b) The establishment of common administrative institutions to approach
patent granting procedures on a harmonised basis. This could be attained
by the creation of a common organ to work together with national patent
offices or to give preliminary rulings on administrative and technical
questions raised by national patent offices
-- (c) The creation of a supranational juridical body the decisions of which
would be directly applicable before the national courts of the States
Parties. This regional institution would in addition provide legal and
juridical advice on questions brought before it by national courts, as with
the European Court of Justice under Article 177 of the EC Treaty.
(d) The setting up of a legislative body, democratically elected by the
population of the States Parties, with more legislative functions than those
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of the Council of the Common Market. The Council of the Common
Market, together with the Common Market Group and the MERCOSUL
Trade Commission would have the power of initiative to propose
regulatory mechanisms, but final decisions would be left to a Regional
Parliament. For the implementation of this proposal, methods of transfer of
sovereign rights to supranational bodies would have to be considered.
(e) The creation of a Regional Council of Science and Technology with the
functions of planning and deciding upon the setting up of guidelines for
regional science and technology policy. This body would be funded by
contributions from national governments and would be comprised of
representatives of governments, industries, workers, academic institutions
and national scientific organisations. This fund would finance research in
all areas deemed strategic and/or necessary for economic, technological,
scientific, educational and social development, through co-operation
agreements with third parties and by the granting of scholarships to
researchers and students. The private sector would be strongly encouraged
to support specific projects of interest in their particular field of activity.
The private sector would also be encouraged to work together with
universities in funding research projects, co-operating with technical
information, and supporting research and development.
(f) Science and Technology policy guidelines have to define clearly the goals
in the short, medium and long term, as well as the balance of investments
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in basic, applied and development research5. It must also optimise the use
and establishment of human resources and not address research and
development directly as a means of competing with the developed nations.
The drafting of a common policy on science and technology should be
regarded as part of a common strategy which would take into account
industrial and environmental policies as an integral part of the overall
concept.
(g) There should be support for the setting up of co-operation agreements
with private entities, academic institutions or governments from developed
and developing countries. These co-operation agreements on, for instance,
access to genetic resources, could include the necessary regulation of the
sharing of the economic and scientific benefits arising from research using
genetic resources; the setting up of training activities and development of
human resources from the country which is the provider of the genetic
material; the recognition of the rights of local and indigenous communities;
and biosafety measures. Co-operation agreements in the field of genetic
resources could be used as a mechanism to develop further the
technological capabilities of the States Parties in this area. Research should
be carried out preferably in the host country, but such measure should be
flexible enough to accept the need of research being carried out in the
5Hiroshi loose & Akira Tezuka. A System Approach to Japanese Basic Research, paper presented
to the Japan-German Science Policy Seminar, Tokyo, May 1984, p. 1, provides the following
definition: "Basic research is defined as the research undertaken for the advancement of scientific
knowledge, where a specific practical application is not directly aimed at Applied research is defined
as the research undertaken for the advancement of scientific knowledge, with a specific practical
application in view. And development research is defined as the use of results available from basic
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international institution in question. The scope of transfer of or access to
technology should be broadly defined and include various technological
elements such as patents, know-how and continuous technical assistance
for equipment which are part of the technology transfer.
(h) The creation of guidelines to provide a regional balance within the
MERCOSUL and within the States Parties of development of centres with
technological capabilities. This could be done by encouraging the private
sectors to work in co-operation with universities of regions which have
not been given sufficient financial and human resources to develop their
own science and technology capabilities. This should consider, as far as
possible, the development of technologies which could directly benefit the
population of these regions.
and applied researches, and actual experiences, directed to the introduction of new materials,
equipments, systems, and processes, or the improvement of such existing ones. ...".
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Chart 1: Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
Source: IDB & INTAL, Economic and Social Progress In Latin America: Economic
Integration (1984 report), Washington, DC: Irter-Amencan Development Bank
(1984), p. 42, was used as a reference for the present chart.
Chart 2: Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)
Source'. IDB & INTAL, Economic and Social Progress In Latin America: Economic
Integration (1984 report), Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank
(1964), p. 42
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Chart 3: Common Market of the South (MERCOSUL) - Treaty of Asuncion
In bold characters are the organs with decision-making powers
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Chart 4: Common Market of the South (MERCOSUL) - Ouro Preto Protocol




Chart 1: Worid Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
Chart 2: World Trade Organization (WTO)
Source: WTO Focus, n. 1, January/February 1995, p. 5
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APPENDIX III
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE EPC AND THE CPC
The chart in bold represents the main structure ofthe CPC,
which would work in harmony with the main structure ofthe EPC
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APPENDIX IV
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS IN BRAZIL
Box 1 (Occurrence of patent applications in Brazil - per area of application
- in the field of new biotechnology, in particular genetic engineering
or mutations - published in the last 10 years)
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Box 2 (Distribution of patent applications in Brazil - per country of origin -
in the field of new biotechnology, in particular genetic engineering or
mutations - applications published in the last 10 years)
1980/1990
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LEGAL COMPONENTS OF THE TRRs CONCEPT
Prepared by the "Working Group on Traditional Resources Rights"












Human rights ICESCR, ICCPR, CDW, CERD,
CG, CRC, NLs
UDHR, DDRIP, VDPA
Right to self-determination ILO 169, ICESCR, ICCPR DDRIP, VDPA
Collective rights ILO 169, ICESCR, ICCPR DDRIP, VDPA
Land and territorial rights ILO 169, NLs DDRIP
Right to religious freedom ICCPR, NLs UDHR
Right to development ICESCR, ICCPR, ILO 169 DDHRE, DDRIP, DHRD,
VDPA
Right to privacy ICCPR, NLs UDHR
Prior informed consent CBD, NLs DDRIP
Environmental integrity CBD RD, DDHRE
Intellectualproperty
rights
CBD, WIPO, GAIT, UPOV,
NLs
Neighbouring rights RC, NLs
















ILO 169, NLs DDRIP
Farmers' rights FAO-IUPGR
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International AgreementsSupporting the TRR Concept
Legally binding agreements in force
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity (1992)
CDW Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(1979)
CERD Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966)
CG Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
GAIT Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (1994)
ICESCR UN International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
ICCPR UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
ILO 169 International Labour Organisation Convention 169: Convention Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989)
NLs National laws
RC Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers. Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organisations (1961)
UNESCO-WHC UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage (1972)
UNESCO-CCP UNESCO Convention on the Means ofProhibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import. Export and Transfer ofOwnership of Cultural Property (1970)
UPOV International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties ofPlants (1961,
revised in 1972. 1978 and 1991)
WIPO The World Intellectual Property Organisation, which administers international
IPRs agreements, such as:
The International (Paris) Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (1883, revised most recently in 1967)
The International (Berne) Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (1886, revised most recently in 1971)
The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Trademarks (1891. revised most recently in 1967)
The Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appelations ofOrigin and
their International Registration (1958. revised most recently in 1967)












UN Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment
(1994)
UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (formally adopted by
the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in July 1994)
UN Declaration on the Human Right to Development
FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (1987 version)
Rio Declaration (1992)
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
UNESCO Recommendations on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and
Folklore (1989)
UNESCO Declaration on the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation
(1966)
UNESCO-WIPO Model Provisions for National Laws on Protection of
Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial
Actions (1985)
VDPA UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993)
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APPENDIX VI
LIST OF OFFICIALS AND PROFESSIONALS WHO PROVIDED
SUPPORT FOR THE RESEARCH
Interviews
• Adrian Otten (Director, Intellectual Property and Investment Division, WTO,
Geneva/Switzerland)
• Barry Greengrass (Secretary-General, UPOV Convention, Geneva/Switzerland)
• Braulio de Souza Dias (Co-ordinator-General, Biodiversity Programme, Ministry
ofEnvironment, Brasilia/Brazil)
• Eduardo Ariboni (Lawyer, Sao Paulo/Brazil)
• Ernesto Rubio (Director, Development Cooperation and External Relations
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, WIPO, Geneva/Switzerland)
• Fernando Gomez Carmona (Co-ordinator, Centre of International Studies,
Fundagao Getulio Vargas, Sao Paulo/Brazil)
• Francisco Adalberto Nobrega (Federal Public Attorney, Brasilia/Brazil)
• Gabriel Francisco Leonardos (Lawyer, Rio de Janeiro/Brazil)
• Gordon Sheperd (Director ofCampaigns and Treaties, WWF, Gland/Switzerland)
• Helio Fabbri Jr. (Lawyer, Sao Paulo/Brazil)
• Jeffrey MacNelly (Co-ordinator, Biodiversity Programme, The World
Conservation Union (IUCN), Gland/Switzerland)
• Jose Antonio Faria Correa (Lawyer, Rio de Janeiro/Brazil)
• Jose Francisco Rezek (Judge, Federal Supreme Court, Brasilia/Brazil)
• Jose Roberto D'Affonseca Gusmao (Lawyer and former President of the INPI,
Sao Paulo/Brazil)
• Julian Burger (Centre for Human Rights, United Nations, Geneva/Switzerland)
• Laercio Betiol (Professor, Funda^ao Getulio Vargas, Sao Paulo/Brazil)
• Luiz Antonio Barreto de Castro (Secretary ofProgramme Co-ordination, Ministry
of Science and Technology, Brasilia/Brazil)
• Luiz Leonardos (Lawyer, Rio de Janeiro/Brazil)
• Maria Thereza Wolff (Private Patent Examiner, Rio de Janeiro/Brazil)
• Mauro Fernando Maria Arruda (General Co-ordinator, Institute of Industrial
Development Studies and former President of INPI, Sao Paulo/Brazil)
• Michel P. Pimbert (Director, Biodiversity Programme, WWF, Gland/Switzerland)
• Newton Silveira (Lawyer, Sao Paulo/Brazil)
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• Octavio Gallotti (President, Federal Supreme Court, Brasilia/Brazil)
• Werter R. Faria (President, Brazilian Association for Studies on Integration, Porto
Alegre/Brazil)
Other Support
• Antonio J.C. Antunes (Secretary-General, LAIA, Montevideo/Uruguay)
• Bruno Bath (Brazilian Diplomat, Brazilian Embassy, London/UK)
• Celso Amorim (Brazilian Ambassador, Brazilian Permanent Mission to the UN,
New York/USA)
• Graga Carrion (Diplomat, Brazilian Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Brasilia/Brazil)
• Jose Graga Aranha (Consultant, Development Cooperation and External Relations
Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean, WIPO, Geneva/Switzerland)
• Jose Julio dos Reis (Chief of Cabinet of the Presidency, Federal Supreme Court,
Brasilia/Brazil)
• Kalemani Mulongoy (Senior Programme Officer - Biotechnologist, Interim
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Geneva/Switzerland)
• Luciana Goulart de Oliveira (Technical Co-operation Division, INPI, Rio de
Janeiro/Brazil)
• Luiz Claudio Marinho (Director, Latin American and Caribbean Economic
Committee, United Nations, Santiago/Chile)
• Octavio Espinosa (Senior Counsellor, Developing Countries (Industrial Property
Law) Division, WIPO, Geneva/Switzerland)
• Otavio Brandelli (Brazilian Diplomat, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Brasilia/Brazil)
• Paulo Roberto de Almeida (Brazilian Diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Brasilia/Brazil)
• Ricardo Sateler (Assistant Legal Counsel, WIPO, Geneva/Switzerland)
• Roberto Jaguaribe (Brazilian Diplomat, Brazilian Permanent Mission,
Geneva/Switzerland)
• Rubens Antonio Barbosa (Brazilian Ambassador, Brazilian Embassy, London/UK)
• Susan H. Bragdon (Senior Programme Officer - Legal Adviser, Interim Secretariat
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Geneva/Switzerland)
• Victor Luiz do Prado (Brazilian Diplomat, Brazilian Permanent Mission,
Geneva/Switzerland)
